THE DISCIPLINARY IDENTITY OF THE MEDIA RESEARCHER:
A VIEW FROM ST. PETERSBURG

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

SERGEY G. KORKONOSenko

This time we offer a rather unusual section to the journal’s readers, connected by a general theme; ‘The disciplinary identity of the media researcher’. Certainly, some publications of the journal touched on this theme earlier, as well as the authors of other scholarly works, cf. the title of one of François Heinderyckx’s articles: ‘The Academic Identity Crisis of the European Communication Researcher’ (Heinderyckx 2007). Even if some will disagree with the diagnosis of this crisis, it is necessary to recognize, all the same, that the ground for detailed discussion exists.

It is possible to conduct search for the identity of the media researcher at a level of relatively abstract reasoning, or in the form of a presentation of real research results on the media sphere and their generalization. In this case, we have chosen the second way. It is not better than the first one and does not cancel it. At the same time, there is sense in collecting different directions of thoughts in the field of media and, probably, in continuing this work further with the efforts of new researchers.

The originality of this section of the present issue also consists in that it brings together a number of representatives of a scientific centre at the faculty of journalism of St. Petersburg State University. According to its structure and main tasks, the faculty acts as a working model of media field. It joins departments of various profiles, research interests, methods, etc. A disciplinary integration that is complex, mobile and has a contradictory unity is being formed as a result.

St. Petersburg University is a highly developed centre for education and science, which, along with the Moscow State University, has received the official status of a leading university of Russia. It means that not only new rights and privileges have appeared, but also an obligation to be a leader in a corresponding field of activity. The faculties of journalism at these two leading universities, realizing their increased responsibility, have signed an agreement of cooperation.
St. Petersburg faculty of journalism is a large organization including 7 chairs and many training and media centers and laboratories. It was founded in 1946 and is the oldest journalism school in Russia. Last year, the academic and journalistic communities celebrated the 65th anniversary of the school. Thus, this section of the present issue is sub-titled ‘A View from St. Petersburg’ and can be seen as dedication to this anniversary.

It is possible to say the intellectual production presented in this section to some degree reflects a condition of theoretical thinking in the Russian faculties of journalism. Moreover, it reflects also the major aspects of the educational process. According to a strong domestic tradition, the journalist is not simply a distributor of the information, but also a spokesman of public feelings and a social thinker.

REFERENCES

This article suggests a nontraditional approach to Russian journalism and posits treating it as a national cultural value. With this purpose, the author brings attention to the question of patriotic view on the Russian domestic press. The Russian journalism possesses a number of features which noticeably distinguish it from journalism in other countries simultaneously putting it on the par with such high values as national literature, arts, and science. This cultural-valuable approach extends to journalism education which also cannot be evaluated according to generally accepted universal criteria.

Keywords: journalism, Russia, cultural value, education

The title of this article may get a wider interpretation in modern media theory, since one may put forth the question of the possibility of applying universal criteria in the analysis of every media system (including theoretical schools and education), regardless of the varied nationalities and cultures involved. Let’s listen to authoritative researcher Denis McQuail. According to him, “even when Europe was divided into East and West, parallel sets of media and civil institutions could be found, even if with differences of purpose and forms

Sergey G. Korkonosenko is chair, Theory of Journalism Department, School of Journalism, St. Petersburg State University (sk401@mail.ru).
of control. Summing up … there is little scope for the survival of national schools, except as a fringe matter, or of a matter of style, or as a reflection of continuing cultural differences that follow the lines of older nation states and linguistic/cultural spheres of influence” (McQuail, 2009, p. 282). Nevertheless, the author mentions some candidates to be recognized as original national schools: France and the francophone area, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Scandinavian region, and the Mediterranean region, with Italy leading and Spain following (Ibid, p. 288). It’s not a surprising fact that we do not find Russia amongst the counties referred to. On the one hand, the European community of researchers are not well acquainted with the basis and traditions of Russian media, in fact, in most cases they know nothing due to the former iron curtain between the two civilizations and our own extremely low activity in popularizing national professional values. On the other hand, during the last few decades we did a lot to borrow and adopt Western standards in the communication sphere, but not always the best ones. Let’s read McQuail once more when he defines some factors, accounting for differences within and between national schools (briefly):

intellectual roots and origins, not only in ‘communication science’, but often also in philosophy, political and social theory, literature, etc.; certain underlying social and cultural features, especially perhaps religion and ethnic diversity; national policy imperatives in a variety of fields of application; development and structure of academic/scientific institutions; the particular national media system and so on. (Ibid, pp. 286, 287)

Every factor mentioned by McQuail looks like a precise characteristic of Russian history, culture, and media development. Naturally, these considerations provoke us to observe domestic journalism as a national cultural value. This paradigm leads us to posit that there are national and culturally specific approaches in the media field, and consider this realization to be a highly productive scientific decision. Generally speaking we suppose a patriotic approach which should be understood as respect, support, and preservation of national traditions and experience in journalism.

**PATRIOTIC ATTITUDE TO NATIONAL JOURNALISM**

Undoubtedly, one of the brightest embodiments of a social identity is patriotism, both in rational and in emotional-sensual dimensions. Relating to it, we pass from the abstracted reasoning of what a society is “in general” to a really outlined world of people living in a certain territory, each in a unity of material and spiritual connections. The set of values included in patriotism, is extraordinarily wide and various. Looking from the present, the
concept of patriotism “stretches” both into history and into the future, it grasps areas of 
morals and policy, high arts and household behavior, it incorporates public and personality.
It wouldn’t be a mistake to say that patriotism serves as the quintessence of the socially 
valuable attitude to the world. Researchers of information behavior emphasize an increase 
of the value of patriotism today. When information that has a psychological influence 
directed on the destruction of traditional representations and values is amplified, “the level 
of patriotic feelings of the population can form a basis for preservation of national identity 
of the Russian citizens” (Arapova, 2007, pp. 116-117). For this reason it is necessary to 
relate patriotism to journalism.

The suggested theme of the preservation of national identity is simultaneously both 
recurring, and new. The anxiety of preservation by the Russian press of its own face is even 
now being born at research conferences, at professional seminars and in editorial corridors.
Thus, we shall try to present, in generalized form, those ideas and anxieties, which more and 
more often meet in the public sphere. However, the paradigm of the value of patriotism in 
national journalism as a special subject of media analysis is not considered in the literature.
In our opinion, it needs to be separated from other popular subjects, but there are some 
conditions, the observance of which protects us from two wrong choices — nationalist 
rhetoric and the primitive listing of advantageous historic facts.

First of all, the posing of a question of a “nationality” of press does not assume either 
a denying of foreign professional experience or does it support the groundless glorifying of 
one’s own traditions. There would be an unnatural opposition on a line between «better — 
worse» if these two extremes were compared as a continuum, when actually it is a question 
of a unique phenomenon which has a high value owing to its uniqueness. On the contrary, 
it is necessary to consider the many valuable achievements of the foreign press, particularly 
the West-European press. Today, in Russia, we need to carefully study the characteristics 
of Western media, such as: fidelity to the facts, the efficient expenditure of resources, the 
pathetic attitude to ethics in the profession (even if it is shown more in words, than in 
behavior), the creation of new forms of editorial practice, and the capability to give them 
exact terminological designations and so on. As is known, the Russian press actively adopts 
many of the practices of our foreign colleagues, even to the point that professional 
dictionaries for the last few years began to associate more with the English language, than 
with Russian. To learn in the West and from the West is an old tendency of development in 
the Russian culture. “…Any of great European literatures did not master another’s riches 
with such persistence, with such quiet confidence of own force, of an invariance of own 
purpose, as Russian. […] Russian language kept in itself unlimited opportunities — it 
proved to be able to express differently any another language forms” (Etkind, 1973, pp. 3-4).
This quotation relates to the extremely difficult creation of domestic traditions in literary 
translation, which has stretched for centuries. It’s very easy to see that direct analogies to
the evolution of our journalism naturally arise. Let’s recollect that Peter the Great got the idea for the first Russian newspaper based on what he saw in European countries, and originally methods of reporting in Russia too had a foreign origin. However, as journalism further developed, genres of the Russian press have found clearly national features.

At the same time the converse will be also true: the foreign press accepts only the smallest share of our domestic experience. Perhaps we can even ask whether it means that there is no subject for the analysis and that the declared theme reanimates jingoism, which is overdone and unproductive in both the historical and cultural sense? Such doubts have the right to exist, but there are objections against them of theoretical and professional-practical origins.

In theory there is a strong basis for the idea that the model of journalism should be adequate to examination within the socio-historical environment in which it was formed. Only in this model will an examination be steady and viable. That is one of the objective laws of journalism. However, by virtue of its own cultural uniqueness, the Russian domestic press is interesting to the world community, is useful to it, is enriching and valuable for its special perspectives to help solve civilization’s problems. Here analogies to the value of Russian literature, folklore, and philosophical heritage as applied to the “big” world are pertinent.

Further, Russian journalism has met with a problem of choice, of a vector of subsequent movement, and the knowledge of its own potential will give to this choice necessary rationality. It is simple to understand, that the limited register of variants (only doing things how they are done in the West), in essence, is equivalent to absence of choice. On the contrary, the comparisons of world experience (versatile and many-sided) with own resources will sufficiently expand a range of opportunities.

At last, the Russian journalistic experience for a long time has been seen as more than a national property, in a very narrow sense. In fact, the press of the majority of the CIS (The Commonwealth of Independent States) countries use Russian experience as if journalism there was formed in a frame of common representations and traditions. This idea only gains support as soon as one examines the content of mass media and of educational and scientific literature concerning journalism in the post Soviet states. For example, V. Zdorovega, professor of the Lvov University (Ukraine) was one of the most authoritative researchers of the press during the time of Soviet Union, whose works developed the national (in the then widened understanding of the word) school of publicism. Under new state-political conditions, he was the hot advocate of the national-cultural sovereignty of the Ukraine. He actually continued to develop and use those concepts of journalistic skill, which he put forward in his books of former decades (Zdorovega, 1966, 1979, 2004). On the basis of personal impressions, the author of an article declares that a similar situation is seen in the republics of Central Asia, in particular in Tajikistan (Korkonosenko, 2006). However, all
journalistic professionals have the same classic guidelines, similar forms of publications and professional standards.

The question of patriotism concerning the Russian domestic press rises in a favourable macro social context. This means general tendencies in the activity of the state on the international arena. These years Russia strongly defends the sovereignty of its policies and returns to a former influence. In economy, Russia extends far beyond its national borders, and in culture it widely shows its own riches to the whole planet.

It is essential that this strategy of widening influence receives a positive response in the minds of the citizens. Sociological surveys serve as a mirror of this trend in people’s thinking. As one of the public opinion centers established,

years of V. Putin’s governing have substantially changed a socio-political landscape of Russia. Changes have happened not only in political system, but also in mass consciousness. The public demand on “patriotism”, on “national-state politics”, which was only outlined in late 90s, has turned into mainstream. Its width became so significant, that everything, which cannot be placed within it, was pushed to a political roadside. […] Patriotic values if are not undoubtedly accepted by all, they are not rejected categorically in any electoral segments… So, on question… (2006 June), whether you are ready to support politicians of patriotic orientation, 44,1% of participants have answered in the affirmative, and 33,6% in the negative. Sociologists specify that it is not a sign of extremism of nationalist kind, which is not accepted by the majority of the population. (Byzov, 2007)

In this situation, the analysis of the press from patriotic positions induces not so much emotional but rational motives.

However a reflection on the problem of the press “nationality” becomes deep and correct only when we lift the status of journalism up to a level it being a fundamental value of society and people. Journalism, contrary to ordinary opinion, stands not below and has not less importance than literature, science, or the arts have. It has other forms of existence but nevertheless belongs to the category of national property of a higher level. Popular attempts to declare journalism as only a mechanism, a serving subsystem (whether for policy or business) of society absolutely deprive of sense any valuable approaches to its understanding.

Let’s go back to the example of the forming of the Russian translation school in literature. Like Russian literature, Russian journalism also developed its own language, genre system, and tonality through centuries, suffering inner contradictions and struggles. In this sphere the system of adequate skills and means is not less significant and not less dependant on national history and mentality, than is poetry and literature as a whole. If someone makes the objection — that is literature, and journalism is quite another matter —
we shall ask: why another matter? Does not it not to the same people belong; and does it not the same language use; and through that language are not the same values of the nation expressed and maintained? It is necessary, not to keep away from the “high” literature as from an unattainable ideal, but to take from its traditions and philosophy the responsible, devout perception of professional riches as a property which was born in troubles. Such an attitude can prevent us from thoughtless acceptance of another’s patterns and a wholesale disregarding of our own as is being unimportant. Journalism fully submits to laws of harmony, and not to any “second-grade” harmony of the lowest level because the best harmony happens only true and deep, incorporating all the available tones and nuances available.

Let us recognize that an objective revision of nationally developed resources, which Russian journalism has accumulated over a long period of time, is required. Using these resources will give us a chance to intensively develop as the appreciable phenomenon we are in the global media environment. Certainly, we are far from its idealization. Any responsible observer knows and remembers numerous imperfections in the arrangement of our press, its genetic defects and modern illnesses, illustrations of which fill media critique publications. But the total criticism, from our point of view, today doesn’t give a sufficient impetus for progress in journalism. Criticism requires support not solely from the negative but also from the positive side of characteristics, which could be found in a kernel of domestic press and used in the interest of its self-development. “Reservoirs” of valuable experience in journalism deserving preservation and successive development, are located in three professional areas: editorial professional practice, scientific research, and education.

EXAMINING PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE

In a practical dimension, a large number of bright features express the originality of domestic journalism. We shall name only some of them, leaving the list open for updating.

Study of people — as one of the manifestations of humanism, is deeply organic to Russian mentality and culture in general. This kind of humanism means not a declaring of human rights that is just inherent in a rationalistic “Western” way of thinking, but a sincere interest in the personality of Another, with a true empathy and sympathy.

This kind of humanism is highly important for national mental health, and our social psychologists write much on this topic. They use the law of mental identity, drawing an analogy of the present day Russia with the troubled times in deep history. Now, as well as then, there is the danger of a watershed in society — between the holders of a primordial Russian collectivist mentality (the majority of the population) and a Western individualistic mentality (Popov, 2006, p. 104). Sometimes in this connection researchers recollect the
opportunities afforded by concepts such as the highly specific genre of Russian journalism ‘otcherc’. In considering the value of the certain genre, discussion passes to the area of preservation of this and other such forms.

Actually, ‘otcherc’ and similar forms of publications are produced from intrinsic features of our press. These features are characteristically not always perceived by foreign observers. They say in their own works that the distinction between traditional Russian and Western journalism is the importance of actuality. For Western journalists actuality is one of the most prominent news values. For Russian journalists it is only of marginal relevance. Instead, a unique genre is involved: otcherc, which can be translated as “essay” or “treatise” (Voltmer, 2000, p. 478).

Looking at the issue from a different angle, it is not an easy task to understand that a documentary basis following to the truth of events never was rejected in Russian journalism. However, forms to express this quality are not the same that are accepted in the Western press. While the widespread use of the essay in European literature is more often turned to self-knowledge by the author, the classical Russian otcherc is an attentive look to the external world inhabited by unique persons (Korkonosenko, 2000, pp. 164, 166). It is necessary to add that not only outstanding figures become the object of such interest, but also so-called ordinary people. The ability to create social-psychological portraits of people makes journalism related with art where the theme of the ‘humble man,’ in Russia throughout the centuries, was a powerful source of great achievements.

Labor is also an exclusively important object for reflection and for understanding. It is not necessary to explain to a thinking person seated in realism, that in the working process, both public welfare and the personal property of the individual grow. Labor activity constitutes the basic essence of man’s social life, and labour achievements deserve recognition and merited encouragement. Let us draw one more parallel and recollect, that in literature the aesthetic comprehension of industrial-labour activity bears in itself a powerful innovative potential, at least in Russian literature.

Unfortunately, today the press distinctly switches attention to the sphere of consumption where instincts of pleasure dominate, but not the forces of creation. At best we get acquainted with the labour process (the creating person) of a ballerina, a variety show soloist or perhaps a tennis player. Maybe it is not an easier task to tell about the “laboratory” of a popular or famous person, than it is to tell about the everyday working of a steel maker or a local doctor, but it is more profitable from the point of view of excitation of reader’s curiosity. Thus, the majority of common men who do not belong to the elite have few chances to meet their own everyday labor life in the press and society does not know the “who and how” in the production of bread and machines. By the way, in post-Soviet Russia the professions of worker and engineer became the most unpopular among the younger generations.
Constructive aim in the analysis of problem situations — constructive aim as a leading method to study reality is another unique aspect of Russian journalism. Some innovations born in the foreign press look like a bright paradox. For example, “civic journalism” in the USA has declared that the duty of the correspondent consists in the suggestion of a solution to a discovered problem, because the reader knows about the existence of problems better than journalists do (Miller, 1994). However, touted as a new innovation in the Western press, in ordinary Soviet newspapers, from the national to the local level, every journalist has heard similar professional truths from his editor-in-chief. Effective cooperation of the press with government administrations, business executives, and public organizations is not a myth from an epoch of totalitarianism, but a strongly mastered technique of editorial work. While trying to adopt the standards of “only facts” reporting we lose resources of socially effective press and former national priority in this dimension.

Moreover, we actually move against the powerful stream in the world press, for which the keeping of the audience is one of the main objectives. The American Centre of Civic Journalism has published the book *Civic Journalism Is... True Stories from America’s Newsrooms*, in which statements of supporters of this professional practice are collected. In particular, Pulitzer Prize winner Jack Nelson (*Los Angeles Times*) declares that too often today much of the news media seems obsessed with reporting problems — almost to the extent of ignoring or excluding solutions. Civic journalism is an attempt to bring the average citizen into the process of journalism to solve social problems. It brings in people who would not normally be involved in governmental solutions and engages people who are normally left out of the process (Nelson).

Journalistic research — as a way of maximum deep penetration to the matter of life is another national aspect to value. Relatively recently investigation has come to our press from abroad, and this acquisition, undoubtedly, has added pungency and a variety to it. The new passion, which without exception has fascinated both theorists, and professionals of the press, has moved the experienced practice of research journalism aside. It is important to note that they are rather independent and separate categories, not able to replace each other. Though not with absolute conformity, it is possible to associate investigation to searches for the criminal, and research — to scientific understanding of the larger phenomenon or problem. In the second case, the range of subjects noticeably widens, incorporating, for example, the studying of customs, economic and social processes, progress of religious-philosophical idea, etc. Investigation is aimed mainly at the control of the activities of officials, organizations and institutes, whereas the journalist-researcher, ultimately, aspires to improve the state of affairs and customs in society or community — in as much as it is possible to do so and still stay in a frame of cognitive practice. The means of work will differ accordingly. The investigator is good at technological processes, his compositions draw attention by visible plot — the researcher operates with generalizations, ideas.
(certainly, growing on the ground of real facts). The Russian press became famous for research publicism in the 18th century and did not veer from this high tradition during later times. There is hardly a necessity to argue this thesis in detail when any educated professional remembers the names of N. Karamzin, V. Belinsky, G. Uspensky, V. Korolenko, V. Ovechkin, A. Agranovsky — fortunately, the list is infinitely long.

It is necessary to recognize and support openly this tradition of research publicism, if not as a priority in comparison with foreign journalism systems, at least as the parity characteristic. In some situations we need simply to remind the world professional community (and ourselves) of achievements of our own research publicism. Otherwise there is a displacement in dating and authorship of inventions. The false perception of authorship was described once by Soviet writer V. Kantorovich — the enthusiast of the cooperation of sociology with literature. In the 1970s, while abroad, Kantorovich heard the word “sociography” (so the “novelty” was called) — the documentary-fiction publications researching modern society. In Russia, with its powerful tradition of analytical press, similar compositions existed long before, and they related to sketches (otchercs) of customs: authors sketched the social type of citizens or the social conflict, showing the processes, which generated the present public phenomenon. Really, the history of domestic culture gives brilliant samples of sociological, in essence, publicism (Kantorovich, 1984, p.127).

The collectivist principle — as a way for the press to join in the life of the population is another dimension of national origin worthy of contemplation. This concept concerns the mass character of journalism as a process involving non-staff correspondents, authors of letters, and experts into editorial work developed in the pre-revolutionary Russian press. Most likely advocates of this journalistic practice have caught the vision of the newspaper’s mission as a public tribune and the mass character of organized newsroom work are connected among themselves not casually, not conjunctively, but immanently. The last century this interrelation has received unprecedented and fruitful continuation, on a background of world practice. Despite all the defects of formalism and the pursuit of statistical indicators, which were typical for the Soviet reality, contributions to the press became an expression of mass civic activity, and a means of disclosing literary-creative abilities, as well as a form to satisfy the need for social dialogue. However, quite to the contrary, the reduction of the journalistic process to the activity of a narrow circle of regular functionaries testifies of the individualistic orientation of this practice. The social importance of the efforts of these professionals falls to an extremely low level. It cannot be lifted up by means of any sort of substitute forms of work with the population, like conducting telephone quizzes, rating voting, microphone interviews on the square, and the like. As a matter of fact, in these situations the representatives of population play a role of theatre supernumeraries, instead of independent participants of civil and creative processes.
High demands in the form of products — as a reflection of the creative nature of journalistic work, is another facet of national journalism. The quality of a product, certainly, has the most direct relation to the reputation and self-esteem of authors of publications. The way one comports oneself, as a master of writing (or TV and radio reporting), essentially garners prestige in one’s own eyes, and in the opinions of one’s colleagues. At the same time the high quality of a product should be related to the audience. Publications are attractive to the public for other reasons than just to know something (about events, solution of problems and so forth). Readers also feel pleasure from the reading of a high-quality text or the viewing of a skillfully made telecast.

The press of news is often deprived of the advantage of the skilful use of language; at least it is not often regarded as an attribute of journalistic professionalism. Not by chance, Russian journalism has created polychromatic and complex genre forms, the equivalent of which is rarely seen abroad. Among these forms there are rather expensive, to rationalistic criteria. Genres, for example, include long stories on human life or other esc on moral subjects. Quite often just such “superfluous” publications bring real pleasure to write and not to a lesser degree — to read. Technological standardization forces correspondents to simplify the construction of materials, to use unified composition schemes, and often utterly ignore the originality of an author’s style. In scientific and editorial speech instead of the word “creation” the term “information product” already appears. This market name sounds as if it is the death knell for the creative nature of journalism.

Skilled professionals easily find out deep distinctions of two stylistic manners. The staff reporter of “Novaya Gazeta”, and winner of the Russian Union of Journalists prize A. Lebedeva speaks on behalf of many colleagues when she writes:

…I remember, we, provincial journalists, were taught impartial journalism at courses in Moscow. The teacher, who during all life worked in English newspapers tried to include into our heads that in the newspaper there should be only one genre — the information. And therefore all materials should be built according only one scheme: first a lead paragraph, then a description of the fact, then two different points of view of specialists and experts on the given question. And — nothing from me, only one person in the periodical has the right to state own position — the columnist. […] I have left the courses with certain belief that it is not for us and not for our readers. The Russian journalists have accustomed the Russian readers (and, maybe, on the contrary, our reading public always demanded it from a writing community?) to other press. To other newspapers and articles, in which the author’s position is present. And emotions are present too — not necessarily in the form of exclamations and naming of villains as villains. (Lebedeva, 2007, p. 25)
Let us venture one more judgement, though extremely unpopular today. The problem is, when having to make a choice, which should be preferred — spiritual values or profit. In Russian journalism “ideological content or business benefit” — a dilemma for a long time — has been solved in the past in favour of high cultural values. At the beginning of the 20th century the leading figures of the press directly approached and dealt with this problem, compelled to make a professional choice under conditions of growing capitalization in the press. It is noticeable, that they sharply emphasized the difference between Russian journalism and the European journalistic forms. While estimating the effect of commercialisation of the press in France and Germany, the representative of “old” liberal intelligentsia L. Slonimsky wrote:

The newspaper and magazine publishing house for us is a field not for a favourable investment of capital, but for self-denying public service… Firmly established traditions of Russian journalism allow to hope, that never it will be possible that the pure commercial capitalist spirit to triumph within it and that, having got rid of external oppression, the press will not fall under other yoke, still the worst, which poisons its most spiritual essence, its soul. (Slonimsky, 2001, pp. 178, 181)

The supporter of another political position, the publicist of the Narodism Party, S. Krivenko, echoed the liberal: “Capitalization of the literature has many negative sides, so even its good deeds are marked by a specific shadow of doubt or a stamp of commercial interest [which] is obviously seen” (Krivenko, 2001, p. 145). Both quoted authors understand domestic journalism not as an area on which ideological distinctions are demonstrated, but rather, as a whole cultural phenomenon having the conventionally accepted features of national origin. If we consider these concepts by Slonimsky, Krivenko and others in the scope of the role of commercialism in the modern world, the authors of these statements could be reproached with idealizing the real state of affairs. However, it is essential to remember that, first, the concepts of the “idealists” did not disappear after decades or even centuries and, secondly, they are anxious to maintain the valuable national property embodied in journalism above momentary reasons and dividends.

We do not pretend to provide an exhaustively full description of the radical features of Russian journalism. Other experts are free to make some additions or appreciable changes. For example, in professional literature the principles of the self-determination of Russian journalism are considered, which stay closely to our theme of the national features of the press.

In regard to self-determination, the following characteristics are mentioned: the truth as a moral category is more important than the scientifically true; the word and idea are regarded as deed; anthropocentrism of journalism; entirety, or community of spirit, etc.
(Mansurova, 2002, p. 146-154). We do not perceive the named characteristics as alternative to our own conclusions; nevertheless, we find a lot of similarity between them. Thus, if different authors independently from each other suggest a similar list of characteristics, they, probably, speak about steady attributes of Russian journalism.

For certain such “elevated” reasoning will seem to someone of new generations useless and archaic, something extracted from a library shelf. This is the attitude as is has been displayed at the scientific conference in the city Ufa, where the author delivered a report on values in the domestic press. Much later, right at the end of the session the secretary of the Union of Journalists of Russia of P. Gutiontov spoke. A young girl, who was sceptically apprehensive of the ideas of a “far from life”, “ivory tower” professor posed the first question to him in that hall of colleagues. Her question concerned values in Russian journalism. She heard the answer: [journalism is the] “Studying of man!” It seems that many other experts — those who know well the things that matter from personal experience and who are disposed towards responsible reflections — could tell this young woman and others like her, something similar.

The editor-in-chief of the newspaper “Uralsky Rabochiy” L. Koshcheev belongs to this community. We shall concisely reproduce his train of thought on how many professional-creative gains of former epochs come back in today’s practice.

[...] Whether nowadays the journalist has an opportunity to propagandise certain spiritual and moral values, to influence an audience? [...] Really, he should say goodbye to the position of monopolistic “ruler of people’s minds”, habitual to many publicists of old Russia and the more so to the Soviet journalists. However it is impossible to speak, that this component is absent at all in the demand of an audience... because for the person is peculiar to search for interlocutors and to listen to their points of view, and frequently the frank instructions for a life. Not only on any particulars, but also on deep world outlook questions. [...] It is impossible to speak, further, that “high themes” irrevocably leaves journalism, that is coverage of the questions, which do not have direct links with an ordinary life of the representative of an audience. [...] One more element of scepticism is the often expressed... opinion, that in new conditions only a “popular” language is demanded, which is more “popular “ more resolutely breaks canons of cultural standards and proprieties. [...] But even if to accept the language of audience as axiom, it is necessary to understand, that significant part of the audience appeared to be more cultured, than disc jockeys... Besides... far not always the audience waits from the journalist to perform a role of “a good fellow”. We go to opera or we watch film just because there everything exists absolutely in another way, more beautifully, than we meet here. The audience needs journalist because he is better informed, more educated than the ordinary people are, and this should be shown first of all at a level of language and journalist’s personal image. (Kosheev, 2006, pp. 10-12)
The original system of professional education represents a special though not autonomous reservoir of experience in journalism. In Russia, professional journalism education was constructed on the basis of university programs, organically combining scientific knowledge of a wide humanitarian structure and technological-methodical skills, a high intellectual level of dialogue, and multilateral professional qualification. The combination of these features reflects the kind of journalism, which was generated and practiced in Russia.

We have to remark, that not every country or state has such a high standard. In many countries journalistic schools do not exist as an independent university department, those journalism departments in existence have a short history in comparison with ours, or the journalism departments are focused solely on the technical-methodical training of students. We have to quote a statement of one of the British experts that in his native land the training of journalists has no deep roots, — it has been regularly organised only in the 1950s, and up to this day there are inherent weaknesses in it. Some of these weaknesses include on the one hand, there is a weak connection between theory and practice, and on the other hand there is a shortage of general humanitarian disciplines. The expert considers: “Time has come to look more attentively at the experience of other countries” (Braier, 2000, pp. 21-22). The long history of journalistic education in Russia, surely, should be of interest for study in such cases as this.

Undoubtedly, the development of foreign schools of higher education contain a lot of applicable material, and we, as usual, scoop from it useful elements. There has become a standard practice to invite foreign lecturers to carry out training seminars on grant money for our teachers, complete with translation and the free distribution of educational literature. At the same time, the representation of journalism as intellectual trade, spiritual and civic in a social-mental dimension, rooted in Russian journalism, conflicts with this foreign teaching, which has a tendency to be primarily technological training.

In a scientific study of the profession a central contradiction was revealed — between mission and service. At Russian universities traditionally the tension between the opposite visions of journalism — mission and service — was resolved in favour of the more high purposes of journalism. While teaching as a means of providing the pupil with the sum of technologies is not denied at all, this part of education occupies the subordinated position.

The polemics on this matter is worth looking at; take, for example, a simple comparison to the educational system in the school arts. Without mastering the techniques and professional technology it is impossible to become a good artist or actor, however it is not just training that has brought world glory to Russian art, but uncommon spiritual-
creative content. In a similar way, in the education of the natural science researcher in the skills required to do laboratory experiments does not take last place in importance, however they cannot replace the development of intellectual abilities.

Just as is true in the examples from art and science, in the structure of Russian journalism education there are and should be valuable components, which the Western university students may consider foreign inclusions. For instance, the developed courses of philosophy, history, literature, and native language seem to be not obligatory elements of actual vocational training, but without them, in the Russian way of thinking, it is impossible to provide a fundamental knowledge and breadth of outlook, as well as an intellectual maturity for the whole education of the potential graduate. To promote the solution of this problem the group of boundary disciplines is included into the curriculum of journalism students, which are intensively developed at Russian universities. We name boundary disciplines as being those courses, which lay on the border of journalistic science with adjacent social disciplines and represent the form of their cooperation and synthesis. Without self-eulogy we have the right to declare, that abroad there will be found few analogues to our courses (psychology of journalism, political science of journalism, axiology of journalism, etc.) which form cultural foundations of journalism. Media psychology or theory of political communications can be met, but these are adjacent disciplines for journalistic labour, they are much more poorly adapted to the work of correspondent and editor.

We have made very few to fill boundary courses with practical and useful contents, and not all the universities in the country have teaching staffs sufficient to deliver the disciplines at a worthy level. These comments do not cancel the fact that Russian journalistic education represents an innovative contribution to the world practice of journalistic education. The patriotic attitude to domestic school would be expressed in a demonstration of this potential to foreign colleagues, in popularisation of our own experience, in searching for adherents and continuers. The matter of spreading the Russian journalistic legacy in the classroom depends on a technical “trifle”: books need to be translated into foreign languages, published and distributed. However, at present this is not taking place. We do not do so partly because of the weak interest of foreign publishers, and consequently we are compelled to enjoy a one-side directed influx of theoretical-pedagogical contacts.

Orientation on fundamentality, on maturing of the person during the educational process naturally assumes a prolonged training in terms. The model of a long education can seem unprofitable, but only from a position of a narrow pragmatism. In a wide social-cultural sense education justifies herself that has been proven by decades of interaction between universities and editorial practice. The system of five-years of professional classroom training developed and relies upon — not a casuistic substantiation nor is it a
product of directive arbitrariness — but rather, it has developed as a result of the intense research of several generations of teachers.

Therefore it is necessary to critically and even watchfully be concerned regarding the current reconstruction of journalism education as delineated by the Bologna Declaration. The losses in depth of education from the introduction of a four-year bachelor degree for the bulk of students are not compensated by the addition of a two-year master’s course for individual graduates. We tend to adopt standards from abroad despite the fact that abroad the press essentially lives in other social coordinates, and in many respects is organized differently and based on other theoretical doctrines. Faithfulness to our national forms of journalism are reduced to instead favour the adequacy of diplomas, which ostensibly will facilitate to our graduates to enter a labour market abroad. Naturally there is an important question: what level and quality of education are we willing to accept? A graduate of an Italian university writes about their own country.

At present we in Italy have 16 schools of journalism, the most part of which gives a post-degree training (two years). Courses, which have been passed in these educational institutions, are quite corresponding with national standards and enable the graduate to join the Association of Professional Journalists. But here there is a problem of financial character: training at such institution costs from 6000 to 7800 Euros per year. Far not everybody can afford it. [...] In this connection it is senseless to argue on system of journalistic education as such. Generally speaking, everybody can become a specialist in the field of communications. The main thing is to appear in necessary time in necessary place or to have money and good relations [...]. (Meriani, 2005, p. 229)

Let us do justice to the critical skill and sincerity of the young Italian colleague, Meriani. However, we worry about the uncertainty of educational criteria, to which our graduates are ostensibly called to even more stringently correspond. For experts it’s not a secret that in the majority of European countries the trade of the journalist needn’t require a certification, the diploma does not serve either as guarantee, nor a condition for employment in a workplace editorial staff (this is true in Russia too). An expert on the French press writes, that in this country “any person can become a journalist, without dependence on the received diploma.” In this connection the following statistics are no surprise: annually in France 400 journalists graduate from diploma schools, and 1200-1500 persons receive certificates of professional journalism, but only 15% of all professional journalists are graduates from corresponding schools (Puyu, 2003, pp. 80, 82).

The humanistic sense of university education is first of all connected with the maximal realisation of the person’s abilities. This idea is clearly expressed in legal acts, by the way. In Russian legislation one of the first stated purposes on which the education
system should be focused is the guaranty of the self-determination of the person and the creation of conditions for his self-realization (“The Education Law” of the Russian Federation).

The university creates opportunities for personal professional socialization, expansion of the individual-personal potentiality, and formations of ability to think nontrivially. These qualities form a kernel of the so-called human capital. Its share in the structure of wealth of Russia is considerably below, than in the developed countries of the West. So, to the beginning of this century in the USA the human capital formed 76% of national wealth, and natural resources formed only — 5%, in Russia — 50% and 40% accordingly (Derkach, 2006, p. 283). There is no national interest in increasing this distance by reducing the higher school training of tomorrow’s generations. The same should be related to journalism education. A high level of journalism education can produce a sufficient share of national human capital if young pressmen have enough time to stay in the university intellectual environment. Meanwhile authoritative experts feel the deficiency of outstanding personalities due to the radical lack of modern press. It became a matter to worry to the head of the Union of Journalists of the Russian Federation, V. Bogdanov, as well as a president of Faculty of Journalism of Moscow State University, Ya. Zassoursky. They ascertain in public conversation with each other: “The inner life of the average journalist, alas, is poor” (Bogdanov, & Zassoursky, 2006, p. 12).

We have briefly mentioned some elements of the patriotic attitude to domestic journalism. In summary — some generalizing remarks. First, the question cannot be settled by one or several publications, it demands deep and regular development. The structure of values, which require being saved as a valuable national cultural property, should be discussed; here there is a wide field for polemics, leading to mutual understanding, if it is desirable, and a coordination of positions. Secondly, this subject cannot remain within the limits of the academic discussions. The responsible handling of the legacy, transmitted to us from previous generations is a care of specialists of press, professional associations, university teachers and state bodies. Russian journalism does not belong to anybody personally, and at the same time everyone who adjoins with it, bears a part of the responsibility of performing specific duties towards it. We mean these remarks, not only for the Russian domestic professional community, but the international professional community too.
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The following article shows how the practice of the Russian press in its early stages of development needed theoretical background. Originally, the initiative to create a conceptual model of journalism came from the authorities, represented, above all, by Russian tsars and their ministers. Later, political opposition, publishers, editors and journalists took the leading role. The understanding and providing freedom of the press became a main problem for many years. In the history of national press, you can find the origins of the sociology of journalism, rights of the media, typological analysis of publications, and tradition of studying the preferences and interests of readers. Scientific works gradually appeared and research direction of journalism emerged.

**Keywords:** journalism, history, freedom of press, censorship, theory

The origins of theoretical thought, which generalizes the practice of journalism in Russia, go back to the historical period when informational communication emerged. The need to understand its significance, peculiarities, and essence pushed theoretical research...
that, as history shows, had not always been reflected in academic studies. It can be most easily seen from the early stages of journalism when there was autocracy and when management practices presented a dilemma for the ruler — how to use information to consolidate power. The confrontation between authorities and opposition was the engine of understanding the problems of journalism and its theorizing. In this connection, the problem of freedom of the press came to the forefront in the dialogue of authorities in Russia prior to the Great Russian Revolution of 1917. Authorities sought to justify restrictions on that freedom, and the opponents, on the contrary, argued the need for its extension in the public interest, and called for full freedom.

The authorities’ thought on journalism, which was not usually mentioned by researchers, was a practical one and was written down mostly in legal documents and recommendations. In this respect, the experience of the Russian Empress Catherine II (1762-1796) is significant. She promoted the spread of education and publicity in the country and did a lot for the development of journalism, but gradually, mainly because of external factors, such as the revolutions in Europe, the Empress understood the need of strict control over printed matter and its distribution. In 1796, Catherine II introduced official censorship in Russia.

It is interesting to note the evolution of the formula that limits the freedom of the press, which was generated and approved of by the Empress. The decree by the Senate, issued on March 1, 1771, became, as Count S. Uvarov noticed, “the first censorship law on civil typography”, but so far “only for books in foreign languages” (Spravka, 1862, pp. 16). That document defined a triad of prohibitions for the printing of certain products. It was allowed to print books and other writings, however, those which are not condemned by either the Orthodox Greek Church, or the government, or the virtuousness ... with supervision in order not to issue anything against the law of God and civil law or inducing to other misdeeds” or “without examination by one of Censorship bodies, set up in our capital cities, and the approval that such writings or translations contain nothing against the law of God, the rules of the State or virtue”. Also, it was decreed to “burn those that contradict the law of God or the supreme power and corrupt morals” (Russkaya zhurnalistika, 2003, pp. 47, 51, 53, 64).

Catherine’s decree, which was issued on September 16, 1796, was later adopted by all Russian rulers. Under various conditions, every ruler of the country looked for ways to handle freedom of the press and found the best solution in those documents. Actually, that practice reflected a very significant moment in the development of thought, i.e. the implementation of the need to manage a huge state cannot always wait for corresponding theoretical treatises to be developed.

This conclusion can be applied to later periods of Russian history. Many public figures generalized theoretical practice in their field by writing reports to the emperor,
government, etc. Such public figures included Count S. Uvarov, Minister of Education (1833-1839) who proposed the formula of state ideology for Russia in the 19th century, i.e. Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and National character, and A. Golovnin, Minister of Education (1861-1866), who showed himself in the preparation of the reform of censorship as a sociologist of journalism, and P. Valuev, Minister of Internal Affairs (1861-1868) (See: Makushin 2009, pp. 5-37). Their writings later improved interactions between government and journalism.

In 1862, A. Golovnin conducted an opinion poll among journalists, writers and censors in connection with an upcoming reform of censorship. He received responses from the editors of Sovremennik (“The Contemporary”), Otechestvenye Zapiski (“Annals of the Fatherland”), Rusko Slovo (“The Russian Word”), “Ilustrirovanny Listok (“Illustrated Leaflet”), and Encylopedichesky Slovar (“Encyclopedic Dictionary”). In 1862, he published “The Views of Different Persons on the Transformation of the Censorship”, which provided a fairly complete picture of the problem and showed the attitudes of the censors and journalists to the changes in legislative policy set by the authorities (Zhirkov, 2001, pp. 119-126). Golovnin strived to find a scientific ground to resolve the problem of freedom of the press in a society.

Such practice of powerful bureaucracy faced oppositional thought throughout this time period. Opposing points of view already appeared to be a purely theoretical matter because, to authorities in Russia at the time, these views appeared to just be filled with wishes, opinions, predictions and fantasy. It is this type of dialogue that has usually induced socially significant movements of thought in societies throughout history. If the authorities ignore their counterparts (explicitly or implicitly), the practice they are attempting to implement can get distorted. When the opposition does not take into account the movement of thought on the part of the authorities, its own thoughts can turn to scheming.

The issue of the freedom of speech and press was the focal point for the theoretical search of the opposition. It operated as an internal spring in its interaction with the authorities. Different political forces dealt with the problem. For example, one can recall the fate of John Milton (1608-1674) who gave a brilliant speech, which was published in 1664 under the title of “Areopagitica”, in defence of freedom of the press in the English Parliament. He later performed certain censorship functions under Cromwell (Wilson, 1983, pp. 162, 232).

When socialists of various kinds came to power, they also failed to realize their ideals. In Russia, the Provisional Government issued a populist decree on April 27, 1917: “Printing and selling of printed production are free. Administrative penalties on the activity are not allowed.” (Russkaya zhurnalista, 2003, p. 243). It corresponded to the main paragraph of the program of the Constitutional Democratic Party worked out mainly by professional lawyers and politicians (Proekt zakona, 2001, p. 304).
According to Pitirim Sorokin, who was a professor at St. Petersburg University and a revolutionist and had some relation to the government, an official press committee was immediately set up. This committee exclusively decided on the fate of the publishing houses. Monarchist newspapers were banned and their printing facilities were confiscated. Socialists considered such measures necessary (Sorokin 1991, pp. 85, 91). The Moscow Actors of Periodicals and Literature Society convened a general meeting of writers and journalists on the issue “of violence against the press”. Their resolution called for the country’s government to end all that. (Oōbvestvō, 1918, p. 4). After the July crisis of 1917, the Provisional Government went on the warpath against the dissent. Bolshevik publishing houses were closed and forced underground. There were a number of arrests made.

Social Democrats (Bolsheviks) acted in a very similar way deciding on the freedom of speech and the press. They resorted to censorship measures after they came to power. They set up the main Soviet censorship body, the Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs, in June 1922, just before the USSR was established (see: Zhirkov 1994, Zhirkov 1995, Zhirkov 1997).

Theoretical postulates brought up by ideals turned out to be unsuitable. Their effectiveness and practical use was different. The freedom of the press problem became a means of regulating the level of freedom in society and its censorship regime. Theoretical dialogue between the government and opposition in this sense was essential.

In Russia, that type of dialogue was going on permanently and simultaneously expanding from an individual’s performance to a collective action. This is according to a sketch of global censorship by A. Radischev (1749 - 1802) in the chapter “Torzhok” of “Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow” (1790). It is full of internal opposition to the policy of Catherine II, to collective petitions, motions, protests by persons of letters who represented a collective theoretical idea of freedom of the press during the period of social reforms of the 1860s and the turn of 19th and 20th centuries. A petition was submitted to his Majesty February 24, 1895, signed by 114 writers, including D. Grigorovich, D. Mordovtsev, K. Stanyukovich, N. Mikhailovsky, P. Weinberg, K. Arseniev, Prince M. Volkonsky, N. Leskov, and M. Menshikov. The intellectuals tried to show the new emperor the powerlessness of the press and the need to return to the 1865 law in which the Russian printed word acquired some degree of independence in freedom. The petition contained significant observations including those on the latest changes in journalism; “Law and justice will relieve Russian writers from the yoke imposed on the printing by industrial enterprise and subservience to ignoble tastes,” (Samoderzhavie,1906, p. 56). Theoretical utopianism is connected here with the understanding of the real evolution of journalism.

The resolution on freedom of the press was developed by journalists in St. Petersburg and published in 1902 in Russian foreign editions. It addressed the struggle for the freedom of the press and proposed radical measures to solve it, such as total elimination of the
preliminary, permissive, restrictive censorship and the system of administrative fines. “A case of offence (press) should be heard in an open and independent court”; registration system of publications should be created; the press law should provide freedom for social and public life issues to be discussed, etc. (Nabokov 1912, pp. 4-5).

There was special attention paid to the legal status of journalism in Russia due to the 200\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Russian press. A large number of newspapers published articles assessing the role of media in society on January 2, 1903. A series of editions called “The Great Reforms of the 60’s in their Past and Present” were published, as well as a book by K. Arseniev titled “The Legislation on the Press”, where the author examines the legal status of the press, legal practice in Russia in 1860-1890.

“The freedom of the press, the freedom of conscience and personal integrity are the values felt to be much more necessary”, Arseniev emphasizes, “[the freedom of the press] plays the same role in social life as the light in the life of the organic world” (Arsenyev). The author believed that there had been “only random, fleeting” notes about the freedom of the press until that time. He expressed confidence that “the time of its bloom” was approaching. He also noted the range of information covered by the press was narrowed, it may mention social issues “only in snatches or through hints” and “studying them is not available for it”. Problems of religion, philosophy, history, political economy and science are only partially open to journalism.

However, Arseniev understands the need for limits to freedom:

Freedom of the press, like any other freedoms, has its disadvantages and allows abuse; if one is to trust it and not to be afraid of it, one should believe that positive aspects not only balance negative ones, but also drastically outweigh them. Respect for the opinions of others, recognition of their right to exist, the ability to distinguish theoretical denial from actual struggle, controversy from hatred and betrayal, contestation from defamation, these are the conditions without which we cannot not only protect but also understand freedom of the press. (Arsenyev 1903, pp. 96, 107, 124, 262-263)

V. Rosenberg rightly called Arseniev’s work “an outstanding phenomenon of our literature» (Rozenberg & Yakushkin 1905, p. 159).

The Collection of Articles on the History and Statistics of Russian Periodical Press 1703-1903 was also dedicated to the 200th anniversary. It summarized the results of its development over the previous 200 years and contained an article by G. Gradovsky, “By the 200\textsuperscript{th} Press Anniversary. The Age of Russian Opinion Journalism”. Its author showed the consequences of censorship and oppression for the development of journalism and noted the realm of censorship was boundless even then. As the result of their work, actual political press, or opinion journalism and publicism, according to Gradovsky, was to mark its 40\textsuperscript{th} anniversary in the future. “The political thought was thrown out through the door,” the
author noted, “and it entered through the window,. the political thought, social consciousness, desire for renewal blazed its trail through the departments of criticism, through novels and comedies, fables and poems. The political press and thought were under pressure inside the country; they moved outside Russia and exerted their influence on our intellectual development from abroad” (Gradovsky, 1903, p. 152).

The time of the 1905 Russian Revolution was a new and most significant step in understanding the issues of freedom of the press. The social thought of the country went a long way during a short time. Politicians, publicists and reporters seemed to make up for lost time. In periodical press, they discussed the issues of governance, parliamentarism, constitutionalism, human rights, and freedom of speech and press.


The collection of articles “In Defense of the Word” is particularly notable. Its authors — K. Arseniev, V. Myakotin, V. Rozenberg, S. Prokopovich, P. Milyukov, and N. Rubakin — were the first to give a comprehensive outlook of the freedom of the press issue summarizing practical experience and making certain theoretical conclusions. The range of topics covered in the articles was diverse: the uncensored and censored, censorship and rouble, ethnic press censorship, politics and censorship, freedom of criticism, the protection of freedom of speech in Russian lyric poetry and even musical censorship. “One of the greatest anomalies of the current status of our press,” Arseniev notices, “is the simultaneous existence of censored and uncensored periodicals” (Arsenyev, 1905). “There are absolutely no publications that reach the reader uncensored in Russia,” V. Myakotin says (Myakotin, 1905). There were interesting facts in Milyukov’s article “Subjective and Sociological Ground of the Press Freedom”. “The press is the finest and most perfect form of the existing forms of social and psychological interaction,” Milyukov wrote (Milyukov, 1905). Making a breach in it leads “to the necrosis of public traditions and social upheavals”. Censorship
can only disrupt the interaction; “an impaired function is restored through the “indirect” way and meets the vital need of the social organism”.

In his article “Freedom of the Press” S. Prokopovich summarizes: “The ban on new political newspapers, the prosecution and, on occasion, shutting down existing ones, strict control over domestic departments of journals, all these are the characteristic features of our censorship regime. These measures have delayed and restricted the spread of political ideas among the Russian people, slowed and weakened the growth of social consciousness. The ultimate goal of such campaigns is the total destruction of public initiative and public art” (Prokopovich, 1905).

All the parties, created before and during the Revolution of 1905 declared the need of the freedom of speech and press in the society, but they interpreted it differently. The Union of Russian People considered the freedom of the press in its “general provisions” for the elections to the State Duma as “the principal means to fight against official abuse and administrative lawlessness”, means for publishing “their thoughts and correcting deficiencies in social and political life” (Programmy politicheskih, 1992; see also: Shevtsov 1997).

The Faction of People’s Freedom Party (Kadets) introduced a bill on the press in the first State Duma on July 4, 1906. The bill was based on that party’s program, published in 1905, and said that everyone is “free to express their thoughts orally and in writing, as well as to publish and spread them through the press or by other means”; censorship is to be abolished, and cannot be restored, a person guilty of crimes and misdemeanours committed by the oral and written word are to face court” (Programmy politicheskih... 1995, p. 327). The bill by Kadets put forward the following requirements: complete freedom of the press; abolition of the registration system for periodicals; individual liability, instead of collective liability for periodicals, and offences involving printed word being subject to the competence of jury.

Under the pressure of revolutionary circumstances and raging debates on the freedom of speech and press in 1905 and 1906, the authorities passed legislative bills on the press; however the laws dissatisfied both the executive branch and most political circles. The authorities believed that “you cannot rely on the law only” and looked for new repressive measures against the rebellious journalism, such as confiscation of newspapers, back-breaking penalties, arrests of editors and their imprisonment, introduction of exceptional conditions, etc. (Zapiska, 1922, p. 280).

On June 6 through 8, 1906, the police raided printing offices of such newspapers as Trudovaya Rossiya (“Labouring Russia”), Golos (“The Voice”), Vpered (“Forward”), Kurier (“Courier”), Russkiy Nabat (“Russian Tocsin”), Priziv (“The Call”), XX Vek (“20th Century”), and Sovremennaya Zhizn’ (“Modern Life”). Referring to the decision by St. Petersburg Committee of the Press, police officials confiscated issues of these newspapers.
Such illegal actions continued. The police regularly confiscated issues of Izvestia Krestyanskih Deputatov (“Proceedings of Peasant Deputies”).

Press activists reacted to these actions of the government immediately. The first State Duma on June 13, 1906 discussed Appeal Number 152, defined in the minutes as “On censorship and the press”. It was put forth by 31 Duma members who wanted to know whether the facts were known to the Interior Minister and what measures he intended to take against violators of the law, i.e. officials.

Despite the protests, the Peter Stolypin government introduced the practice of “exceptional conditions” in 1907. The adopted provisions on military protection during hostilities were modified to the provision on enhanced or emergency protection. The government granted the administration the right to mercilessly fine newspapers for transgressions. State official S. Witte wrote knowledgeably, “Since you can always hold capitals and other major cities under exceptional conditions then, consequently, you can impose fines on newspaper in your own way” (Witte, 1960, pp. 320-321). Another repressive measure was added to this, namely, jailing an editor for several months. This led to a reciprocal measure by publishers who started to employ so-called fictitious editors for doing the time in prison.

A special Council was set up under the Ministry of Justice to develop the issue of liability for criminal acts committed through the press in September and November 1908. It discussed a project on improving punitive policy regarding journalism. According to A. Bellegarde, Chief of the Office of the Press in 1905-1912, courts too often brought in acquittals for newspapers, and sentences rarely reached the maximum level prescribed by law. They decided to substitute some penalties for monetary fines instead of imprisonment (Zhurnal, 1908, p. 4, Karatel’nye, 1908, pp. 473-474, Kniga, 2008, p. 41).

The government’s punitive actions were summarized by Utro Rossii (“The Morning of Russia”) in the issue dedicated to the new 1908 year; greater control was extended to more than 63 million people in the country, and special authority for the publication of the mandatory regulations without intensified control spread to more than 86 million people.

The issue of freedom of the press during the transition period;1905 Russian Revolution showed confrontation between the authorities, the opposition and their dialogue left its mark on journalism. The main result was that the government was not able to go back to its old order, although it sought to do so. According to G. Shtilman, “the question of the specific nature of the press torts is normally focused on by criminology in 1908-1912, the period described by contemporaries as a time when the state moved from absolutism to representative system. At the same time the warning system gave way to “judicial repression” when there was a question how the general principles of criminal law treated the excesses of press (Shtilman, 1912, p. 339).
The revolution forced the government to take a closer look at the position of the police law when freedom of speech and press went far beyond the limits set by the law. The newspaper *Rosiya* ("Russia"), which had represented the official position under a contract signed by the government and the editors in 1906, published a series of articles by L. Tikhomirov who expressed the government’s viewpoint.

Tikhomirov closely examines the press as a part of social threats, which are a powerful instrument for a wide variety of interests, including common and routine, private, political, economic and others. The author concludes, “But since it comes to freedom of action of such diverse interests, the state and law inevitably receive a task and undertake an obligation to set up here certain supervision and regulation, in case if this action moves towards the violation of the rights of private and public interests protected by law” (Tikhomirov). But the press is a tool used for deception and libel against enemies and competitors, for blackmail and speculative activity, ... Corrupt authors are a tool of unscrupulous fraud that are aimed at robbing an entire people, they use the press even to incite to murder, not to mention revolts and revolutions” (Tikhomirov, 1909, pp. 7 - 8).

Finally, the press “is exposed to monopoly” and this has also been a “threat for society to be enslaved by monopolistically captured tools of informing and influencing minds and consciences”. As a result, he justifies the need to limit freedom of the press for the public interest and within the law.

G. Shtilman also developed a thesis on the social threat posed by irresponsible press in a report delivered at the 9th Congress of the Russian Group of the International Criminologist Union. “The importance of social functions carried by the periodical press,” emphasized G. Shtilman, “the unboundedness of its audience, and the inadmissibility of any outer intervention in its routine work, the impossibility to determine the typical features of the work of all its participants and the easiness with which torts (associated with enormous harm to the public and private benefits) can be done with the help of this tool without control — all these induce a lawyer to put press crimes separately, putting forward a number of exemptions in favour of its leaders and on the other hand, at their own expense” (Shtilman, 1912, p. 344).

Under those circumstances, the authorities found new means for their repressive policy against rapidly growing journalism. In 1912, count Paul Tolstoy came up with a conclusion in his report exposing such a policy. He wrote an article entitled, “Press Freedom Restrictions with Resolutions as a part of Security,” in the Pravda ("The Truth") magazine (#27, 29-32). A quote from this article reads; “Our journalism lives without any legal basis under the sword of Damocles of resolutions as a part of control” (Tolstoy 1912, pp. 89, 121).

*The Knizhnaya Letopis* ("Book Chronicle") journal summarized the results of governmental regulations on the press over the first three months of 1912. Thirty-five publications were removed from sale, 173 were confiscated by the order of administration,
119 were confiscated by a court verdict, 70 were liquidated on court verdict (totally or partially) and two were completely banned by the court. Also, a periodical was suspended until the trial and the administration confiscated the property of 30 publishing houses. There were 430 governmental regulations on the press for those three months (Knizhnaya letopis’. 1912. #1-14). But the authorities’ attempts to go back to the old censorship orders were doomed to fail under the new conditions. The issues of human rights, freedom of speech and press were reflected in party documents, discussions in journals, at conferences and at the State Duma.

Thus, there was a long discussion of the freedom of the press in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. The problems of improving legislation on the press were still acute during the post-revolutionary period under the renewed system. The public and politicians alike summarized the experience of relations between the authorities and journalism. This also helped to develop new projects and programs.

Under public pressure through newspapers and journals, debates in the Duma, and at party conventions, the Ministry of Internal Affairs developed a new press law. The chair of the Council of Ministers V. Kokovtsev said, speaking at the State Duma on July 5, 1912, that the government was “fully aware of the desirability of replacing the administrative repression by legal prosecution concerning offenses in the field of the printed word, as well as the urgent need to determine the position of the press, and especially time-based portion of it, by clear and firm rules of inviolable law” (See: Novozhilova 1971, p. 11).

The Kadet Party brought forward “Legislative Proposals on the Press” at 4th State Duma. The document was signed by 36 members of the Duma, under the leadership of P. Milyukov on December 3, 1912 (see : Lihomanov 2006, pp. 247-256). The preamble to the draft of the main provision on the press law justified the need for such a document because “the press is still depending on the discretion of the administration. Armed with the right to impose monetary and individual fines on editors, censorship has still been actually carried out”. Many paragraphs of the earlier bill by Kadets were repeated almost verbatim (Prilozheniya, 1913).

In 1912, the government published a draft of the Statute of the Press (St. Petersburg, 1912), which had 152 articles in contrast to 302 articles contained in the publication of 1890. N. Maklakov, who worked for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, sent a letter to the deputies on February 27, 1913. He reported the government was developing a new press law and it would soon be put forward to the State Duma. However, the government was not going to develop the bill on the grounds offered by Kadets (Gosudarstvennaya… 1913, p. 1612). The paper was published in the newspaper Novoe Vremya (“New Time”) on May 13, 1913. The Press Committee was elected at the meeting of the Duma on February 27 to discuss proposals on the legislative reform in the field of press. The Press Committee consisted of 33 members and was headed by V. Shulgin. The Press Committee received six
different bills from; the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the right wing, Octobrists, progressists, a revised draft by Kadets and a personal draft from V. Shulgin.

There was a discussion in the press when the project by N. Maklakov was criticized. His work was criticized in articles by V. Vodovozov “New Crusade against the Press”, “The Press Bill and the State Duma”, L. Slonimsky “On the Bill against the Press”, “The Fight against the Press”, S. Mstislavsky “Own and Alien” (Sovremennik 1913. No 5, Sovremennik. 1914. No 2, Vestnik Evropy 1913. No 6, Vestnik Evropy 1914. No 3, Zavety 1913. No 6). However, despite the criticism, the committee chose the draft by the Interior Ministry. However, the almost two-year discussion of the project did not result in any advances due to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914; the authorities never doubted the need for censorship in wartime conditions.

The struggle for the freedom of the press, the criticism of the government crackdown on journalism, nevertheless, should not be misleading in regard to the position of the press after the Manifesto of October 17, 1906. Without a doubt, it differs from its position prior to the Manifesto. The first Russian revolution made significant corrections to the censorship regime in society and relieved the information market from the closed control of the state. Journalism developed intensely and this was one of the main effects of democratization of society in that historical period.

The development of theoretical thinking on the freedom of the press issue was a practical dialogue between the government and the opposition whose utopianism ran into conservatism of the state supporters. As a result, the legislation pertaining to the press as well as the informational process on the whole were improved, with transparency increasing in Russian society. The information market became freer from the impact of the state. Private enterprises were rapidly developing in journalism. The theoretical understanding of the problem itself was gradually reaching the level of generalizations and conclusions, but still not summarized as a scientific abstraction and did not lead to the creation of a special academic theoretical work.

While the dialogue on freedom of the press was quite open in reports, notes, publications, other important issues arose, such as information consumers, readers, and the relationship between mass communications and society. The Russian authorities approached the dissemination of information differently in Russia. Understanding the role of elites, authorities did not shield that class from information, except for political knowledge. As for ordinary people, Russian Tsars, as a rule, tried to limit their access to information in general.

S. Uvarov came up with an excuse for limiting the spread of cheap literature in the nation, pointing out periodicals “similar to foreign ‘Penne Magazine’ or ‘Heller Magazine’”. Allegedly, such press being light reading prevented people’s mental development (from the Uvarov’s report, March 10, 1834, approved by the emperor (Russkaya starin). P. Shirinsky-Shikhmatov, who became the Minister of Education in 1849, prepared a special report to
Nicholas I on the issue of literature “for common people”. The Minister’s main proposal was “to encourage reading ecclesiastical literature rather than civil books” (Russkaya starina, 1903, p. 424-425; see also: Zhirkov, 2001, pp. 92-98).

As a result, this autocratic domestic policy tendency developed. This corresponded to the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church and did a lot for the spiritual enlightenment of the people. However, it did not expand the outlook of the people or enrich their knowledge. The Main Office of Press was vigilant regarding literature that was addressed to a broader audience. In 1874, it pointed out to censors it was necessary to “expose every publication for people to the strictest censorship” (Zhirkov, 2001, pp. 77, 166).

However, the understanding of the basic need to educate people had always developed in Russian society as an opposition to authorities’ folly. Education was considered to be a guarantee for the progressive development of society. Thus, N. Dobrolyubov examined the content and communications of the journal Sobesednik Liubitelei Rossiiskogo Slova (“Interlocutor of Lovers of the Russian Word”, 1783-1784) by using sociological methods. N. Nekrasov and I. Panayev, publishers of the Sovremennik (“The Contemporary”), supported its editor N. Chernyshevsky in conducting research on audiences of journals in 1859 (Dobrolyubov 1986, Chernyshevsky 1950, p. 418-427. See: Talovov 1993, Talovov 1998).

The authorities understood there was a gap between the elite and the people, trying to find reasons for this. S. Krivenko, a publicist, noted on the pages of Otechestvenye Zapiski (“Annals of the Fatherland”) in 1881 that people took up reading, “showed interest in life beyond the fence of their village, and wanted to know a lot about their rights and responsibilities. And since there is such a need for knowledge and reading, you cannot eliminate it with scorpions or winch mechanisms. It firmly asserts itself just as hunger and thirst” (Otechestvenye zapiski, p. 262).

The urbanization, internal migration and need for intensive economic development were objective reasons for changes in social structure, industry, and cities as the population grew and the services sector developed. Literature and journalism faced a new audience. Leo Tolstoy states in his letter to Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin, December 1885, “reading audience has terribly changed and views on the reading public too… there has emerged a new circle of readers, a large one, it accounts for hundreds of thousands, almost millions” (Tolstoy 1955, p. 179).

There was diverse publishing activity in the Russian Orthodox Church to meet the growth of cultural and spiritual needs, e.g. a popular journal, Niva (“Field of Grain”). We can also recall Leo Tolstoy and V. Chertkov with their non-profit people’s publishing house, Posrednik (“Intermediary”) and folk tales by Tolstoy. Also, cheap popular publishers must be mentioned that produced about 15 million copies of various books annually in the 1890s. That activity encouraged the rise of the people’s literacy and developed readership.
The growth of the people’s literacy put on the agenda the issue of its study. V. Orlov suggested that Moscow Bureau of Statistics start collecting information about what people read in 1883. He prepared a report entitled, “What Moscow Province Farmers Read.” He spoke at the meeting of the Department of Statistics of the Moscow Law Society and then published his report in the newspaper Russkie Vedomosti (“Russian Bulletin”) (Prugavin, 1895, p. 433).

At the apartment of a district council member and publicist M. Schepkin, one of the organizers of the census of 1882, there was a meeting of artists with similar views who were involved in educating the people. Members of the Society of Lovers of Russian Philology, Moscow University, constituting its editorial committee were present. This included well-known literary critics A. Veselovsky and N. Storozhenko, publisher of folk literature V. Marakuev, and M. Schepkin, a professor of economics. Tolstoy gave a keynote speech on national publications at the meeting and they also discussed “the principles and plans to publish books for the people”. Tolstoy outlined “the plan for the publication of books for educating the Russian people” that was carried out by the publishing house Posrednik (Tolstoy, 1955, p. 654; see also: Zhirkov, 2007, pp. 233-297).

District council statisticians took part in the research of people’s reading needs. They began to draft programs for such studies (D. Shakhovskoy in 1885, A. Prugavin in 1887, N. Rubakin in 1889) (Ruskii nachal’nyi uchitel’ 1885. No 3, Russkaya mys’l 1887. Vol. XI, Rubakin 1889. See the analysis: Kogan 1969, pp. 39-67). The first volume of the book, “What People are to Read?” was published in 1884 under the control of the founder of Kharkov Sunday School Hristina Alchevskaya (1843 - 1920). The second and third books were published in 1889 and 1906, respectively. These 2000-page volumes summarized the research on the literacy of the Russian people, which started in 1875. It became one of the first books to research the readership of peasants and the poorer urban audience. Its authors - school teachers - write about the psychological types of readers among people. The book gained a favourable response from such outstanding writers as G. Uspensky, A. Ostrovsky, L. Tolstoy and V. Korolenko. N. Shelgunov wrote “a small earthquake it had made in the minds of the intelligentsia”. The book was awarded with the highest prize, a gold medal at the World Expo in Paris in 1889, (Shelgunov 1954, p. 371, Os’makova 1992, p. 52). The book was widely discussed in society and made the press put forward the issue of people’s reading. There were articles and reviews on this book in the Novoe Vremya (“New Time”, April 23), Blagovest (# 13), Zhenskoe Obrazovanie (“Women’s Education”, # 8), Russkie Vedomosti (“Russian Bulletin”, # 223), Novosti (“The News”, # 231), Russkaya Mys’ (“Russian Thought”, # 1), Zapiski Uchitelya (“Memoirs of a Teacher”, # 3), etc. in 1884; in the Delo (“Action”, # 5), Narodnaya Shkola (“People’s School”, # 1) in 1885, etc. (Bibliography of responses to the book see: Frid’eva, 1963).
Commitment to the study of readers’ interests and needs spread among the publishers and editors at the end of the 19th century. For example, the newspaper Nedelya (“Week”) regularly raised the issue of the need to study the audience in such articles as, “The Press and the Reader” (1878, # 23), “The Press and the Society” (1884, # 46), “The Printed Word and Life” (1886, # 20), etc.

Prugavin published his “Program to Obtain Information about what People read” in the journal Russkaya Mysl’ (“Russian Thought”) in 1887. It was reprinted by many publishers; e.g. Volzhsky Vestnik (“Volga Bulletin”), Vostochnoe Obozrenie (“The Eastern Review”), Novoe Obozrenie (“New Review”), and Severny Kavkaz (“Northern Caucasus”). More than 200 people responded to the program from across the country; teachers, priests, landowners, officers, peasants, students and booksellers. The Russkaya Mysl’ published a book by A. Prugavin called “Queries of the People and the Responsibilities of the Intelligentsia in the Field of Mental Development and Education,” that summarized the data collected in 1890. Prugavin concluded “most peasant populations have no idea what a journal is” and that “both daily and weekly newspapers make a difference”. And although “the newspaper has entered the village comparatively recently, the circle of readers amongst peasants grows every year” (Prugavin, 1890, p. 93).

What newspapers are successes among people? According to Prugavin, they were, first, cheap dailies, like the newspaper Svet (“Light”, 1882-1917) by V. Komarov, which had a tabloid reputation; second, “small press newspapers” (Moskovsky Listok — “Moscow sheet”, Peterburgskaya Gazeta — “Petersburg Newspaper”, Minuta — “Minute”), and, third, illustrated editions (the Niva, Luch — “Ray” by S. Okreyts) (ibid, pp. 101-102). Prugavin’s observations are interesting for us as they show the dynamics of folk audience preferences. His program aroused interest in the research of readership among the editorial staff of the country and the public.

In 1891, M. Lederle sent out 2,000 questionnaires, mostly to writers and the intelligentsia, but he received back only 86 responses. He published a book, “The views of Russian people on the Best Books for Reading,” in 1895. In 1895, Vyatka provincial district council carried out a survey among teachers and agronomists. They received more than 500 responses that indicated that Vyatskaya Gazeta (“Vyatka Newspaper”) published since March 31, 1894, was being read in villages and schools. Moreover, its copies were being passed from one reader to another and they were read aloud at village meetings. The questionnaire revealed significant shortcomings for publishers in the operation of the newspaper. Many peasants were not happy with it as articles on agriculture and handicrafts had an instructing nature that was tiresome for unaccustomed readers. On the whole, the newspaper seemed to be boring. Here is the opinion of one of the peasants (the chair of the community); “The newspaper is not interesting for us, peasants.. It is more for masters and it uses a lot of words we have never heard about and cannot understand them or sometimes
it is written clearly, but we do not like the manner and it is not interesting for us” (Materialy, 1899, p. 66).

In 1898, the newspaper sent out “questionnaire sheets” once again and got more than a thousand responses from peasants. The responses noted advances in newspapers and pointed out it had become closer to the audience; “Twenty one percent of the replies showed the peasants followed the newspaper advice on improving farming. “Peasants themselves claim that newspapers in many ways can replace a technician and agronomist” (ibid, pp. 89, 99).

The study of 88 socio-political private newspapers was conducted in 1900 by A. Peshekhonov, who published the results in the article “Russian Political Newspaper (A Statistical Essay)” (Russkoe Bogatstvo, 1901). The investigation can serve as an example of a content analysis of publications of those years. The comparison of the amount of information of metropolitan and provincial newspapers showed that the former offers printed material 70 percent more and this increases its price. But given the size of the metropolitan edition, it turns out this type of paper is cheaper. Peshekhonov’s observations regarding the newspapers of those years are interesting. Nearly 40 percent was advertisements, its informational content consisted of more than 70 percent and there was 30 percent left for “literary refined material (articles, fiction, skits)”. Ultimately, the author concluded the newspaper was becoming an increasingly important element of our public life. At the same time, there was a decrease in the influence of the official press and a growth of the role of private newspapers (Peshehonov 1901, pp. 7-9).

“Systematic Index of Literary and Artistic Content of the Niva journal over 30 years (1870-1899)”, by A. Toropov was an attempt to summarize the content, links to the reader and the spread of the Niva journal (St. Petersburg, 1902. 450 pages). The content analysis of the Niva conducted by Toropov showed it had about 2,000 authors. One thousand, two hundred and seventy-two writers published 16,726 significant works spread over 30,830 pages. The Niva published 1,450 novels, short stories, 968 poems, 2,131 biographical sketches, 2,523 works dedicated to Russian regional studies, 1,556 on geography, 761 on natural history, 667 on history and 967 about inventions. The Niva’s column on art referred to 2,730 artists of the world. Thus, Toropov, using numbers, presented a concise, yet detailed outlook on the content in the Niva journal.

Studies were also done on the image of readership. For example, research was done on the ethnographic information of peasants of Central Russia, conducted in the late 1890s. This was presented in the section, “Reading A Book,” and they used “A Program in the Form of a Questionnaire for the Study of a Peasant Reader,” (Tenishev 1898).

The relationship between the press and its audience grew with the increasing number of periodicals after the first Russian revolution of 1905-1907. In this respect, an article by S. Krivenko, “Newspaper Business and Newspaper People,” is very interesting. Published
in the Russkaya Mysl’ journal in 1906, it pointed very precisely to the main developments in trends in periodic newspapers. “Despite the censorship and other various unfavourable conditions,” Krivenko writes, “the newspaper business has grown and developed very rapidly.. And it has been only three or four years.. The number of metropolitan and especially provincial newspapers grows annually as the number of readers grows as well as the demand for newspapers, especially cheap ones that sell tens of thousands of copies. They say one of these small newspapers sells 150,000 copies” (Kriven).

The author concludes: “All this points at the surge of new readers who did not previously deal with newspapers … and especially street papers, with their very specific rollicking, sensational titles, descriptions of murders and criminal novels are aimed at an urban half intelligent reader, including stewards, doormen and street sweepers”. “The newspaper becomes more and more an essential need,” Krivenko summarizes, “for not only wealthy classes and the intelligentsia, but also for common people.. Newspapers are very often subscribed to by people splitting the price and read in turns or read aloud in groups” (Krivenko, 1906, pp. 1-3).

Under these circumstances, the questionnaire method for analyzing the audience became a means for strengthening relations between the editorship and the audience, reflected in many articles, including, “‘Farmer’ and His Reader” by Yamshenetsky — Southern Notes, Odessa. 1904. # 15-16, 19, “Our Readers and Their Opinion on the Paper and Requests (from the questionnaire of Utro Rossii)”, by M. Surin — The Utro Rossii. 1910. 1 and 7 December, “Journal and the Reader — The questionnaire of Novy Zhurnal Dlya Vseh. 1910” by N. Rubakin — Novy Zhurnal Dlya Vseh. 1911. # 36, 37, “Writers and Literary Work” (questioning journalists) by L. Kleybort — Novy Zhurnal Dlya Vseh. 1911. # 30, “Democratic reader. According to the survey conducted by Vestnik Znaniya” by A. Nikolaev — Vestnik Znaniya. 1913. # 6 (3,000 responses received).

In 1913, the 50th anniversary of one of the most influential newspapers of the country, they published an interesting collection of articles called the “Russkie Vedomosti: 1863-1913”. There were two articles on the results of the study of newspaper audiences — “Readers of the Russkie Vedomosti written by an economist L. Litoshenko and “Readers of the Russkie Vedomosti” by a lawyer, N. Iordansky. Iordansky concluded there was a new type of reader — a “friend-reader”, who lives in the outback of the country, “The Russkie Vedomosti is our teacher of life”, “together with this friend we thought about remarkable ideas and dreams”, “this is a department of political thinking and citizenship (Russkie Vedomosti, 1913, p. 128). The questionnaire of the Russkie Vedomosti printed on separate sheets and was spread among newspaper readers to answer questions about its readership. The audience was quite devoted to its newspaper; 75 percent were the readers during five to 30 years. Almost 70 percent had a higher education and more than 5 percent were aged 30 to 50 years. More than 80 percent lived in Moscow. More than 60 percent of the audience
of the Russkie Vedomosti was the intelligentsia (teachers, doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists), 17 percent were students, (Russkie Vedomosti, 1913, pp. 113-118).

Questioning by periodicals became so popular it formed a separate genre of the interview. Leo Trotsky published “Something on Questionnaires” in the Kievskaya Mysl’ (“Kiev Thought”) in May 25, 1912 where he mocked this new phenomenon. “The philosophy of most newspaper questionnaires completely coincides with the philosophy of an old woman who, as they say, asked Tolstoy for the remedy for rheumatism … A newspaper questionnaire is a way to make those who have nothing to say, speak”. Trotsky referred to the Birzhevye Vedomosti (“Stock Exchange Bulletin”) and the questionnaire, “Where are we going?” of 1910 (Moscow, Zarya Publishing House).

When summarizing the research on the audiences of the pre-revolutionary period, N. Rubakin, a writer, sociologist and bibliographer, concluded “the experimental study of the readership started here, in Russia, much earlier than abroad”. He claimed Tolstoy to be the first researcher dealing with readers (Rubakin 1919, p. 3). The same point of view was later expressed by S. An-sky (S. Rappaport) in the “People and the Book” in 1913. He argued Tolstoy was the first not only to study people’s reading, but also in trying to theorize on these issues (An-sky 1913, p. 9).

Academic and promotional activities by Alchevskaya, Prugavin, Rubakin and others stimulated the research of wide audiences. Thus, the Russian intelligentsia came to the 1917 Revolution with certain skills for studying readership and the press. That’s why, despite the most radical party coming into power, which opposed most initiatives of the previous government, there was not a pause in studying journalism and its audience. Moreover, the new authorities were seeking interaction with people, considering the authorities to be a representative of their interests.

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The article stands the actual ontological and epistemological preconditions of the theory of journalism. The new century in the social sciences is characterized by the convergence of the processes that contribute to the growth needs to consider the theory of journalism as an open system, permanently updating with fresh ideas and concepts. The author analyzes experts’ answers to a formalized questionnaire in the field theory of journalism: 1) What corresponds the concept of the theory of journalism as an open system to? 2) How are important the theoretical researches of foreign colleagues for media studies in Russia? 3) Does it make sense to raise the question of any influence of the Russian experts in the field theory of journalism on the scientific discourse abroad? 4) To which extent fundamental philosophical differences hinder the construction of scientific theories of journalism as an open and adversarial system? 5) Are there any new trends of analysis in Russia today? 6) What are the current areas of journalism and mass communication that has not been the subject of discussion yet? This distance discussion summarizes the new and open to debate issue - the role of the subject of media research which looks at the functions of journalism and the media within the subject matter. But there is another view from the outside - society. So it should deal with the
intersections of the two types of functions formed by the "internal law" of a life of journalism and the laws of social development.

**Keywords:** information age, journalism, mass media, postmodernism, globalization, pluralism, social nature of journalism, virtual reality

The progress in the field of social sciences is rarely represented as an ascending arrow between the two axes of a graph - the time and the sequence of fundamentally proven scientific laws. In fact, not only do theories appear discretely, but so also do the conditions of their creation, and they evidently depend in a certain way on fundamental economic, political and technological changes in the society. One cannot ignore an important feature of social science, which is that old and previously rival (“ideologically alien”) theories hardly converge. On the contrary, new realities may still be treated differently in these theories, and previously unforeseen dichotomies emerge. Not everything matches perfectly, even within related theories, as there are different approaches to those in the same problem field. It is not surprising that the scientific community wants to substantially revise that which has been encompassed and achieved, to try to understand whether the body of knowledge looks like an organized system or Brownian motion space. This desire can be looked upon as a subjective reason for organizing this forum, however, there is an objective reason - the state of public life encourages reassessing values, specifying the place of journalism in it, and understanding contemporary laws of journalism.

The eras of modernism and postmodernism, which successfully absorbed the technological features of the so-called informational society, have led to numerous attempts to conceptualize the place of journalism and mass media in a new way. Naturally, a scientific reflection followed so, cf a fundamental work by a British sociologist F. Webster (Webster 2004) who managed to show both achievements and vulnerability of new theoretical concepts. It is his original connection between informational features of the new society and mass media operation that is especially important for us.

We inhabit a media-laden society, F. Webster believes, and the informational environment is a great deal more intimate and more constitutive for us. Now deal-makers, managers, software engineers, media creators and all those involved in the creative industries are seen as key to the information society (Webster, 2004, pp. 7-8).

The information age drastically transforms the human environment since, on the one hand, it is a natural consequence of the scientific and technological revolutions of the 20th century, and, on the other hand, it is a result of objective economic and socio-political processes. The transformation encompasses mass communications, journalism and mass media. There are Internet versions of traditional media and new Internet media, Internet TV
and Internet radio, digital TV, optical discs to store and distribute video and audio products (including the digitalization of masterpieces of the past). There are new forms and speeds for the audience to contact the editorial office of a newspaper, radio station or TV channel and new ways to express one’s thoughts with the help of personal web-sites, blogs, etc. All this has a certain connection to journalism and impact on it as the interaction between journalism and its audience has changed, along with the ways for collecting and storing information, and preparing journalistic works. Modern media have become not only the result of a tremendous leap in the development of technological means for information transmission and translation of cultural values, but also a cultural phenomenon that is highly complex as it involves science, politics and technology. Today, the fate of the world in its cultural, economic, political and social aspects is inseparable from mass media because the media instil economic, cultural, political and social values (Polikarpova 2008). The list above shows the extensive nature of the changes in mass media. The issue of intensifying the operation of journalism is on the agenda.

According to F. Webster, even media have undergone dramatic changes due to new ways of collecting and transmitting information — there are light cameras that allow reporters to arrive where it has previously been difficult and satellite communications that send images over thousands of kilometres in a few minutes. But an increase in the amount of information in the context of current changes means much more than simply an increase in the number of messages to the public (Webster, 2004, pp. 82-83).

An explosive growth of the mass media sphere has undermined the confidence of today’s public in truth and reality. A lot of groups, regions and countries have gained access to mass media due its expansion. Therefore, people inevitably have different views on various issues and events. Indeed, this is a condition of freedom, believing in reality and the related methods of persuasion have lost their credibility. How is it possible to believe in one and the same reality when the media pours such a great number of different interpretations of facts and defines very differently the range of events for us to think about (Webster, 2004, pp. 341, 343).

Can our contemporary audience discern adequate reality behind the signs transmitted over mass communication channels? One can assume that pluralism has lost its value or has been questioned as a feature of a democratic society, since pluralism has its significance as long as an individual can perceive the whole range of possible views on issues of interest. When there are as many truths as sources of information, then the very idea of truth loses its meaning. It is no accident that F. Webster picks up M. Castells’ idea on the “timeless culture”.. He postulates that nowadays we live in the perpetual present, where political democracy is irreversibly replaced by information policy that has become global, irreverent, and focused on scandals, thanks to information and communication media. If we agree with the role media plays in the spreading and reproduction of the market system, we can only
wonder where all these programs come from. As a result, F. Webster refers to H. Schiller’s idea that the information revolution has come from a class society, for it bears the stamp of inequality, and it only exacerbates this inequality (Webster, 2004, p. 177, 197-199). After such a statement, the following comment of a Russian analyst on normative theories of mass communication cannot be surprising; each of them is connected with a form of political system and government (Bakulev, 2005, p. 105).

The quoted review article of the Russian analyst is remarkable because it is in the line with the revision and systematization of that achieved in the theory of journalism, and therefore it contains some important ideas for our discussion. The statement of McLeod and Blamer quoted by G. Bakulev deserves attention; they advised mass media researchers to first decide for how long their proposed theory could be effective (Bakulev, 2005, p. 106). This comment is of great importance for the organized forum, the main goal of which is to make an inventory of what has been accumulated in the theory of journalism and outline possible future issues.

First, let us define the course of analysis where it is possible to discuss the problem. At least two approaches can be identified here, which are of the same origin and yet are still different Historians and sociologists of the 20th century generated a certain understanding of the concept of openness of the social system, although not always unquestionable (P. Sorokin, K. Popper, A. Toynbee and others). They considered a social system to be viable and progressive when it had an inclination to exchange information and material resources with other systems. The approach turned out to be fruitful and served as a methodological ground for later theories. It is from this point of view that scientific knowledge is a definite social resource that on the whole should freely participate in the intersystem exchange. Mutual intersection of conventional system boundaries is intended to enrich everybody’s scientific knowledge.

More specific interpretation is connected with the subject of the analysis - journalism and its theoretical understanding. First of all, journalism itself is a part of a broader social context where the society moves towards being open. In this aspect, it is easy to notice that the idea of, let us say, secrecy and confidentiality of the press is absurd, since publicity, transparency and clarity are inherent in journalism, not only regarding the facts and the information contained in the publications, but also the ideas put into them. In this sense, the following question cannot help but arise: for sure, journalism is inherently an open system, however, is theoretical justification of journalism, which is presented in different societies and their social classes, as open as the system?

Epistemological roots of the problem can be seen in extant theoretical discordance of the 19th and 20th centuries when the meaning and the purpose of journalism were defined in conflicting terms - the press was thought to be a part of a social management system, on the one hand, and the organizer and provider of the public discourse, on the other. As a result,
one side of the theoretical justification of the social functions of journalism tended to elite exclusiveness of “those enlightened on true knowledge” and the other easily coexisted with principles of democracy and, more importantly, with democratic society potency to move towards openness. The question on the theory of journalism as an open system journeyed into the new century, with such a mismatch of understanding, both scientific and political,

In scientific practice, we accept the theory of journalism as an area open for discussion. According to the laws of system functioning, journalism does not exist in an isolated form. One way or another it overlaps the theory of information society, communication theory, etc. However, not all of the adjacent areas of knowledge can be properly used by theory of journalism, even if it was an intersystem exchange. For example, the ability of mass communication to manipulate mass consciousness does not appear unnatural. But, when such a statement is applied to journalism, it causes rejection. For us, a manipulator and a journalist are different occupations; manipulation and propaganda are things taking opposite poles of society. Additionally, it must be noted that there is no place for a person or idea to dominate or dictate in an open system. Therefore, one should take into account local conditions and realities when borrowing foreign values of scientific knowledge. Li Czin Cze says the same thing, referring to centuries of experience:

two and a half thousand years ago, Chinese sages gave an example of mandarins which could not be transplanted otherwise the fruits got inedible so that people did not borrow anything without thinking. The thing is that sweet mandarins in China usually grow to the south of the Yellow River, but if you put them to the north of the river, the fruit will have a pungent odour and be inedible. The reason is that there are different conditions on different sides of the river. (Czin Cze, 2008, p. 3)

Pluralism and equal rights of scientific ideas in journalism should be considered the primary components of analyzing mass media. The question of the universalism of journalism theory is thought to be one of the most complex issues. Is it possible for universal principles of journalism to exist? Should they be discovered and validated by the theory of journalism? Or should the theory of journalism absorb the very inconsistency of the world, all the antagonism of the political life of societies, in order to build on their basic modern understanding of the media.

This panel discussion was designed as part of an international conference “Media in the modern world. St. Petersburg readings,” on April 21-22, 2011. It was preceded by an expert survey among participants, which allowed the ordering of the discussion of the issue. Let us go through the questions (they appear in boldface letters and are numbered) and introduce the panellists: Marina Berezhnaya (St. Petersburg), Valeriy Berezin (Moscow), Igor Blokhin (St. Petersburg), Irina Erofeeva (Chita), Alexander Kazennov (St. Petersburg), Sergey Korkonosenko (St. Petersburg), Valentina Mansurova (Barnaul). The author of the present forum report is also included in the list. All these people are well-known Russian
professors whose research deals with different aspects of the theory of journalism, as well as the authors of numerous scholarly works.

1. Is the theory of journalism as an open system more like a bulk of diverse but related theoretical ideas on journalism or a consistent, open and integral forum of opinions on it?

I. Erofeeva opens the discussion. She relies on the idea that an “open system” is a category of synergy. “Openness and incompleteness” are notions of postmodernism and both are not just philosophical paradigms, but represent the reality of being and thinking like a modern person living in the information society Therefore, if we talk about current approaches to the theory of journalism, it is a set of diverse, perhaps controversial (non-linear) freely discussed theoretical concepts that are nevertheless of the same problem field. Another researcher, M. Berezhnaya, considers journalism as an institution of society, which operates under social, historical, economic, communicative and other conditions. Theoretical understanding of practice is influenced by these conditions. The theory itself can form a certain practice based on the social needs of the state, people or business interests. As a result, we have the variability of practices and theories that exist in the same professional field. It seems quite natural that provisions of the theory of journalism of the Soviet period conflict with modern concepts, and the theoretical postulates of the United States and China contradict each other. For example, N. Luhmann regards the mass media as a closed system, D. Rushkoff and J. Baudrillard point to reality virtualization, J. Habermas insists on the dialogical model. A single coordinate system (which allows observing the mutual influence and interaction of elements within it, but indicates only the key points of the operation) can provide transparency to the system under study.

S. Korkonosenko begins his argument with the assertion of the social nature of journalism as well. “I propose,” he says, “to proceed from the fact that the law of lifelikeness (journalism like life) holds central position among the laws of journalism.” Thus, one should first address the category of being or life, in order to correctly understand the structure of journalism theory. Thus, the natural connection of the following points will be restored; the existence of a person and society, then journalism as a way of existence of a person and society, then the theory of journalism. Journalism as non-being loses its content and value to the world as well as the theory that non-journalism loses its subject of the study. It is hard to imagine life as a kind of a flat and homogeneous formation with a code of consistent rules (however, such rationalistic experiments on society have repeatedly been carried out in theory and social practice, but no one can be proud of them). Life can be imagined only as a continuous change of pictures, colourful unpredictability, and collision of natural and exceptional phenomena. That is why journalism will never be subordinate to
any cliché; it will always be trying to break away from imposed “correctness”. The content of theoretical work aims to spot and show the live movement of the press. But this is not a passive observation, it is a desire to identify common ground among diverse things and offer models of the most harmonious interplay of life and journalism. Thus, the theory reveals regularities, proposes norms and generates innovations. Otherwise, science would be forced to stop in its development or at least there would be no space for different schools of thought.

V. Mansurova’s ideas on the theory of journalism overlap partially those of S. Korkonosenko. She believes the modern theory of journalism can be represented as a structural component of the general theory of an open system of social self-organization that accumulates the methodological approaches of natural and technical sciences, and the humanities. Considering journalism as an evolving structure (which is localized in a particular time and space, exists in the form of an activity and has the ability of development and self-development), the theory of journalism is a specialized scientific knowledge, based on the growing interdisciplinary mix of sciences.

The other experts claim the theory of journalism to be an open system too. V. Berezin understands it as a set of diverse but interrelated theoretical ideas about journalism. This is why “the theory of journalism, just like the mass communication theory (which is broader), is an open system”. I. Blokhin offers to structure our understanding of the theory of journalism as a set of three related levels. “First, there is a general theory of journalism which addresses the questions like ‘What is journalism?’ ‘What are its general functions?’ ‘What social and political environment reveals features of journalism as an instrument and institution?’ Second, there are social theories of journalism, i.e. structural functionalism of journalism, conflictology of journalism (Marxism, social Darwinism, etc.), and phenomenology of journalism. Third, there are special theories of journalism, such as journalism sociology, journalism political science, economics of journalism, cultural studying of journalism and etc.”

2. How significant are theoretical works of foreign colleagues for media research in Russia?

This particular aspect seems not to have caused much dispute, although there were some minor differences both in understanding the question and the given answers.

V. Mansurova discloses historical grounds of relations between foreign and Russian theoretical thought, particularly in journalism. “From the very outset,” she reminds, “the theory of journalism in Russia was formed on the basis of European Enlightenment, liberalism and then Marxism. In the middle of the 20th century, it was boosted by the Western classical sociological theory, which served as a ground for linear model of the
social system where journalism was considered to be a component for controlling society. In the second half of the 20th century, the system began to shatter and transform under the pressure of natural sciences and humanities of the ‘new generation’, such as hermeneutics, phenomenology, non-classical sociology (interpretive sociology), semiotics, cybernetics, information theory, and synergetics.”.

According to S. Korkonosenko, “on the whole, there are no foreign countries for science, but this axiom is realized differently in research practice in natural, social and humanities disciplines. As a rule, precise data from natural science experts acquires the status of knowledge, regardless of boundaries. But it is different with researches in the field of national economy, literature, or psychology. Thus, when studying media, one cannot ignore its deep relation with national, cultural, socio-political and mental context. We should remember that we have different media at least in terms of its historical evolution. It was clear to the authors of classic comparative works on the history of the press in different countries - L. Salamon, N. Novombergsky etc. This means that “foreign” knowledge first is accepted in Russia as a version that should be proved in local environment, excluding such documentary evidence as dates, names, number of participants of an event, etc.). At the same time, close acquaintance with the works and ideas of foreign experts is a must for a qualified researcher, in order to minimize repetitions. Therefore, we should support the publication of translations of works or their analytical reviews, just like the works of G. Bakulev and L. Zemlyanova and others, (not to mention that reading the originals is necessary). Unfortunately, there is a trend to compile foreign sources and present them as one’s own ideas. Let’s hope that we will get rid of both worshipping idols and being isolated.”

“Foreign theoretical developments in the field of mass communications and journalism,” M. Berezhnaya takes the floor, “are of importance, without a doubt, for modern media researches in Russia, and there are several reasons for that. First, we became involved in busy information processes much later. Now our technologies have fallen behind those of developed countries and that exerts negative influence on both journalism practice and comprehending information trends in Russia. In this situation, estimates conducted by foreign colleagues provide a basis for studying the reality, which is only emerging here. Second, for many years, we had a critical attitude to foreign experience that was stipulated by ideology and the lack of juxtaposing mass media practice. Third, Russian journalism and TV in particular borrowed Western approaches of presenting information with alacrity and thus created replicas of foreign programs and channels. The process of the adoption of journalism practice entails the adoption of theoretical research related to this practice. Our foreign colleagues have advanced much further regarding psychology of media, information processes and media convergence, the ethics of journalism.”
This view is also supported by I. Blokhin who believes that the developments of foreign colleagues are very important as we use their theoretical ideas and methodological approaches. V. Berezin states that modern mass communication research in Russia follows foreign media research and uses it as a ground for system development and practical application. This is due to the fact that there has only been a 20-year period of liberalization and socio-economic life in Russia.

In the course of discussion it becomes evident that Korkonosenko’s idea on the impossibility of “foreign” science is true. The faster scientists adopt new things achieved sometimes far away from Russia, the more effective current Russian developments become. This is, of course, when foreign experience is adopted creatively. I. Erofeeva underlines the national identity of media text on the one hand, and some psychological similarities in scientific discourse on the other. For instance, in the Russian psychology of journalism the emphasis is put on studying media text as a mean of communication, its philosophy, meanings and psychological aspects. American and German colleagues, (e.g. L. Cheskin, D. Bryant, S. Thompson, P. Lazarsfeld, H. Lasswell, D. Klapper, K. Manheim, P. Winterhoff-Spurk and others) long ago started their topical experimental research to capture the whole picture of “media text as an instrument of influence”.

3. Do you think that Russian journalism theory has had an impact on scientific discourse in other countries?

The promotion of Russian journalism theory in other countries faces the same problems there as the promotion of foreign theories in Russia.

I. Blokhin believes that “there is sense in raising the question of probable impact of Russian journalism experts on academic ideas of our colleagues in other countries, as there are unique conditions in every system journalism belongs to, although you cannot reject common trends as well, especially when foreign experts often express their own interest.”

M. Berezhnaya emphasizes “the fact that Russian (Soviet) journalism developed as a closed system. However, the sustainability of that system facilitated the creation of fundamental theory that retains stability under new conditions. Scientific understanding achieved by Russian researchers can constitute the basis for a common frame of reference when assessing current processes. It is impossible to study modern journalism practice without involving foreign experience; however, our domestic conditions require some adaptation of existing theories and their transformation within a different culture. Differences in terminology become a problem in this process - there is a trend in Russian research to interpret terms quite differently.

V. Mansurova has a different point of view. She believes that “the priceless contribution of Russian theory of journalism, which has not been appreciated, is considering
itself as a part of dialectical theory of activity mediating the diversity of a person’s relationship with the world. A clear definition of the functions, scope and methods of study, assessment and reproduction of reality made it possible to extract the science of journalism from the theoretical views on information and mass communication, the role of socio-political, economic and techno-spheric processes in society. In Russia, the theory of journalism genres proved that humanistic thinking plays a leading role when reproducing “man-related” objective reality. There is historical knowledge, which includes journalism as a crucial factor of the historical process of development and social regression.

V. Mansurova’s opinion was continued by I. Erofeeva: “We might be interesting to each other because of the national specifics, which I have already mentioned, of the journalism theory; asking a question on the impact of one school of thought to another, in my opinion, is not correct, there is mutual enrichment there. However, a meaningful dialogue is only possible if there is open communication and cooperation but, for some reasons, we have serious problems here.” Perhaps, I. Erofeeva means that some experts are ignorant of foreign languages when she says that “we have serious problems” with open communication and cooperation. V. Berezin understood the situation precisely that way, and this is why he thought the third question was not entirely correct. “As I see it, the impact of Russian experts is inconspicuous. This is a consequence of our being ignorant of foreign languages and the lack of financial support to participate in international academic media discourse.”

At this point in the discussion, the floor was given to S. Korkonosenko, who had been involved in international academic discourse on different aspects of journalism for many years. He says: “The easiest way would be to say yes, because of patriotic motives or the belief that the impact should be mutual. But, in order to give a definite answer, we must first determine whether there is such an original intellectual material in Russian academic institutions that deserves the interest of global research community. I have no doubt that there is such a material and I have often strived to prove that in my publications. The second part of the answer is related to the need of foreign experts to have intellectual import from Russia. It should not be us who must solve this problem, since we can only suggest to the world our publications of works in foreign languages and other forms of academic experience exchange. There are reasons to believe that representatives of the former Soviet republics (not all of them, of course) strongly tend to study works by Russian theorists as their countries and Russia had the same journalism practice, education and science, and language barriers are not yet so serious. On the other hand, the same experience makes us admit that leading positions of Russian researches have recently been taken by Western academics, and we are being sluggish and short-sighted instead of strengthening the genetically formed relations.”
4. Do opposing fundamental views of different academics boost or impede turning the theory of journalism into an open system?

“Specific ideological differences become less and less sharp,” V. Berezin believes, “but there are still problems with preserving the national identity of Russians in the field of mass communication theory. Also, there are problems with being tolerant of other peoples living with them. Also, they have different mentality regarding basic principles of journalistic work (cf. truthfulness, loyalty, humanity, ethics).

V. Mansurova’s opinion is that there are no possible obstacles. Creating the modern theory of journalism is difficult because of the inflexible approach to the use of interdisciplinary studies, shallow knowledge and the inability to use modern scientific methods. These penetrate the study of media, communication and creative processes in society. The fact that the achievements of Russian journalism theory are hidden from Western researchers is a serious barrier.

I. Blokhin firmly denies fundamental differences of views of journalism among researchers. “Even if we imagine that such dramatic differences exist (which I strongly doubt),” he says, “you can always reach consensus if applying the system approach’. M. Berezhnaya disagrees with I. Blokhin. Different fundamental views among researchers of journalism are an unquestionable fact to her. “Another question is that despite opposing views of media researchers”. She maintains that “such differences may improve the theory. The theory of journalism is inseparable from its practice, and therefore, academic theories appeal to specific professional experience. Systematic knowledge of the object under study does not rule out contradictions, and it would be strange to strive to create a single theory of journalism. There are new steps taken in the study of radically different views.

A single approach to crucial issues is impossible even among the small number of participants in this forum who know and understand each other’s academic views quite well. For example, in I. Erofeeva’s opinion, “the theory of journalism is a dynamically developing area of knowledge, determined by the media operation practice,” I. Erofeeva said. “This feature of theoretical discourse allows developing radically controversial ideas, and even, perhaps, initiating or justifying negative media practices. But the actual creative process in journalism puts everything in its place - false ideas that are far from actual journalism work are short-lived.”

This practice of ideologically diverse journalism is “lifelike”, as S. Korkonosenko would phrase it. There is a general social practice behind the practice of journalism and everyone must see it, because diversity among the social and cultural precepts of life leads to differences when journalism interprets spiritual values. Controversial interpretations of guiding precepts become a visible source for political debates, misunderstanding and
conflict. However, controversial interpretations of precepts mean a sometimes invisible and latent clash of social interests among political figures, which is the main reason of such a conflict. It must be emphasized that absolutizing the principle of determinism can lead to its vulgarization. Parties of the conflict can struggle for ideological reasons, not understanding clearly their own social interests. However, the ideal and material aspects of the conflict are not ontologically alien to one another; on the contrary, there is natural interaction between them.

5. Are there any new directions for analysis that have appeared in recent years in the Russian theory of journalism? If there are, what is their future?

“Yes, some have sprung up,” A. Kazennov said confidently. In general, they tend to focus on the study of journalism ties with society, the relation of journalism and social processes. These are sociological theory of journalism, political theory of journalism and some others. They have successfully developed, especially in St. Petersburg.

V. Mansurova believes that works in the field of sociology of journalism, phenomenological issues of journalism (St. Petersburg & Moscow schools of studies), psychology of journalism, media discourse theory, media economics, typologies of media multimedia journalism (Moscow school), linguistic media studies (Moscow, Voronezh, & Ural schools), the theory of genres (Voronezh & Moscow schools of studies) show progress in formulating theoretical ideas. In the system of theoretical ideas on journalism, there are directions that consider journalism in the context of communication studies, sociology, psychology, and political science. The concept of socio-journalism (i.e. socially determined press that in its turn determines the society), formulated by S. Korkonenko and V. Oleshko has become an important step for further development of this knowledge.

“The current practice of Russian journalism,” M. Berezhnaya says, “gives a wide range of objects to be studied. The trend towards creating new target audiences (e.g. niche broadcasting) is responsible for the need to explore specific thematic areas in journalism, information requests and needs of the audience, the new classification and typology of media products. Technological capacities of production and information transmission are responsible for the interest of researchers in media convergence, networking and Internet social resources, communications and creative capabilities of the audience. The economic aspects of the media and the production of information as a business also attract researchers. There has been a certain interest in the humanistic and social potential of journalism in recent years, as well.

I. Blokhin believes that the concept of a communicative personality, a role concept and a game concept (everything related to the study of a person within journalism, from the author to the reader) constitute new approaches for analysis, as well as the studies of the role
of new technology in journalism. I. Erofeeva addas that there have been fundamentally new
types of analysis of media text in recent years, and today there are significant studies
focusing on the specifics of modern information environment. The linguistic, semiotic,
substantial, psychological, cultural, philosophical, synergistic, sociological approaches are
developing especially rapidly.”

S. Korkonosenko decided to treat the issue more comprehensively. He is convinced
our theory of journalism in the strongest terms involves an “external” knowledge - from
foreign sources, as was mentioned above, and from neighbouring disciplines. This is a
benefit, although it requires some prudence and professional self-esteem in order not to be
dissipated in ‘strange lands’. Whole branches of academic knowledge about journalism have
been formed - legal, political science, cultural, media criticism, axiological, ethno-cultural
branches, etc. Nevertheless, interaction with the “serious” science occurs predominantly in
the upper layer of knowledge, where basic categories and theories are studied. It is more
difficult to include the fundamental discoveries made in neighbouring fields. The same can
be said about improving the potential of methodological theory of journalism - it is mostly
traditional, even conservative, including empirical methods repeated from one thesis to
another.

6. What pressing issues in the field of journalism and mass communications
have not yet been the subjects of scientific analysis?

“Unfortunately,” M. Berezhnaya said, “today’s researches have primarily a specialized
and fragmented nature, and there is a lack of comprehensive interdisciplinary studies which
require considerable financing and management. Such projects combining various research
methods will comprehensively examine the subject and give a real basis for a theoretical
understanding of the state of modern journalism.”

“The most pressing problem of the modern theory of journalism is the creation of a
system that would allow first to combine all possible paradigms and concepts (with the
possibility to add new ones, as in the periodic table), and second to analyse and solve
practical problems,” I. Blokhin said.

V. Mansurova agrees with him. “The lack of a holistic view of the methodological
basis of modern journalism is a considerable ‘gap’ in the theory of journalism, epistemology
and ways of reproducing reality, methods of integration of journalism in the system of the
self-management of society in terms of mass information intervention. The methodology of
studying the phenomenon of modern journalism as a system, as a process, and as a creative
activity needs to be seriously renewed. Finally, the philosophy of journalism should be
formed but not the philosophy of media as some authors try to offer to the scientific
community.
S. Korkonosenko gave an interesting summary of the theoretical analysis of the issues mentioned in the expert survey. He added to what had been already said on how little focus was put on the role and state of an individual who feels and behaves differently both in life and, therefore, in journalism. He continues that the boundaries of the theory of journalism are vaguely outlined; the categorical system is not developed and is often being ignored in many academic; the body of national classical theories is not compiled, and therefore we have to look at the theories offered by foreign authors.

The exchange of views was very interesting and provocative food for thought. It appears that there are two main paradigmatic approaches to the study of the journalism phenomenon. The first is based on the primacy of social needs and is generally inclined to the materialistic interpretation of the reality of the information sphere. The second is based on a specific focus on the information processes themselves and mass communications, i.e. it finds an explanation of the phenomenon of journalism in an idealistic sphere, but presenting it in some cases almost as material (the so-called phenomenon of virtual reality).

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MEDIA TEXT IN
SOCIO-CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT:
THE ANTHROPOCENTRIC ISSUE

BORIS YA. MISONZHNIKOV

This article studies the media as a function of human beings from ancient to developed civilizations. It considers it in a broad philosophical, ethnic and cultural context. The author stands up for the humanistic purpose of media system and media text, in particular. In this regard, the author supports those academic trends that are associated with the concept of anthropocentrism. The author also presents a critique of those media trends that deny the spiritual values of communication via mass information channels.

Keywords: media, medium, text, humanism, mythology

The category of media text has recently become deeply integrated into socio-cultural, academic and professional contexts. It has acquired additional semantic shades that require proper identification due to their joint humanistic importance. The category of media text reveals two components. First, the concept of text as the basis of a lexeme; the concept is indivisible and serves as a fundamental element of word formation. The second component is the media concept that acquires, quite surprisingly, morphological features of a prefix, and

BORIS YA. MISONZHNIKOV is professor, Theory of Journalism Department, School of Journalism, St. Petersburg State University (bmiss20550@mail.ru).
gives powerful semantic content to a single word-form. This, of course, is to a certain extent conventional.

Thus, on the one hand, the text is a semiotic phenomenon with an actual denotation. But in the given case of media text, it is not just a text but one that is determined in a certain way, with its own direction and specifics. The predicate component in a single word-form is represented by the media concept that points to the ontological form of the main subject, i.e. the text. One should agree with the statement that, “it is not the concept that predicates being, but it is being that predicates concepts” (Shylov, 2006). Media text develops and continues in the predicate component, makes itself stated, expressed, presented under certain conditions and in a certain quality. The media text concept predicates the main concept, i.e. the text and gives it an opportunity to show its features and quality signs. It is due to this predication that we consider the media text as an independent phenomenon of a specific kind.

It should be noted that the concept of media has a high degree of cohesion and due to this fact it is intensively used for generating new words and it is similarly a predicate component, cf. media product, media sphere, media holding, etc. However, the subject of this paper is the category of media text, with the main the focus on the media component. The identification of this very concept may give the key to understanding the meaning of media text and its concept.

The word “media” or “mediums” is in modern English a plural form of the word “medium” that can stand for “means”, “mode”, “environment”, “middle”, “psychic”, “intermediary” or “intermediation”. As a result of additional semantics, it can also refer to the medium of information transmission to the masses. Thus, media can be comprised of television, radio and newspapers that provide information to the public (Lord Quirk, 2000, p. 890).

It is interesting to look at the etymology of the term “media”. The stem of the modern term “media” reflects the Latin stem “medius” or “mid, internal (median, mediaevalist, medium, intermedium, medicine, medicament)” (Kosarzhewskiy, 1981, p. 275). However, it would be a mistake to use a narrow, pragmatic and utilitarian approach to the category of media without taking into consideration the diverse and comprehensive universal relations or, to phrase it differently, the universal paradigm. This implies anthropocenosis, which is the biocenosis that involves human beings. A biocenosis is a group of interacting organisms that live in a particular habitat and form an ecological community.

The category of media corresponds with Noospherical spirituality, “on the ground of noobiogeocenoses, Noospherical consciousness and dynamic balances of nature”, (Danilova & Kozhevnikov 2010, p. 175). Noospheric, defined loosely, is the sphere of human consciousness or human thought. It should be noted that a biocenosis of living elements evolves constantly and this is influenced by the anthropogenic factor when applied to
humans. During virtually all their existence, “biocenosis gradually change their structure” (Mitrushkin & Shaposhnikov, 1977, pp. 26-27). At the stage of Noospherical formation, humanity must solve the problem of adapting to the world, which is clearly changing at a rapid rate. The adaptive field of anthropology seems to be extremely important and is much more complex than it seems at first sight. The process of adapting to the reality of a changing world might is always occurring and its continued progression could reveal unexpected failures caused by completely unknown features of human nature. To summarize, a rapidly changing world could introduce or re-introduce forgotten human phenomena, such as how some cultures used to picture unity among humans. This constant evolution has clearly influenced media in past, ancient cultures and will continue to do so in the future.

The creation of a complex system of cult and cultural institutions in past cultures was the embodiment of the eternal and irresistible desire of humans to directly and effectively participate in the cosmic and planetary processes. These cultural institutions were a kind of collective mediums that provided communication between a clan or a community with cosmological entities and they were virtually a psychosocial adapter for helping people to join the world of cosmic rhythms.

This mediumistic act of these institutions was considered very important. For example, a high Prussian priest could act as a medium for his people and held the title of “griwe”. In different tribal dialects, the word could also mean — “blood”. A griwe helped provide spiritual communication between people and the cosmic world. A griwe “urged priests and people to properly worship gods, gave necessary advice and took all the sins of his tribesmen upon himself and ordered to burn himself publicly” (Snisarenko, 1989, pp. 220, 221). It is possible to make the claim that the ground of the “griwe” philosophy in Prussian culture was the concept of blood as the basis of living things. More elaboration on this concept of blood includes, “in the anthropomorphic model of the Universe, blood stands for water in microcosm”, “blood equated to the Universe”, “equals to the number as the symbol of the Universe”, appears as “invariable attribute of a sacral act” and “can be the symbol of birth,” (Makovskiy, 1996, p. 204). Note that a griwe’s actions had on the whole intermediary nature and they acted for the benefit of people.

It is typical that social and humanitarian roles of a medium differ in different cultures, along with the details of presentation, such as symbols on clothes and objects of religious rites. These can constitute a complex semiotic formation with its own peculiar way of presentation. However, the semantics of sign systems are similar in many ways, despite the difference of semiotic codes. A possible conclusion is these texts or “mediums” have, first of all, a cosmologic nature. Whatever names they have - a shaman, enchanter or wizard, mediums from different tribes have a lot in common. For example, their purpose in many cultures was to serve as an “intermediary for a spirit’s will” and be able to summon “souls
of their ancestors from the underground world” (Frazer, 1985, p. 334). The word “medium”, sometimes written in Latin, means an “intermediary” (Babkin & Shendezov, 1992, p. 856). The Russian language borrowed long ago the words “mediator” (intermediary), “mediation” (intermediation) (Filin, 1982, pp. 58-59). The notion medium corresponds to some extent with the concept of messiah. The latter without doubt has more global vision and mission and is more solemn and full of social pathos. A medium only provides communication, contacts, serves as an intermediary and an interpreter. However, the messiah, God’s messenger, also serves as an intermediary to some extent at a certain point of time, then sacrifices himself and saves others — “Messiah is a sufferer!” (Men`, 1983, p. 188).

A medium “had to know the constitution of the universe” as he “was a regular walkers into the other worlds”. Especially notable is that a medium, rather a shaman, “mastered the word. In the course of the rite, a shaman reported on his ‘trip’ and described everything that was going on. [...] A shaman resorted to the use of rich folk oral tradition, created his own style, and skillfully introduced new epithets and similes. ... Hardly was there a single nation that did not consider a poetic talent sent from above” (Basilov, 1984, pp. 64, 119, 120). Also we would like to point out the statement that; “An ecstatic trance makes a medium and seer out of a shaman, people seek for his help to solve everyday life problems. [...] The fact that ancient mediums and shamans had supernatural talents made them a strong authority in their nation” (Svetlov, 1971, pp. 51, 58). A medium may be a subject of some mystical action (Pruss, 1910, pp. 124-126) and may represent a mediating image of exclusive spiritual and artistic strength. Thus, invention of the cinema represents the “birth of a medium” that serves “as an ontologically-communicative tool” (Kazin, 2002, p. 74).

It is the word, however, that is always the basis of any form of mediation. The philological factor, or rather the factor of speech in loose interpretation of this category, is important not just in the light of the communicative possibilities. The philological factor is probably the most critical element of the spiritual system of individuals and, thanks to this factor, subjects can not only communicate, but also provide deep social integration through a system of texts. They can also incorporate themselves into a general system of humanitarian correlations. A dismissive attitude toward this factor could inevitably lead to the collapse of the basis of civilization and complete degradation. Unfortunately, we are to admit that the symptoms of this disease become more visible in the modern world.

The early stages of anthropogenic cosmography showed a specific sacrificial importance of the word (rather, a specifically organized text), and “the leading part goes to quoting sutra as a magical spell text which, when used properly, can heal, exorcise an evil spirit, pacify fierce deities, cause rain and drought” (Ermakov, 1994, pp. 51, 176). The word addressed to higher spheres becomes an embodiment of spiritual knowledge that allows one to transmit complex and sacrificial forms of thought. It appears as logos with a special position in the field of cosmography, which has its own hierarchy and ideological structure.
Cosmography may include concepts reflecting natural phenomena, human artefacts with common cultural connotation attributes and those that can be placed within ethnic limits, space. Cosmography could also include concepts with clear-cut ethnic connotations including pragmatonyms, described as “conditionally combined groups of nominative units that have denotations in the pragmatic sphere of human activity” (Bykova, 2005, p. 5). The everyday activities of human life serve as denotations in this case. All of them are reflected in cosmology and involved in the mediumistic practice.

Archaic religions with their complex ritual system involved “medium sessions” targeted at solving lots of important social and spiritual questions. For example, in one ethnic Chinese religion, “They had an important mission of regulating relations between the living and the dead who were not treated properly and therefore were evil-minded” (Maljavina & Kozhin, 1991, pp. 140-141). They could “foretell people’s fate by going to the sky to contemplate ‘celestial flowers’ symbolizing these fates. Besides, they were in charge of the souls of relatives who were not covered by the cult of the clan and children whose fate frightened parents” (Maljavina & Kozhin). Medium cults went deep into social relations of different nations, and it would be wrong to assume that they were exclusively an ancient phenomenon. There is a lot of evidence that medium cults are still in practice and represent samples of mediumistic text creation.

In regard to all mediumistic activity, it is possible to point at a separate operationally-communicative sub-system. Such a system could allow the actualization and effective performance of the function of psychological adaptation of an individual to the powers of nature. Subjects of this process are not just endowed with special innate qualities, but also are well prepared for their mission. They use proven methodology to reach specific levels of knowledge and relations. They also use this methodology for the adequate transmission of their own experience, and to take in information. The meaning and essence of a mediumistic factor has changed little with time.

Even today, people need an intermediary between themselves and the powers at different levels in the world; ones that are not easy to understand, that are clandestine and sometimes hostile. An individual needs the explanation of objects and phenomena and the interpretation of semiotic codes. An example could be the “cross tree” that “represents fertility and therefore is considered to be a symbol of life energy, eternal rejuvenation and rebirth,” and that in addition, “connects different worlds.” Such an interpretation is a very challenging task as “the intermediation of the ‘celestial axis’ is not understood literally, but anyway the concept of the mystical world tree that binds cosmos is the basic principle” (Evsukov, 1988, p. 157). Thus, a society needs an intermediary between itself and the incomprehensible sphere of spiritual life. Contacting the latter leads to a dangerous confrontation, conflict and “this conflict (the encounter of an individual with the other world) is mysterious, scary, and mainly tragic”.

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The mediumistic system is very often complicated by assisting subjects and a respective hierarchy. These are, for example, “informers” or “correspondents” who get information from the subjects of an event and transmit it to a higher researcher who is directly engaged in analytic activity (Pomeranzeva, 1975, pp. 153, 50, 114). As we can see, in developed societies of today’s world, the mediumistic problem is resolved, as a rule, by professional researchers who are experts in different fields of exact sciences and humanities, along with spiritual sphere experts, such as priests, painters, men of letters and journalists. Such professionals constitute, in a certain way, the modern equivalent of mediumistic institutional formations, the social role of which can hardly be overestimated. As we have discussed in earlier passages, these formations are based on tremendous spiritual experience accumulated over thousands of years and their activity harmoniously corresponds with that of ancient mediums. The forms of cognitive activity, of course, are now completely different. Modern mediumistic institutions are quite developed social structures with extensive methodological and organizational experience and communicative potential. Their activity is standardized. The methods in use are tested and systematized.

Standardizing methods in such a way contributes to stable effectiveness in the activity of these modern mediumistic institutions. However, such systematic approaches can often corrupt the creativity of these mediation subjects. Mass media, which produces a diverse array of media texts, is distinguished among mediumistic institutions by a number of characteristics. These could include an unlimited thematic range, presenting text according to universalism and highly suggestive potential. Another major ability of mass media includes the ability to directly influence the hearts and minds of recipients. This is possible because mass media creates and closely presents different news stories using a workable medium that is easier for the general public to understand.

Modern mass media, when regarded as a mediumistic institution, manifest their inherent properties and characters on a very large and systematic scale. In contrast to ancient mediums (which were isolated and emerged spontaneously), modern subjects of mediumistic institutions are deeply integrated into the common global communications network, through tools like national TV stations, global subscriptions to both newspaper and magazines and the World Wide Web. Mass media of today’s world stay within a clearly structured system with both horizontal and vertical structural connections.

Proserskij makes the case about the peculiarity of the complexities of media “information moves through the communications network in such a way that sense appears in every intersection zone of information streams. This creates a pluralism of cultures in a single culture where national traditions can strangely combine with those imported through media,” (Proserskij 2003, p. 53). Also, the modern media system is standardized on a global scale and this includes linguistic factors. Some national newspapers and magazines are published in English, for instance, a St. Petersburg newspaper, “St. Petersburg Times” or
“Swiss Review of World Affairs”, a Swiss monthly supplement of the “Neue Zürcher Zeitung”.

The technology of storing information, processing it and further transmitting it has improved greatly over the past century. For example, text creating processes have become more effective, thanks to rationalized approaches. Pragmatic textual facilities have also grown as a result of the extensive use of various semiotic codes; joint text complexes are almost always used simultaneously.

Thus, print media has visual iconic, symbolic and index texts. Electronic media also have other forms of presentation, for example, non-literate ones. Today’s media system as a mediumistic institution is distinguished by the fact that it is possible to conceive and estimate the media process, as such. Experts analyze its effectiveness, the methodological aspects, and its place in the system of social relations. Media criticism has fairly high professional and social potential. Criticism of the media of today is allowed to point at corresponding priorities in the functioning of the global media system.

There is no doubt that the most important aspect of text creation in almost every national media subsystem, at least at the level of public statements, is objectivity. This highly influential aspect can be divided into three components - reliability, clearness, and consistency of coverage. These components are created by such professional journalistic qualities as competence, responsibility and honesty (Bopre, 1993, pp. 68-78). Objectivity is a dialectical category that imbibes certain qualitative features in other categories that impact journalism.

A commitment to this focuses journalists and editors on cognitively practicing objectivity by using restrained estimates and intentional tolerance; “Just like the theory of science, the science of communication has authors who stand up for understanding the objectivity of covering events not as an accurate reflection of reality (as it really cannot be checked), but as a reflection commensurate with events contacted during the process of obtaining knowledge and its presenting” (Donsbach, 1997, p. 88). And in fact, objectivity reveals itself not in the “mechanic” transmission of information, but in the transmission of the “true” essence of a news-worthy phenomenon, by reproducing its qualitative level, approved in correlation with other phenomena.

We also call attention to the following statements; “Be careful with names, dates, numbers, and facts! […] When does the government become a regime and vice versa? Who is a freedom fighter and who is an insurgent or a terrorist? Who defines this?” (Golombek & Schlüter, 1990, p. 134). In other words, there is “external objectivity” that has all the formal features of real objectivity, but it is only hollowness, virtually a simulacrum, since the “external objectivity is not complete objectivity” (La Roche von, 1975, p. 126). There is some sense in the following conclusion, “Thus, let us not be ceremonious, not defend
'pure information’ because of some fear, but make it popular and save it for the democratic process” (Rager, 1993, p. 17).

There is a question of factual accuracy of the accounts of events and the relevance of the given imperative in the journalistic text. There is, of course, only one answer - journalism needs very precise facts. Journalism thrives, thanks to facts. At the same time, a huge number of para-factual factors of different systems affect the semantics of the text, distorting it at one degree or another. Complex mechanisms of pragmatics come into action - they make subjective the ideal process of reflection and semiotic formalization. These may be temporary factors, situational, political, social, exclusively personal ones, etc. If there is too much of an overload of these outlying factors, the negentropy threshold will be overcome and the facts can lose their apodictic nature. There could then be an annihilation effect, the result of which could be a completely different fact, which corresponds with the objective fact only externally.

In other words, the transformation of the level of expression in any given news fact could lead to a significant transformation in the level of content, and the entire textual continuum will be distorted. These are all the reasons for discussing the false meaning of a text or its fragment. This is truly “false phrases are all the same, they mean nothing” (Brandenstein von 1926, p. 518). The consequences of implantation of these fakes in the field of the media text under the aegis of the unshakable “objective fact” can be fatally destructive.

A developed society cannot exist without mass media. However, there is a danger of its disruptive impact because “dialogue and communication - and thus the media - only destroy the internal logical relationships between different logical systems and replace them with external ones that have nothing to do with their intrinsic nature and, in their turn, ideological” (Grojs, 1988, p. 56).

In modern society, mass media, mass newspapers, magazines and electronic channels play a much more important mediumistic role compared to individual mediums, if one is considering the mediumistic role in its historical and traditional context. Mass media is rather a substitution for medium cults; they are full of predictions, fortune telling, horoscopes and mystical correspondence, which are thought up directly in editorial offices. Their main distinction from ancient mediums is that the ancients (just as some modern individual mediums) have sincerely believed in their mystical abilities, whereas editors basically resort to obvious juggling with one goal - they want to attract credulous readers and expand their audience for profit. Thus, they introduce a system of non-equivalent substitutions of media texts, at least most of them.

In earlier folklore, objects of natural origin (a hill, tree) and specially manufactured artefacts (e.g. a roadside cross) were presented in texts as “objects which played the role of a mediator in mythological systems.” Now these peculiar material indexes of sacral
continuum, markers that serve for indicating topos, are complemented with and often substituted by virtual indexes. The medium is replaced with an informant that is positioned as the original source of the myth or coexists with it. Topos virtualization causes unpredictable consequences—one picks up speed, breaking the ontological chain, the links of which have been forged in the context of human culture for thousands of years. An individual ceases to act as a subject that generates respective mythologemes and engages in familiar creative activity. Instead, he or she gets the role of a mere product ready for the consumer, a passive recipient in a hyper-trophied sense of the word. It can be stated that “mass communications (calendars, periodical press, cinematography) play a specific role in the formation of modern European and contemporary utopia and fantasy” (Gladysh, 1994, p. 87). The ready product consumers are not only passive regarding all the spheres of life, but also they are reconciled to their dependent position and become more and more integrated with an environment full of unforeseen events and phenomena.

It was folk art that mainly resolved the adaptive issue. Folk art perfectly interpreted the world with all its contradictions and tragedy and sought to prepare people for a fatal accident or possible manifestation of blind and violent forces of nature. All this was reflected in astonishing and sometimes sophisticated fantasy, in creating a complex and effective impact image system. The social and everyday role of the creation of folk art was to “warn” people about possible encounters with supernatural beings, to inform about their properties in order to teach how to neutralize harmful actions of these creatures” (Zinoviev, 1987, p. 395). Metaphorically, these dangerous creatures represented the everyday traumas that could befall a person in everyday life, such as a drowning or loss of a limb.

In some cases, mass media texts have lately tried to play this same role, although in a special form, in a different social context, e.g. explaining the cosmic mysteries, the traces of ancient civilizations adapted to cosmic rhythms, etc. Mediumistic activity has always operated in information patterns, in those or other forms and volumes. A medium, as a rule, considered owning information as his or her absolute prerogative, with its storage and use at their discretion. Often this was done secretly and for mercenary motives. Information not only allowed one to be a medium but also it gave more power to those who owned it. Therefore, it often was the subject of underhand manipulation. Thus, the Gnostics were acquainted with the secret doctrines of early Christianity. They interpreted Christian Mysteries in accordance with pagan symbolism. They concealed their secret information and philosophical achievements from the profane and taught a small group of specifically chosen individuals (Hall, 1993, p. 63).

There is a lot of accumulated experience regarding genesis, the cyclical process of information mediation, and its systematization. The research conducted by L. Svitich is of particular interest. Svitich explored mythological mediators (the gods), actual verbal communication mediators, professional informants and written language mediators The
author stresses that “Noosphere should not be occupied with ‘dirty’ destructive information” (Svitich 2000, pp. 169-171).

As for modern media text practice, we would like to note that the cultivated spiritual and educational component, however, is sporadic and does not play an important cognitive role. This is because these projects (ones with a heavier emphasis on spirituality and education) often have a monetary background and they focus primarily on intriguing and enticing recipients. This promises a direct material benefit.

Consider the mediumistic function of television in terms of mass media entertainment. “The word ‘television’ is means ‘to see at a distance’, which has mythological implications. A long-cherished dream that was reflected in the tales of different nations came true. Fairy-tale characters could see at a distance using ‘magic mirrors’, ‘magic balls’ and other magical devices (Kirillova, 2006, p. 33). The author goes on to note, “In fact, that which we see on the screen is not our ‘vision’. But the psychology of a viewer is that they accept someone else’s opinion as their own. Arguments are just a pretext, a starting point for forming a television myth” (Kirillova, 2006, p. 33).

The creation of reality TV in the media industry has given rise to “identical (cloned) programs that have recently hit inexperienced Russians”, and a “TV game creates the illusion of life, the effect of participation, and this attracts the attention of its audience” (Kurganova, 2004, pp. 13, 14). Thus, we can conclude that mass media, particularly television as a specifically sophisticated and aggressive medium, seek to perform the mediumistic function through specifically adapted textual systems. However, modern-day mass media accomplishes this in a completely different way as compared to the subjects of ancient folk beliefs, i.e. mediums, mediators between earth and cosmos. Certainly, it is not just about the differences in the technological equipment of the time periods, but about the fundamental differences in ideology and spiritual guidelines, goals and objectives. Finally, this notion is about a moral position. Modern media have usurped the role and place of ancient mediums in the system of social relations. Modern media have replaced the sincere, genuine mediation of the ancients that was usually devoid of mercantilism with manipulative mediation. Mediums of the ancients were free of that which demoralizes the spirit and that which is full of greed and passion for acquisition. Earlier mediation involved not just a vision, but contemplation, insight into cosmological phenomena and rhythms. Geometric space was a very special element of the habitat (a formal analogue of the modern window to the world, or the screen); it was becoming a sacred object of worship, and was not intended for neglect or short consideration. Its perception was carried out as a vital and vibrant ritual that had a distinct sacred nature.

Take, for example, the contemplation of the mandala, of which the most typical design “is an outer circle with an inscribed square”. The mandala is presented “as a model of the universe... and as a means of achieving depths of the subconscious in a ritual or meditation...
an individual who engages in meditation or participates in this ritual as the leader puts himself at the centre of M. (Mandala. — B. M.) and looks forward to a deity, a divine spirit that should descend on this person” (Toporov, 1992, pp. 339, 340). The mandala is a wonderful example of how a form begins self-development, own some content, become sacred and serves as a mediumistic channel. The mandala has the function of organization and comprehension and the function of overcoming the external and internal chaos (Odainyk, 1996, p. 140). The following statement about the mediumistic nature of the mandala is interesting; “An adept, immersed in contemplation, should reproduce in himself all represented on the M. (i.e., on the mandala. — B. M.), merge with the deity placed in the centre, and then reach the highest level of contemplation, connecting with the absolute. [...] Carl Jung discovered M. in dreams and visions of his patients suffering from various forms of mental illness, and believed it was some psycho-cosmic system that provided the universal rhythm that combined macro and microcosm” (Djad`kov, 1997, p. 212-213). The geometric space of a screen, that produces a corresponding media text, perhaps, has not entirely lost its sanctity in the eyes of viewers, at least in terms of its deep archetypal code that makes this feature attractive. But due to this substitution of the motivational concept it actually turned from a mediator into a subject of hard manipulative actions.

Due to the fact that there is now is a computer civilization, the problem of regulating this collision is especially a pressing one. “As reasonable humanity (at least of philosophers, scientists, humanists, artists) have realized not only the positive value of electronic communications, but their devastating effects, it is now necessary for every person to understand (and, again, not without the help of philosophy) the radical movement of emphasis, it is not electronic means that should manipulate a person’s consciousness, but people should use them efficiently and reasonably” (Manikovskaja, 2004, p. 123). Perhaps this sentence seems now random and unimportant, but we can assume that it will gradually become more important and urgent, and at some point begin to play a fundamental, essential and decisive role in the field of anthropocenosis.

The process of cognition, which has never been easy, was accompanied by painful and even tragic accidents. Cognition for humanity will become even more complicated. This requires awareness and specific study. Mass media could play an important role in this adaptive aspect. Today’s media, however, acts the other way, as we have already mentioned. They produce media texts that often exert a destructive influence over an individual and they are charged with new phobias and destructive situations. Mass media, especially those show-cased using electronics, reproduce the effect of a theatre.

However, a spectator becomes (let us use actionist vocabulary) a social actor (Irshorn, 1999, p. 39-49) who is virtually involved in risky activity on the screen against his or her own will and, (potentially) could become an object of exploitation, with little defence. The spectator, in other words, is not just watching, but also takes part in the drama of mass
media. If an ancient medium was called upon to act for the benefit of people, a modern one is extremely cynical and self-interested. He is not worried about the neurotic condition the social actor is in. In certain cases, the spectator might be seriously shocked. The closer we see the deceased and their remains, the more of their unhappiness we absorb automatically. Here is the case with the media - it makes the depressed even more depressed and the aggressive more aggressive (Riehl-Heyse, 2002, pp. 134, 135). The social actor finds sometimes himself or herself on a stage full of misanthropy and hangs between “critical and clinical”, trying to understand the notion of this “human disease” and “human carrion” (Derrida, 2007, pp. 277, 299, 300).

As can be seen, the thing is not about the object of reflection but about how it is done, from the standpoint of humanism or traumatic misanthropy. This form of reflection in media texts can reach a total dehumanizing point. We must understand that the spiritual and physical organization of man is the result of a long evolution; it is a fragile and easily broken mechanism that requires careful and cautious treatment. Also, we should take into account that the burden of information and psych sociology on a person during his or her Noosphere integration will unavoidably grow throughout time. Human reserves are not unlimited, especially since they are unlikely to be renewed through the biological and evolutionary way. There is a definitive statement by a genetic expert S. Inge-Vechtomov — “the biological evolution of the human is over, the brain is evolving not biologically but due to the hereditary signal. This is a social evolution” (Dolgosheva, 2007). This statement corresponds with an opinion that the dominant influence of biology has “ended” on humans, but at the same time, it continues. The biological nature of humans can continue to go up to a new, higher level, while it integrates and surpasses all the previous levels (Hollitscher, 1975, p. 110). There is no reason to disbelieve this statement. Although this matter cannot stand any categorical assertion, we rather cannot deny that something is happening in biological evolution, though very slowly, implicitly, beyond our understanding and identification.

Thus, the gradual accumulation of anthropological expertise and the ability to creatively and effectively use it is a necessary condition for the construction of Noosphere reality. Otherwise, humanity simply cannot stand the huge intellectual, psychological and even physical tension associated with a complete change of lifestyle. On the whole, this is a security issue. Even if humanity survives, there will be a great and most complex task to save its own humanitarian identity. In this respect, there should be a deep, meaningful modification of mass media and media text.

One of the imperatives is to go from myth-making to real problems of the world order and to understand that “the rhythm of the myth, which condemns to the catastrophe and is shown by all the great historical narratives, is not the only one and cannot remain the only one” (Kamper, 1997, p. 171). Modern media texts, both written and unwritten, are poisoned
with mythologization, spreading of escapism and rampant reproduction of dehumanizing ideologies. This corresponds to the interests of a very narrow circle of persons and at the same time exerts a detrimental effect on the whole human community. To turn to the essential needs of humanity is possible only if we turn to demythologization. Claiming that “a specific feature of a literary text as an aesthetic unit of communication is its absolute anthropocentricity” (Domashnev, Shishkina & Goncharova, 1983, p. 23), we can affirm that media text should have this quality, namely, to be oriented solely as a reflection of reality in humanitarian terms.

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MEDIA STYLISTICS: THE NEW CONCEPT OR NEW PHENOMENON?

LILIYA R. DUSKAeva

This article describes the modern media stylistics field of research in Russia. Media stylistics is based on the methodology of functional stylistics, which studies speech along with other intrinsic properties of people’s activities and consciousness. In this respect, the field is developed in close connection with epistemological, deontological, political, sociological, psychological, praxeological, culture-related research of the media. It is shown that changing conditions in the rapidly developing world of mass communication require extending the horizons of research into stylistics to allow for analysing media text with its complex integrative nature.

Keywords: functional style, interdisciplinary method, speech consistency, media text, speech genre

In this article we will try to answer the question of what the contemporary media stylistic field of linguo-stylistic research in Russia is and what problems it faces today. This task

LILIYA R. DUSKAeva is professor, Theory of Journalism Department, School of Journalism, St. Petersburg State University (LRD2005@yandex.ru).
makes it necessary to look at the history of linguo-stylistic media studies in Russia. Academician V. Vernadsky wrote:

The history of science is to be revised critically by each academic generation and it is not just because the storage of knowledge changes, new documents are discovered and new methods of restoring the past are invented. Certainly not! It is necessary to rework the history of science because, thanks to the development of modern knowledge, one thing of the past becomes valuable and another loses its significance. Every generation of researchers looks for and finds in history the reflection of scientific theories of the time. Moving forward, the science not only creates new things, but also inevitably revises old ones, that what has passed. (1922, p. 122)

These thoughts are true regarding the article’s problem, i.e., in order to understand new challenges for scientific knowledge, you have to understand and evaluate that which has passed.

The turn in linguistic studies from the study of language as a whole to the study of its “operation” led to a rapid development in functional stylistics in Russia in the second half of the 20th century. The foundations of this field were laid in the writings of V. Vinogradov, G. Vinokur, M. Bakhtin, L. Yakubinsky and members of the Prague Linguistic Circle. The start of the field was also stimulated by the discussion of stylistic problems in the journal Voprosy Yazikoznaniya (Questions of Language Study) (1954-1955). The functional-stylistic theory was formed in the writings of M. Kozhina, A. Vasil’eva, B. Golovin, V. Kostomarov, O. Sirotinina and K. Gauzenblas, A. Edlichko, M. Jelinok, I. Kraus, and J. Mistrik in the 1960s and 1970s. Functional stylistics was formed as a theory of macro styles. The speech studies approach became one of the most basic approaches to the functional style. This style was described as “A peculiar speech of different social forms relating to a certain social activity sphere and a corresponding consciousness form created by linguistic means in this sphere and a specific speech order with a certain stylistic nuance” (Kozhina, 1977, p. 42).

The methodologically importance of carrying out comprehensive interdisciplinary research in speech studies was emphasized in the 1960s, cf.:

Such issues as the ‘reflection’ of social and psychological aspects in speech, mind and speech, extra-linguistic foundations and the reasons for speech variety and others are the focal point for the functional stylistics. Therefore, a fruitful, promising solution to these problems depends largely upon an integrated study by a number of sciences, union of linguistics and philosophy, sociology, aesthetics, literature, psychology, physiology and mathematics. (Kozhina, 1966, δ. 13-14)
This idea became, in subsequent years, a ruling one in functional-stylistic research. The means of expression in different levels of the language system, their stylistic meaning and nuances (called ‘connotations’) are the subject of functional stylistics studies. Also, the patterns of language use in different spheres and communicative situations are the focal subject of this field and there is a peculiar speech organization, specific to every sphere, as a result (Kozhina, 1970).

Works on journalism style, the style of the media, i.e., periodicals, radio and television at that time are notable among functional-stylistics studies in the 1970s and 1980s. Wordsmiths pointed at the signs within speech, not linguistic signs, but more systemic signs, when they analysed the specifics of journalism speech. The system of journalism speech is conditioned by the structural principles of alteration, which includes expression and standards (Kostomarov, 1971), and social evaluation (Solganik, 1973). Such structural principles have an extra-linguistic basis. This is because they can and are conditioned by a functional bi-unity of style. This type of style is influenced by the subject, which the journalist is covering. This influence can happen both by information on the topic and the specific social nature of the journalist’s topic.

Extra-linguistic factors of the functional style of journalists are defined in the works of this period (Kozhina, 1977; Solganik, 1976; Vasilyeva, 1981, 1982). The specific selection of lexical factors (Solganik, 1976) and grammatical factors (Rogova, 1978; Shvec 1979) means complying with the given structural principles. Sub-styles (Kozhina, 1977; Vasilyeva, 1983) and social types (Lysakova, 1983), were identified and described in the styles of various journalists. At the first stage of functional-stylistic studies, different components that constitute a text in journalism were studied. One of these components included pre-text units at different levels. Researchers began to study the textual organization of journalists in the 1980s. The researchers’ focus changed when they turned to text units and composition (Kajda, 1982, 1989; Mamalyga, 1987; Majdanova, 1987; Odinco, Krylova & Kozhin, 1983). The style itself was described from the viewpoint of text categories (Matvejeva, 1990; Muravjova, 1980). Among research tasks posed and solved at the time was the study of various journalist styles as a system. This traditional genre was studied, in addition to other, separate genres of journalism.

These genres included the study of notes, reports, (Slavkin, Solganik), essay, pamphlet, (Kajda, Kohtev, Krasnova, Vakurov), and the stylistic specificity of television (Svetan). Functional stylistics began to interact with other speech-related disciplines. These included pragmalinguistics (Stepanov), psycholinguistics (Leontjev, Sorokin, Tarasov), sociolinguistics (Deshiriev, Shvejcer), and linguosocial psychology (Dridze). These scholars also turned to studying the use and operation of language in the media. Such interaction is very productive because it expands the understanding of the nature of speech influence in this sphere and it could improve ways of achieving its effectiveness, cf.: “With
an interdisciplinary approach it is possible to see new objects for analysis, new dimensions of existence and operating of the studied entities, and most importantly, new opportunities for explanation of recorded observations and facts” (Bazylev, 2005, p. 13).

Socio-political changes in Russia in the late 1980s and early 1990s showed themselves quite quickly in the style of journalists and this corresponded with the political and ideological forming of social consciousness. The stylistic image of journalism changed and, consequently, journalism text did as well. The traditional system of journalism underwent a significant transformation. However, the dialogue and informational genres took over the leading part in coverage by many institutions of mass media. Investigative genres emerged in journalism. Speech style forms, (such as public meeting speech), arose in the writings of Russian journalists. An advertising sub style was formed.

Researchers faced a new challenge at that moment. A wide range of linguistic works was dedicated to understanding ongoing changes, e.g. Chernyshova 1997; Duskayeva, 1995, 2003; Duskayeva, & Kozhina, 1993; Kajda, 1992; Kakorina, 1993; Kara-Murza, 1996; Kon’kov, 1995; Kostomarov, 1994; Lazareva, 1994; Majdanova, Soboleva & Chepkina, 1997; Rechevaja agressija, 1987; Solganik, 1994; Vinogradov, 1996). The works by these authors reveal semantic changes in Russian speech. These works also show the specifics of social expression as witnessed in multiple publications and programs. Also studied was the change in stylistic tone when covering political issues, (as a result of the change in information norm of the style). Researchers in these works also defined approaches to describing the stylistics in new publication types and programs.

During the 1990s, there was a wide spread trend in which journalists shifted from the traditional linguistic approach to approaching journalism text as an integrated structure with graphic and semantic borders. The work by E. Lazareva particularly shows the text is not only a separate speech product, but also a corpus of texts on a page or in a newspaper. The author underlines that “A newspaper, just as a set of newspapers, is a continuum comprising interrelated parts, i.e. article texts” (Lazareva, 1994, p. 56).

Through analysis of stylistic features, the researcher tries to reveal the structural principles of journalism, not only in the general sense but also in special cases. He also attempts to reveal these principles when developing a stylistic concept of a publication.

The concept (model) is formed through the interaction of applied speech and compositional means. The stylistic concept of a publication is formed by three groups of attributes: genre, structure and expressiveness. This genre model assumes a number of genre forms used by a newspaper and text features as formative signs. Structural attributes of the stylistic concept of a newspaper contain characteristics of page creation, compilation and separate text. It is supposed to analyze not only expressive means within separate texts, but also within a header complex (Lazareva, 1994, p. 56). However, Lazareva considers the stylistic model separately from two others; thematic and graphic models of a publication.
It seems that analyzing text stylistics without any relation to its content and meaning can limit the analysis. Meanwhile, the idea of the integrative relationship between texts within a newspaper is a productive and promising one.

Pondering over the results of linguistic research conducted on mass media in the 1990s, we would like to highlight a few points. First, the research during this period verified basic functional and stylistic ideas expressed in the previous period. Particularly, the works of this period tend to have a broad interdisciplinary approach to linguistic studies in the field of mass media.

By the end of the 1990s, the observation of social reality reflected in the language of mass media had led to setting a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach as the main means of analysing a journalism text. This approach assumes the linguistic aspect should be studied in close relation with the political, sociological, psychological and cultural theories of mass media. It is noteworthy that this interdisciplinary approach has become a leading one in theoretical journalism research. Philosophy, ethics, epistemology, psychology, political science and sociology of journalism (mass media) developed in those years.

Linguistic research was built into the system of theoretical journalism and theoretical communicative research. Due to that fact, it became possible to spot cause-and-effect relationships in the general picture of mass media. Indeed, the results of stylistic studies show the consequences of what happens in the media system, cf.: “The stylistic analysis is to identify how adequately the speech fabric transfers the content of an utterance, aims and intentions of the speaker (the author) and how the speech style helps to penetrate deeply into the content. In this respect, extra linguistic factors being not a language one, (and linguistic), nonetheless, becomes to some extent the subject of the study” (Shmelev, 1977, δ. 41). Being a part of mass media system studies, stylistics becomes media stylistics.

Mass media language studies became one of the most promising fields of study. These studies have been intensively conducted in Russia in the linguistic departments of schools of journalism. This integration was a result of the practical need to teach future language experts to be conscious of the use of language in their speech.

In connection with the intensification of mass media language studies in Russia, there have been talks about the development of media linguistics (Dobrosklonskaja, 2005). The field of studies focusing on journalism text, now called media text, has rapidly developed within both functional and stylistic research. We would like to emphasize mass media stylistics developed along with scientific speech stylistics (Koturova, 2010; Krasilnikova, 1999; Lapp, 1993; Salimovsky, 2001; Trosheva, 2001), formal language stylistics (Duskaeva & Protopopova, 2010; Egorova, 2008; Ivakina, 1995; Sologub, 2009; Shirinkina, 2003) and religious language stylistics (Bobyreva, 2007; Gosteeva, 1996; Ickovich, 2010; Krilova, 2003; Krysin, 1996; Salimovsky, 2007).
Media text has various aspects that have not yet been studied or have been rediscovered due to the changes in the media and this is in the focus of media stylistics research today. The following are several works or authors focusing on this: Annenkova, 2005-2010; Chepkina, 2000; Dronayeva, 2003; Duskaeva, 2004; Jazyk sovremennoj, 2005; Kara-Murza, 1996-2010; Karpova, 2010; Kostomarrov, 2005; Lysakova, 2005; Majdanova & Kalganova, 2006; Popova, 2004; Publicistika i informacija, 2000; Russkaja rech’, 2007; Slovo i kljuchevye, 2004; Smetanina, 2002; Solganik, 2003, 2005; Surikova, 2007, 2009, 2010; Svetana-Tolstaya, 2007; and Vepreva, 2003. This indicates there have been advances in the media stylistic field of studies within functional stylistic research. Such advances have found new solutions to old problems and raised new issues. New issues include items such as the relationship between linguistic and extra linguistic aspects in media text organization.

New issues could also include their social typology (Lysakova, 2005) and genre typology (Donskov 2004; Duskaeva 2004), along with media text development patterns and structural principles (Duskaeva, 2000). Other new topics include the concept sphere of these patterns and principles, along with architectonics and composition (Kajda, 2010; Slovo i kljuchevye, 2004). In other words, these properties of media text contribute to the impact and effectiveness of journalism. New analysis of Russian advertising has also become an important aspect of media stylistic studies (Kara-Murza, 1996-2010). The analysis of media texts under the influence of cultural factors has had interesting results in recent years (Annenkova, 2007-2011; Smetanina, 2003). They have studied the stylistic effectiveness of media text in multiple aspects, taking into account different features stipulated by the hierarchy of extra linguistic factors.

According to Annenkova, “stylistic research has more and more focused not on modern fiction, but on the language of newspapers, magazines, television, radio and advertising... ‘Fly-by-night’ journalism turns out more often to be ‘eternal’ as for its impact on people’s mind and, consequently, the position it takes when creating a new value system” (2005, p. 99). Another scholar adds a similar statement: “The influence on society, development of linguistic preferences, behaviour, literary norm exerted by the media is incomparable either to the language of fiction, or to any other style. The nature, functions and quality of the media language serves as a factor that unites all the classes and groups of native speakers” (Solganik, 2010, p. 266). Solganik comes to the conclusion that “Finally, the media language has become a main factor for development of both national and literary language” (Ibid.).

All the experts agree on one thing; the on-going development of the Russian language and its stylistic system are under the aegis and influence of how the media speaks. This powerful influence is happening in part because the linguistic conscious of mainstream Russian society associates and accepts the way media speaks as the literary and stylistic norm of the day. And this is the most important feature of the modern cultural and speech
situation in Russia at the present time. Multiple examples of this are happening at present in the national language of Russia.

At the turn of the 21st century, stylistic research into the media language focused on the text (speech) (as a text type, L. D.) in its own nature, “not as material for extracting and creating a language system model” (Kozhina, 1985, p. 6). This very approach was used to develop the genre and concept of journalism texts (Duskaeva, 2004). The concept was created taking into account methodological principles developed within the functional stylistic research on journalism style. Such methodological principles included the unity of linguistic and extra linguistic components of speech, the relation between journalism style and political/ideological form of public consciousness and a corresponding communication field. Other principles included the active approach to the functional style of speech, goal-setting of a certain text or a group of texts as a determinant of speech peculiarity and a system approach to the analysis of speech material.

All previous linguistic works that described text as a unit of communication focused only on the journalist and his or her intentions, while the source of the news was ignored. On the contrary, they chose the dialogical cycle with its interactive nature as a minimal unit of speech in the course of communication. Consequently, they chose a minimal unit of text segmentation when considering the communication process as a constant dialogue. The analysis of journalism texts is aimed at studying the dynamics as such; text formation in the media. As a result, researchers found that media text develops the interaction between the attitudes of the journalist and the source.

This interaction is provided mainly by three ways reflected and structured in respective dialogical units of newspaper texts; 1). a question — the answer — correcting the answer; 2). a message — the evaluation of the message — the argumentation or explanation of the evaluation; 3). an impulse to act — action — justifying the necessity for action.

The peculiarities of the relationship between the author and the reader are reflected in cycles; response messages were corrected in order to prevent the possible misunderstanding of certain fragments of the content of the text and then the evaluation is argued to prevent the reader’s possible disagreement with it. Creative processes can make the evaluative, interrogative and illocutionary elements more complex. They inter-weave, acquire new content and take turns. The content of the text develops due to this.

Researchers were allowed to specify the peculiarities in the development of text by defining these interactive text units and analysing them. By recognizing and defining these text units, researchers noticed a reflection in media content of both real dialogue (such as an interview) and the implicit dialogue with a reader’s attitude. Research also indicated that the creativity of media and its socialized nature clearly implies that the illocutionary enforcement of a news story is a feature of both the author’s work and the interpretive mind of the reader.
As one can see from the previous pages, this type of research has justified the unity of speech-generating mechanisms, not only in monological and dialogical units, but also in inter-textual ones. Dialogical texts, (such as an interview), are represented in complete cycles where the initial phrases and response phrases belong to different people engaged in communication. External monological text has complete explicit cycles or, more often, a reduced form; each phrase composing the cycle belongs to one person, i.e., the author.

A separate text can form a phrase in inter-textual units. Thus, researchers proposed an approach to analysing inter-textual relations in forms of media that produce text. Journalists exert the impact of speech on the public when they give information and evaluate information. Journalists mainly take into account not the adequate, reasonable reactions of the audience, but the contrary ones which the author is trying to cause. This could be a possible misunderstanding of the message, disagreement with what is stated or neglecting the impulse for action. The genre of stylistics can predict the reader’s “resistance” to cognitive, emotional and volitional impact; dialogism of different newspaper genres shows itself in such responses.

Dialogism, i.e., the use in a text of different tones or viewpoints, has a genre-generating property. The formation of speech genres is determined by information demand and the communicative interests of the public, as taken into account by the journalist. On the one hand, an author’s idea can be ground for generating a speech genre and is a part of the media activity. On the other hand, this idea can become a response to a previous statement on the topic matter, according to the author’s assessment of what type of information the public is demanding. The audience factor in media texts can be illustrated in how the author meets the information demands of the public. The audience factor can also be seen in how the author brings in composition, topic and stylistic features of the text, in trying to follow various hypotheses on what type of information the reader expects.

The genre of speech is a typological form of interaction between those engaged in communication; this is why the composition of the genre consists of the speech embodiment of a sequence of communicative interactions, (sub-genre and elemental cycles). This reproduces an objective logic for interactions between a journalist and a genre-based hypothesis of the addressee or reader⁴. The text exerts influence and brings in information by demonstrating the relationship of different attitudes in cycles. The order of the cycles reproduces the line of action, the order of relations and the way to achieve the aim of the genre. Thus; “All the textual material of a work is the real system when all linguistic means involved in the text organization become stylistically significant, however, importantly, not as such but in context, as a part of the unity” (Kozhina, 2002, p. 29).

The subjective aspect of genre goals is defined by a journalist’s predictions on the addressee’s demand for information. Such an approach has allowed creating a classification on a single basis, i.e. the goal of communicative interaction between the journalist and
reader. The style of journalism put into practice, according to a genre-oriented system, consists of information, evaluation and motivational genres: 1) The system of information genres represents the first stage of social vectoring. This includes messages on events, different situations, facts, and participants; 2) Evaluation genres are considered a textual embodiment of the stages of journalism research into reality, particularly in cases where the evaluation is the main goal of a publication. These genres include an evaluation of results along with the consequences of social change; the evaluation of a public trend (sequence and reasons) toward change, phenomenon evaluation, situation evaluation or the evaluation of somebody’s opinions; 3) A system based on motivational genres reflects making and discussing managerial decisions in journalism and implements the following goal system: they define social goals and tasks, propose solutions to social problems, compare possible solutions to such problems and discuss different programs in order to choose an optimal solution. It adjusts actions taken and managerial models used for the solution to a problem.

The classification of genres of journalism speech is created on the basis of typical communicative goals (see Table 1).

As one can see, this is a ternary classification of the different genres formed on the interactions between a journalist and his or her audience, in the process of social vectoring. These outlined goals are not isolated; instead they interact with one another and represent a system that implements social vectoring within journalism. Genres differ in their structure as the author’s ideas are implemented in various forms, such as in the forms of monologue, dialogue and inter-textual cycle phrases.

The given analysis shows that whole journalism texts and their stylistic typology are integral regarding their formal and grammatical and communicative aspect, stipulated by extra linguistic factors. Here one can see textual organization, composition, principles and ways of journalism text development provided by a number of communicative characteristics, such as a communicative goal that includes cognitive, emotional and behavioural aspects and a respective hypothesis regarding the addressee.

Different search and cognitive algorithms are at the heart of the evaluation and motivational genres. In other words, one should see the relationship between a journalist’s investigative activity and speech embodiment of the genre. This approach allows one to answer a whole number of questions which arise during research into the peculiarities of speech journalism activity, e.g., what communicative and value goals resulted in this activity and what are the main, verbalized forms of this activity in cognitive structures. Thus, the given analysis is involved in a rapidly growing stack of cognitive research on media language.

V. N. Bazylev notes the productive interaction of cognitive linguistics and stylistics. He makes his point with a certain unity of ontological prerequisites and goals of stylistic and linguistic cognitive analysis.
The unity of ontological prerequisites of the analysis of both disciplines can be rightly seen from research hypothesis that text, just as any other activity, has a purpose and motive and the ways of its creation depend on interaction conditions (between the author and reader, for example). Stylistics, which is not reduced to text interpretation but emphasizes linguistic form issues, is a close discipline to linguistic cognitivists that creates certain basis for the research as the style of a text is defined by the speaker’s personality. The goal of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups of genres</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Information genres (news, reports, interviews)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Reports on what is happening</td>
<td>Reports on the progress, place, consequences of and reasons for an occurrence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reports on the current status</td>
<td>Reports on a phenomenon, a situation as an interaction of subjects, the place and reasons for it</td>
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<td>Reports on political figures</td>
<td>Reports on someone's activity, their statements; an information portrait</td>
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<td>2. Evaluation genres (.article, commentary, review, observation, analytical interview)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Progress evaluation</td>
<td>The evaluation of someone's actions, results of social changes; forecasting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Status evaluation</td>
<td>Evaluation of a phenomenon, situation</td>
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<td>Evaluation of someone's statements</td>
<td>Evaluation of someone's statements, work of art</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Motivational genres (.article, commentary, analytical interview)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Stimulating practical activity</td>
<td>Proposing ways to solve a problem, programs of action</td>
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<tr>
<td>Choice stimulating</td>
<td>Motivating to choose a possible solution to a problem, programs of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulating to adjust actions</td>
<td>Adjusting wrong decisions made by the authorities, wrong actions in a conflict situation</td>
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research in both disciplines is to show that the form of a speech message (a text) depends on external factors that are defined as extra linguistic ones. The difference relates only to meta linguistic systems that describe these factors. (Bazylev, 2005, p. 15).

However, the leading principle we’d like to emphasize is a principle which has taken into account a huge range of extra linguistic factors, even from the beginning of functional and stylistic research on journalism text, cf.”Speech, rather, a style of speech, as a phenomenon defined by the extra linguistic and closely interwoven with it, has to be studied from the non-linguistic point of view, without the fear of spoiling the ‘purity’ of the linguistic in the speech stylistics, for only this extra linguistic opens the possibility of revealing genuine linguistic specificity” (Kozhina, 1968, p. 198).

Research into functional stylistics has been represented by intellectual speech activity performed through linguistic means. This topic affects most areas of peoples’ lives, such as science, art, politics, law, religion, and everyday life; this is why the research has always had cognitive direction. However, as a rule, researches used to apply this idea to scientific texts, but later they started to consider it within stylistic interpretations of journalism texts as a methodological ground for analysis, (see: Duskaeva, 1995, 2004; Kon’kov, 1995). It seems this cognitive approach is productive both when analysing the speech mechanisms of text generated under hypertext conditions and also when analysing the stylistic image of publications with different scopes.

Journalism text researchers have always stressed that their aim is to influence readers and create a stylistic image. However, the research into mass media in the 1990s showed that impact differed; it could have a socially-oriented direction, but it could also manipulate. Thus, there were two problems. The extra linguistic problem was the problem of ethics impacting text creation. The linguistic problem was the problem of stylistically diagnosing a linguistic and ethical breach in the media’s language. Lately, researchers have been interested in the study of speech mechanisms responsible for information distortions or for concealing information for certain purposes (Kopnina, 2008). Such research could reveal how adequately a text conveys the content of a statement and the author’s communicative intent toward the audience, along with how the style of speech helps to understand the content. The cognitive-stylistic approach has turned out to be an effective tool for solving linguistic and ethical problems. Such forms of language behaviour as lies, scandalous and outrageous behaviour, aggression, vulgarity or cynicism became the object of the research under this approach, (Etika rechevogo, 2009). Linguistic and ethical issues are most systematically revealed in the work of T. Surikova, who studies features of conceptualization, ethical concepts and regulations, as well as speech deviations from these ethical standards. The cognitive-stylistic approach is promising regarding other fields of media stylistic studies, e.g. hypertext studies.
The fact that linguists focus on mass media usually means researchers start with extra linguistic factors instead of linguistic ones when raising linguistic questions. One of these issues was research into the stylistic and typological factors of rapidly growing texts on entertainment, (Dosugovaya zhurnalistikà, 2009). The research task needed previous ideas on the ideological impact of journalism style to be clarified. Enlightened consumerism and hedonism became the ideology of modern Russian mass media. There was also research into stylistic and typological factors of educational and entertainment publications dedicated to culture, scientific discoveries, fashion, sports, home and hobbies.

Later, analysis came to involve more and more non-linguistic factors that had created any number of linguistic features, e.g. the Internet and a hyper-textual environment. This environment created brand new speech forms and this influenced the literary language and the entire national language. The Internet turned out to be a new kind of communication with almost no borders between the monologue and dialogue or between oral speech and written language, formal and informal communication or socially and individually oriented communication.

It was clear in the beginning of observations over information hypertext that quite a significant part of text stylistics should be revised. From this point of view, let us look at the connectivity category. The development of hypertext on the Internet uses stepwise refinement (top to bottom reading of the screen) compared to the linear newspaper text. In journalism stories on the Internet, first goes the header, and then either the entire text, or first a component of the text (subtext) and then the whole text. Consequently, the content is not built for the media user completely in advance and the more active the reader is, the deeper he or she studies the material. Although the traditional text composition is missing, we can see a new hyper structure along with the reader’s ability to develop it. The creator of such a “stepwise” text should carry out a number of communicative tasks, such as encouraging the recipient to go on with the hypertext; maintaining interest in the subject of the story; and guiding the reader through the whole hypertext. The last point is important because the development of news on the Internet is very varied, hypertexts providing the technical capacity for multi-vector informing. This can mean choosing interpretation variants and logic by using a lot of information sources and presenting information in various ways such as hyperlinks, photos, video and audio presentations.

Under the given conditions, hypertext connectivity means the following; 1) an indication that the statement continues in the next subtext; 2) a reference to clarifications, illustrations; 3) a reminder of what has been said earlier; 4) encouraging reading and other communicative activity of the reader; 5) representation of splitting and connection within subtext and text units; 6) an indication that different subtexts have something in common regarding speech subjects.
Thus, some ways to express connectivity in hypertext include hyperlinks and references of a prospective and retrospective nature, advertising the news and maintaining tension in subtexts. Even a preliminary analysis of connectivity in hypertext highlights new text features.

In the last decade, experts speaking on differences between the text and the media texts, (e.g. Solganik 2005), have pointed out to an important feature of the latter. V. Kostomarov assesses publicity as one of its most significant features; “Today’s generation turns out to be accustomed to ‘3-D text’, obtaining information from the fusion of the sound, speech and picture”, (Kostomarov 2005, p. 116). Kostomarov also states:

The present era marked by technological inventions that allows... to record, store, reproduce] natural spoken language... but without limits of writing that is not able to reproduce sound, colour, movement, all the cultural environment and can only provide speech descriptions to compensate for real acts of communication. ... Now, with the emergence of a new virtual mass media world, there are all the preconditions for the approach of these ‘languages’ or, rather, for creating a specific mass media ‘language’. ... Stylistics cannot ignore this fact today as it more and more relies on extra linguistic forms of transferring information through highly influential mass media texts and partially following their example in other texts as well, it should extend its range of prospective research into the language. (Ibid, p. 119)

Therefore, extending the range of prospective research into language requires further development of the analysis of stylistic methodology. Researchers should focus on the problem of multidimensionality and diversity of a media product that “exists in several guises, several areas, several environments — in a paper, spoken and visual form” (Zassoursky, 2007, p. 7). The studies bring to light new shades of meaning and new additions to the media, when a classic text is translated into the sphere of mass media.

Another feature of publicity is that one text is open to other ones, pointing at the intermediate position of any text in the media system (Kazak, 2010). There is a question of this interaction typology in literature; dialogical factors, polemics and the correlation of semantic positions expressed in the text are all possible. Such a solution is based on the dialogic theory developed by M. Bakhtin. The thematic convergence of hypertext (Kablukov, 2010) is possible within a super text (see: Kupina & Bitenskaya, 1994).

In conclusion, it is possible t say that a new field of media stylistics has been formed. The subject of its study is the speech organization of the media text. Its semantic structure, which determines the style of the field, is defined by speech and non-speech components and intra-textual as well as inter-textual factors. Media stylistics is based on the methodology of functional stylistics, which studies “speech together with other intrinsic properties of a person, their activities and consciousness” (Salimovsky, 2005, ṃ. 16). In this
respect, the field is developed in close connection with epistemological, deontological, political, sociological, psychological and praxeological factors. Changing conditions in the rapidly developing world of mass communications require expanding the range of research into stylistics, the development of new methods of interdisciplinary approaches.

ENDNOTES

1. The nature of the system of speech is different. Its basic principle is the complexity of extra linguistic factors, which determine the choice and organization of linguistic and text units, along with their relationship to the text plane (M. Kozhina). V. Odintsov noted stylistics started to develop successfully due to the fact that researchers focused on finding out factors that defined the usage of linguistic means (Odintsov, 1980, pp. 16-17).

2. The cornerstone of comprehensive functional-stylistic research into journalism texts was laid in the 191980s. The full-fledged research was carried out later in the post-perestroika mass media.

3. M. Kazak pointed out the element media was very productive regarding the formation of Russian academic term and in discovering the evolution of its word-forming function;

   “Activation in Russian of the borrowed element media has led first to finding of the status of a free stem by it, and then — due to unlimited activity of its usage — it has approached, in essence, the status of an object that formed an open set of formations with the same stem, media — mediatekst (“media text”), mediasobytiye (“media occurrence”), mediastruktura (“media structure”), mediaobstoyatelstva (“media conditions”), medieramnotnost (“media literacy”), mediakompetentciya (“media competence”), mediiniy (media-stic), mediatizatsiya (“mediatisation”), etc. Everything that is mediatised is involved in the mass media sphere and can be defined as a media text (e.g. art films, computer games)”. The researcher points out that, “the term media text has acquired the status of a basic category in mediology, media linguistics, media education — new fields of linguistics and pedagogies”. The author concludes by defining the scope of the media text concept;

   “Apparently, the term acquired its explanatory power when interpreted as a set of products of three global mass communication subsystems, i.e. journalism, PR and advertising” (Kazak, 2010).

4. The subject of some works is the discourse instead of the functional style. However, although these concepts are not identical, they are very close. M. Kozhina and J. Stepanov have already said these concepts are close and that discursive and functional-stylistic approaches are close as well.

5. The way for such an approach was cleared by Russian and Czech linguists in the 1920s and 1930s, e.g. M. Bakhtin. V. Vinogradov, G. Vinokur, L. Yakubinsky and members of the Prague Linguistic Circle.

6. To put it more exactly, this could be a hypothesis on journalism expectations or addressee’s (reader’s) demand. But there are terms such as “the addressee concept, hypothesis,” (L. Hochunskaya) or “genre addressee model” (M. Bakhtin) that we use.

7. All these names were given according to the dominating communicative goals of the interaction between the author and the reader that determined genre formation. Therefore, there were such names as “reports on the progress of an occurrence”, “reports on the place of an occurrence”, “reports on the reasons of an occurrence” and etc. We have chosen this way because we relied on the domestic and foreign traditions of linguistic genres where they are divided according to a leading communicative goal (T. Shmeleva, N. Fedosuk and others). The tradition has been approved and is sustainable. Particularly, there are genres defined by their illocutionary goal, e.g. genres of greeting, gratitude, apology, compliment, advice, joke, etc. Our research resulted in revealing typical illocutionary goals important for journalism and the speech genre names have been given on this basis.
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The basic feature of crises from the end of the XX century to the beginning of the XXI centuries is their indisputable impact on the field of information, both locally, regionally, sub-regionally or even the globally. Among the basic actors in the field of media and conflict, we should first take into account mass media. Therefore, the role and function of mass media in international, political or economic conflict is the subject of our analysis. The authors suggest a theoretical, typological model for the function of media within the framework of conflict. This model describes four basic ideal types of mass media functioning in the structure of the conflict: 1) Media is an actor in the conflict and supports one of the sides; 2) Media is an actor in the conflict and keeps secret about it; 3) Media does not participate in the conflict and only informs on it; 4) Media does not participate in the conflict and does not inform on it. This is based on suggested models by authors who analyzed the media coverage of the economic conflicts of 2006 to 2009 between Russia, Georgia, Moldova.
and Ukraine. An empirical study has shown the validity and explanatory abilities of the developed “Peace-conflict journalism multidimensional approach”.

Keywords: media discourse, interstate conflict, peace-conflict journalism

Recent military conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, in Iraq, in South Ossetia and Georgia and inter-governmental conflicts in the economic sphere of 2000 to 2010 have attracted the attention of scholars to the roles, functions, and responsibilities of the media and journalists in the structure of a conflict. In modern political science these subjects are analyzed from two theoretical perspectives; the international relations theory and the peace journalism approach.

According to the theories of international relations, mass media is considered a secondary, peripheral political actor. Instead, the leading roles are given to governments, diplomatic and military actors, and international organizations. These theories regard official channels of communication as the most important. Of course, direct and official channels promote the fast transmission of communication between opponents in the conflict. However, this means of communication is also able to intensify a crisis. According to Kraus and Deutch (Kraus & Deutch, 1966, pp. 572-577), sides of a conflict often use direct communication channels for the exchange of mutual recriminations and threats. This produces additional negative emotional reactions. And the conflict becomes even sharper. Besides, direct/diplomatic channels, in many cases, are used to pressure the opponent based on one-sided, in-exact and doubtful information. All this obviously negatively affects the conflict resolution process. So, in a great deal of international conflicts, indirect channels and particularly channels of mass media are more efficient and convenient and open up more opportunities.

Diplomatic communications initially have limited efficiency. They function in rigid traditional frameworks and this restricts their ability to suggest fresh, alternative ideas for their side of the conflict. In general, in the modern theories of international relations, mass media are regarded as a secondary and, in the majority of cases, an actor of little influence. This can be explained by the general theoretical discourse among international relations scholars. The first rank players for most scholars are governments and international organizations. In many cases, international relations theorists give an inaccurate portrayal of the functions of mass media in the conflict framework. Media in this discourse is considered not capable of realizing and conducting an independent policy on reporting state propaganda or is even considered tools of national “big business” players. This approach leads to a misunderstanding and simplification of the role of mass media in international
conflict resolution. Additionally, it enforces a popular and dangerous stereotype of mass media, one of conformism, dependence and controllability.

**CONTEMPORARY THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE PEACE JOURNALISM APPROACH**

One of the most interesting and promising approaches to theories on media and conflict is suggested by the concept of peace journalism. It was introduced by Galtung (Galtung 2000; Galtung & Vincent, 1992) and has been developed by Wolfsfeld (Wolfsfeld, 2004), Lynch and McGoldrick (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005) and other scholars in 2000s.

The operational definition of this concept was given by Lynch & McGoldrick: “Peace journalism is when editors and reporters make choices of what stories to report and how to report them that create opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict” (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, p. 5). Galtung has described the practice of peace journalism in comparison with the behavior of traditional journalism in conflicts (Galtung, 2000). According to Irvan, peace journalism is “a normative theory claiming that the media ought to play a positive role in promoting peace” (Irvan, 2006, p. 34). This approach is based on earlier ideas, especially on Peterson’s social responsibility theory (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1963). For Peterson, the theory has this major premise: “The press... is obliged to be responsible to society for carrying out certain essential functions of mass communication in contemporary society” (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1963, p. 74).

As a normative theory, peace journalism gives basic guidelines for the right and wrong behavior of journalists in conflict. Unlike descriptive theories, normative theories try to prescribe good and bad roots for journalism in complex situations. As Hallin argues, “the field of communication, and most particularly the study of journalism, has always been heavily normative in character. This is due in part to its rooting in professional education, where it is more important to reflect on what journalism should be than to analyze in detail what and why it is” (Hallin, 2004, p. 42).

The approach of peace journalism gives two basic models for media participation in conflict — socially, professionally and ethically approved and disapproved. To our mind this normative concept plays a significant role in the promotion of positive professional standards for journalists working in conflict situations of different types. At the same time, one should realize that peace journalism as a normative theory is not suitable for a detailed description and analysis of all the factors that determine the realistic practices of journalists in conflict, especially in international conflict. Here, the switch to some kind of descriptive theory is needed. And some authors working within peace journalism paradigm are already in tune with this fact.
Towards New Understanding: Peace-Conflict Journalism Multidimensional Approach

We have now taken into consideration the strong and weak points of the peace journalism theory and its basic findings. The authors now suggest developing this theory in the direction of producing a descriptive approach reflecting different media repertoires in modern international conflicts. We call it “peace-conflict journalism multidimensional approach” (PCJMA).

Below, the basic premises of PCJMA are outlined and later illustrated using examples of Russian print media during the economical conflicts of 2007 to 2008, with the Russian Federation on one side and Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova on the other.

As a necessary component of modern society, mass media is always a significant actor in international conflicts. Moreover, in many cases the media discourse created by journalists, despite its vitality, becomes the most real platform of conflict escalation. One should consider mass media as active participant of any conflict in the public sphere. Media try to influence these antagonistic dynamics by means of relevant communicative technologies. We presume the spectrum of roles and functions of mass media in conflict is wider than suggested by the peace journalism approach.

First of all, journalism informs the public about current conflicts. It identifies its sides/participants and informs the public about versions of the reason and possible consequences of an antagonism. Citizens have the right to get this information. In the case of conflict escalation, the public should be informed about the conflict parties, their actions and positions, about measures which are undertaken for conflict settlement, about victims and losses, about threats, prospects and the future dynamics of the conflict.

In social and political interactions, mass media can take various positions, defending their own interests, the interests of groups, institutions, or national and global communities. In a conflict situation, mass media can take a position of one of the conflicting parties and start to play a role of straight (or, depending on circumstances, indirect) participant in the conflict by means of informational or even propaganda support.

When discussing the ways the media can report on conflict, we should make a theoretical distinction between the two ways the media can function. The first one can be called ordinary reporting (informing) or “conflict representation”. The second should be regarded as informational escorting and support. This regime assumes much deeper media involvement in antagonism.

The first way of simply informing about the conflict emphasizes a journalist’s attempt to be as objective and informative as possible. It seeks a maximum output of information to the public on the details of the conflict. It seeks a maximum output of information on the
competing parties, including each side’s prospective purposes, real purposes, and intentions. We assume when the term “conflict representation” is used, it makes sense to speak about a journalist being “above the battle”. The only task fulfilled by journalism here is to realize the right of an audience to know what is going on. This regime of media functioning is very close to what is called by Galtung the peace journalism.

Media coverage of the international conflicts of the last 30 years has shown that despite all journalistic ethical codes, national media as a rule provided support for the state policy. It is enough to recollect a position of the British media during the Falkland crisis of the 1980s, the U.S. media during the Balkan wars of the 1990s or Russian mass media during the conflict around Ossetia in 2000s.

However, it is important to note that although the majority of national media chose to support the state policy, national media in many cases have played an oppositional role to the governments in international conflicts. By criticizing the policy of the national government in the conflict, newspapers with great influence are capable of forming an oppositional public opinion and putting pressure upon the state decision makers. It is well known that before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the U.S. media, together with the Bush administration, created an image of an aggressive Saddam Hussein threatening global security with nuclear weapons. And the public in the U.S. and E.U. has supported military operations against Iraq. Yet later in the war, when the absence of nuclear weapons in Iraq became obvious, the position of many journalists changed. They began to criticize the U.S. government. And of course, they began to change the public opinion.

In addition to these two direct functional roles — supporters and opponents of the government in the conflict- mass media is capable of playing two additional indirect roles. We suggest naming them “inviter” and “hider”. By reporting on the conflict and creating an appropriate public attitude toward it, mass media sometimes invites or even pushes the government to enter the conflict and to become one of the sides. Here, media plays the role of the “inviter”. On the contrary, sometimes for different political reasons, the media makes the decision to ignore the conflict. They exclude any information about it from the public discourse. This is what we call the role of the “hider.”

As we can see, in general, mass media can play a relatively wide variety of social roles in international conflict. This range of social roles is clearly not limited to the two normative roles proposed by the theory of peace-conflict journalism.

Of course, these two roles introduced by Galtung should be regarded as ideal types in terms of Max Weber. But in reality, the situation is more complicated.

Developing the peace journalism approach and applying it as a descriptive theory and not a normative theory, we suggest a two-dimensional matrix of mass media functioning in international conflict.
First of all, one should note the duality of the functional position of mass media in any large or mid-scale conflict. On the one hand, the professional duty of a journalist is to inform the public about the conflict, and so mass media becomes a part of the informational environment surrounding the conflict. So in reporting about the conflict, journalists are producing a conflict-determined discourse within the media. On the other hand, mass media has the opportunity to become an actor inside the interaction of the conflict, i.e., a direct participant.

Theoretically, the professional duty of journalists is to inform about crisis situations and conflicts. Crisis and conflict reporting always gain public interest and are profitable for media. But, journalists can become relatively self-dependent players in the context of being an actor in a conflict. They are even able to initiate conflict or crisis. For example, The Jutland Posten published caricatures on the prophet Mohammed, or CBS informed on torture in Abu-Grejgb prison.

This ontological dualism of journalism produces additional problems for the theoretical distinction of involvement versus non-involvement of media in a particular conflict. Unless a journalist definitely demonstrates his or her position in the conflict or the media itself is one of the conflicting parties, it is clear that involvement of the media is not an issue.

However, the media can participate in a conflict through implicit support of a conflicting party. In this case, the distinction between informing and participation is very slight.

We distinguish two possible levels of mass media participation in the structure of conflict: instrumental and discursive. On the first level, media is one of the direct, conflicting sides. On the second level, media is also active in participating in the conflict by producing appropriate discourse on the conflict.

Ideal types of mass media functioning in the structure of the conflict

Based on analysis of mass media practices in the international conflicts of 1980 through 2010, we suggest four ideal types of mass media and how it functions in the structure of conflict;

1. Media as an “actor-supporter”, which takes part in the conflict and supports one of the sides (“conflict support strategy”).

2. Media is an “actor-hider”, which takes part in the conflict by keeping secret about it (“conflict hushing up strategy”).

3. Media as a “non-actor — reflector”, which does not participate in the conflict and only informs on it (“conflict reflection strategy”).
4. Media as a “non-actor — hider”, which does not participate in the conflict and does not inform on it (“conflict ignoring strategy”).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media function</th>
<th>Participates</th>
<th>Does not participate</th>
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<tr>
<td>Reflects</td>
<td>+ / + (1)</td>
<td>+ / – (3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Does not reflect</td>
<td>– / + (2)</td>
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The first type is realized when mass media is directly involved in the conflict and is producing a corresponding media discourse. Here, the media functions as an “actor-supporter” for one of the conflicting parties. In different conflict situations, journalists can pursue their own aims or defend the interests of the involved actors. Such a model is often realized in international conflicts when national media work together with the state diplomacy.

In the second type, mass media is involved in the conflict on one of the sides, but their function is to hide or “hush” the information on the conflict.

The third type is named “conflict-reflection”. Here, journalists are not involved in the opposing parties and do not render direct influence on conflict development. They inform the public but do not produce media discourse for the sake of any involved party. Within the limits of the “conflict reflection” model, it is possible to realize the principles of objectivity and impartiality, providing balanced information to the public on the conflict.

Sometimes it can be difficult to distinguish type 1 from type 3 without understanding the inner details of how particular parts of the media function. Still, in the majority of conflicts, a reasonable analysis of media discourse, journalistic style and wording can give one the opportunity to understand where particular media is engaged and where they are not.

The fourth model, “conflict-ignoring”, is realized in the situation where particular conflict is of no importance to the given media and its audience. Thus, this type assumes journalists will have a lack of interest both in influencing a conflict situation and in producing any media discourse on it.

**INDEX ON MASS MEDIA INVOLVEMENT AND THE PRODUCTION OF CONFLICT DISCOURSE**

When media deal with conflict (models “actor-supporter” and “non — actor — reflector”), it’s important to introduce this index on the intensity of the coverage. This index shows the degree of media involvement and the production of conflict discourse. We suggest the following linear, 5-component scale for this index.
A high grade of involvement means the conflict is presented to the public as main news and is extremely important, significant, or “number one” on the agenda. It gets the priority in broadcasting time or on the newspaper’s first page. Editors and journalists use special means to attract the attention of the public. A medium grade of involvement means media rank the particular conflict among the most important news. A low medium grade of involvement means the conflict is covered as an ordinary event, which is not of special importance. Reporting on the conflict gets little space in the structure of news. Journalists don’t use any special expressive language to highlight the conflict. A low grade of involvement takes place when there is only a short mention of the conflict, (for example, in the section “chronicle” or “incidents”), without analysis or comments. A zero grade of involvement means that particular conflict is outside journalistic attention and media space.

To characterize the involvement of particular media in conflict discourse, one should consider positioning the event in the news structure and analyze how it is built into the agenda and into the general information stream. As indicators for this process we can use:

- quantity of the publications devoted to the conflict, for a certain period
- the position of coverage devoted to the conflict within the newspaper or structure of a news release
- use of special means for highlighting the conflict in the structure of the issue (by means of design, photo, info graphics, headliners, etc.)
- genre specificity of the publications devoted to the conflict (presence/absence of analytical genres, editorial columns, special reports, etc).

**COMMUNICATIVE STRATEGIES OF MEDIA IN THE CONFLICT**

The media can strategize which stages of a conflict they would like to cover, adopting corresponding methods for the coverage of various stages.

We suggest the following typology of media strategies in the conflict:
conflict escalation
conflict intensifying (“warming up”)
conflict resolution
outside observation
concealment

Using the escalation strategy during that stage of a conflict, media reporting can be aimed at making conflict deeper, wider and sharper. Journalists can bring onto the scene of the conflict new political and social actors, suggest new conflict themes or tell shocking stories. They can create additional centers of antagonism (for example, when switching from the political or economic dimension of a conflict to the ethnic or confessional dimension). They can even create an image of the “enemy”, etc. This escalation strategy can both follow the “order” from the conflicting side or by the initiative of mass media. The escalation strategy is very close to the Galtung’s “war journalism” model.

The conflict intensifying strategy, in some cases, acts as a part of the escalation strategy, however, it can be used independently as well. In this case, mass media tries to artificially increase the status, level, scale and consequences of the conflict. Mass media even wants “to warm up” the attention of the audiences to the event and to warm up the sides of the conflict. Such strategy is not pure war journalism. But it is very close to it.

The conflict resolution strategy assumes media activities are aimed at the settlement of contradictions between the conflicting parties. Within this model, journalists try to find compromise, mutual understanding and dialogue. Here the ideal type of peace journalism can be implemented.

The “observation from outside” communicative strategy means journalists demonstratively take the position of an independent, uninvolved observer. The media here tries to realize a policy of full, objective, unbiased coverage of the conflict.

The concealment strategy is realized in cases when the media tries to hide any information about the conflict or tries to show the public the absolute absence of any contradictions.

To analyze the communicative strategy of mass media within conflict coverage, the media researcher should study the processes of how journalists select facts, their interpretation and formation of their attitude to the conflict and its subjects. For this purpose, it is necessary to study how journalists collect and denote information on the conflict. A researcher should calculate the quantity and thematic orientation of statements, the presence and the maintenance of background and contextual information, completeness of sources and structure of the subjects.

Media reporting on conflict should be analyzed also at the designative level. For the assessment of media conflict interpretation, it’s important to analyze the social roles
prescribed by the journalists to the conflict figurants: who is aggressor and who is victim, who is Hamlet, who is Polonius and who is the Joker. Of course, very important is the language dimension of the analysis. The description of the conflicting parties may include irony, negative and positive metaphors, value oriented wording, etc. Attitude producing types of language in the media can be expressed in explicit or contextual form, directly or through opinions of experts, analysts, supporters and opponents of conflicting parties.

Institutional Criterion

For the analysis of the media’s involvement in international conflicts, we need to introduce one more criterion, namely an institutional one. Being a social institution, journalism can be in a different relationship with state and governmental institutions. The scale of relations between state and media within a particular conflict framework can be wide — from support to opposing. Theoretically, it is possible to label five basic types of the media attitude toward the state or governmental institutions involved in a conflict: unanimous support, approval, neutrality, disapproval or sharp criticism.

Implications: Cases of Economic and Trade Conflicts

Based on the theoretical approaches suggested above, authors carried out research of the Russian mass media’s coverage of the economic and trade conflicts between Russia and Georgia, Russia and Moldova (2006), and also a Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict (January 2009).

The following are some of the details of these conflicts.

In spring 2006, Russia put a ban on the importation of Moldavian and Georgian wines and Georgian mineral water. Russia stated the ban was because of the inadequate quality of the production of these items, (there was a discrepancy in requirements of sanitary safety). However, other interpretations of this change were extended in mass media and in political discourse: it was considered as rendering political pressure on Moldova and Georgia by the Russian government. We noticed sanctions concerning the Moldavian production were cancelled in 2007, whereas the specified Georgian goods had no official chance of entering the Russian market until now.

The gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine became extremely hot in January, 2009. Initially, contradictions arose between the Russian company “Gazprom” and the Ukrainian company “Naftogaz”. However, then the conflict developed until it reached the intergovernmental level. As is well-known, due to the conflict, some EU countries couldn’t get Russian gas in the winter time. This created problems for the economic and social situation.
On the 19th of January, the long-term contracts that fixed the price formulas on the purchase of gas and transit throughout the Ukraine were signed. On 21st of January, European consumers received the Russian gas. But the attention to the conflict from journalists decreased only at the end of the month, when the arrangements reached on the price of gas and transit were confirmed by the Ukrainian president.

Initially, international economic conflicts are a subject of professional interest only for specialized and professional audiences. But when the conflict switches to the political sphere, it arouses the interest of the masses. The national governments involved need support from the internal and external public opinion. Thus, a formerly little-known economic conflict can become an important news item for the mass public.

For our analysis we have chosen three most influential Russian national daily newspapers: “Vedomosti”, “Kommersant”, and “Izvesti”, which are regarded by Russian media scholars as qualitative and authoritative. “Vedomosti” is the business media, issued in co-production with “Financial Times” and “The Wall Street Journal”. “Izvestia” is the national political newspaper and “Kommersant” is the eldest national business newspaper. We have analyzed these newspapers from March 2006 to November 2007 and from December 2008 to January 2009 by means of the qualitative and quantitative content-analysis.

As a result, we have labeled a number of communicative strategies applied by these media. A character of a media discourse formed by newspapers varied depending on the phase of the conflict and the general situation. Economic conflicts between Russia and Georgia and between Russia and Moldova were represented frostily enough and monotonously. However, the gas war between Russia and Ukraine has caused considerably more journalistic emotion and tactics. It was often possible to observe a combination of different communicative strategies, using different instruments of media discourse construction, (including elements of peace journalism, war journalism and other strategies).

For content analysis, two research techniques were used. In the basic research, a single article was a tally. The first issues of newspapers have been studied separately; in this case the semantic statement became a tally. The semantic statement comprises a mention of the subject, a theme in connection with which it is mentioned, attitude to the subject and a source of this attitude. We’ve made the detailed calculation of all semantic statements together with the analysis of creative journalistic practices. It gave us a detailed picture of what the newspaper media discourse looked like. For example, the first issues of “Vedomosti”, “Kommersant” and “Izvestia” in the year 2009 contained six, 10 and six materials devoted to the gas conflict, accordingly, (i.e. 221, 369 and 142 statements). Figure 1 shows the presence of main subjects of the conflict and their evaluation in newspapers.

In general, during the whole conflict period, (January 2009), the structure of representation of the key actors of the gas conflict, (Russia, Ukraine, EU, “Gazprom” and
“Naftogaz”), was very close to what is shown above. In the newspapers “Vedomosti” and “Kommersant”, Ukrainian and Russian governments are presented negatively while both gas companies are presented in a balanced manner.

Unlike “Vedomosti” and “Kommersant”, “Izvestia” obviously uses the strategy of informational warfare against the Ukrainian government and for support for the Russian government. Basic evaluations of Ukraine (and also its president) are strongly negative, while the attitude to all other subjects of the conflict is close to ambivalent. Thus, if in
representation of journalists from “Vedomosti” and “Kommersant”, responsibility for the
gas crisis lies on both states, “Izvestia” distinctly accuses only Ukraine. In the “Izvestia”
discourse, Russia is a victim of cunning Ukrainian politicians as well as the EU (see Figure 2).

“Kommersant” and “Vedomosti” have similar structure of sources on
statements/speakers (including directly and indirectly quoted sources). They typically use
the Russian journalist, (as a rule, the author of the publication), the Ukrainian politicians,
the Russian politicians, anonymous sources (without a surname, only with post instructions
— «the Kremlin official»), employees of companies “Gazprom”, “Naftogaz”, the Russian
experts, representatives of the European Union. “Kommersant” also quoted foreign mass
media and “Vedomosti” addressed comments to the Russian business community. The
structure of sources in the newspaper “Izvestia” is much poorer. “Izvestia” doesn’t give time
to Ukrainian point of view. It’s easy to see the newspaper actually broadcasts the position
of the Russian government, at the same time criticizing the Ukraine and its representatives.

The analyzed newspapers used various communicative means of conflict media
discourse production including graphic, linguistic (use of military lexicon) and other
channels of influence on an audience.

Results of the research show that while representing the gas conflict, such newspapers
as “Vedomosti” and “Kommersant” realized the conflict reflection strategy. They did this
by assuming information about a disputed antagonism and also forming conflict media
discourse without direct participation in the conflict. “Izvestia” operated within the conflict
support strategy, providing supportive information to actions of the Russian side and
consolidating the Russian public opinion against, “Ukraine stealing gas” (quotation from
“Izvestia). “Vedomosti” and “Kommersant” used various communicative strategies,
including “increasing in intensity of the conflict” and an “observation from outside”. The
involvement of these newspapers in the formation of media discourse on conflict can be
characterized as high. In the course of designing the gas conflict media discourse, both
business newspapers increased the political dimensions of the conflict, considering the
political factors out of context with economic logic.

Journalists of “Izvestia” were involved in informational warfare against Ukraine fairly
extensively; they used personal pronouns, (“our victory”, “our gas”), thereby identifying
themselves with one of conflicting parties and opposing the other. “Vedomosti” and
“Kommersant” did not use such wording and it gave them a chance to be above the conflict
situation.

“Izvestia” even strengthened a conflict discourse by using the term “larceny” for
Ukrainian activities. This word had strongly politicized negative connotations and has been
entered into the public discourse by Russian politicians. In fact, it’s now known that Ukraine
occasionally took gas away partly for technical needs for transit maintenance. But “Izvestia”
Figure 2. Structure of judgment sources about conflict’s subjects
used terms like “larceny” and even “stealing” and “thieves” to describe the actions of Ukraine. In “Vedomosti”, the word “larceny” was found only in citations. “Kommersant” practically did not use the given lexeme, just a more neutral expression — “unapproved taking of gas”. Still, every analyzed newspaper used the militarized lexicon for strengthening the conflict discourse. For example, in publications of “Kommersant” during the considered period, gas opposition between Russia and Ukraine was described by means of following lexemes: “war” (it was used 71 times), “conflict” (68), “crisis” (44).

To conclude, we should stress our research demonstrates the reliability of the suggested theoretical model of “peace-conflict journalism multidimensional approach”, (PCJMA).

REFERENCES

BOOK REVIEWS


Reviewed by Igor N. Blokhin,
Professor at the Theory of Journalism Department
Saint Petersburg State University,
igor.blohin@mail.ru

In his new book, Professor Korkonosenko takes up an important problem of arranging theoretical representations of journalism in the context of the ever-increasing social, political, cultural and technological changes of today. The book “Journalism Theory: Modelling and Applying” is another work by one of the most prominent Russian researchers of journalism. The book under review addresses a number of ideas discussed in Korkonosenko’s previous publications while taking them to a new level.

The author starts by defining the essential features of journalism. In particular, Korkonosenko draws distinctions between “journalism” and “means of mass information”, “journalism” and “media”, and “journalism” and “the press”. The author also discusses the definitions of journalism found in other schools of thought, especially in the field of mass communication. Korkonosenko maintains that journalism as a special form of human social and productive activity calls for a special academic field for its study and research, i.e. the theory of journalism.

The first section of the book is devoted to the theory of journalism as an academic discipline. In this section, Korkonosenko analyzes modern journalism as a holistic phenomenon, which, however, is not free from some internal controversies. The author proposes a structural and content model of journalism based on the principle of adequacy of creative and production practice. According to Korkonosenko, the social, historical, philological, communication, technical and technological disciplines are represented as structural elements in journalism theory. The author pays special attention is paid to the terminology of the theory of journalism, providing an original classification of the types of concepts, where physical, technical and professional features are highlighted.

Korkonosenko continues to search for the essence of journalism, coming to the conclusion that “apparently, we cannot find a single definition of the essence of journalism.
It is lifelike, at least due to its documentary base, visibility and event character of its forms for reflecting reality, its extreme topicality and its ability to penetrate into all fields of the social world both in the thematic and geographical dimension” (94). According to the author, the essence of journalism includes such basic, structure-forming features as freedom and critical thinking, multiplicity and variability, and efficiency and relevance. The thesis of the lifeliness of journalism allows the author to formulate its operational laws that include the law of the press diversity, the law of development (particularly important in terms of socio-technological acceleration), the law of conformity to social environment, the law of the existence of journalism as the embodiment of freedom, and the law of the spiritual and practical nature of journalism. In his work, Korkonosenko carries on the social and humanistic mission of journalism. Thus, it not surprising that the analysis of deontological principles of sociality, humanism and truthfulness gets special treatment in the work. The appeal to the moral and ideological aspect of the theory of journalism leads the author to the conclusion that the “attitude of a journalist to the reality rests on the materialistic world outlook and disposition” (146).

A special section of the book is devoted to exercises on application of the theory of journalism. Korkonosenko selects a few topics with the closest ties to the methodological foundations of the theory of journalism. First, these are the topics that clearly identify the socio-value content, e.g. a patriotic attitude raising its status to the level of fundamental values of society and people. The author provides a list of features that, in his opinion, reflect the identity of a Russian national journalism. These include humanism, labour as the most important thing for understanding and reflection, constructive analysis of problematic situations, research journalism as a way to maximize insight into the social and spiritual life, and collectivist principles in organizing editorial process. Korkonosenko’s focus on the problems of modern journalism education and contemporary requirements to a journalist is connected with the analysis of socioal content of journalism.

The second topic, which serves as testing ground for exercises on application of the theory, is represented by an analysis of the socio-political functioning of journalism. For many years, Korkonosenko has been advocating for a special status of political science of journalism as a distinct scientific discipline. The author emphasizes the ideological and conceptual components of the discipline, particularly the political analysis in journalism and political culture of a journalist. In addition, political journalism, along with its research and educational techniques, are natural parts of political science of journalism. Korkonosenko explores different models of journalism functioning in the political system and its interaction with authorities, civil society, business people and politicians. The author treats the political role and functions of journalism and mass media as means of control.

The advantages of Korkonosenko’s book are its numerous examples of journalistic, legal and political practice, the application of philosophical, sociological and political
science concepts to support the author’s conclusions. The new work by Korkonosenko will be useful not only for students studying journalism, but also for a wide range of experts in the fields of media, mass communication, political science, ethics, and public relations.

Reviewed by Yury V. Klyuyev,
Associate professor at the Faculty of Journalism
Saint Petersburg State University,
klim-yurish@inbox.ru

This extensive work provides insight about the features of the coverage of social issues on Russian television. The book includes three chapters and a number of voluminous supplements. The new book starts with a study of the ontology of “the social”. Here are some definitions:

“Social security is the minimum level of social safety and life-sustaining activity” (p. 8)
“The term ‘social’ is used in two senses: in a broad sense it’s a synonym of ‘societal’, as opposed to ‘natural’; in a narrow sense it symbolizes a part of the ‘societal’, or certain aspects of social life” (p. 6)
“Population social assistance is a system of principles, practices, and social guarantees legally established by the state in order to provide optimal living conditions, meet the needs, support necessities and the active existence of individuals or various social categories and groups” (pp. 7-8).

In the book, the essential approaches to studying social problems are given. Relevant problems in efficient communication with Russian society on important social issues are set up. The author highlights that in the social field:

“the conditions and mechanisms of society self-protection are concentrated” (p. 14)
“information on the state of the social sphere is a source of making vital decisions and strategies, the results of the social sphere functioning are under control of the information recipient” (p. 31).

Studying the theory and practice of informing a television audience on social issues, the author applied a toolkit of various sciences and used both interdisciplinary and integrated approaches. At the core of her work, the author laid the idea of modern television as a creative non homogeneous entity, the activity of which is guided by trends of screen message personalization - “coverage through a specific personal story” (p. 113) - and interactive communication, which is an important potential of modern broadcasting;
“The principle of dialogue, which focuses on the development of interaction within the society, as opposed to formal entertaining dialogic tendencies of broadcasting, promotes involvement of the audience in solving problems of real life, sharing of social practices, adaptation of people to new social realities” (p. 90).

Using examples of specific life situations and television programs, the author shows the weakness of contemporary Russian television. Television does not always trace the specific social problems of citizens as these issues develop, (e.g., from the beginning of the issue to the actual solving of the problem). Consequently, the author claims, television is not always able to be an effective tool for social dialogue or social interaction, particularly between government and society. TV space possesses an inherent inconsistency in the coverage of peoples’ problems: they “exist in TV coverage only piecewise, and in a specific hierarchy determined by various factors” (p. 90).

Social problems are usually only acknowledged by journalists, while possible solutions are not offered:

“Focusing on the active community, journalism finds and formulates its problems, but is not involved in their solution, nevertheless, certain programs are aimed at enlightenment, actual help, as well as entertainment” (p. 160).

Television viewers, as a rule, do not receive any positive impression or positive experience as a result of disclosure of an urgent social problem on television:

“Too much drama as one of the major techniques for coverage may come into conflict with functional orientation of the social sphere” (p. 90).

Therefore, “there are obvious contradictions between the inherent features of television and real practice, which either does not take into account the known effects of telecommunications, or ignores its powerful social potential” (p. 83).

The author offers a scale of social information levels.

“Micro-level fixes the stories of specific individuals, the facts of private life and personal experiences. Meso-level reflects the views of active organized society - professional communities (teachers, psychologists, medical doctors) and public organizations. Macro-level demonstrates the official opinion of the authorities, reflects the direction of public policy development” (p. 180).

Certain algorithms are presented in the book. These procedures present social problems by identifying the main indicators of the problem.
Such indicators include:

Threat
Danger caused by the problem, followed by “no threat”, meaning a possible way out of the situation without any danger
A threat overcome
The existence of the problem
An individual or a group of individuals facing the problem (p. 181)

This study by Marina Berezhnaya is a profound scientific work, which reveals different sides of social problems in connection with journalism. The book, which carefully considers the problems of the modern human community covered on television, will be useful to anyone involved in the state of modern television and social issues.

Reviewed by Nikolay N. Kolodiev
Associate professor at the Faculty of Journalism
Saint Petersburg State University,
kolodiev@inbox.ru

Professor I. N. Blokhin’s work is devoted to an undoubtedly important and complicated subject; the functioning of journalism in the field of ethnic relations. The timeliness and relevance of the book’s topic are due to serious problems in national and religious policies, which have led to a crisis of multicultural ideas. These trends make intellectuals face the need to reconsider the role of journalism in the modern world, as well as try to identify a new place for journalism in the field of ethnic relations. This study also raises the issue of social responsibility of journalists. According to I. N. Blokhin, “careless attitude to facts, increased attention to conflict situations, the presence of stereotyped judgments and evaluations of events” in such a sensitive and sometimes very unstable area as national relations, not only generates a “valid claim to journalism” from the public, but also warms up scientific interest to the problem (3).

Blokhin builds a multi-paradigmatic study and tries to harmonize institutional, functional and operational approaches to the analysis of journalism as an ethno-political and ethno-cultural phenomenon. The author chooses a structure for the study which allows for a comprehensive consideration of the stated problems on different theoretical and methodological levels.

The book consists of five chapters. The first chapter, describes the institutional and functional characteristics of journalism as an ethno-political phenomenon. The second chapter examines the values of journalism functioning within ethno-cultural relations. The third chapter is devoted to the involvement of journalism in the implementation of national policies.

In his study, I. N. Blokhin clarifies a number of important concepts, such as “ethnic journalism” and “ethnographic journalism”. He introduces another scientific concept, “ethno journalism”.

According to I. N. Blokhin, ethnic journalism is the kind of “journalism that helps a nation with self-cognition of their ethnic being, consolidation and integration of the ethnic community, preservation and development of their cultural identity. As a rule, [...] its audience consists primarily of representatives of the own ethnic group” (p. 76).
He justifies the need for the term “ethno journalism”, arguing that its use in scientific and editorial practice will clarify a special kind of journalism and give a better understanding to its nature. Ethno journalism, according to Blokhin, is a kind of “journalism that considers issues of ethnic relations and also describes other ethnic cultures” (p. 76).

In its turn, ethnographic journalism is a sub-variety of ethno journalism, that describes “life and culture of exotic and relict ethnic communities” (p. 80). The professional culture of a journalist specializing in ethnic relations issues is also discussed in detail in this study. Blokhin highlights the ethnological culture of a journalist as a component of general professional culture. Every journalist should, to a certain degree, practice an ethnological culture. Its true value “shows itself in cases when the journalist describes and analyzes inter-ethnic relations” (p. 77). The author believes the main component of the ethnological culture is “the ability and the need to think, reflect, and analyze ethnic phenomena and processes” (p. 77). A thorough analysis of ethnological culture features allows the author of the study to formulate criteria to estimate the level of ethnological culture of a journalist, which makes the study not only interesting from a scientific point of view, but also very useful in practice.

The author’s analysis of the creative lab of a journalist specializing in national relations is of theoretical and practical interest. Blokhin focuses on the motives of the journalist’s work. He takes into account the difficulties, problems and paradoxes that inevitably arise in the course of a journalist’s investigation of ethnic relations, as well as estimating the conflict potential of ethno journalism.

In the chapter “Journalist as investigator of national relations”, the author formulates the principles of a journalistic investigation of ethnic relations and describes sources of ethnic information. Unfortunately, Blokhin did not think it necessary (or possible) to show the difference between scientific and journalistic investigation methods, actually making them seem similar, which is not quite true. However, this in no way diminishes the merit of the book under review.

His study is well structured. It contains a considerable amount of interesting data. For example, he monitors research of periodicals issued in Russia (statistics of publications, citations from journalistic material, and fragments of interviews with journalists).

The author often goes back into the history of world journalism where he actively and fruitfully uses a comparative analysis. He compares Russian journalism to European and American journalism, but his main focus is always on the Russian media. This allows him to trace and evaluate the evolution of the state of ethno journalism in today’s Russia.

The book by Professor I. N. Blokhin may be recommended to the widest range of researchers of politics, political relations, media investigators, journalists, and media managers, as well as anyone interested in national or international relations.

Reviewed by Nikolay S. Labush
Professor at the International Journalism Chair
Saint Petersburg State University,
ns_labush@mail.ru

This manual was prepared by a team of scholars at the School of Journalism, St. Petersburg State University including S. Bodrunova, A. Bykova, Y. Kuryshcheva, A. Litvinenko, E. Ozerova and A. Puyu. It is designed for both undergraduate and graduate students majoring in Journalism and Public Relations and for students taking the Contemporary Foreign Journalism Course.

The main subject of this manual is to study trends and system changes under the influence of the globalization of communication in the media markets of the five leading countries in Western Europe, i.e. Great Britain (pp. 10 - 110), Germany (pp. 111 - 144), France (pp. 150 - 213), Italy (pp. 214 - 303) and Spain (pp. 304 - 336). The choice of the countries studied is not random.

First, studying this region is a national tradition because it has been a power engine in global social development. Second, this region was studied because of the wide possibility for using the comparative method when investigating reality. The countries studied give an example of journalism in media systems of three different political models - liberal (Anglo-American), corporate democratic (Continental European) and polar-pluralist (Mediterranean). This work is targeted at filling the gap in Russian media, which only partially covers contemporary Western media industry. This gap focuses primarily on specific aspects of the development of European media, omitting the integrity of the historic process.

This book consists of sections covering the historical, economic, political, and social aspects of media systems in these countries. It describes the structure of these national media systems and their transformations at the turn of millennium. It takes a look at the persistent phenomena and trends in the national media markets and characterizes the role of national news agencies in the media structures of these countries. The book also reflects the differences in media traditions at the regional level. Considering the need to identify national identity, the authors paid special attention to the typology of national media and the development of public and commercial television. A separate chapter characterizes mass media in the context of European integration, (pp. 337 - 391). The legislative framework is analyzed separately for each country and Europe as a whole.
The main purpose of the work is to describe regional features of contemporary global trends in the development of media systems.

A number of tasks have been set and solved successfully in this work, such as “identifying system transformations in the modern media and their comparative analysis” (pg. 5-6) and describing the overall regional development context of Western Europe as part of the global media system. The work focuses on the concept of glocalization; the authors seek to examine the phenomena of national journalism where there is a dialectical interaction between what is global and what is local.

New factors in journalism and qualitative characteristics of contemporary media products led the authors to apply a unique research approach that combines national, regional and global levels.

The book spends much time examining the national level of journalism because it is the basis for the development of mass media and journalism. Much of the writing is about national mass media typology and ways to improve public and commercial television where the national identity is most clearly seen. The work gives focus to media companies in national markets instead of following a recent tradition, which focuses on the role of multinational companies.

The work traces global trends in the national mass media. Such trends include accelerated technological development and media internalization, fast growth of the new media and interactive media service, the expansion of satellite and digital television, the emergence of participatory journalism, and strategic marketing as a new key factor in making editorial decisions.

The recognition of global trends in the development of journalism has created an information space for the authors to examine the position of national media systems in the context of these global trends. However, it is the level of regional research that appears to be the most important as; “Overall trends in the development of media systems in Western European countries have become the basic structure of the media system analysis and have created a reference field for their comparison” (p. 9).

This analysis considers such factors as the place of the national media market in the European market, the influence of European initiatives on national media economies and information policies, European broadcasting media companies and mass media law changes. The European media encompasses the unique regional processes of the system transformations of regional media markets (p. 394). Europeanization of the media has encountered several obstacles such as national media markets, private interests, and national legislation.

As a result of this research, the authors conclude: “Germany and Italy are evidently the power engine of the unifying tendencies, however, Germany sticks to common European goals, and Italy adopts rapidly European media law complying with the interests of its
national elite. Britain and France rather support autonomy regarding information and economic expansion of their corporations, whereas Spain impedes adopting European media standards due to the structure of its political and media elite” (pp. 395-396).

However, there is no forecast on which of these tendencies is will one day be the most dominate; increasing globalization, top-down Europeanization or various national backgrounds.

The work is based on considerable factual material. It gives a lot of specific quantitative and qualitative structural features of various traditional and new mass media. Information on the circulation of print media, number of TV audience, TV channels popularity and audience coverage is given in tables, which make it more convenient to use.

A reader might find interesting not only the general analysis and special features of the media landscape but also the mass media typology represented both in a traditional way and in the original ways typical for different media schools of every country. All the chapters have reference lists and tests; and at the end of the work, there is a bibliography and a list of basic terms and concepts that allow students to study any other materials. However, expanding the list of basic terms and turning it into a glossary would be helpful. This idea derives from the fact that the authors use a lot of original terms and categories with national flavor. Such terms still have an explanation in their context; however, putting all the terminology in a single section could make it more comfortable for readers.

The work reviewed provides a specific direction for researching European media systems as a component of the pan-European public sphere.
Tolstoy’s heritage, both artistic and spiritual, is truly immense. Within his lifetime, the man of letters and thinking was already at the focus of social, political, ideological and intellectual activity; he was recognized as a great writer, mastermind and powerful moral and spiritual authority. So it is not surprising that many aspects of Leo Tolstoy’s life and work are studied and described in great detail today.

What is surprising, however, is that in this extensive literary research there has been no comprehensive analytical study of the relationship between Tolstoy and official censorship. To be more exact, there is no comprehensive study of his words’ and ideas’ struggle against obstacles of authority in his aspiration to reach the hearts and minds of educated society and citizens in general.

The book of the book under review rightly notices that there has been some research done on this topic. From N. Apostolov’s “Leo Tolstoy and the Russian autocracy; Facts, Memories, Documents,” (1930), most researchers chose the path of publications (with commentary) of “documents and evidence, which were found by them in storages and which reproduce censorship history of Tolstoy’s works” (p. 12). However, there was no comprehensive picture of the confrontation of the writer and official censorship. It Zhirkov’s monograph is the first such study. Moreover, it is obvious that the book title itself, “Leo Tolstoy and Censorship,” is, in a certain way, broader than the material. The subject of the book is primarily the censorship policies of the government and the church regarding Tolstoy’s works. It also discusses a specific regime of censorship “over Tolstoy” in the context of his ideological struggle with the political monopoly of the autocracy and the spiritual monopoly of the church.

Tolstoy was assigned a “specific role” by the authorities through censoring his work. Evidence of this is a common trend of “extremely careful censoring” of his work, on the behalf of editing comments by tsars and the Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod K. Pobedonostsev.

In general, the coverage of Tolstoy’s censorship conflicts reflected a broad context of “the great argument” between a writer’s moral, social, ideological and political views and the dominant government ideology of the autocratic and orthodox Russian Empire. This struggle for Tolstoy was eventually (somewhat inaccurately) labeled ‘Tolstoyism.’
Chapters one through four of the book give a detailed picture of the censorship history of certain works by Tolstoy, from the first collisions in the 1850s and 1860s to the incident with the Posrednik publishing house that popularized the term “Tolstoyism”. In the next two chapters a review of anti-Tolstoy “counter-propaganda” and “counter-ideology” in the area of political and religious opinions in journalism of that time period is given. There is also a thorough analysis of organizational and publishing activity of “Tolstoyans” headed by V. Chertkov, as well as a social program by Leo Tolstoy himself.

Especially valuable is the research of the moral, spiritual and biographical contexts surrounding the creation of non-fiction works by the writer. This includes the ideological evolutions, which Tolstoy experienced. This evolution can also be considered as ascending from the “inner change” in “A Confession” to the political manifestos “To the Tsar and His Assistants”, “An Appeal to Russians: To the Government, the Revolutionaries, and the People,” and Tolstoy’s non-fiction will, “I Cannot Be Silent!” In his last works, Tolstoy denounced the false values of many political parties and urged all political parties to work together to solve the problems of modern Europe. Those problems included moral, ethical and spiritual issues.

Zhirkov’s book bears explicit support for Tolstoy’s ideas and public conduct. Many of Tolstoy’s statements regarding social processes in Russia are defined by Zhirkov as “prophetic.” Fascination for Tolstoy sometimes, in a good way, forces a lot of researchers to treat what he said as “ultimate truth” rather than opinion. Today, it is also obvious that Tolstoy’s original, intense thoughts and his internal moral development are largely unclaimed by the political forces in Russia.

Lenin believed the left-wing “revolutionaries” of the time period defined Tolstoy one-sidedly, pointing out those revolutionaries were biased to a single party and social class. Lenin thought these radically destructive materialists and atheists were a “mirror” reflecting the lack of revolutionary spirit.

These liberals did not accept Tolstoy’s moral teaching as guidance. In fact, Tolstoy denounced the constitutions of liberals for their separation of societies and their alienating of political groups. Liberals were perplexed as to why Tolstoy labelled them associates of the universal “lies” of modern Western civilization.

But the moral teaching of Tolstoy will not be ignored forever. As Zhirkov precisely noticed:

“Most of the intellectuals both leftwing and right wing accepted Tolstoy’s speeches with irritation and misunderstanding, and perhaps this resistance forced Tolstoy to mobilize all his creative reserves, all the energy of his mind, and the Publicist, Thinker, Creator completed his mission. He brought moral understanding of the meaning of life and the primacy of spirituality and religion over consumption to the human world. So to say, he was
the first environmentalist of the human soul that lost its way in brutish wilds of civilization” (p. 260).

Tolstoy’s voice and thought about the “science of how people should live together” will be in demand once again in modern societies as the resources of bare “technotronic development” and the notorious values of the “mass consumption society” run out. In this regard, such thorough and deep works as Zhirkov’s book are essential “building blocks” for reconstructing Leo Tolstoy’s artistic and spiritual heritage.

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THE STRUCTURE OF TEXT CONTENTS

LEONORA A. CHERNYAKHOVSKAYA

The present article is based on the hypothesis that text contents are a psychic phenomenon produced by the interaction of information texts potentially contain with the information text Recipients already have. Language signs as a system carry information that is static and refers only to language constructs of several logical ranks: Names (N), Predicates (P), Propositions with N(P) structure where names are ascribed some qualities and which may turn into model sentences with N-P Grammar structure. In texts, model sentences interacting with the Recipient background knowledge turn into utterances carrying dynamic and concrete information and verbally simulate segments of non-lingual reality (facts, events, objects, etc.). Elementary verbal simulations have N(Pemst) information structure that includes the name (N) chosen by the text Sender for some segment of non-lingual reality that, according to the text Sender, presumably exists (e) in certain time and space parameters (s, t), is evaluated, from the point of view of the text Sender, as real, unreal, desirable, etc., the modal parameter (m), and is ascribed some qualities (P). These simulations may be viewed as Elementary content entities that serve as construction material for content entities of higher logical ranks — Compound and Complex content entities. Their N(Pemst) information structure does not depend on any particular language in which utterances are presented, and they
may be viewed as elements of a universal ‘mind grammar’ of human thinking that is used in structuring text contents irrespective of a language in which texts are created, and, consequently, can be considered the text content invariant. The structural elements of text contents may be of direct interest to translation scholars. Whereas translation theories today are generally based on establishing multi-level inter-language correspondences, text content entities and their structural elements may be viewed as translation units, and the idea of opposing communicative information of text content entities to language meanings that verbally simulate them may serve the basis for creating a different translation theory, with much greater explanatory force.

**Keywords:** Need keywords

There have been many attempts to analyze text contents and their structure from purely linguistic points of view, studying language meanings at various language system levels. For instance, in Generative Grammar texts are viewed as sets of Deep and Surface Grammar and Semantic Structures (Chomsky, 1971, pp.183-216; Dressler, 1970, pp. 202-209), Logical Semantics describes texts as strings of predicates (Aruiunova, 1976); Transformational Grammar and Text Linguistics — as discourses (Harris, 1952; Enkvist, 1979; Grimes, 1975) or sets of frame structures (Minsky, 1975). The purpose of this paper is to show that text contents cannot be brought down to clusters of meanings of lexical units and grammar structures. While communicating, people do not exchange language meanings; they exchange information. Though varied and unique for every original text, the information any text contains has its own structure and its own information components. As information is the core concept in this approach, a clear-cut and detailed definition of the term is offered below.

**INFORMATION**

Besides being a sum of facts, information is a certain natural process with its own mechanics of existence and development. Information processes in natural objects, the human Conscious and the human Subconscious included, have one common feature: interaction of specific objects produces something that does not exist outside the interaction, is not a quality of any of the interacting objects, but a specific function of their interaction. It cannot be limited to any of them, though it may be stored on one of them as its carrier, to be further actualized in the process of interaction with some other objects. In addition to inherited information (genetic codes), *Homo sapiens* acquire and accumulate Cognitive
Information, the result of life experience, which is knowledge of the physical world around, including physical objects, facts, events, and of the world of constructs of human mind, including ideas of physical objects, facts, events, and logical connections between them established and evaluated by people. Cognitive Information has several characteristic features:

(a) Being the function of two interacting objects, i.e., the brain and the outer world, it offers to human mind a transformed form of the world, where generalized qualities of various objects are separated from the objects themselves and transferred to a different carrier (substratum) (an analogy can be drawn with to the definition of money by Karl Marx defined as a transformed form of the goods where a dependent relationship, historically a derivative, turns into an independent, dominant relationship that in its second form acquires an independent content of existence, K.Marx. Das Kapital, v.IV).

(b) It can be transferred from one carrier to another via various communication systems.

(c) Encoded in the symbols of communication systems, it exists potentially either on the substratum of a human mind — the brain — or on the substrata of symbols of human communication systems.

(d) It can be “revived” at the moment of interaction of the human brain and some other carrier of potential information.

In an individual human mind it is conscious and subconscious Individual Knowledge, the result of personal social experience.

Stored on material carriers and accumulated through ages, it is Social Knowledge, the asset of the whole human society. It can be verbal (encoded in texts), visual (encoded in symbolic languages of Mathematics, Chemistry, Traffic Rules and symbols, in drawings, schemes), acoustic, tactile (e.g., encoded in Braille symbols), etc.

(e) Cognitive Information is not amorphous. Human experience has subdivided knowledge of objects, facts, events, etc. into Designata, Conceptual Categories of colligated knowledge of objects and events with more or less similar qualities.

Designata are interpreted here as constructs of human mind created as a result of Cognition, with more or less similar qualities, from the point of view of their interpreters, and are rigidly labeled with names (see the definition of Designatum by Charles W. Morris in Foundations of the Theory of Signs (1938) as a class of objects to which the symbol can be applied, i.e. objects with similar properties, from the point of view of their interpreter). Besides names, Designata have extended definitions that may be verbal or use symbols from
other codes (e.g., the Designatum represented by the word ‘water,’ besides various word definitions, can be also referred to by the chemical formula H₂O).

**LANGUAGE**

Language is a specific part of Cognitive Information used as a communication tool shared by cultures. As part of social knowledge, it is described in textbooks, dictionaries, etc. As part of individual knowledge, it is known as Language Competence and includes intuitive Individual and acquired Social knowledge. Various users may use Language somewhat differently, but its relative subjectivity does not influence communication process and can therefore be ignored.

Building any social product, Social Knowledge included, leads to increase of Entropy, dimensionality and homogenization of its elements. Cognitive information as social product is presented in Language as homogenized sets of lexical and grammatical units representing homogenized segments of knowledge. Lexical units are rigidly referred to their Designata and categorized into Names, labels of Designata presented by the Language as objects, and Predicates, labels of Designata presented as qualities.

(It is an established fact that physical perception of any material object by the human brain is mostly visual — 95% of information is received through eyesight. It has been recently discovered that while a material object is being perceived through the eyes, the brain analyzes it via two channels and in two ways. One channel provides for perceiving and evaluating the object as a whole entity, and the other channel does analysis of the information received, distinguishing separate features of the object, abstracting and registering them as its qualities. The physiological mechanism might have imposed its influence on both thinking processes and the structure of human Language. Names and Predicates coincide with and probably belong to the two types of finite products of Cognition acquired through each of the two vision channels.)

The reference of a word (or a word combination) to its Designatum is viewed here as the word’s Referential Meaning (RM) (Austin, 1962). Word references to all Designata it names constitute the sphere of its RM. The part of Cognitive Information processed and fixed as a set of language symbols with rigidly fixed strict references to Designata make up Language semantic space.

The RMs of Names and Predicates are correlated with Designata, not with any concrete physical objects, facts, events or their qualities. RMs are registered in dictionaries as *sets of references to a restricted field of rather sharply delineated objects* (e.g., nobody would call mustard “honey,” but in reference to one’s beloved tradition may be allowed). Bilingual dictionaries offer only approximate RM correspondences, as references to
Designata in different languages may vary. Names and predicates make up the language Vocabulary, which is the lower level of a hierarchy of Language constructs.

Predications make up the next level of constructs. Predication is viewed here as a function of a verb towards its agents (see: Mechaninov, 1982; Losev, 1982). Predication is the process and the result of ascribing a predicate to a name, which symbolically may be presented as N(P). These structures have a complicated grammatical meaning of a predicate attributed to a name, but have no reference to any concrete segment of reality.

Propositions are constructs of a still higher logical rank. They are viewed here as structured entities (propositional functions) with objects and properties as their constituents (Russel B. Logic and Knowledge. London, Allen and Unwin, 1956). They have N-P syntactic structures carrying grammatical meanings (rules of uniting words into structures), with the components yet to be filled with concrete names and predicates joined by predication. Shcherba’s famous phrase ‘Glokaya kuzdra shteko budlanula bokra i kudryachit bokrenka’ illustrates the importance of grammatical meanings in propositions that even allows their translation: “A female creature with some unknown quality has done something (probably aggressive) towards a different male creature and is now doing something (probably unpleasant) to the male’s baby.” However, since the names kuzdra and bokr are not correlated either with any Designata or with any segment of reality, the proposition has meanings, but does not have any content.

Filling Proposition positions with concrete language symbols turns them into Model Sentences that have RMs and grammatical meanings, but do not yet refer to any segment of reality. A propositional function filled with meaningful words is a sentence. However, according to B. Russel, sentences should be viewed as symbols that take on meaning within appropriate contexts, but are meaningless in isolation. Following this logic, we have introduced the concept of a model sentence as opposed to sentences used in texts in reference to objects of non-lingual reality (utterances).

Model Sentences are viewed here as constructs of a higher rank than Predications and Propositions. A set of rules allowing names and predicates to form propositions by means of predication, and propositions to be filled with meaningful language symbols and form sentences constitutes the Language Grammar (intuitive and socialized knowledge of how Names and Predicates may be arranged into Propositions and Sentences). Grammar structures carry information on the functions of names and predicates within model sentences. RM of names and predicates, grammatical meanings of propositions, RM and grammatical meanings of Model Sentences make up Lingual Information that includes the Language Vocabulary and the Language Grammar. In different languages the correlation of RMs and grammatical meanings may vary (compare: “He waved an angry hand” and ‘On serdito makhul rukoi’, or “Raymond leaned up against a tree trunk. He had been lying on the
ground,” and «Mister Reimond vnachale lezhal na trave, a zatem sel I prisonilsya k derevu'», etc. (Barkhudarov, 1975).

Lingual Information carried by units of all the hierarchy ranks is static and has no communicative function. Therefore, Language units have RM, may form structures carrying grammatical meanings, but do not carry any messages.

**Cognitive Information Versus Language**

The sphere of Cognitive Information is not equal to the sphere of Lingual Information, though it finds expression through the latter’s system of coordinates. It cannot be reduced to Language forms, because:

People acquire Cognitive Information as a result of life experience, while Language Competence is both inherited and socially acquired knowledge;

Cognitive information presents the world to the human mind as sensual and intellectual images of facts, events, objects, etc., while Language presents both the world and knowledge about it as assemblages of language symbols.

Cognitive information is knowledge of the world we live in and is a register of Designata. Lingual information is knowledge of word meanings and functions and is a register of word references to Designata, not to any objects or facts.

While Designata are the essence of intellectual property of humanity, Language, with its Vocabulary and Grammar system, is a specific tool transferring Cognitive information from one carrier to another.

The volume of Cognitive Information within a Designatum in Individual Knowledge depends on a person’s cultural background, experience and education. The application of Language names in reference to Designata is more or less the same for people within the same culture, which is reflected in dictionaries containing word meanings descriptions, and which makes communication possible.

The amount of cognitive information, both individual and social, is constantly being enriched, thus enriching Designata contents. The number of language symbols is more or less the same for people within a language Culture, which is reflected in dictionaries registering word meanings, which provides mutual understanding between communicants sharing the same language.

**Planes of Reality**

The physical world and events taking place there exist irrespective of which language is used to describe them, or whether it is used at all. This is Non-lingual Reality. It includes
the world of material objects, facts, and events. Cognitive information about them constitutes the world of Designata and their logical interconnections - a spiritual world described by K. Popper as the world of ideas and values (Popper, 1968).

Verbalized social knowledge presents both the physical and the spiritual worlds as an assemblage of text descriptions, which gives reason to say that both worlds are presented in Social Knowledge as Lingual Reality created by assemblage of texts.

Lingual Reality constantly created and enriched by texts carrying Cognitive Information encoded in language symbols is not a mirror reflection of non-lingual Reality, because it is created by individuals, with their personal views and evaluations of the non-lingual world.

**EIDETIC REALITY**

In communication, when a Sender wishes to share with Recipients some Cognitive information about certain segments of non-lingual reality, he/she turns them into Referents (Ogden/Richards triangle of Reference in “The Meaning of Meaning” by C/K Ogden, I.A.Richards, 1923).

One cannot penetrate the black box of human thinking, but one thing is evident: segments of non-lingual reality are projected into the human mind as their personalized, psychic-emotional simulations which undergo the process of so called “eidetic reduction.” (Eidetic - “pertaining to the faculty of projecting images,” (from German “eidetisch,” coined by German psychologist Erich Jaensch (1883-1940) from Greek eidetikos, “pertaining to images,” also “pertaining to knowledge,” from eidos, “form, shape.” “Eidetic reduction” is a term borrowed from Phenomenology where it names a method by which the philosopher moves from the consciousness of individual and concrete objects to the trans-empirical realm of pure essences and thus achieves an intuition of the eidos (Greek: “shape”) of a thing — *i.e.,* of what it is in its invariable and essential structure, apart from all that is contingent or accidental to it and which is no mirror version of its prototype (Britannica online Encyclopedia). Phenomenology defines eidetic reduction as a form of imaginative variation by which one attempts to reduce phenomena into their necessary essences. For a Sender pondering a Referent for a communicative act, ‘the necessary essences’ are those of its features that he/she deems important for the communicative act. These features make up a psychic-emotional mental entity, partially verbal and partially sensual. It is an eidetically reduced Referent version, or an Eidetic Entity, \( EE_i \), a mental image that, being alienated from its prototype, reproduces the prototype in its features essential to its observer at the moment of communication.

In a communicative act the Sender uses language symbols to encode the \( EE_i \) into a text with a certain communicative intent, thus creating a verbal simulation of the Referent.
The process ends up in alienating EE₁ from the human mind, making it objectified in language symbols, and turns it into an EE₂, a segment of Lingual Reality.

The EE₂ is another reduced version of the Referent transferred to the material substratum of language symbols. The reduced approximation has been first mediated by the Sender’s personal evaluation and then by the language in which the text is created. Therefore, it contains the features of the prototype that the Sender has selected for communication and acquires some peculiarities imposed by the influence of the language meanings. Both aspects of its presentation influence the quality of the verbal simulation, making it, at the same time, both similar to and somewhat different from the mental, psychic simulation. (Analogy: houses built according to the plan but from different materials, e.g. wood or bricks, will reproduce the essential features of the designer’s idea but will have their own features imposed on them by the specifics of their construction materials).

Verbalizing EE₁ into texts is, presumably, what is meant by putting “thoughts” or “ideas,” into words, where we can objectively analyze them.

While turning EE₁ into EE₂, the Sender is trying to avoid encoding redundant information by evaluating how much the Recipient may already know and how much of it should be verbalized, which possible inferences the Recipient may make from the verbalized information, etc. Therefore, the Sender may leave a lot of EE₁ information, so to say, “off-screen,” and some of it just hinted at. This is the implicit information of the text, the potential part of the message that is pre-programmed by specific verbal means (such as articles, specific word order, semantic ambiguity, presuppositions, etc.). EE₂ exist in texts only potentially, as any text is dead without a Recipient. They can be revived, or decoded, if there is a Recipient with a certain amount of knowledge, Language knowledge included, the lingual text information interacting with the Recipient’s background knowledge.

A text created in a language unknown to the recipient would offer him/her no content whatsoever. If the Recipient is familiar with the language but does not possess knowledge enough to interpret the text content (e.g. a description of a complicated surgery offered to a Recipient who is not familiar with medical terminology), no message, or only some part of it, will be extracted from the text.

E.g.: “Do you mean to tell me that this boy — this boy! — knows nothing about ANYTHING?”

“I know some things, -he said. - “I can, you know, do math and stuff.” (J.K.Rowling. “Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone”).

Harry, the main character of the book, interprets only the lingual information in the phrase — the meaning of the phrase “nothing about ANYTHING,” and is responding
accordingly, insisting that he does know at least something. But his relatives interpret it as a reproach for hiding from the boy very important facts about his parents, himself, and of many other important matters.

Availability of a certain amount of background information is a prerequisite for extracting EE from a text. The concept of “background information” may be defined as the amount of Cognitive information programmed by the text to be jolted in the Recipient’s mind at the moment of interaction with the lingual information of the text, allowing the Recipient to interpret the text message.

While the text is being perceived, the pre-programmed interaction of the lingual information presenting potential EE with the background information it jolts in the Recipient’s mind produces a certain psychic-emotional state EE similar to EE, the Sender encoded in the text. It correlates with the Referent simulated in the text as EE, that triggered it off, though does not copy it exactly. The accuracy of turning EE into EE depends on the quality of EE encoding and on the amount of background information the potential Recipient has.

However, EE in the Recipient’s mind is not purely psychic-emotional, like the initial EE. It is initiated by the objectified lingual information of the text and, therefore, is less subjective than EE. As a result, the perceived EE, is partially lingual and partially psychic-emotional.

This means text content has three stages: (a) a certain psychic-emotional state of the Sender, to be encoded into a text with a certain intention - EE; (b) a potential psychic-emotional state encoded in a text as its verbal simulation - EE; (c) an actual psychic-emotional state in the recipient’s mind at the moment the text is being decoded - EE.

It follows that text content is not quite a linguistic concept. The Sender uses language symbols to verbally encode his/her EE as potential EE, and EE similar to EE are pre-programmed by the text and by the presumed Recipient’s background knowledge.

EEs constitute one more plane of reality — a potential world of EEs revived at the moment texts are being perceived. It is a world of Eidetic Reality consisting of potential psychic-emotional approximations of Referents created by their verbal simulations and revived at the moment of text perception. Hence, one can figuratively speak of three planes of reality:

- Non-lingual reality — the physical world of things and events;
- Lingual reality — language simulations of Referents, segments of non-lingual reality registered in strings of language symbols arranged into texts and stored for indefinite periods of time;
- Eidetic reality — psycho-mental states encoded in texts as potential EEs programmed by the texts and revived at the moment of text perception. Eidetic reality potentially exists in texts.
Referents belong to non-lingual reality. By selecting a Referent as the subject for communication, the Sender turns it into an EE₁, a very personal, subjective psychic-emotional simulation of the Referent, and then, in the text - into EE₂, an objectified, verbal Referent simulation, a segment of lingual reality. The interaction of the text with the Recipient’s knowledge produces in his/her mind EE₁, a segment of eidetic reality, objectified by the language meanings but personalized by the Recipient.

COMMUNICATIVE INFORMATION OF EIDETIC ENTITIES

Just as lingual Information of language units arranged into a text cannot be identified with Cognitive Information constituting the society social knowledge, Cognitive information of EEs encoded in texts cannot be identified either with Cognitive Information in general, or with the lingual information texts contain. Cognitive Information, Lingual Information included, consists of constructs and is static, generalized. While building a verbal simulation of an EE, the Sender intentionally correlates language meanings with the prototype of the EE. Therefore, EE₂ contain information programming the reduced psychic versions of Referents encoded in the text as their verbal simulations; it is Communicative Information. It includes a range of dynamic and concrete aspects, such as:

- the communicative intent of the Sender involving his/her expectation of some result;
- some features of the EE the Sender considered essential for communication;
- difference in the communicative weight of various portions of information verbalizing a simulation of the Referent in the text;
- lingual information of the language symbols used in the text with their meanings being redirected from constructs to concrete objects of non-lingual Reality, etc.
- some amount of pre-engaged Recipient’s “background” Cognitive information programmed by the Sender as implicit, etc.

Communicative Information contained in EE₂ in a text constitutes the text message and, consequently, its content.

LINGUAL ASPECTS OF EE₂

Redirecting Word Meanings While Creating a Text Message

Functioning in verbal simulations of Referents language units of all the hierarchy levels carry the communicative information imposed on them by the communicative intent of the text Sender, which makes them undergo substantial changes in RM and acquire specific new features.
In a particular communicative act the Sender (generally following the accepted social norms of usage), may select names and predicates for Referent simulations to his/her own liking. Therefore, while in the language vocabulary names and predicates refer to Designata, in texts, due to the Sender’s communicative intent, they may be used in reference to whatever EE he/she has in mind. “When I use a word, - said one of st Lewis Carol’s famous characters, - it means exactly what I want it to mean.” The choice of a word for naming a Referent depends upon the communicative intent of the Sender. And this is, in a nutshell, what creating a text is about. Sometimes the choice may be quite unexpected, as in the following dialogue:

“- I am a journalist. I am here to do hard news, not fashion. When Teddy Roosevelt led his country out of the Great Depression, he did not do it with fashion and fantasy.
- Franklin Roosevelt.
- Whatever. You know what I am saying. If people are worried, let us do the economy.
- Stupid dickhead. Teddy Roosevelt, Jesus. They are not journalists!”

Though the name chosen for the Referent is evidently wrong, it does not prevent mutual understanding of the dialogue, as the participants share a certain amount of background knowledge. Lack of such knowledge may lead to misunderstanding, e.g.:

“…even Stigang, the patriotic archbishop of Canterbury, found it advisable —
“Found what?” said the Duck.
“Found it,” The Mouse replied rather crossly: “of course you know what “it” means.”
“I know what “it” means well enough, when I find a thing,” said the Duck: “it’s generally a frog, or a worm. The question is, what did the bishop find?” (Lewis Carol, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland).

The first participant in the dialogue attributes to the word “it” the role of a formal element in a Grammar structure (“found it advisable”). However, the second dialogue participant interprets the word as a substitute for the name of some EE, he has in mind, and supports the information with the phrase “I know it when I find it.”

Besides re-addressing a Name from a Denotatum to a Referent, there is one more kind of re-addressing. A Name can be used in reference to the quality of belonging to a Designatum, i.e. to a class of similar objects, which is another construct that will be called Denotatum. Re-addressing a name from its Designatum to Denotatum in speech redirects the name reference from the Class of Names to the Class of Predicates (Compare: “I saw a man in the street” and “He was man enough to do it…”).

This becomes possible because, in addition to its meaning, the name in the EE is loaded with some communicative information that makes it function either as (a) the name
of a Designatum, i.e. a Conceptual Category; (b) the name of a Denotatum, i.e. of an object standing out for its quality of belonging to a group of similar objects within the Designatum; (c) the name of a Referent, i.e. the subject of the communicative act, i.e. a physical object, a fact, an event, a construct, etc. The choice of one of these three functions for words used in EE depends solely on the Sender’s communicative intent.

To sum up, in EE, the communicative intent of the Sender redirects words references from Designata to Denotata or to Referents, thus building EE, or potential messages. If the redirection of a reference is successful, the message will be successfully comprehended.

Model Sentences Versus Utterances

Due to the peculiarities of human perception, human beings physically perceive only the three-dimensional non-lingual reality space of here and now. Predication is an instrument assisting in creating spread out four-dimensional Referents verbal simulations. However, text predication differs from language predication ascribing qualities to names. In addition to lingual information, text predication includes the background information of potential Recipients preprogrammed to be revived by the lingual information of EE. The interaction of the two kinds of information turns the static information of language symbols, propositions and grammar structures into the dynamic communicative information producing potential EE and allows modeling events flowing in time, verbally reproducing past, future, desired or imagined events, create imagined worlds, etc. E.g: The model sentence “Tom is fooling around” has RM and grammatical meanings, but does not carry communicative information (makes no sense) until it is used by the Sender with a certain communicative intent. As soon as the Sender refers the name “Tom” to the Referent he/she has in mind, the predicate “is fooling around” would redirect its reference, too, and refer to different actions suitable for certain Referents. Consequently, the sentence would carry certain kinds of communicative information and become an utterance containing a message: “Tom the baby” is being naughty, “Tom the cat” is prowling in the night, “Tom the husband” is being unfaithful, etc.

The message makes sense for the Recipient if he/she has some background knowledge of what EE is represented by the name “Tom.” If the Sender is aware that the Recipient has no such information, more communicative information may be added to the phrase, like: “Tom, my son,” or “Tom, the neighbor’s cat,” or “Tom, my sister’s husband, etc.” …is fooling around,” Each of the phrases will carry different messages.

To sum up: whereas model sentences are built as a result of predication uniting a Name and a Predicate into an N-P structure and are objectified Language constructs with no Referents, utterances containing verbal simulations of Referents (EE) are built as a result of interaction of the lingual information of the text with the Recipient’s background
information involved by the interaction and therefore contain enough communicative information to identify verbally simulated Referents.

THE INFORMATION STRUCTURE OF EIDETIC ENTITIES

When EE₁ unattainable for direct analysis get objectified in words and become potential EE₂, their communicative information becomes traceable. Projection of a potential EE₂ into the Recipient’s mind as EE₃ is predetermined, hard-coded by an objective set of language symbols; it guarantees producing more or less similar psychic simulations for different text Recipients (though in some aspects they will remain subjective, as the amount of the Recipient background knowledge may vary). Therefore it is possible to analyze the information of EE₂ by taking into account the implicit background information pre-programmed by the text explicit lingual information (Chernyakhovskaya, 1981).

The research has shown that, boundless as information amounts are, information clusters arranged into utterances have some definite structural features. There are certain types of information, or Information Parameters, that seem to be mandatory for any verbal Referent simulation, irrespective of whether the Referent is fully or partially verbalized in a text. It is their potential presence in the text that allows producing EE₃ in the Recipient’s mind at the moment of text perception.

They make up the information structure of an utterance that is much more sophisticated than the (N-P) structure of a model sentence, because it has an important communicative function of containing an EE, that a model sentence does not, and produce EE₁ in the Recipient’s mind at the moment of text perception.

Tagging the Referent with a name (the N parameter) is one of the most important information parameters producing EEs. A name N is chosen for the EE₂, in accordance with the communicative intent of the Sender. Any Referent named N in a particular act of communication and ascribed some qualities P (N-P structure), presumably exists (may exist, imagined to exist, etc.) and is located somewhere in Space and Time. Therefore, the other mandatory information parameters allowing the Referent to be referred to as N, are: Information Parameter “e” (existence) in certain Time (“t”) and Space (“s”) Parameters; the Referent is evaluated by the Sender as to the degree of reality of its existence, which is the Modal parameter “m.” This information may be presented as N(Pstme) structure, as opposed to the N-P structure of model sentences. In Indo-European Languages Information Parameter “e” is usually incorporated into verbs as the sense of existence: Existential sentences-patterns may be used in utterances introducing Referents supposed to be new for the Recipient (“Once upon a time there lived…,” “In front of the map stood …” etc.).

The Information Parameters may have various kinds of verbal presentation, with various degrees of explicitness (compare “This year saw…” and «V etom godu proizoshlo»,
“I came across an old calendar…” and «Mne v ruki popal staryj kalendar’…» etc.), and all the more vary in different languages. E.g., the information on the time parameter in one of African languages is not incorporated into a verb, but is shown by intonation only, and by a special sign above the line at the end of a phrase (see: Bendor-Samuel J., 1971)

The Modal parameter “m” has an especially rich gamut of means of verbal presentation, in addition to the information provided by the Grammar Mood of the utterance verb. These means seldom coincide in various languages (compare “Columbus never heard of the calendar. It did not exist until 100 years after he was dead,” and the Russian version, “Kolumb ne mog slyshat’ ob etom kalendare, potomu chto on poyavilsya tol-ko spustya 100 let posle ego smerti.” In the English version the indicative Mood of the verb “heard” evaluates the situation as real; however, the second utterance provides information that allows the inference that the situation could not be real: one could not hear of something that did not exist. In Russian the information on the unreality of such a situation is verbalized via a modal verb: “Kolumb ne mog slyshat’

The modal Information Parameters serve as structural “ribs” for building four-dimensional Referent simulations of EEs with N(Pemst) information structure.

**CONTENT ENTITIES**

As text utterances represent EE, interacting with the Recipient’s background knowledge, they contain the information parameters that allow the Recipient to perceive them as EE, approximating EE,, the initial psychic simulations of the Referents the Sender had in mind.

From this point of view, discussions of B. Russell’s paradoxes like “the king of France is bold” on how a formally true statement may be telling a lie (Russel, 1956) have no grounds. Such phrases, if viewed as model sentences, have meaning, but do not carry any messages and, consequently, cannot be interpreted as true or false as they do not refer to non-lingual reality. Model sentences may be used to build EEs, parts of Eidetic reality evaluated by their Senders as real, unreal, imagined, true, false, etc.

An EE with all the mandatory Information Parameters producing an EE in the Recipient’s mind is a Content Entity. While utterances make up a text, Content Entities make up the text contents. Their mandatory information parameters may have various degrees of verbalization, from zero or minimal verbalization as a seme or a single word, to several sentences. Therefore, depending on how much information each Information Parameter supplies, an utterance may coincide with a phrase, a sentence or a group of sentences, a whole paragraph, etc., as long as it has N(Pemst) information structure.

The following mini-text analysis may serve an illustration of how content entities can be singled out:
“Once upon a time there lived a king (1). He was young and handsome (2). He had a wife and two daughters (3). Unfortunately, the wife was bad-tempered (4), and the daughters were spoiled (5). . . .”

The above mini-text contains five utterances. In the first one: “Once upon a time there lived a king,” a content entity named “king” (the N parameter) is introduced into the text by the whole utterance, via its name accompanied by information “e” and “m” indicating that the person truly existed (the Indicative Mood of the Predicate) in some vaguely mentioned “t” (“once upon a time”) and “s” (“there”) Parameters. The name “king” used with the indefinite article carries information that the noun has re-directed its reference from its Designatum to a Denotatum — a person having the quality of belonging to the Category of kings (N and P Information Parameters). Supported by the other mandatory Information Parameters, the noun turns into an EE simulated by the utterance, with N(Pemst) structure. In the next utterance (2) the same EE is represented by the substitute pronoun “he” (as the EE familiar to the text Recipient); here the Referent is ascribed some more qualities (“young and handsome”). In Utterance 3 the EE acquires more characteristics: “had a wife”, “had two beautiful daughters”. The nouns “wife” and “daughters” here refer to Denotata (one of many) and do not represent any content entities, because the utterance does not supply enough mandatory Information Parameters to complete a new EE. The two utterances to follow, (4) and (5), offer the information necessary for these nouns to re-direct their reference from Denotata to new Referents and, consequently, to simulate new EE verbally represented by the predicative names “the king’s wife” and “the two children” (predicative names are names of previously verbalized EEs).

Predicative names may be viewed as folded utterances. (Folding an EE to a single word as its substitute is one of many devices that assist in attaining text cohesion.)

The above utterance content might be also presented as a single sentence containing several folded utterances: “Once upon a time there lived a young handsome king with a bad-tempered wife and two spoiled daughters.” The sentence in this case is an “onion” utterance — an utterance containing several Content Entities represented by predicative names.

**Elementary Content Entities**

Names may be considered predicative, having potential N(Pemst) structure and represent Content Entities if, while interacting with a person’s background knowledge, they acquire all the mandatory parameters of an EE. Thus, for a Russian the name “Moscow,” even without any context, refers to the capital of Russia. For an American the same name would have to be accompanied by the verbal information on a certain location where a town
under the name of “Moscow” exists, as there are several towns named “Moscow” in several US states.

N(Pemst) structure is potentially present in a number of names that are associated with well-known segments of non-lingual reality or with some segments of eidetic reality (such as Geographic names like “St. Petersburg,” “New-York,” “The Red Square,” “The Eiffel Tower,” etc., personal names like Alexander Suvorov,” “Steven King,” famous cultural realia like “Bolshoy Theater” in Moscow, “The Museum Mile” in New York, etc., which without any context represent EEs of existing objects of non-lingual reality). EEs behind such names do not necessarily have prototypes in non-lingual reality. Names of persons created by human imagination, like “Batman,” “Spiderman,” represent EEs to people pertaining to the American Culture, names like “Illya of Murom,” “Eugine Onegin,” represent EEs to people pertaining to the Russian Culture, because for language users within corresponding Cultures they actualize information that such objects exist (or existed, or would exist, with a certain degree of reality) in some Space and Time Parameters of Eidetic Reality and have certain qualitative characteristics. Therefore, such names can be viewed as the smallest, or elementary, content entities that potentially contain all the mandatory parameters turning these names into EE, without using them in texts. A text Recipient may identify a name with a certain EE to which the Sender refers it only if he/she has a certain amount of background knowledge, and cannot do it if he/she does not.

Predicative names representing elementary EEs are often used as Information Parameters for more complicated EEs represented by larger text utterances.

**Complex and Compound Content Entities**

Elementary EE serve as supportive cogs for more complicated EE text utterances represent. Thus, an elementary EE “France” might serve as the Space information Parameter in the phrase “The King of France is bald” in case the phrase were accompanied by explicit or implicit information on whether the Sender had in mind an EE (some historical person or a person created by his/her imagination), with all the mandatory Information Parameters. As long as such information is not provided, the phrase cannot be viewed as an utterance, but remains a model sentence. If such information is implicitly present, the phrase “the king of France” becomes a verbal simulation of the person. The phrase “The king of France” would then turn into an utterance including two EE: an Elementary EE represented by the name “France” becomes an Information Parameter for a larger EE represented by the phrase “the king of France,” thus making the whole phrase a Complex EE with two layers of Information Parameters.

Utterances including more than one EE may be defined as Complex Content Entities. The usually include Elementary EE as one or more of their Information Parameters.
In the phrase “the king of France is bald,” the presumed Complex Content Entity “the king of France” is attributed a new quality, of being bald, which adds one more layer of Information Parameters and turns the phrase into a multi-layered EE. A multi-layered EE that includes an elementary EE and a Complex EE may be defined as a Compound EE. A compound EE, like a Complex EE, may be presented as an utterance consisting of one or several sentences, or just of a phrase.

Complex EE have multi-layer information structure including a whole range of Content Entities, from elementary to one or several Compound EE. Implicit information in the Recipient’s background knowledge may add additional sophistication to their information structure. E.g.: the phrase “Volga runs into the Caspian Sea,” on the surface, contains two elementary EE represented by well-known names “Volga” and “the Caspian Sea,” as both names are familiar to those who know elementary Geography. The Referent named “Volga” is introduced as an elementary EE presumably familiar to potential Recipients. The utterance offers information about the qualitative feature of the famous river (“runs into the Caspian Sea”), which includes the other elementary EE, “the Caspian Sea.” The second EE offers information about some qualitative characteristic of the Volga River (“runs into the Caspian Sea”). However, for representatives of the Russian Culture the utterance implicitly contains one more complex EE: the phrase has become a symbol of trivial truth. For those who have read Chekhov’s story “The Man in Cotton Wool,” the phrase contains even more sophisticated information: it is also a visit card of the famous Chekhov character, and is a verbal synonym of the EE belonging to the world of Lingual Reality and usually referred to as “The Man in Cotton Wool”.

In the same way, N. Chomsky’s famous phrase “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously” offered as an example of a grammatically correct but senseless sentence, since his “Language and Thought” was published (Chomsky, 1968), has acquired a Referent in the world of Lingual Reality, at least to linguists, and therefore may be considered another EE of that world.

As a rule, new EE introduced into a text have rather explicit presentation of their Information Parameters, and not necessarily within the range of a single sentence. E.g.: “It happened in 1941. It was summer time. The weather was excellent… This is how the World War II began for the Russian people…” No matter whether a micro-text includes a phrase, a sentence, or several simple sentences, it is a single utterance as long as the micro-text contains a Compound EE (including at least one elementary EE).

Psycho-lingual analysis taking into account the pre-programmed background Recipient’s knowledge demonstrates that EE produced by a text make a complicated non-linear information structure of the text message which may be considered the text content invariant.
Linearization of EE₁ Information While Turning Them into EE₂.

When EE are coded into EE₂, linear chains of language symbols, the choice of a linear succession of verbalized information parameters depends on their communicative functions within the utterance, i.e. whether they carry Rhematic or Thematic information. Theme-Rheme Information structure (FSP) is typically viewed as an integral part of model sentence Grammar and is interpreted as sentence members acquiring Thematic or Rhematic functions depending on contexts where sentences are functioning (see detailed reviews on the Theme-Rheme division (FSP, IS) in: Chernyakhovskaya, 1978; Primus, 1993; Erteschik-Shir, 2007; Yokoyama, 1986), even when the role of human cognitive mechanism is taken into consideration, and the role of focusing is noted in all modes of perception (as in The Dynamics of Focus Structure by Erteschik-Shir, 1997).

Opposing model sentences to utterances offers a different interpretation of Theme-Rheme Information structure. The direct result of the Sender’s communicative intent shaped into words is viewed as the Rhematic part of the utterance communicative information. Its Thematic part is a certain amount of knowledge necessary for the interaction with the information in the potential Recipient’s mind resulting in producing an EE₁. As the Sender builds his/her message counting on a certain amount of the Recipient’s background knowledge, he/she has to take into account how much his own knowledge differs from that of the Recipient, in order either to add the information parameters of EE₂ that the Recipient may not be aware of, or to just trigger off the information the Recipient already has.

This requires certain verbal actions from the Sender which broaden the amount of transmitted information, in order to provide for the interaction of the EE, with the background knowledge of the Recipient and for a better mutual understanding between the communicants. Specific language means are used to this end, indicating which information in the utterance is the subject-matter of the message and which is introduced into the text as some extra without which the message cannot be deciphered. In most languages communicative information within utterances is typically distributed from Thematic to Rhematic (with some exceptions, though). Lexical-syntactic shaping of EEs information components has much more variety in different languages. E.g., compare the English “This year saw severe attacks on house rents…” and the Russian “Å...etom godu imelo mesto ser’eznoe udorozhanie kvartirnoi platy” or “I came across an old calendar” and “Mne popalsya staryi kalendar’” where Thematic and Rhematic kinds of information find very different syntactic presentation, with the semantic Theme-Rheme order being similar (Chernyakhovskya, 1978).
Various linguistic theories of translation concentrate on establishing correlations between meanings of words and phrases of the Source and the Target Languages (e.g. V. Komissarov’s “Theory of Equivalence Levels” (Komissarov, 2004) or trying to explain compensating for lack of such correlations by “transformations of language meanings in translation process” (Retsker, 2010).

However, since verbal communication is exchanging communicative information, not just word meanings and model sentences, translators should pay more attention to information structure of messages, as of their “mind grammar” invariant requiring a different verbal re-shaping in a Target language. Content entities of various ranks, as well as their information parameters, may be used as translation units of respective ranks. Within such units Communicative information shaped into words is blended with language meanings, which impose their impressive influence on its quality. And this is what makes translators and researchers concentrate so much on finding inter-lingual lexical and grammatical correspondences. However, translation process cannot be restricted to rendering specific Source language features into a Target language. Extraction of multi-level message information structure from the Source text and its reproduction by means of the Target language is a very important part of translation process, the translator/interpreter playing the role of the Recipient and extracting EE₁ from the original text, and then playing the role of a new Sender, to transform them into EE₄, verbal simulations of the original Referents in the target language. This is why, besides concentrating on rendering the RMs and grammatical meanings per se, translators/interpreters should pay more attention to reproducing in the Target language the information structure of the Source text contents, as its inter-lingual invariant, and, shaping it into the Target language, look for adequate means of explicit or implicit presentation of content entities information parameters. The procedure may cause some information components implicit in the original become explicit in a translation, and vice versa, as they are addressed to people of different cultures. Depending on the peculiarities of a Target language, a translation may suggest a different verbal presentation: what was originally verbalized via grammatical meanings, in a translation may find expression via RM, and vice versa; EEs may change their verbal presentation from a group of sentences to a single word, and vice versa; peculiarities of Theme-Rheme linear presentation may also influence lexical-syntactic shaping of EEs and their information components, etc. Such variety of information verbal presentation needs special research which may result in a very different translation theory that would shed more light on the translation/interpretation process, seriously assist in improving the quality of translation in
general and become an important tool in understanding and mastering translation/interpretation process, as well as in qualified interpreters/translators training.

REFERENCES


The term “politics of fear” implies that political elites manipulate people’s anxieties intentionally, for political reasons. This study investigates how the image of frightening Russia has been maintained by the New York Times since the collapse of the USSR. The study focuses on the nuclear dialogue between Moscow and Washington. Starting from December 25, 1991, and finishing with December 5, 2009, the authors analyze 903 of the New York Times editorials and opinion pieces. The results of this analysis show that during all the years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the whole nuclear discourse related to Russia has been constructed through two different types of fear. The first fear is associated with Russian nukes that were allegedly poorly guarded and could be easily obtained by terrorists or “rogue” states; another anxiety referred to Russia’s aggressiveness, its unscrupulousness and unpredictability. There is an observable correlation between specific types of fear, which surfaced in the New York Times at specific periods of times, and specific types of policies conducted by the White House. Russia with nukes but without aggression.
implied cooperation; Russia with both nukes and aggression meant containment and isolation.

**Keywords:** fear, nuclear weapons, framing, Russia, USA, *New York Times*

The term “politics of fear” gained popularity after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Most often, it has been associated with the anti-terrorism policies of the Bush administration. Many observers have claimed that the Bush administration inflated fears of terrorist threats intentionally, for political reasons (Thrall & Cramer, 2009). The term “politics of fear” thus implies that political elites consciously manipulate people’s anxiety in order to realize their goals; fear is consciously constructed and delivered to publics by means of media.

This study aims to investigate how the image of frightening Russia has been maintained by the *New York Times’* editorial and opinion pieces since the collapse of the Soviet Union. To concentrate on fear as a possible driving force driving for the construction of Russia’s negative image, we have investigated this question through the prism of nuclear dialogue between Moscow and Washington, which started not long before the demise of the USSR.

We first review theoretical, as well as empirical literature on mediated constructions of fear. Then, we discuss the advantages of framing analysis as a method for the investigation on how the image of Russia as a permanent threat to U.S. security has been constructed.

The results of this analysis show that during all the years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the whole discourse of the nuclear topic as applied to Russia was constructed through two different types of fear. The first of them was associated with Russian nukes that were allegedly poorly guarded and could be easily obtained by terrorists or “rogue” states. This kind of fear implied the necessity of collaboration with Russia for the sake of collective security.

Another fear was associated with Russia’s “inherent” aggressiveness, its intolerance of democracy and freedoms, unscrupulousness, unpredictability, and so forth. This fear urged the search of nuclear threat solutions without Russia: the U.S.’s unilateral withdrawal from the ABM missile treaty, establishing an anti-missile shield on Russian borders, or NATO expansion to the east.

**Politics of Fear and Its Representation in Media**

It looks quite obvious to many observers nowadays that large-scale political manipulations of fears are inevitably mediated because “in the modern world we know very
little beyond our immediate experience that is not mass mediated” (Altheide, 2010, p. 146). Media constructions of fears are also politicized because “the mass media rely on governmental news sources and perspectives for most of the information pertaining to social order, internal security and international threats” (Altheide, 2010, p. 150). The examples of collaborations between media and governmental authorities in these spheres are abundant. Gordin (2009), for example, discusses how U.S. officials used media to reduce fears in American society after the USSR detonated its atomic bomb (pp. 233-236); Seib (1997) presents several case studies on how politicians exploited media to play with public fears during the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and other international conflicts.

Public fears can be exploited not only within the realm of international relations. Ragnedda and Muschert (2011), for example, describe how the Prime Minister of Italy, Berlusconi, uses his media influence to cultivate the public’s fear of domestic crime (p. 44). Taylor (2009) observes how media representation of poor neighborhoods of Santa Domingo as sites of danger leads to marginalization of these areas and increased policing. Muntean (2009) argues that media and politicians facilitate the catastrophic imagination of the post 9/11 world by blurring the distinction between viruses and terrorism while rhetorically constructing bird flu.

As a result of such multi-vector manipulations of people’s sensibilities, as Furedi (2005) claims, fear has permeated the whole of Western culture. According to Robin (2004), this is inextricably linked to the exhaustion and demoralization of a society that is not able to project positive visions of the future. Their absence is often compensated by negative substitutes like the constructions of dangerous otherness and the necessity to unite against it (Alexander et al., 2004).

**RUSSIA AND U.S. MEDIA**

The tradition of portraying Russia as a dangerous “other” in U.S. media has a long history, which, according to Davis and Trani (2009), can be traced as far as the end of the 19th century, when Kennan (1891) published his *Siberia and the Exile System* — a book where Russia was presented as a despotic state with the inhuman penitentiary system. Such a portrayal of Russia did not change for the better with the advent of Bolshevik rule, which was accepted by American political elites predominantly as an “embryonically totalitarian” regime hostile to the United States (Davis & Trani, 2009, p. 33). The important purveyors of knowledge about Soviet Russia were American correspondents, who, as many experts observed, often misrepresented the facts, replacing objective reporting with anti-Communist propaganda and presenting much of Soviet history in negative terms because of their personal anti-Communist biases (Bassow, 1988; Lippmann & Merz, 1920).
Not much changed with the demise of the USSR. As Cohen (2001) observes, Western journalists, who first greeted Russia’s post-Soviet movement to capitalism, quickly returned to the familiar Cold-War rhetoric when Putin replaced Yeltsin in Russian presidency (p. 38). Cohen’s observation is supported by Le (2006), who has found that the New York Times editorials on Russia in 1999-2000 were predominantly constructed within a Cold War framework and that Soviet period of Russian history played a substantial role in the constructing Russia’s negative image.

The importance of history and collective memories for the construction of otherness has been highlighted by numerous researchers (e.g., Beck, 2003; Hudabiunigg, 2004). In this respect, the memories of the nuclear contest between the USA and the USSR — full of mutual mistrust, hostility, and fear — are important for understanding the relationship between post-Soviet Russia and the United States.

**A SHORT HISTORY OF NUCLEAR USA-RUSSIAN RELATIONS**

On July 16, 1945, U.S. scientists detonated the world’s first atomic explosion; on August 29, 1949, Soviet scientists tested their own atomic weapon. President Truman’s announcement on the Soviet nuclear explosion caused shock in American society. In order to prevent the intensification of panic, a campaign to spin Truman’s announcement was organized (Gordin, 2009, p. 235). Nevertheless, nuclear fear was set in: “Within a year of Joe-1, certain tendencies of American approach to the cold war have hardened into permanent features of the geopolitical landscape: nuclear and conventional arms races, spy hunts and anticommunism paranoia, and proxy wars outside Europe” (Gordin, 2009, p. 250). All these processes were accompanied with mutual mistrust and hostility, which became the dominant mood of U.S.-USSR relations of the Soviet era.

On December 25, 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, giving way to the commonwealth of fifteen independent republics. However, 27,000 Soviet nuclear weapons, which were dispersed over them, remained under Moscow’s command. Rising nationalism and economic and political chaos within the new independent states generated concerns about control over the weapons, which might become an easy prey of terrorists or criminals. In order to prevent nuclear disaster, the United States Congress allocated $400 million in Department of Defense funds to help the former Soviet republics secure their nuclear weapons, thus launching the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs (Woolf, 2003).

Another step toward Russian nukes control was the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), signed on July 31, 1991 — five months before the formal demise of the USSR. It barred Moscow and Washington from deploying more than 6,000 nuclear warheads atop a total of 1,600 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Its final implementation in late 2001
resulted in the removal of about 80% of all strategic nuclear weapons then in existence (Congressional Research Service, 2001). With START I scheduled to expire December 5, 2009, there were proposals made by the Obama Administration to renew and expand the treaty. However, a series of disagreements with Russia prevented the new START treaty from being signed until April 8, 2008 — the birthday of the new nuclear agreement between Moscow and Washington (Blank, 2009).

**Method**

To investigate how U.S. media portrayed Russia in the course of the USA-Russia nuclear dialogue, we analyzed the content of *New York Times* editorials and opinion pieces. The choice of medium was determined by the *New York Times’s* prestige and its role in public agenda setting (Entman, 2004). The decision to analyze editorials and opinion pieces instead of hard news was determined by several reasons. First, editorials and opinion pieces usually comment on the issues that newspaper’s editors deem most important. Second, editorials and opinion pieces differ from hard stories because they do not pretend to present news objectively and, thus, serve not as “vendors of news” but as “dealers of public opinion” (Habermas, 1964/1974, p. 53). Third, there is sufficient empirical evidence to claim that it is by means of editorials and opinion pieces that the officials of the White House, CIA, or Pentagon often try to manipulate public opinion on the matters of foreign policy (Gordin, 2009; Kalb, 1994; Seib, 1997).

**Framing Analysis**

With little personal experience in politics, people depend on news media to understand the political world. This gives media the power to frame reality for the public. It is well documented that media frames can shape how audiences interpret ambiguous political issues (Entman, 1993) or attribute responsibility (Iyengar, 1991). Gamson and Modigliani (1987) defined a media frame as “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an upholding strip of events…. The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (p. 143). According to Entman (1993), to frame means “to select some aspects of a perceived reality to make them more salient, thus promoting a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (p. 52). In communication flows, frames manifest themselves by means of framing and reasoning devices. Framing devices (metaphors, catchphrases, exemplars, depictions, and visual images) suggest a framework within which to view the issue, while reasoning devices (roots, consequences, and appeal
To identify media frames, we analyze the *New York Times* deliberation about Russia-USA nuclear relations starting from December 25, 1991 — the death day of the Soviet Union — and finishing with December 5, 2009 — the day when the START I treaty expired. We retrieved 933 editorial and opinion pieces via the Lexis-Nexis academic database. No sampling was involved; instead, all commentaries were reviewed. However, only opinions containing the combination of words “Russia” and “nuclear weapons” (or “nukes”) were included in the study. To test the further proposition that the culture of fear became omnipresent in American society after the September 11 terrorist attacks, two sub-periods were examined separately: before 9/11 and after it.

**Coding**

Coverage included six distinct frames as defined in the coding key depicted in Appendix A. We derived frames using a two-step procedure. First, a sample of 40 randomly selected news stories was selected. The first author carefully read them for recurrent themes, or central organizing ideas. The result was a preliminary classification system with five frames or “story lines” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143): (1) Uncontrolled nukes (2) Russian aggressiveness; (3) Russia’s unreliability; (4) Russia’s containment; (5) Overstatement of danger. Both authors agreed on these labels.

Second, we used the preliminary coding instrument to analyze 40 additional, randomly selected stories. Frames that did not fall into any of the originally identified frames were coded as *Other*. Thus, an additional frame was identified and labeled “Nuclear smuggling.” A detailed coding schedule was then constructed that compiled indicators for each frame to assure consistency. Subsequent analysis detected no frames that could not be accounted for using this scheme.

Although many editorial and opinion pieces under analysis contained more than one frame, only primary frames were used in this analysis. As a result, one editorial/opinion piece (a unit of analysis) represented one media frame; the frequencies of frames’ employment over time (Appendixes B and C) were calculated as the ratio between the number of editorials/opinion pieces containing a particular primary frame and the total number of editorial/opinion pieces within a particular period of time.

A separate pilot study using a sub-sample of stories was conducted to test coder reliability. The second author coded another random sample of articles. Then, the results of the work of the first author and the second one were compared. The intercode reliability turned out to be 91 percent and was deemed satisfactory.
Quantitative analysis was used to count the frequency of particular frames or themes using cross-tabulations of frequencies. Qualitative analysis was used to analyze the message meanings.

RESULTS

From December 25, 1991 to September 11, 2001, the New York Times published 552 editorials and opinion pieces related to Russian nuclear weapons. From September 12, 1991, to December 5, 2009, the newspaper published 381 editorials and opinion pieces on the same issue. Appendixes B and C present the distribution of frames across these two sub-periods.

As these appendixes show, this frame distribution is not stable. There are three main periods when contributors of the New York Times stress the necessity of cooperation and depict Russia positively (“Uncontrolled nukes” frame): 1991-1992 (75%-85%); 2001-2002 (47%-55%), and 2008-2009 (55%-72%). The peak of Russia’s negative descriptions as an aggressor (“Russian aggressiveness” frame) is observed in 1993 (50%); Russia’s presentation as an unreliable partner (“Russia’s unreliability” frame) is most conspicuous during the period of 2003-2007, with the highest percentage of employment in 2003 (76%). “Russia’s containment” frame is most popular among the New York Times writers from 1997 (44%) until 2001 (58% before 9/11 and 40% after). The least employed frames are “Nuclear smuggling” (up to 6%) and “Overstatement of danger” (up to 17%).

In the qualitative analysis that follows, we offer our explanation of this unequal distribution of frames across the 18 years under analysis.

Nuclear Russia as depicted by the New York Times before 9/11

The analysis of editorial and opinion pieces published before 9/11 has shown that during 1991 and 1992 — in the aftermath of the USSR disintegration — the New York Times contributors were basically preoccupied with the fear that “there is no central authority and therefore no common political control” over nuclear weapons (Gelb, 1991). It was unclear for them “whose orders the officers are prepared to obey” (“At last,” 1991), and they worried that Russian nuclear scientists might “be tempted to sell their talents to higher bidder” (“Forget Dr. No,” 1991). Smuggled Soviet nukes or seduced Soviet scientists were also discussed: “Italian investigators seize Soviet plutonium… Libya reportedly tries to recruit Soviet scientists” (“A ‘no sale’ sign,” 1992). Various dangers emanating from nuclear chaos in the former USSR led authors to talk about deep cuts of nukes or even total abolition of nuclear arsenals: “There remains terribly important work to be done: elimination of nuclear arms from the face of the earth” (“There’s a big job,” 1991).
An impressive electoral result for Russian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky in Spring 2003 gave grounds for other concerns: “Mr. Zhirinovsky’s...electoral triumph is the most dangerous development in Europe in a long time...He campaigned as an extreme nationalist and anti-Semite, calling for the restoration of the Russian empire and the use of nuclear weapons” (Lewis, 1993). The theme of nuclear Russian nationalism gained impetus in 1994, when “political disarray” in an economically plummeting Russia was brought to the forefront: “Yeltsin gave up reform to please the communists and extreme nationalists in the Duma...Russia is a potential source of great danger: a huge country, with thousands of nuclear weapons, heading for economic chaos” (Lewis, 1994a). In articles under startling titles such as “Dismantle Armageddon,” authors discussed dangers of “coup or irrationality in Moscow” (Blair & Kendall, 1994) and questioned “What might a Russian fascist with a nuclear arsenal feel confident enough to try?” (Lewis, 1994b). This dismal political mood was reinforced by the “chilling stories” about “the prospects that the Russian mafia is getting into the nuclear market” (“Deterring nuclear theft,” 1994) and by “recent reports that German police have intercepted small amounts of nuclear material on Europe’s black market” (“The nuclear black market,” 1994).

It is symptomatic that it was in these years 2003 and 2004, with their abundant descriptions of Russia as a permanent source of danger that the new frames of reference to the solution of the Russian nuclear problem, other than reducing its nuclear arsenals, emerged. These were the plans of the White House to withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and its intention to expand NATO eastward.

These themes developed fully in the following years 1995 and 1996 and remained on the New York Times’ agenda until March 1999, when it became clear that the Clinton team chose to trade a working relationship with Russia in the nuclear sphere for NATO expansion. It is noteworthy that the majority of the New York Times contributors (84%) who discussed the NATO issue in the light of Russian nuclear danger during the years 2005–2008 were strongly against NATO movement to Russian borders. They opposed NATO expansion because of the fear that “treating Russia like an inevitable aggressor today may encourage belligerence tomorrow” (“Then and now,” 1995) and “humiliating the losers — Russia in the case of NATO expansion, Germans after World War I — will only lead to further destabilization” (Hutchins, 1998).

The minority of those who defended NATO expansion (16%) stressed the necessity to contain Russian aggressiveness: “Let us not treat the Russians like children. They know that Europe is still unstable and that they are a big part of that instability” (Rice, 1996). Not to treat Russians like children meant to restrain them by military means: “In coming decades, Russia...will rise again. The only way to deter future aggression without war is by collective defense” (Safire, 1996) or “Russia is an aggressor in the face of weakness. In the face of formidable defense, it can be expected to stay home” (Holland, 1998). Thus, as
these examples show, both protagonists and opponents of NATO expansion constructed their arguments by means of fear: the former called for containing future aggressiveness by Russia; the latter argued that the NATO expansion would cause this aggression today.

The same logic of constructing arguments by fear was observed in the discussions of the United States’ plans to withdraw unilaterally from the ABM treaty to establish the anti-missile defense shield. “Violation of this treaty [ABM] might impel Russia to increase its arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles, thereby renewing the nuclear arms race” (Tsipis, 1999) — such was the fear of the missile defense opponents; “It is unconscionable to leave our cities vulnerable to nuclear blackmail. President Clinton is wrong to oppose efforts to develop a system to protect them” (Laun, 1996) — this is how the danger was constructed by the supporters of the new anti-missile Pentagon plans. Protagonists of NATO expansion or withdrawal from the ABM agreement argued that Russia would remain hostile toward the West under any circumstances — with NATO/ABM or without them. They substantiated their claims by criticizing Russia’s support of the Iranian nuclear program and Russia’s unwillingness to back the United States’ policies toward Iraq. These authors constructed the image of Russia as an unreliable partner, which immorally tried to fish in troubled Middle-Eastern waters: “The danger of the world expressed by the decaying Yeltsin is the unholy marriage of Primakov and Saddam” (Safire, 1998).

The sense of danger seemed to intensify any time something resonant happened in Russia:

The default in 1998: “Russia, with 20,000 nuclear weapons and an impoverished arms industry ready to sell anything to anyone, is teetering on the edge of collapse” (Friedman, 1998).

The Chechen campaign: “Russian imperialism is still alive and growling” (Safire, 1999).

Putin’s ascendancy to power: “Mr. Putin, a former lieutenant colonel in the KGB, is rapidly remilitarizing Russian society” (Gessen, 2000),

The sinking nuclear submarine “Kursk”: it “is not just a tragedy… It is a warning of the dangers” (“Russian unsafe nuclear submarine,” 2000), and so forth.

**Nuclear Russia as depicted by the New York Times after 9/11**

Forty-seven percent of editorials and opinion pieces published in the year 2001 after the 9/11 attacks discussed the danger of Russian nukes to be obtained by terrorists: “A Russian general raised concerns recently when he revealed that terrorists have twice this year conducted surveillance at a Russian nuclear arms storage facility” (“The specter,”
2001). Forty percent of them contemplated the rationality of U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty in the light of the new Russian-American anti-terrorist cooperation, which emerged after Russia provided the United States with “vital intelligence on conditions in Afghanistan, the Taliban and terrorist networks” (Kennedy-Pipe & Welch, 2005, p. 283). The prevailing attitude toward the anti-ABM plans of the White House administration was negative — 87 percent of writers seemed to agree that “Russia’s military and foreign policy elite considered Mr. Bush’s ABM move ‘a slap in the face’” (Friedman, 2001). Even the authors who supported the idea of the missile defense shield against “rogue states” at the expense of the ABM treaty now tried to discuss this option taking into account the new, “deeper partnership” with Russia (e.g., Keller, 2002).

The theme of cooperation with Russia dominated the New York Times in the following year (2002) as well, and nothing pointed towards the collapse of this positive trend until 2003, when Russia took a solid stand against any cooperation with the United States in military intervention in Iraq. Russia’s maliciousness, aggressiveness, unpredictability and ingratitude immediately filled the New York Times’ pages: “Russia… has shown an affinity for murderous dictators from the Balkans to the Persian Gulf” (Safire, 2003b); “St. Petersburg…was built on the bones of tens of thousands of serfs who perished while raising it out of the swamp” (Albats, 2003); “Forget about our sacrifices in freeing France, Germany and Russia from Hitlerism and Stalinism; remembrance has no place in their diplomacy” (Safire, 2003a), and so forth.

The year 2005 was a moment of triumph for those who, since the Soviet Union collapsed, had been insisting that Russia could not be trusted. It was the year of Putin’s infamous speech in which he described the fall of the USSR as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century: “What we are seeing, in short, is a country with nuclear weapons that is enduring a slow-motion version of the medieval Black Death” (Brooks, 2005). This discovery led to another conclusion: “Promoting democracy is one American foreign policy goal, and rightly so, but… promoting democracy is too difficult to be a truly viable doctrine” (Haass, 2005).

Such reasoning meant a new line of criticism of the White House, which ultimately took shape in the New York Times. Accusing the Bush administration of foolishly benign policies toward Russia, it replaced the criticism of the previous years, when authors blamed the White House for being too militaristic and unilateral. Although calls for friendship did not completely disappear from the New York Times pages in 2006, the vast majority of its articles (79%) related to Russia and nuclear threats clearly demonstrated that those times had in fact returned: “It is time to let Mr. Putin know that we are looking hard into his soul, and we don’t like what we see” (“Revisiting Putin’s soul,” 2006). Sixty-eight percent of articles published in the next year (2007) were united by a general characterization of Russia as aggressive, savage, and mean: “The criticism by Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, of
the United States and NATO put one in mind of an alpha dog at the junkyard gate — tough, unrelenting, pugnacious” (Gottemoeller, 2007).

The topic of the necessity of cooperation with Russia for the sake of nuclear weapons reductions reappeared on the *New York Times* agenda at the end of 2007 and intensified in the 2008 election year. The authors of the articles followed the lead of Barack Obama, whose international agenda was partly devoted to nuclear disarmament, and stated the absence of any development in that direction demonstrated by the Bush team: “Today — 19 years after the Berlin Wall came down — the United States and Russia still have more than 20,000 nuclear weapons, thousands ready to launch within minutes” (Robbins, 2008). Discussing the necessity of nuclear negotiations with Russia, the authors claimed that it would be folly to try to isolate Russia: “Isolation is far more likely to spawn more resentment and radicalism” (“The new chill,” 2008). Even in the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia military crisis, which brought an outburst of anti-Russian sentiments, e.g., “The United States must find a way to constrain the Russians’ worst impulses” (“Barack Obama for president,” 2008), writers were not averted from contemplating how to preserve “the ability to work with them [Russians] on arms control and other vital initiatives” (“Barack Obama for president,” 2008).

During the year 2009, as the USA-Russia relationship improved, and the dialogue between the two countries intensified, the theme of nuclear danger emanating from Russia noticeably receded. Even the traditional topic of Russian “aggressiveness” and “authoritarianism” sounded in a new fashion now, with an acknowledgment of Russia’s partial right to have been not friendly in the dark Bush-dominated past: “Mr. Bush both enabled former President Vladimir Putin’s worst impulses and ignored his occasionally legitimate complaints” (“Mr. Obama and Mr. Medvedev,” 2009). In the course of time, the voices of those who tried to understand the “legitimacy” of Russian complaints became more confident: “The Russians want respect, and resent when they are perceived as has-beens who can be pushed around, especially by Americans” (Levy, 2009).

In the course of just several months, Russia stopped seeming to be a threat for U.S. commentators: “Threats are more likely to come from states like North Korea and Iran than from a heavily armed power like Russia” (Taubman, 2009). The general tone of the publications was full of anticipation of positive changes: “Moscow’s overall outlook toward the United States has unquestionably warmed in recent months, largely because of President Obama’s drive to ‘reset’ relations, and that could ultimately be pivotal” (Levy, 2009b), and so forth. What is interesting is that these hopes did not reflect the reality. On the eve of the expiration of the START I nuclear agreement, the new White House administration was not at all successful in prolonging the term of the treaty with Russia. Despite all the talks about cooperation and friendship, Russia insisted that it would sign a new treaty only in exchange
for Washington’s reconsideration of its plans to establish the anti-missile shield in Europe and to expand NATO.

**DISCUSSION**

The dynamic of the development of the Russia-related nuclear discourse outlined above allows reaching several basic conclusions. First, during all the years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union starting from 1991, the whole discourse on the nuclear topic as applied to Russia was constructed in terms of fears, which, however, were not homogeneous. We can differentiate between two main kinds of insecurities associated with Russian nuclear weapons. The first was directly related to Russian nukes that were allegedly poorly guarded and could be easily obtained by terrorists or “rogue” states (“Uncontrolled nukes” frame). This kind of fear also envisaged the risk of underpaid, hungry, and disoriented Russian nuclear scientists who might be tempted to sell their knowledge to terrorists, criminals, or “rogue” leaders. This kind of insecurity implied the necessity of cooperation with Russia for the sake of further reductions of nuclear arsenals, cooperation in anti-terrorist undertakings, and the aiding of nuclear scientists and the Russian economy on the whole. This type of discourse prevailed immediately after the Soviet Union dissolved and was associated with corresponding politics of the United States (Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs). The same type of discourse on Russian nukes (the danger that terrorist groups or rogue states would obtain them) prevailed, as well, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and was also associated with the political realities of new Russia-American cooperation.

The second type of danger associated with the Russia-related nuclear problem was the fear of Russia’s “inherent” aggressiveness and its intolerance of democracy and freedoms (“Russia’s aggressiveness” frame) or its unscrupulousness and unpredictability (“Russia’s unpredictability” frame). Because of these putative characteristics of Russia, its nukes and nuclear technology looked even more intimidating because they could become a possession of terrorists not incidentally but intentionally, owing to the unscrupulous cupiduty of Russian ruling elites, insensible to moral considerations. This kind of attitude toward Russia, which first manifested itself after Zhirinovsky and his party got victory in the parliamentary elections of 2003, vanished in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the course of the Russian-U.S. anti-terrorist cooperation, reemerged when Russia spoke against the military invasion of Iraq, and passed out of sight again after Obama made attempts to revise his foreign policy. The fear of “aggressive,” “anti-democratic,” and “unreliable” Russia led to the search for ways of dealing with nuclear threats outside of cooperation with Russia: unilateral withdrawal from the ABM missile treaty and establishing the anti-missile shield on Russian borders, or NATO expansion to the east (“Russia’s containment” frame).
There was an observable correlation between specific types of fear (specific frames), which surfaced in the New York Times at specific periods of times, and specific types of policies conducted by the White House. These correlations looked quite logical: Russia with nukes but without aggression implied cooperation; Russia with both nukes and aggression meant containment and isolation. Most conspicuously, such a drastic change of attitude toward Russia (from aggressor to partner) happened after the 9/11 terrorist attack when cooperation with Russia became vital in the eyes of U.S. observers. All Russian sins were forgotten at once: Chechnya, assaults on democratic freedoms, nationalism, Putin’s KGB-shaped soul, and so forth. Colin Powell’s statement made in 2002 that “Russia is fighting terrorists in Chechnya, we understand that” (cited in Kennedy-Pipe and Welch, 2005, p. 282) could serve as a manifestation of such political “oblivion.” Only one year after that, however, the pendulum swung in the opposite direction, after Russia refused supporting the USA-led intervention in Iraq. In a moment, it became a “bullying” “friend of all dictators,” and “enemy of freedom and democracy” undeserving of being treated with understanding and respect.

Following Furedi’s line (2005), we can interpret such rapid changes in public attitudes as the confusion and powerlessness of a society permeated by fear and manipulated by it. However, the questions arise: (1) Is it possible not to fear a nuclear country that experiences economic disorder, managerial collapse, moral decline, and the rise of nationalist movements? (2) Is it possible not to see Russia as aggressive and dangerous if such “shady” characters as the “nationalist” Zhirinovsky and “KGB-made” Putin are able to grasp power there, if it sells nuclear technologies to the “rogue” states, if it doesn’t unconditionally support all the aspects of the “war on terror,” or if it threatens to aim its nuclear missiles at European targets where the United States locates its anti-missile shield?

To answer the first question, we have to return to the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s disintegration. While the general feeling of danger and fear over Russian loose nukes dominated, there were some voices in the New York Times that sounded sober. Basically, they claimed that the Russia-related nuclear fears were far exaggerated (“Overstatement of danger” frame): “There’s much talk these days about the danger of nuclear weapons under dual jurisdiction. I think that is nonsense, another way to keep the cold war rhetoric in place” (McCullagh, 1991), or “The Pentagon itself knows better than to worry about accidental Russian missile launches. These missiles are under the tightest lock and key” (Gelb, 1992). After 1993, as the concern about Russian nationalism and its inherent aggressiveness rose, those non-frightened voices, yet not numerous, disappeared from the New York Times public space.

The disappearance from the New York Times of the voices claiming that the Russian nuclear threat was grossly overstated has a plausible explanation. It is quite easy to assume that a nuclear country doesn’t represent any danger if one also assumes that this country is
friendly and open to cooperation, the image Russia had in the New York Times immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is much harder to believe, however, that the threats are exaggerated if a nuclear country is portrayed as nationalistic, chaotic, non-democratic, and malign, the way Russia was often presented in the New York Times after 1993. So the second question remains: is there any option to see Russia as non-aggressive, not-hostile, and not-dangerous if such people as the nationalist Zhirinovsky and USSR-nostalgic / KGB-shaped Putin are able to gain power there? The answer will be “No” if one can really believe that a nation can be aggressive by nature; the answer will be “Yes” if one tries to understand the reasons for the opponent’s “aggressiveness.” As Robin (2004) put it,

> Understanding the objects of our fear as less than political allows us to treat them as intractable foes. Nothing can be done to accommodate them: they can only be killed or contained… Were we to understand the objects of our fear as truly political, we might argue about them, as we do about other political things (p. 6)

In their “Anti-Americanism in Russia: from Stalin to Putin,” Shiraev and Zubok (2000) explained why anti-Americanism grew in post-Soviet Russia. After the disintegration of the USSR, many Russian people dreamed of freedom, market abundance, and new opportunities, everything that the U.S., as they believed, embodied. At those times, the admiration of the U.S. in Russia was so great that “any American professor of economics… could easily enter the most top-level offices in Russian officialdom” (Shiraev & Zubok, 2001, p. 37). Those U.S. specialists, possessing no understanding of the realities of post-Soviet Russia, only contributed to its economic collapse. “Shock therapy” prescribed to Russian society by liberal-minded American advisors brought on soaring inflation, skyrocketing prices, massive unemployment, and rampant delinquency. Russia waited for real help, like the Marshall Plan, but her hopes were never realized. To make things worse, contrary to the expectations of Russian people, the United States soon moved NATO to Russia’s borders.

The electoral victory of Zhirinovsky, who built his political career on the rhetoric of Russia’s humiliation by the West, became a reflection of Russians’ feeling of betrayal by the U.S. Putin’s ascent to power was greeted by Russian people not because he was a former KGB officer, but because he was unlike Gorbachev and Yeltsin, who in the eyes of many Russians had humiliated their motherland by allowing the West to trample its pride. If we look at the Russia-USA relationship from this perspective — from the perspective of many Russian people — we can better understand why Moscow has been so reluctant to support some of the major elements of the U.S. “war on terror” (like the invasion of Iraq, where no nuclear weapons were ultimately found) and why it was so stubborn later in negotiations over further reductions of nukes (Blank, 2009).
It is important to note, however, that Russian public opinion is not rigid in its anti-American sentiments. As various public opinion polls show, Russians’ attitudes toward the United States are significantly influenced by immediate political events, like 9/11 when many Russians sympathized with the U.S. or Iraqi invasion, which led to the fit of anti-Americanism in Russia. As Shiraev and Makhovskaya (2007) put it, “Specific events…drive Russian public opinion back and forth from pro- to anti-American sentiments” (p. 118). This observation definitely testifies against Russia’s inherent aggressiveness and hostility to the Western world. But it also allows making another judgment: the fear of American publics of “nationalist” Russia, contributing to aggressive foreign policies of the United States, stirs up, in turn, anti-American feelings in Russia itself. It is this spiraling fear, cultivated and spread by media pundits, that appears to prevent American publics from seeing their countless “foes” as people who have their reasons to resist pressures from the outside. And it is this fear that prevents them from finding a common language and understanding — conditions necessary for the emergence of a global public sphere, necessary for solving common global problems.

If viewed from this global perspective, cultivation of fear for the sake of gaining social solidarity within one particular society (a country or a group of countries) cannot be justified. But is it possible to untwist this spiral of fearful “anti-other rhetoric”? The analysis of the New York Times deliberation on the Russian nuclear issue provides some basis for optimism. Both Russian public opinion and the American view of Russia significantly fluctuate in accordance with changes in each others’ political behavior. The problem thus lies in the interpretation of these changes. Elite newspaper editorials and opinion pieces are critical in shaping elite readers’ interpretations. As we have seen, the authors of the editorial and opinion pieces contain their fears quite successfully when it is necessary for political purposes of cooperation, and they easily unleash them when these cooperative perspectives vanish. Fears presented in the New York Times are indissolubly connected with politics of confrontations; their containment always implies search for a fruitful dialogue. In other words, they can be managed and suppressed in order to eliminate destructive fears from the public discourse.

REFERENCES


APPENDIX A

Coding Key

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<td>Russia’s unreliability</td>
<td>• The danger of collaborating with Russian because of its economic/political/military relations with “rouge states”/dictators is constructed.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Russia’s containment</td>
<td>• The solution of the Russian nuclear problem by means of NATO or ABM is discussed.</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Overstatement of danger</td>
<td>• The overstatement of dangers related to Russian nukes is stressed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nuclear smuggling</td>
<td>• Real cases of the smuggling of Russian nukes are presented.</td>
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APPENDIX B


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APPENDIX C

Framing of Stories on Russian Nukes. September 12, 2001 – December 5, 2009

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ATTEMPTING TO RE-BRAND THE BRANDED: RUSIA’S INTERNATIONAL IMAGE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

GREG SIMONS

The way in which international relations are being conducted in the 21st century is evolving from the earlier reliance on government to government communications and the use of hard power in order to achieve policy objectives. Currently there is a rush by countries around the world to build up their soft power potential and use attraction as a persuasion and means to attain their goals, Russia being one of these countries. This article focuses on a number of different PR programmes and events run as a means of trying to shift the national reputation and image to a more positive one. The actors and events described are viewed mostly through the lens of public diplomacy, government to people communication. I track a number of the different PR programmes that have been run through mass media and PR agencies. The aim is to gain an insight into the wider picture of Russia’s attempts to rebrand itself, and the successes and obstacles along the way.
I

creasingly, in the contemporary period where controlling information and perception is seen as the key to political success, information technologies are being developed and used to influence publics. This is due in part to the shifting notion of values. Previously, there was a greater deal of attention and value in tangible assets — physical and real structures. However, there is increasing attention and value placed in intangible assets — reputation, brand and other ‘virtual’ aspects. The focus of this article shall be attempts to try and rebrand Russia’s current image and reputation through a number of different means, and to understand the logic of attempting nation-branding on an object that is widely recognised (although can be considered as misunderstood in a number of contexts).

Joseph Nye’s soft power concept shall form a theoretical background and understanding to Russia’s nation branding attempts by providing an understanding to the shift in how power is exercised on the international stage. Countries around the world are using information technologies, such as PR and nation branding, in order to project a desired image on the international arena. Public diplomacy is the means of operationalising the attempts through Government to People Communication via informing, influencing and persuading foreign publics in order to realise policy objectives. The reasons for engaging in nation branding and PR campaigns are as diverse as the countries that engage in the practice. However, this still raises the central question, why do countries choose to brand or re-brand? Following from this question is the next logical step is how (method and practice) do they go about rebranding their image?

This article intends to try to trace and understand (in terms of possible motivations and results) attempts to improve Russia’s international image through various government initiatives in the post-Boris Yeltsin period. A first logical step in this process is to understand the nature of branding, and specifically, how it applies to a nation’s image. This is intended to give the reader an appreciation of the theoretical and practical considerations in the sphere of nation branding in a general context.

After laying the broader foundations of nation branding, the Russian context is brought into focus. Russia and ethnic Russians is not an unknown or at least unrecognised country and people, there are existing associated values, stereotypes and prejudices. This may mean that an existing image stands in the way of creating a specific desired image. What are the obstacles and problems that need to be overcome in order to generate the more favourable brand? Although examples of stereotypes are raised in this article it is not my intention to elaborate on them, and how they are formed and recreated. To do this subject

**Keywords:** soft power, public diplomacy, public relations programmes, Russian image and stereotypes, reputation, nation branding.
adequate justice, would require another article. The final step is to outline a number of practical ways and means of trying to realise the more favourable international image.

**NATION BRANDING**

In order to orientate this article, it is necessary to define what is meant by the term brand. According to Norman Stone “a brand can be a stand-in for experience, a promise you expect to be fulfilled, a strategic image statement, a proxy for reputation. In other words, PR.” (Stone, 1995, p. 72) This term is most often associated with the business/commercial sector and the numerous products and services that are promoted through the mass media daily. This raises an important issue, to make the brand character unique and favourable so that it stands out from the other competing brands.

Thus the brand’s reason for being, its vision, core values, and know-how must be clearly defined, internalised and communicated. Country branding plans exhibit the clear, simple, differentiating propositions often built around emotional qualities expressing some kind of superiority, which can be readily symbolised both verbally and visually. (Akotia, 2010)

Before a brand can be promoted though, the issue of reputation needs to be considered. Reputation is generated through such elements as national economic performance, government track record, national/international security and integrity (the aspects of reputation listed for business have been adapted to nation branding) (Stone, 1995, p. 87). If a country is newly established it may not contain these elements in the current form (although there may be some historical influences). However, a country with a long history and a high international profile shall have established stereotypes and image.

Public diplomacy is another information tool at the state’s disposal. It is closely related to public relations, using a number of the same methods and objectives. It differs from traditional diplomacy that focuses on a government to government relationship, by seeking direct contact with citizens of another country. There is an attempt to attract people to an idea or cause (soft power) rather than coercing them or using force (hard power). Tactics employed include (but not restricted to) cultural exchanges, lobbying, advertising, websites and state visits. Objectives are also varied, but may include increasing awareness, changing attitudes or opinions and managing reputation (Coombs & Holladay, 2010, p. 299).

The concept of nation branding (as envisaged by Anholt) is relatively new, and is not deeply theorized at this stage. What is the aim of nation branding and what does it involve? Jaffe and Nebenzahl (2001, which is cited in Fan) defined “the aim is to create a clear, simple, differentiating idea built around emotional qualities which can be symbolised both verbally and visually and understood by diverse audiences in a variety of situations. To work effectively, nation branding must embrace political, cultural, business and sport activities”
Attempting to Re-brand the Branded Greg Simons

(Fan, 2006, p. 3). Thus when it comes to the issue of nation branding, the question arises, nation as a state or nation as a people?

A nation’s image is used to promote and realise such commercial goals as increased exports and tourists. New Zealand has used its Clean Green image in order to generate increased tourism and increase its attractiveness as a tourist destination. Nation brands have also been used in the political sphere as well, such as the Evil Empire (Soviet Union) and the more recently coined Axis of Evil (Iran, Syria and North Korea).

Simon Anholt, who is practically engaged in nation branding, lists five broad reasons as to why nation branding is seen as being needed by states.

**Introduction** — the place is not known to a target audience. Therefore the focus is upon highlighting sectors and attributes that shall fulfil the government’s objectives.

**Targeting** — it may be the case that the ‘wrong’ audience is receiving the message. This requires a more accurate re-targeting of another audience in terms of target audience demographics (right countries, decision makers, business sectors ... etc.).

**Correction** — a country may be known, but for the wrong reasons. Therefore the brand needs to be ‘corrected’ via expanding and revitalising images, and enhanced awareness of key qualities.

**Improvement** — this is the case when a negative image exists. The brand needs to be improved in order for a more positive perception in the target audience to take hold. Ways and means of achieving this correction depend on whether the perception is founded or unfounded. If founded, the problems can be contextualised (to allow better understanding) or de-emphasized (to distract or ‘forget’). When unfounded, the problems are either refuted/suppressed or simply ignored (Anholt, 2006, p. 98).

This division of different reasons does not imply that a single case is motivated by a single reason, one of those listed above. A single country may be affected simultaneously by several of these listed reasons. However, a nation branding campaign must be based upon a message that is both believable and true. Otherwise the target audience shall not change their perception and attitudes. (Bernays, 2005) PR and other information technologies cannot ‘magically’ turn something negative into something positive.

Mathias Akotia, the chief executive officer of Brand Ghana Office, argues that nation branding is not something that is new (even if the term is). One example that he gives comes from France in 1789 when the core values of Liberty, Fraternity and Equality were expressed by the new revolutionary authorities. Renaming can also take place, such as Rhodesia became Zimbabwe and its capital Salisbury was renamed Harare. (Akotia, 2010) This is an attempt to rebrand a nation in the wake of a revolution that was followed by a
regime change. It is an attempt to project a coherent image (what the new France stands for) to the French people and perhaps also to the wider world. Some current examples of nation-branding include:

- South Africa — Alive with possibility
- Spain — San Siro
- India — Incredible India
- Thailand — Amazing Thailand
- Estonia — Positively transforming
- Egypt — Destination Egypt
- Malaysia — Truly Asia
- Costa Rica — Peaceful destination
- Iceland — Iceland naturally
- Bolivia — The authentic still exists (Akotia, 2010).

These slogans reveal not only the name of the country seeking branding/re-branding, but an expression of values and goals (political, economic, perception change) as defined by the government. Other examples, in the post-Soviet sphere, include Kazakhstan’s active advertising campaign in international media under such catch phrases and slogans as land of democracy and the Heart of Eurasia. (Marat, 2009, p. 1123) A significant problem faced by the Central Asian states is the association with the Soviet past, which is at times mocked, as in the film Borat. The Baltic States have undergone a process that attempts to remove the Soviet associations, such as the above mentioned example of Estonia.

**THEORETICAL FRAME**

A theoretical frame is needed in order to try and bring together the diverse strands of this article; nation branding, international relations, foreign policy and influence. Seemingly the most appropriate tool for this task is Joseph Nye’s concept of Soft Power. Nye already noted a shifting measure in the definition of power in his 1990 article. He remarked that:

Traditionally the test of a great power was its strength in war. Today, however, the definition of power is losing its emphasis on military force and conquest that marked earlier eras. The factors of technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more significant in international power, while geography, population, and raw materials are becoming somewhat less important. (Nye, 1990, p. 154)

A number of trends that are responsible for the diffusion of power were noted by Nye: economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, and changing political issues (Nye, 1990, p. 160). Power is beginning to transform and be found in more intangible forms. “National cohesion, universalistic culture,
and international institutions are taking on additional significance. Power is passing from the *capital rich* to the *information rich*” (Nye, 1990, p.164) The issues of communication, reputation, influence and persuasion become a vital part of the equation.

This second aspect of power (to get other actors to change in particular instances) — which occurs when one country to get other countries to want what it wants — might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants’ (Nye, 1990, p. 166).

Nye lists the intangible power resources as being culture, ideology, institutions (national and international) and foreign policy (Nye, 1990, p. 167). In getting other actors to do what the actor wants (or at least, not to challenge or resist) requires a sense of legitimacy in the eyes of others. “If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow” (Nye, 1990, p. 167). These elements can be found in the reputation or brand of a country, which can either make a country more or less attractive to an external audience. As Nye concisely states, “soft power rests on the ability to set the agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others.” According to Nye “soft power arises in large part from our values. These values are expressed in our culture, in the policies we follow inside our country, and in the way we handle ourselves internationally” (Nye, 2002-2003, p. 552). The nature of soft power and the ability to make use of it is therefore dependent upon sets of internal and external factors, as they are perceived by others.

**Operationalisation Frames**

The theoretical frame that is described above needs a means with which to be operationalised and the goals, along with it the goals that have been established. The appropriate means of enacting the nation-branding programmes that are designed to change the perception of targeted publics towards the country concerned is *Public Diplomacy*.

*Strategic Issues Management* is a necessity (which values, subjects and reputations to promote and those to downplay), given the broad nature of the task that is to be undertaken. This concerns that fate of a country, how it is received by audiences (in terms of the values and characteristics that are associated with it), and how it is able to influence events and people in order to achieve foreign policy goals. Strategic issue areas in this article focus upon political and economically oriented events. The relevancy of *Public Diplomacy* over other forms of governmental communicative action is stressed by the fact that it is Government to People communication (G2P) and not government to government. It is a foreign public and not a foreign government that is the intended object of influence.

However, for public diplomacy to be effective there needs to be sufficient physical and psychological means to convey the desired image for the effect that is desired. By physical, this means the tangible assets that are required to send messages, TV, radio,
newspapers, the internet … etc. With regard to psychological means, it is those intangible assets that are required in order for a message to be successful (considering the senders agenda in this instance). Intangible assets include issues like reputation, trustworthiness, brand and message recognition. An example of this can be the use of key influencers (well known or recognised public figures, either as individuals or professions that are trusted in society) in order to deliver a message, so as to maximise the possible chances for success. The brand known as Brangelina (Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie) are a good example of the use of key influencers in order to influence a target audience into fulfilling the sender’s agenda.

According to World System Theory, which was developed by Immanuel Wallerstein, the world is divided into three different zones — core, peripheral and semi-peripheral nations. The specific area to apply this theory is in the area of the production of high and popular culture (films, art, literature, music, TV entertainment and sport). Core nations are considered to be those that are capital intensive, high wage, high technology production involving lower labour exploitation and coercion. The European Union and the United States are examples of core nations. Peripheral nations are labour intensive, low wage, low technology production involving high labour exploitation and coercion. Many African countries and large parts of Asia fit into this category. Semi-periphery nations display both core-like and periphery-like activities. China, India and Russia are representatives of semi-periphery nations (McPhail, 2010, p. 24-26).

Core nations are able to influence the other two categories of nations through their cultural and popular production, through exporting the values and attitudes that are expressed in those products. In addition, they are able to influence the opinion and perception of core nation audiences about semi-peripheral and peripheral nations by generating news and information on them. In this instance the information is being ‘imported’ for a domestic audience by core nations. Therefore, the audience is influenced by images and perceptions imposed upon the subject, if it is covered at all. For instance Walt Disney and Astrid Lindgren’s stories influenced children around the world (McPhail, 2010, p. 27). The Soviet Union did possess a potential level of influence in terms of popular and cultural production, which was significantly and adversely affected by the Soviet collapse in 1991.

The Russian film industry has been undergoing a revival, currently some 250 films are made per year. Some of these films have made an impression on the international stage, such as Night Watch (2004) (Mikhaylov, 2009). But many are inaccessible for a large part of the foreign audience owing to issues of language and topics that are unfamiliar to that audience (involving Russian patriotism for example). Therefore, to some extent the potential audience can be smaller than for English language films. The profile of Russian movies, film directors and actors is gaining a gradually greater global profile. Russian classical literature,
arts and culture are well established and known, names such as Chekov, Pushkin and the Bolshoi Theatre need no introduction for many. However, in terms of contemporary pool of key influencers, Russia lacks world renown names (and in effect brands), such as those in Hollywood to be the face of various PR and information campaigns.

In terms of physical assets needed to send the message to foreign audiences, Russia is in the process of accruing a sizeable capability, which shall be discussed in further detail later in the article. Coming back to the issue of public diplomacy, there are numerous ways of seeing and understanding the concept and practice. To give a very concise and to the point definition, it is “an international actor’s attempts to advance the ends of policy by engaging with foreign publics.” This is achieved through “public understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences” (Snow in McPhail, 2010, p. 90). One of the iconic figures in American public diplomacy was the former war correspondent, Edward Murrow, who was chosen by President Kennedy to head the United States Information Agency (which he did from 1961 to 1964). He took a very specific approach to the task of influencing foreign audiences.

American traditions and the American ethic require us to be truthful, but the most important reason is that truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive, we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that (Snow in McPhail, 2010, p. 90).

One of the problems encountered by Russian public diplomacy relates to the credibility, and therefore the believability of the messenger. This is especially the case, if the messenger is tied to the Russian authorities owing in no small part to the strong anti-democratic reputation that has been gained in the post-Yelstin era (from the year 2000). Additionally, the strong reactions by public officials to what is seen as being criticism from foreign sources, such as Putin’s reference to circumcision when a journalist pressed him on events in Chechnya (in response to questions from a French journalist in 2002).

**PR Campaigns: Rebranding Russia**

A brand is a public face (persona) of a product and this is symbolic in conveying a sense of certainty and commitment that is suggested by the brand persona. Branding a nation is much more difficult owing to a plethora of different (and at times inconsistent) images that make achieving a unified brand persona problematic to achieve. There are many potential points of reference that influence its persona and character that are at play in any given nation. This exerts an effect upon how a nation can be promoted.

A nation’s image is more likely to be pressed into service as a risk indicator or a conjunctive rule to reduce options than to operate as an emotional pull. It is too difficult to pull across an overall positive image of a nation that emotionally resonates with the
consumer sufficiently to affect behaviour over all the whole range of a nation’s products. (O’Shaughnessy & O’Shaughnessy, 2000, p. 60)

When it comes to effectively projecting a desired image to an international audience, the country in question needs to be in touch with international public opinion(s). The educational and informational efforts of the United States, for example, are coordinated through the United States Informational Agency (USIA). It is located in more than 140 countries, with over 200 offices, around the world. Its task is to also interpret overseas public opinion, delivering commentary and analysis to the federal government. The USIA is an independent foreign affairs agency within the executive branch of government that is reports directly to the president (USIA is known as the United States Information Service (USIS) outside of the United States. VOA broadcasts in some 50 different languages around the globe, reaching an audience of millions). (Cutlip et al, 2000: 493) There are a number of mass media assets associated with the USIA, including the radio station Voice of America (VOA). These assets give the agency the possibility to project their influence to international audiences.

One of the USIA’s critical tasks is to correct information and to counter propaganda that may prove harmful to US policy and interests. The USIA uses a number of different tools and assets at its disposal, including personal contacts, internet, print media, radio, TV, film, libraries, books and art to convey the official message. Two way communications are enabled through agency programmes, such as cultural and educational exchanges that involve scholars, journalists, students and cultural groups from around the world. A specific example of this came in the early 1980s when a story emerged in the Nigerian press that the US was building a weapon that would kill Blacks, but not Whites (Cutlip et al, 2000, p. 493).

Russia’s primary perceived problem in terms of its international image are the negative associations and stereotypes that exist (improving and correcting the image), therefore the campaigns to re-brand Russia fall into the broad category of reputation management. The likely avenue therefore is to try and gain a new and more positively received international public profile, to shed the old one and gain a new reputation. According to the article Reputation Shifting, there are a number of key factors that affect the stability of a reputation.

Reputational endowments:
- Historical precedence
- Distinctive support or anchoring
- Actor embeddedness

Reputational content characters:
- Condensation (degree to which the reputation elicits emotional response)
Simplicity
Linkage to positive or negative social impacts
Content embeddedness

Reputational audience characters:
Familiarity to audiences
Segmentation of audiences
Audience reach (number, diversity, and dispersal of audience members)
Legitimacy
Credibility

Reputational opportunity/change factors:
Definitional stability
Environmental stability
Perceived costs in modifying reputation. (Mahon & Mitnik, 2010, p. 284)

The above, are factors that need to be taken into account when formulating an effective strategy to boost and enhance the reputation of the object or subject that is undergoing branding/re-branding. After weighing the factors and the desired outcome, the appropriate strategy for managing reputational change can then be considered. Mahon and Mitnick list five different available strategies for managing this change.

Discard — negative reputations are removed via shedding or dumping. Dumping is the complete purge of the undesired element(s), shedding is to modify those aspects considered negative.

Conceal — in this instance negative reputation is shielded from key external audiences so that they do not become holders or see others that are holders of negative reputation, managed through the process of obfuscation.

Redefine — a negative or suboptimal reputation is redefined into a reputation more likely to be more productive for the subject actor. This is attempted through morphing or transformation.

Transfer — positive reputations are transferred inside or outside the organisation. Whilst negative reputations are transferred outside the core organisation so that they are rendered harmless. Different strategies include firewalling, which is a form of concealment. Outsourcing, where positive reputations are transferred to outside units. Extension, where outsourcing is conducted via remote and possibly indirect action. Offloading, occurs when tactics such as scapegoating, disengaging or distancing are utilised. Insourcing includes a diverse set of tactics such as cooptation, appropriation.
importing, bonding (merging), and socialisation of reputations. A barrier is established between the newly created desirable reputation and others that may damage or interfere with it through firewalling. Another means of distilling a reputation is buffering, which occurs when the effects of old, negative reputation are filtered as they flow through the organisation or externally. Alternatively, compensating evidence is produced that weakens the effects of the negative reputation, allowing a new positive reputation to dominate.

Create — generating positive reputations through growth from basic elements or created whole cloth from the modification or acquisition of key core elements. Reputations may be created inside or outside the core actor, or with respect to entities outside the core actor, i.e., as in the creation of external agents. Tactics used include fertilisation and manufacturing/sculpting (Mahon & Mitnik, 2010, p. 291-95).

For the tactics to be effective in achieving their intended objectives, the new reputation and image needs to be supported by substantive and real changes that not only occur in the realm of actual events, but they also need to be perceived by the target audience. An interest in actively engaging in transforming Russia’s international reputation and image was publicly uttered by the Media Minister of the time, Mikhail Lesin in 2001 when he stated that the country needed to cultivate a new image otherwise Russians would “always look like bears.” (Bibb, 2006)

A Russian expert in Public Diplomacy, Igor Panarin of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy proposed a five-step programme for improving Russia’s international image (Igor Panarin’s website (in Russian) can be found at http://panarin.com/). He also has a blog (in English) on Twitter - http://twitter.com/i_panarin). This strategy is posted on his website, the steps include: 1) creating a new presidential advisory position that would coordinate all public information coming from the presidential administration, the government, Foreign Ministry and Security Council; 2) to create a new presidential administrative office of information analysis, and an agency for foreign political news sponsored by the state and business; 3) establish a state commission for public diplomacy, which would be composed of senior state officials from the presidential administration, government, State Duma, national media outlets and leading politicians; 4) restore to Foreign Ministry supervision Voice of Russia (radio) and RIA Novosti (news agency) from the Culture Ministry; 5) the establishment of a number of Russian NGOs, with the aim of pursuing Russia’s foreign policy objectives. (Yasmann, 2006) These innovations to the Russian system would theoretically allow for a greater control of the flow of information and messages to and from the state structures. This in turn may allow for a more consistent message and image coming from the government. Panarin’s comments seem to contradict President Medvedev’s remarks about the state divesting itself of media assets. How these
suggestions could be used to further Russian foreign and economic policy could prove to be somewhat problematic (owing in no small part to very diverse publics and issues).

There have been a number of recent articles on the topic of nation branding campaigns in contemporary Russia, including in the *Russian Journal of Communication*. In 2008 Igor Klyukanov led a forum in the *Russian Journal of Communication* on the theme of *Nation Branding and Russia: Prospects and Pitfalls*. One of the participants, Simon Anholt, stated that nation branding Russia is about proving that Russia deserves a different reputation. In realising this point, information about Russia needs to be communicated to the international community. The next task is setting about generating a desire among the targeted publics to access that information in order to affect some kind of influence on opinion and behaviour. A setback in Anholt’s opinion is the fact that there is a lack of clarity concerning basic concepts, and a lack of consensus of a shared vision among the various stakeholders (not to mention a lack of coordination among them) (Klyukanov, 2006, p. 194-95).

A number of the members of the forum addressed the issues of a lack of clear identity, and a lack of consensus among the key stakeholders on what values and images to communicate. The problem of split and contradictory messages was also raised, caused in part by contradictions in rhetoric and practice (events of international interest, such as the Gas Wars). Many of the contributors also saw the issue of nation branding as something related to international politics, rapprochement with the international community, rather than something that is primarily commercial in nature.

In 2006, when Russia was holding the G8 presidency and the summit in St Petersburg in June of that year, an effort was made to revamp the national image. The firm *Ketchum* (http://www.ketchum.com/) was paid some US$2 million to support the Russian government in their objectives and goals. They were hired again in 2007 for advice, lobbying and media relations in support of promoting foreign investment and Russia’s wish to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Other contracts have been entered with Ketchum that have included promoting a greater visibility and understanding of the Russian government’s goals (see the Foreign Agents Registration Act page for details on foreign government PR and lobbying attempts in the United States - http://www.fara.gov/). The 1938 law makes it mandatory to have all foreign government attempts to influence US publics transparent through registration). (Orttung, 2010, p. 8) The G8 presidency provided an opportune moment for Russia to use a political event, and if correctly supported by an information campaign, could be used to project a more positive international image. However, the communicator needs to not only know the target audience, but the appropriate use of symbols and rhetoric, otherwise the moment could be lost. The cofounder of *GPlus Europe* (Ketchum’s sister company in Brussels), Peter Guilford, explained the reason for hiring a foreign, rather than Russian PR company.
I think they realised that in the normal course of events they can do it themselves, but the G8 presidency is an exceptional opportunity and an exceptional year where they need an exceptional response. So they have decided to outsource a lot of the communications work as much as anything to make the life of the Western press easier in the run-up to the St Petersburg summit in July, and beyond. (Bigg, 2006)

There were three key issues in particular that were being promoted for the Russian government — health, education and energy security. Ketchum introduced a number of innovations in trying to get the message across to a global audience. One of these innovations occurred with the use of social media and a blog on the popular site Twitter - http://twitter.com/modernrussia. This page has attracted 1327 followers as of 9 February 2011. The page contains a number of different visual symbols for the reader, including the Russian state emblem (double headed eagle) and an outline of the Russian Federation. Modern Russia states its business and objectives as being to bring “News, analysis, commentary on economic, political and social modernization of Russia from Ketchum.” (From the ModernRussia page on Twitter, http://twitter.com/modernrussia, accessed 8 February 2011) The news feeds relate almost exclusively to economic and commercial matters. Issues that relate to national and international politics do not appear to be introduced.

State/owned companies and the Russian government have been hiring foreign PR companies in order to target specific audiences. One of those audiences is the business community, which is being targeted with the message that Russia is a safe and profitable country to invest. An additional message is the “reliable energy supplier” message, which intersects with the business community. (Kupchinsky, 2009) The nature and means of Ketchum’s message seems to imply that the business community is the intended target audience.

Not all efforts for improving Russia’s international reputation and image have been carried out by foreign PR companies. There have been a number of Russian projects that include such events as the Valdai Club, where foreign guests are invited to mingle with influential Russian policy makers and discuss a variety of subjects. The Valdai Club website (http://www.valdaiclub.com/) describes itself as being “a global forum for the world’s leading and best-informed experts on Russia to engage in a sustained dialogue about the country’s political, economic, social and cultural development.” (Front page of the Valdai Club, http://www.valdaiclub.com/, 11 February 2011) A motto appearing on the website reads “fostering a dialogue about Russia.” This particular project has been running since 2004. It seems to be intended to function, in terms of influencing publics, by firstly affecting the perception and opinion of key influencers who in turn (theoretically) influence a wider audience by virtue of their social/public position in their home society.
The *Russia Now* campaign was another attempt to influence foreign publics through the mass media. Articles were placed in mass media outlets, such as the Outpost of Change article appearing in the Washington Post. (Levchenko, 2010) This article gave the impression to the reader of openly expressed public discontent as being a “model for constructive dissent” in Kaliningrad. This is opposed to the more often seen and read stories featuring conflict between police and protestors during the *Marches of Dissent* (organised in part by the National Bolshevik Party) and the underlying theme of lack of opportunity in the freedom of expression.

As with Ketchum’s *Modern Russia* campaign that appeared on Twitter, *Russia Now* also uses social media as part of its means of influence and getting the message across. The *Russia Beyond* blog on Twitter - http://twitter.com/russiabeyond - unlike *Modern Russia* does actually bring up political topics and issues. As of 9 February 2011 there were a total of 620 followers of the blog. There is a much broader range of topics, everything from foreign news, culture, politics, sport, history to technology and much more. No Russian state symbols appear on the margins of the blog page, and it appears visually to be quite plain.

*Russia Beyond the Headlines* (part of this PR campaign) also appears on Facebook - http://www.facebook.com/russianow?v=wall. It has a following of some 3276 people (as of 9 February 2011). This is an expanded upon version (in terms of amount of content) of what appears on the Twitter blog, with some articles being generated in the mainstream mass media and being reposted. Many of the articles are drawn from the *Russia Beyond the Headlines* website (http://rbth.ru/).

Mass media that are owned or controlled by the Russian government form an important part of the effort too. The Doctrine of Information Security (For an English translation of this policy document please see Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & Zassoursky, Y. (editors), *Russian Media Challenge*, Helsinki, Kikimora Publications, 2001, pp. 251-292), which was approved in September 2000, recognised that the Russian government needed a consistent approach, message and access to media outlets in order to influence domestic and international publics. Existing media outlets have been remodelled and new ones established in this regard.

*RIA Novosti* (http://en.rian.ru/) a government owned news agency operates in some 45 countries in some 14 different languages. (RIA Novosti, 2011) In 2009 *RIA Novosti* partnered with the Washington DC, London and Zurich based consultancy called *RJI Companies*. The primary contract involved organising a high-level conference on the Arctic in Moscow in November 2009. Intended messages from the event were Russia as a good international actor in terms of their environmental and energy policy. Similar conferences were planned to take place in the Middle East and the Far East. (Rettman (B), 2009) This appears to use the *redefine* strategy combined with *transformation* tactics. Russian
government policy is trying to be shown as being progressive and open in two high profile issue areas.

*RJI Companies* also stated that there was a second contract in the making with *RIA Novosti*, which was to “generally improve the image of Russia abroad.” This included helping to “portray Russia as a benign great power entitled to negotiate with the likes of the US, China and the EU on global security and energy issues.” As part of this effort, it was intended to create the perception of historical precedent and a sense of legitimacy in Russia influencing neighbouring countries for the “good of the world.” This included creating a positive impression of the Soviet Union before and after World War Two. (Rettman (B), 2009) For this to have any chance of succeeding the messenger needs to have credibility, a believable message, a wide interest/appeal and reach (to the audience).

The creation of the English language (and later Arabic and Spanish) *Russia Today* (http://rt.com/) was intended to fill one of the gaps identified in the Doctrine of Information Security, the state’s capability to directly broadcast to an international audience. *Russia Today* also has a presence on social media - Twitter, Facebook and You Tube. The TV channel was launched in 2005, and now boasts having coverage on some five continents and over 100 countries. Their promotion/differentiation is the ability to “show you how any story can be another story altogether.” On their website is the claim to have an audience of about 200 million paying viewers among pay-tv subscribers. (Russia Today, 2011) The format of the programming appearing on *Russia Today* is tailored for an international (Western) audience. Figures for the potential viewership are impressive, with a very large pool of a global audience to influence. The sense of familiarity of format is intended to be the means of getting the message received with less resistance. This is tempered by an expressed suspicion that *Russia Today* is a propaganda tool under the control of the Russian state.

**CHALLENGES TO PROJECTING RUSSIA’S DESIRED IMAGE**

The physical attributes that constitute a nation cannot be altered or changed by branding, it is the audience’s perception of that nation that can be influenced. There are a number of factors that need to be taken into account, among the audience, which can exert an impact upon their perception: personal experience (visiting a country, meeting and interacting with its citizens); acquired education and knowledge; existing stereotypes and prejudices; framing and narratives of a country through mass media.

A number of mechanisms exist through which a nation’s image influences perceptions. Events, culture, people, products, nature, climate and ideologies (to name a few) can all be associated with a country. As such, both the country and the other aspects exert a mutual effect and impact upon each other’s image and how it is received and
perceived by an audience. For example an association can exist between tulips and the Netherlands, poor/boring food and the United Kingdom, blonde women and Sweden.

O'Shaughnessy and O'Shaughnessy (2000) list a number of different underlying factors and reasons why associations can exist.

*Conditioning:* there is a suggestion of substance over image, where people, products, events and so forth come to be associated with positive or negative reinforcement.

*Link to Social Norms of Target Audience or its Values or Valued Images:* symbols in this instance are used to persuade “the rhetoric of presentation, in which the display of symbols outweighs discursive argument.” The use of given symbols is intended to be the means of persuasion.

*Link to a Feeling of Solidarity With Others:* this method of appeal can be more usefully understood as an offer of affiliation. The “persuasion presupposes that the persuader and the target audience share a common interest — not all interests in common but the interest relevant to the appeal.” An interest that is used for the appeal may not initially form the basis of a common interest, but may become so through effective rhetoric.

*Link to Position and Prestige:* is an appeal that uses the hierarchy of influence. The general thesis of this appeal is that those who are higher in the social hierarchy, knowledge hierarchy or celebrity hierarchy possess an advantage in their ability to persuade. There is a reliance on the target audience’s desire to associate with a prestige position. (O’Shaughnessy & O’Shaughnessy, 2000, p. 61-62)

A government is likely to choose what they believe to be core values of a nation, in other words those ideals and values that express what a country and its people stand for. In this respect, it can simultaneously act as a unifying theme. The understanding and exercise of reputational capital is essential in successfully managing to influence and persuade a target audience, and an extremely difficult task without it.

A certain level of conditioning exists beyond the borders that affect the outcome of the campaigns that are being run to improve the international image. Those images are in many cases involving negative associations, which can be picked up through reporting in the mass media. For instance, a Washington Post article described Russia Today in the following light; “at first glance it looks a lot like CNN, but it can be a breathless cheerleader for the Kremlin.” A quote from the same article mentioned Jack Shaffer’s (media critic for *Slate*) describing *Rossiskaya Gazeta*’s supplements in the *Washington Post* as “beneath the shattered syntax of these laughable pieces beats the bloody red heart of the tone-deaf Soviet propagandist.” (Finn, 2008) These quotes from one article illustrate a number of established
and still existing stereotypes and prejudices. There are the associations of Russia with the Soviet Union; crude, yet sinister propaganda; media as being a tool of state propaganda.

This begs the question, what are the current stereotypes and prejudices that exist that could potentially disrupt efforts to re-brand Russia’s international image? Not all stereotypes and need to be politically negative. For instance, the Russian Union of the Travel Industry in their *Just Russia* campaign approached the issue of symbols and stereotypes of Russia and Russians.

The stereotypical understanding is that Russia is a faraway, snowy country, where one must wear a fur coat and valenki (felt boots), people do nothing but drink vodka and play balalaikas, while bears are leaving their forest homes to go walking down village streets. However, the reality of our life is very far from this idyllic myth: balalaikas, bears, and felt boots have more or less become symbols of Russia rather than attributes of everyday life. (Just Russia, 2011)

The website takes each symbol and stereotype in turn, describes the history and significance of each character or object. These stereotypes and symbols are more related to cultural images and perceptions of the Russian people and lifestyle. Other popular stereotypes include Russians as being hospitable, risk-taking and warm hearted. Others bring diverse elements as vodka, beautiful girls and communism or that Russians are lazy. (The Cross-Cultural Rhetoric Blog: Stereotypes About Russia, 2008) A number of these images seem to be generated and perpetuated through a lack of direct contact between those who hold these beliefs and Russia/Russians.

If there is not always the opportunity for direct contact to influence views and perceptions, what is a possible source that perpetuates them? Mass media are one of those possible sources of influence by providing an avenue to people and events that would otherwise be remote from their lives. An article appeared in the Guardian newspaper, written by a Russian, expressing a sense of frustration of the mass media entrenching stereotypes by virtue of their narratives and frames.

Stereotypes promoted by the media are now entrenched: Russian companies are corrupt and are puppets of the state, minorities are not allowed to speak their languages and males are chauvinist machos. The economy survives on pumping gas, while the leadership dreams of conquering half of the world. News from Russia is bad news. (Matveeva, 2008)

The reputation and image of Russia to some extent is tied to historical precedent, which is getting reinforced by mass media reporting. Therefore the brand becomes stable, in a negative sense, owing in part to the familiarity of the audience to those stereotypes and traits. President Dmitry Medvedev mentioned the issue of stereotypes in relation to NATO-Russian relations and their harmful effect. He mentioned the existing stereotypes of democracy failing to take root and the Russian leadership being devoted to authoritarian principles. Medvedev then acknowledged that these things “are well entrenched in the minds
of people in Russia, in Europe, and in the US. This may be a grassroots interpretation of the previous approach, but it is there. And we can feel it.” (The Permanent Mission of Russia to NATO, 2010) Once more the element of sticky prior stereotypes in maintaining an image is raised.

There appears to be an effort to try and address the negative images and stereotypes being perpetuated in the mass media. This is being done through the process of identifying and trying to challenge them. One of these efforts can be found in the Real Russia Project (www.russiablog.org — in 2007 the Russia Blog recorded nearly three million individual visitors) that was launched in 2005 by the Discovery Institute (located in Seattle, US), and their production of a leaflet 10 Western Media Stereotypes About Russia: How Truthful are They? It lists 10 stereotypes in turn, which it characterises as being outdated Cold War frames being circulated by US media. The stated aim of this project is “to focus on the emerging new Russia with accurate and fair reporting and analysis — without fear or favour.” Each stereotype is named, examples of that type appearing in the media given, and then an argument to refute the stereotype is detailed. The 10 stereotypes listed are:

- Putin is a former KGB agent who is suppressing opposition and accumulating power;
- Russians live under Putin’s tyranny;
- Russian media isn’t free;
- Khodorkovsky is a political prisoner;
- Brutality and human rights abuses run rampant in Chechnya;
- Kremlin supports Hamas, Iran and radical groups;
- New NGO law assaults Russian civil society;
- New ‘slander’ law demonstrates Kremlin’s authoritarian tendencies;
- Putin’s policies constitute major human rights abuses in Russia;
- Russia is unsafe for US investors. (Discovery Institute, 2006)

These stereotypes are perpetuated in the global mass media through news reporting, which tends to support these as facts. Although these contentious stereotypes are tackled head-on, which is an unusual step and probably more fruitful than trying to avoid such questions, such contradictions (plus the ability to reach the audience that is exposed to the ‘negative’ news) make the task of influencing and persuading the audience very difficult. Additionally, the news footage of such events as the court trials of such events as the Khodorkovsky court trials or the breaking up of unsanctioned public protest marches (such as gay rights or political opposition) tend to support the dictum that actions speak louder than words. Having said this though, the more ‘novel’ approach of publicly and openly discussing such problems in order to challenge the stereotypes is likely to be the best approach, which needs to be seen to be supported by the actions of the authorities in Russia.
This particular campaign tackles the various high profile and some controversial stereotypes in an apparently open and systematic manner. On the blog it states that it is managed by “Yuri Mamchur, Director of Discovery Institute’s Real Russia Project, a member of MBA class 2011 at Vanderbilt University’s Owen Graduate School of Management.” (Russia Blog, 2011) As stated earlier, the Real Russia Project is run through the Discovery Institute (http://www.discovery.org). Discovery Institute describes themselves as being a non-profit educational organisation. The mission statement of the Discovery Institute is quite broad:

Discovery Institute’s mission is to make a positive vision of the future practical. The Institute discovers and promotes ideas in the common sense tradition of representative government, the free market and individual liberty. Our mission is promoted through books, reports, legislative testimony, articles, public conferences and debates, plus media coverage and the Institute’s own publications and Internet website

Current projects explore the fields of technology, science and culture, reform of the law, national defence, the environment and the economy, the future of democratic institutions, transportation, religion and public life, government entitlement spending, foreign affairs and cooperation within the bi-national region of “Cascadia.” The efforts of Discovery fellows and staff, headquartered in Seattle, are crucially abetted by the Institute’s members, board and sponsors. (Discovery Institute, 2011)

This project seems to have met with some success, insofar as they are quoted in some US and Russian media sources. Tough and controversial aspects are broached in the Real Russia Project, instead of trying to bypass or focus attention on other issues. Given the volume of visitors on the Russia Blog, this initiative seems to have gained public attention. However, has this translated into a change of stereotypes and images? Two issues/events shall now be briefly discussed in order to try and find an answer to this question — the 2008 Georgian-Russian War and the Gas Wars with Ukraine. These two cases represent the issue of actions (or perceived actions) speaking louder than mere words, thereby ensuring efforts to shift reputation in order to better accumulate and wield soft power, more difficult.

The outcome of modern wars are being determined more and more by political considerations, which are guided by perception and opinion, rather than by pure military might. Georgia and Russia have a relationship based upon tension and conflict in the post-Soviet era. As with the weighting of the two countries tangible qualities (land mass, population, economic and military strength), the intangible assets (reputation and image) also displayed a large gulf and were asymmetric. It is not the intention of this article to go extensively into the rights and wrongs of the Georgian-Russian War of August 2008. This
event does however demonstrate a number of important points, which relate to the issues of prejudices, stereotypes and the influence of external events upon a PR campaign.

In a reflection upon the failings of the Western media and their reporting on the war, Peter Wilby of the Guardian summed up a number of reasons why they fell short. “They need to be told who are the goodies and baddies. News, remember, is part of the entertainment industry.” (Wilby, 2008) An assumption from Wilby’s statement and the nature of the mainstream international media framing of this conflict implies that Russia is carrying the label as one of the ‘baddies’. This resulted in diametrically opposed frames and narratives describing Georgia and Russia. Georgia was being framed as a democratic country, seeking independence from an aggressive and authoritarian Russia.

There were PR agencies attempting to render some help to the Russian cause, such as GPlus Europe had been active in trying to influence EU policy makers, it specialises in hiring former EU officials and prominent journalists. During the 2008 war they pushed for press visits to South Ossetia “so that TV in Europe had more to show than rampaging Russian tanks.” (Rettman (A), 2009) The nature of the international media coverage of the conflict generated significant debate and many accusations of lack of professionalism and ethics. Early coverage painted Russia in a very bad light, which was exacerbated by an overwhelming coverage of the official Georgian perspective of the conflict. Such coverage was very harmful to Russia’s international credibility and image. The harm can be found in the fact that the perceived actions of Russia in the Georgian-Russian War of 2008, tended to support a number of the ten stereotypes that are listed above. This is acutely shown through news reporting that tended to blame Putin (rather than the incumbent President Medvedev) for the perceived wrongs and injustices of the moment.

The post-War tit-for-tat is still happening at the political and diplomatic level between the Georgian and Russian governments. Mass media reports, especially in the early stages of the war were laying the blame on Russia, together with a loaded framing and narrative (which included references to the Soviet period — Prague Spring of 1968 and Hungarian Uprising of 1956 for example). Comments made by Peter Wilby underline that journalists were making value judgements based upon existing knowledge and what they perceived to be happening. Therefore concluded that historically, and what they perceived to be happening at the time, framed Russia as the aggressor and Georgia as the victim. Given the values and messages being expressed and transmitted, international audiences were more likely to empathise and sympathise with the Georgian cause. This in turn had the effect of restricting the military options available to Russia.

Conflict over energy supplies is another contentious issue, which touches the political and business sphere. How has this issue affected Russia’s international brand? Russia’s G8 leadership became marred by a number of different events, one of which was the 2006 Gas War with Ukraine. A conflict over the price of gas supplied by Russia to Ukraine resulted
in the shutting off of gas supplies to Ukraine on 1 January 2006. One side portrayed this event as being a sign that Russia was an unreliable supplier of gas and was using energy as a foreign policy weapon. On the other side, there were those policy watchers that commented that Russia was entitled to raise the gas price. Vladimir Putin’s Deputy Press Secretary at the time, Dmitry Peskov, noted the problem of perception and rationalized it as being rooted in Russia being ‘misunderstood.’

The situation surrounding the conflict between Gazprom and Ukraine probably demonstrated most clearly that we are not always understood correctly. [...] Gazprom did not sever supplies to Western consumers, and the argument was with Ukraine only. But many analysts literally refused to understand this, and accused Russia of using its gas and its natural resources as a means to put political pressure on some countries, whereas this is purely a business question. (Bigg, 2006)

Various Gas Wars between Russia and Ukraine (Belarus also) have been another source of negative image for Russia. It is difficult for the Russian government and Gazprom to get their message across (and accepted) in the international press. Established narratives and stereotypes quickly emerge in the framing of these energy conflicts. However, there have been some changes in attempts to manage the information from previous conflicts. In December 2008 Gazprom realised there was likely to be another Gas War with Ukraine, and unlike the previous one in 2006, they began to communicate proactively through establishing a website - http://www.gazpromukrainefacts.com/. This forum carried daily news reports of meetings, press conferences and the company’s version of events as they were unfolding. (Orttung, 2010, p. 9)

The Gazprom website (www.gazprom.com) is available in Russian and English, with a well laid out and easy to access and navigate website. Different political and business news is published on the website. The German magazine Der Spiegel had an interview with Alexei Miller from Gazprom, eventually the issue of Russian government influence on Gazprom was raised. The interviewer posed a question after the issue of the progress of the various gas pipelines was discussed (Nordstream, South Stream and Nabucco).

Interviewer: Where are such decisions taken — at Gazprom’s headquarters or 6 kilometers away from there, in the Kremlin?

Alexei Miller: It’s nice — a good stereotype for western readers. That’s right, Gazprom is a state-owned company and the Government holds over 50 per cent of its shares. Being the majority shareholder, the Government defines our strategic goals, we have only three of those: diversification of our markets, transportation routes and final products. No other tasks are given by it. At our
level we make managerial decisions and we do it in a timely manner! We consider it a great competitive advantage. (Mahler & Schepp, 2011)

A number of questions relating to Ukraine followed, which seems to demonstrate that certain prejudices and stereotypes are imbedded in journalists, and get expressed in the mass media, which then perpetuates them. As the mass media provide an outlet to those who do not necessarily experience events they cover directly, opinions may be formed on the information that is available and/or consumed. Gazprom seems to be trying to circumvent at least some of this problem by communicating to target publics (given the nature of the news available in English, likely to be Western businessmen). There is a clear understanding here about the potential loss of reputation with the resulting deficit in terms of soft power and its consequences (political conflicts with other governments and lack of business interest in investing in or doing business with Russia for example).

Hills and Knowlton has also been assisting the Russian government with the energy security issue. Elaime Cruikshanks, the Brussels office chief, promoted the Nord Stream pipeline as a "purely commercial" venture and a "strategic prospect" for EU energy diversity. Previous campaigns by Hills and Knowlton have included flying Members of the European Parliament (MEP) to Siberia on a private jet for Rosneft, a Russian energy giant. (Rettman (A), 2009) Different tactics and appeals are used in order to try and influence the target audience, as seen here, the use emotional appeal to self-interest (EU to secure energy supplies). An additional tactic of employing privilege with familiarity is also used, in bringing MEPs to Siberia so that the idea seems to be more tangible and real in addition to being very warmly hosted. These efforts revolving around economic/energy issues show efforts that go beyond merely using mass media as a means to influence key influencers. Although this is not an example of G2P communications it does tend to demonstrate the understanding of the limits of mass media based communication. Mass media information tends to reinforce existing opinions and attitudes, rather than changing them. First hand exposure to the concept or idea that is being promoted is more effective. This can be a more problematic issue for ordinary people gaining entry to Russia, owing to the visa regime.

Both of the cases, of the Georgian-Russian War and the Gas Wars in Ukraine, represent examples of the potential of individual issues threatening the strategic management of the image that is desired by the Russian government and the images being conveyed through the various elements of public diplomacy. The situation no longer exists, where a government can hope to effectively suppress various events and images over a protracted period, such as happened during the Soviet period (for example news of the Ukrainian Famine and repressions during the Stalin-era). New Information Communication Technologies and the presence of international news media, not to mention social media, make this task seemingly impossible. The case of the Domodedovo Airport bombing in
January 2011 illustrates this point, when social media broadcast images and news of the event when the mainstream domestic media did not initially report on the terror act.

The Georgian-Russian War and the Ukrainian Gas War are two cases, one that was a success and the other a failure, in terms of a positive image of Russia. Both events were a potential threat to the Russian government’s attempt to instil a more positive international image of the country. As stated earlier, the Georgian-Russian War proved to be harmful to that image, owing to the event tending to reinforce the existing negative images of Russia (mainly political, but also economic in nature). Georgia was much more adept at the information war in the early stages. By the time Russia began to communicate more effectively, journalists had moved on to the next story. The short attention span of international media to ‘hot’ stories worked in Georgia’s favour, as the negative stories concerning Russia’s involvement in the war are the ones that continue to hold resonance.

Experience that was gained from the First Gas War in Ukraine was used to wage a much more effective information campaign in order to mitigate negative effects. The information campaign can be considered as being well organised and reasonably effective, insofar as getting the official position of Gazprom (and the Russian government) in global media, and therefore successful. Thus the disastrous performance of informing, influencing and persuading an international public of the earlier Gas War was turned around. One of Russia’s potential means of accumulating soft-power is through its ability to attract foreign investment in its industry. International big business has shown a great deal of interest in possible projects in Russia, however, they are cautious owing to political uncertainties (such as those experienced by the energy company BP). Big business is also a means with which to indirectly influence foreign governments, owing to the connections between politics and corporations.

In sum, there are a number sub-issues that affect the strategic image of Russia. The source of images and information is not solely derived, owned or controlled by the state. State and non-state actors through their words and deeds can either consolidate or break efforts at attempting to re-brand a nation. The recent example of events in Belarus in the wake of the December 2010 elections completely overwhelmed and undid the successful work of Timothy Bell in rehabilitating the Belarusian image.

**RESULTS REFLECTED IN PUBLIC OPINION AND POLLS**

How have all of these diverse and various attempts served the cause of improving Russia’s international image? Has it worked at all, or has the exercise been a waste of time and money? A number of polls and their results have appeared in the news lately, with a somewhat mixed result. In the BBC World Service Poll (held annually), which is conducted by GlobeScan, found that Russia rose from 29th place in the previous poll to 13th place. This
ranking is made in terms of thoughts and feelings of respondents on different countries’ influence upon the global stage. (Washington, 2011)

The poll asked some 28,619 people to rate the influence of 16 major nations and the European Union. Those who viewed Russia as having a positive effect grew from 29 per cent in 2010 to 34 per cent in 2011. A majority of 38 per cent (stable from last year) still view Russia negatively though. Of the 27 countries where the poll was conducted, nine had a positive opinion of Russia’s global influence, 11 held a negative opinion and seven were divided (The full report is downloadable from http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_on_countriesregions_bt/680.php?nid=&id=&pnt=680&lb=). (World Public Opinion, 2011) Russia Beyond the Headlines met the news with a positive tone. “Although there have been numerous hiccups along the way — refusing entry to a Guardian journalist earlier this year for example — the result of a more ‘pragmatic’ foreign policy and efforts to improve ties with the West now appear to be reaping dividends.” (Russia Beyond the Headlines, 2011)

However, another ranking, given by the conservative US think tank the Heritage Foundation, rated Russia as being in 143rd in the world position and 41st among European countries (out of a total of 43 countries) in terms of economic freedom for investors. This was still a 0.2 improvement on the last evaluation, which was due to what were termed as being minor improvements. Chairman of GlobeScan, Doug Miller stated that Russia was hurting its international image by virtue of some of its actions. “[…] the more it acts like the old Soviet Union, the less people outside its borders seem to like it” (for the Heritage Foundation Report on the Index for Economic Freedom in 2011 please see http://www.heritage.org/index/). (Washington, 2011) It can be assumed from the results and the remarks, a country’s international image is adversely affected when its leadership is perceived to be violating common norms and acceptable behaviour.

**Conclusions**

With the Cold War coming to an end there was a realisation of a change in how a country projects its power and will on the international stage. Long gone were the days when hard power, such as economic coercion or the use of military force, bring about the desired and intended effect. With rapidly transforming information technology and methods of communication, an alternative form of power, soft power was realisable. The new situation meant that a state could utilise its culture, reputation and foreign policy in order to achieve its goals. But this requires a country to gain setting the international agenda and influencing the preferences of others. This is done by increasing a country’s perceived attractiveness in terms of its culture and policies that are practiced, to an international public (at the level of citizens and not government).
A key problem that can be detected is how actors view the role and effectiveness of PR technologies in persuading and influencing a target audience. In some regards it is viewed as the silver bullet that has the power to resolve a variety of social, commercial and political issues. However, as the likes of Bernays and Lippmann have already stated, for the desired change in image to occur, real change to address those issues also needs to occur in order to support the message being relayed.

These two problems have the effect of causing definitional stability of reputation, which is further reinforced through environmental factors such as framing and narratives used by international mass media, and a lack of direct experience (in visiting Russia and meeting Russians) of some segments of the audience. The old stereotypes and images are more familiar, which is likely to result in the new communicated messages not having any or the intended effect. Media reporting focuses on, as a rule, negative or bad news from Russia. This in turn creates a link to negative images.

Added to these problems is the issue of how the Self is seen, and therefore can be communicated to the Other. What does it mean to be Russian? What is the Russian identity? These are questions that have existed for centuries and are still hotly debated. This makes the matter of expressing oneself in terms of nation brand much more difficult, when the basis of the image that needs to be relayed is uncertain.

In the current global landscape, a currency of ideas is in existence, and Russia (like everyone else) needs to compete in order to get a message across. This is not something that is easily done, crafting and delivering an effective message takes much time and effort in order to stand some chance of success. For a message to hold the attention of and resonate with the target audience it must use recognised and accepted symbols and images, offer some platform for the basis of establishing a shared interest, linking common or shared values or norms, and to deliver the message via the mass medium that is used by the target audience.

Results from the various PR campaigns aimed at re-branding and improving Russia’s international image have been mixed. Various strategies have been used, such as *transferring*, *redefining* and *concealing* in order for realising a re-branded Russia. Different campaigns run by different organisations have targeted different publics with a variety of issues and appeals.

There have been attempts to influence *key influencers*, those in society that hold status and position that would enable to influence a wider circle of people that trust them. This has in some cases been skilfully done through such events as the Valdai Club, and organising international conferences and symposiums around key issues that are designed raise the Russian government’s image through linking it to a position or prestige (such as energy security and the environment).
One of the elements that can undo these efforts is an inconsistent image, whether by accident or design. If a tourist or businessman has an unpleasant experience with a customs officer or some other public official, word of mouth through informal channels of communication can spread negative news and images. This was certainly the case when my father and sister visited Russia several years ago. There are also international events, such as the Georgian-Russian War and the Gas Wars that can also prove to be very damaging to Russia’s attempts to re-brand itself, having the effect to confirm a number of the old and negative stereotypes. The influence of the information sphere has its limits, it forms a bridge between the physical world and the cognitive sphere. Information needs to be able to support and agree with events in the physical world, otherwise they are not likely to gain currency. All of the attempts to rebrand Russia’s international image (especially the political reputation) seem to stumble upon Simon Anholt’s observation, which is the difficulty in proving to the international community that Russia deserves a different reputation and image.

Russia has a multitude of brands relating to culture, economics and politics (and are perceived and understood differently), which provide mental short cuts and understandings of the country and its people. In sum, Russia has an attractive culture, which has a long established and rich tradition in literature, music and the arts. This is offset and overshadowed by politics (real and perceived), which revolve around the issues of lack of freedom (political, human rights and economic). The main objectives of the nation branding exercise involve the task of correcting and improving the current national image, which is attempted through trying to discard the negative aspects.

A problematic issue in realising this is there seems to be a lack of consensus on a lack of clarity of the main concepts, identity and values expressed. This is further compounded by differing information agenda and objectives by various actors (state and non-state), with the resulting lack of coordination. Conditioning in the foreign publics also presents a significant obstacle, such as associating Russia and the Soviet Union, which superimposes negative values and attributes of the later upon the former.

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In this work, it is argued that the concept of participatory media is suitable for understanding communicative practices performed by Russian collective civic actors. In order to systematize these investigations, an analytical framework is presented. It combines existing schemes of categorization of participatory media practices and typologies for measuring their levels of participation. The purpose of this framework is to describe how individuals participate in distinct spaces — management, production and audience — within specific civic groups. It is a diagnostic tool meant to increase the dialogue between scholars and practitioners. In theory, the framework can be applied to further qualitative analyses. In practice, it works as a guideline for civic actors to maximize the participatory potential of their actions. The empirical applicability of the framework is illustrated with the case of the newspaper “Inkeri”, produced by the Ingrian Union of St. Petersburg.
The purpose of this article is to present an analytical framework based on the notion of “participatory media” for the investigation of civic actions in Russia. The need for an alternative and the usefulness of participatory media can be grasped by examining the features and limitations of the scholarly assessments about two interwoven post-Soviet phenomena. One is the establishment of civic activism in the country from Perestroika onwards, and the other is the emergence of Russian media culture.

In a brief historical overview, anti-state mobilizations of the 1980's are often considered the roots of independent civic action in Russia. In the 1990’s, a multitude of non-governmental organizations were formed. Later that decade, the growth and institutionalization of Russian civic activism led the federal government to regulate the actions of civic organizations. In the 2000's, the president Vladimir Putin created tighter laws to increase governmental control over civic groups (see Brygalina & Temkina, 2004; Evans, Henry & Sundstrom, 2006). Despite such political turbulence, in 2006 about 450.000 non-governmental organizations — including feminist, environmental, ethnic and welfare groups — had been registered. At that time, approximately ninety thousand were active (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006).

The concept of “civil society” has been very popular among analysts of non-parliamentary forms of political action in Russia. However, the discourses about Russian civil society have been more problematic than elucidating if we are to focus on the dynamics of non-governmental, non-profit civic action in Russia. The key problem lies less in the concept than in the way it was adopted in Russian debates from the context of democratic transition onwards (Alapuro 2008).

After Perestroika, civil society was given the official status of “project”. That is, “civil society” was interpreted as an objective to be reached as a necessary social feature in order to detach the new democratic Russia from its Soviet past. As a consequence, the concept has commonly been used in normative and ideological disputes about whether or not the existing non-governmental practices in Russia constitute the allegedly ideal Western-inspired sense of civil society (Schmit-Pfister 2008 reviews these discourses). Most descriptions of Russian civic actions through the prism of civil society tend to be somehow negative. Some argue that the concept is incompatible with Russian society, for instance, because of a supposed passivity of Russian individuals towards political life (Sundstrom and Henry 2006). Even stronger scepticism is noticed in discussions about Russian civic actors vis-à-vis the state. Some claim that Russian civil society organizations neither cause significant impact on government decisions nor do they promote citizen participation in...
politics (Crotty 2009). Some, on the other hand, concentrate on the restrictions and violations of democratic values by the Russian state after Vladimir Putin’s rise (Robertson 2009, Henderson 2011, Debra and Lindemann-Komarova 2010). While these approaches present different perspectives on institutional power disputes in Russia, they hardly enable approaches to the inner logics of existing civic actions.

Despite the problematic discourses about Russian civil society, the concept can still be useful for more in-depth studies about the dynamics of civic action and engagement in the country. For that purpose, in this work civil society is understood similarly to Peter Dahlgren’s terms (2009). For Dahlgren, civil society is the domain of political life between (and I would add interrelated to) the state and the market in which individuals associate and interact in order to achieve non-profit, personal and collective goals. In addition, Dahlgren emphasizes the civic aspect of civil society. That is, the fact that citizens act in accordance with democratic values (p.59, 68). Thus, reactionary, extremist and even criminal groups that have been part of the Russian recent political history (Shelley 2006, Umland 2002) are certainly significant public phenomena, but not part of civil society from this perspective.

However, these analytical boundaries blur when considering the relationships between civic actors and the state. There is a common expectation that civic groups have to be disconnected and independent from the government. In Russia, civil society actors which are supportive or related to the state are regarded with suspicion and described as managed (Robertson 2009). The restriction to West-versus-Russia civil society discourses aggravated by a general disgust about the Russian political system tend to lead some to argue that these organizations are not part of civil society. But these either-or positions tend to be more effective at heating endless debates rather than for motivating critical research. The case of the Youth Movement Nashi [Ours] is a recurrent example of a managed organization. The group is constantly accused of being a puppet of the state ready to show support whenever Vladimir Putin snaps his fingers (Morozov 2011a, pp. 67). Should we assume, then, that thousands of youths are manipulated as toy soldiers into taking any necessary action to support the government or their opposing parties (cf. Schwirtz 2007)? Should we just ignore the participants’ autonomy of thought (Karmalskaia 2008), agency (Atwal 2009) and social environment? The overall remainder of this article is that forms of participation in civic actors should be approached critically. For that, as researchers we need distance from the general lack of sympathy for Russia’s controversial political system and governors (Debra and Lindemann-Komarova 2010) if we are to grasp the nuances of the Russian political space (Liikanen 2008). In that sense, we need analytical tools that would complement the concept of civil society as defined in this work.

Alternatives to the dead-end discourses about civil society in Russia may be developed by taking more culturalist approaches to civic activism. Here, I am drawing my discussion from what Peter Dahlgren (2009) calls “civic cultures”. Dahlgren describes civic cultures
as an analytic frame suitable for investigating the conditions and factors at the level of everyday life that shape the self-understanding of individuals as civically-engaged citizens (pp. 102-107). Some scholars have taken different paths to reach similar objectives in Russian studies. Elena Zdravomyslova (2004) has applied frame theory to analyse how the Soldiers’ Mothers organization constructs their self-identity. Zdravomyslova shows how the group combines the idea of motherhood with the notion of human rights to communicate with constituents, create public appeal and also cause some impact on the state. Similarly from a discursive perspective, Suvi Salmenniemi (2008) has inquired about collective identities in civic activism in Russia through the prism of gender analysis. Based on the ethnographic study of non-governmental organizations in Tver, Russia, Salmenniemi has identified a gendered polarization between a feminine social welfare activism and masculine traditional and confrontational political practices. Both studies are examples of attempts to understand the internal dynamics of civic activism in Russia from within. Still, a lot remains to be investigated about participation and communicative practices of Russian civic actors.

The second contemporary and highly investigated Russian phenomena is the widespread status of mainstream media and information technologies in the country, which marks the establishment of what Douglas Kellner calls “media culture” (1995). According to Kellner, media culture is a symbolic phenomenon in which the products of mass media help both to produce the fabric of everyday life and forge individual and collective identities (pp. 1-2). In this sense, radio, television, print media, Internet and other new ICT’s as well as the products that circulate in and through them shape “the dominant form and site of culture in contemporary society” (p. 35). This conceptualization of media culture dialogues with debates about mediatization (Lundby, 2009). Proponents of mediatization also argue that in contemporary society it is not possible to think of different forms of socialization without taking the role of media into consideration (Krotz, 2009, p. 22). The societal impacts of the post-Soviet media system have been scrutinized by distinct disciplines such as media studies, sociology, literature and philology. Recent studies include analyses of media structure and consumption trends as well as investigations of changes in public values and lifestyle among Russians (Rosenholm, Nordenstreng & Trubina 2010). However, at least in the literature available in English, the radical role of media (see Christians et al., 2009), materialized by the interventions of civic groups in the Russian media system, have lately been noticed but seem to remain understudied.

The apparent small amount of studies about media practices performed by Russian civic actors could be a result of how theoretical debates about media in Russia have evolved. In the Russian communication field, media have been thought, from a predominately instrumentalist perspective, as ideological tools in a battle between state and market forces. Due to their emphasis on media ownership and control, most literature functions as chronological accounts of the political transformations in the country since Perestroika (see
Nordenstreng, Vartanova & Y. Zassoursky, 2002; I. Zassoursky, 2004). In these accounts, traditional media technologies (e.g. radio, newspaper and especially television) appear dominated by power elites, with barely any room left for civic groups to act. But this limiting theoretical scenario is gradually becoming more inclusive with the growth of Internet penetration and other new ICTs in Russia.

Civil society already appears, even if timidly, in general descriptions of the contemporary Russian media system (Vartanova, 2007). Some scholars have recently described civic activism in blogs and other social networking platforms online (Lonkila, 2008). Nevertheless, the general analyses of the democratic potential of the Internet in Russia, as elsewhere, remain full of controversies. On the one hand, there is optimism. Ivan Zassoursky (2009), for instance, believes that in the future there will be the “Russia 2.0.” in which “people act as they please and say what they wish” (p. 40). On the other hand, there has been concern and disbelief in the causal relation between Internet and the increase of freedom of speech in the country. Some sceptics have referred to the efforts of the Kremlin to control Internet development (Alexander 2004) and to manipulate online discussions in order to favor the regime (Morozov 2011b). Problematically, these approaches to the power balances between the state and civil society limit the possibilities of inquiring about civic actors’ communication experiences and how these impact on levels of civic engagement among Russian citizens.

This article proposes an approach to Russian civic action in response to the theoretical limitations described above. Participatory media theory is a suitable alternative to the dominant research fields of Russian civic and media cultures for being located exactly where these theoretical streams intersect. In the following section, the fundamentals of participatory media are reviewed. Afterwards, typologies from participation research and participatory media are combined in order to systematize a diagnostic tool for identifying participatory levels in communicative practices of civic actors. The applicability of the framework will be illustrated with the case of the Ingrian Union of St. Petersburg and their newspaper, Inkeri.

THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL OUTLINES OF PARTICIPATORY MEDIA

The fundamentals of participatory media include elements of democratic theory. In general, democracy is a controversial theme in the Russian context because it is commonly associated, almost as a synonym, to Western political and economic expansion. Certainly there is plenty of historical evidence which confirms the use of democratic discourses to sell the capitalist ideology worldwide. However, participatory media is founded on values and ideals that oppose the tendencies of consumerism and individualism. In addition, the concept reinforces the understanding of democracy as a result of civic practices in daily life rather
than an obligatory requisite for non-Western nations to be accepted in the international stage of economic and political affairs. Participatory media encompasses the promotion of dialogue and participation (Freire, 1973) as means for individuals to exercise their right to communicate (Hamenlink & Hoffmann, 2008). Therefore, the communicative practices of civic actors are a stage for individuals to construct “citizenship” as an empowered subjective position (Mäkinen, 2006) achieved and enacted through their engagement in civic action (Mouffe, 1992). Thus, “participation” has a crucial role for the democratic impacts of participatory media.

At the risk of oversimplifying a long and complex debate, we could identify two ways of thinking participation. In a line of thought inherited from political science, participation has long been understood as a factor to determine whether civic engagement in parliamentary and non-parliamentary politics is good or bad, sufficient or not. For decades there has been a scholarly effort to find explanations for the decreasing interest of individuals in participating politically (for an account of Russia, see Petukhov, 2005). These kinds of analyses tend to establish a certain definition of what participation is, then based on this preconceived standard, they determine the factors that prevent people from participating. Apathy, alienation and passivity are common explanations. Another stream of participation research acknowledges the elusiveness of the term. Here we refrain from a rigid essentialist definition of participation and argue that there are different participatory degrees ranging from maximalist to minimalist forms of participation (Pateman, 1970; Carpentier, 2008). The acceptance of this complexity forces the focus of research to shift away from the questions “is this participatory?” or “why do (do not) people participate?” Instead, emphasis is placed on the relevance of asking “how participatory are these practices?” and “how does the act of participating impact on participants?” In short, participatory media as a concept allows us to investigate the complexities of participation in communicative practices in civic actions.

What are participatory media in concrete terms?

It is impossible to provide one clear-cut definition to the diverse and dynamic participatory media practices worldwide, but some features can be handpicked and analysed separately in order to establish the contours of what they mean in practice. One aspect in the body of literature about participatory media that is often confusing at first sight regards how these practices originate. Concerning their origins, participatory media may be divided into “institutional projects” and “grassroots experiences” (Gumucio Dagron, 2001). Institutional projects are part of macro-social plans promoted around the world under the notion of “participatory communication for development”. That is, strategically elaborated actions in which mass media and other kinds of technologies are employed to promote social change especially in under-developed countries. The history of these projects can be traced back to the early years of the Cold War. At that time, U.S. political scientists had support from the
U.S. government, international agencies (e.g. UNESCO) and foundations (e.g. Ford, Kellog) to set up projects meant to transpose their knowledge for the social and economic development of local populations, mainly in rural regions, especially in Latin America. Colin Sparks (2007) locates these projects in the “dominant/diffusionist paradigm” of development communication. Due to their one-way transmission of information, the projects were discredited under harsh criticism for ignoring local realities and needs (Beltrán, 1976).

The second paradigm of development communication emerged from the criticism made to diffusionism. Especially throughout the 1970’s, a more critical UNESCO promoted regional debates and supported local voices, especially Latin American scholars, in their struggle to denounce what was then called cultural and economic imperialism. These discussions happened parallel to and interrelated with the “great global media debates” in UNESCO especially during the 1970’s (see Mansell & Nordenstreng, 2006). As a result of the insurgence of the poor, different kinds of development projects were planned and promoted. Co-operations with local scholars and agents were formed in order to increase self-reliance and emancipation of local populations through more horizontal forms of communication (Beltrán, 1979). In those projects, beneficiaries were also allowed to participate in planning and executing activities. These actions formed the “participatory paradigm” of development communication (Sparks, 2007). Despite accusations of some projects not being participatory at all (Arnst, 1996) and not promoting significant change (Jacobson, 2003), participatory projects for development are still organized especially in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Interestingly, Russia does not appear among the most common centers for similar projects and the reasons remain to be investigated. But one concrete example to illustrate the point just made is the Russian Rural Information Network, a four-year project (1998-2002) developed and applied in Russia by the Farm Radio Network, a Canadian non-governmental organization. In the project, radio and Internet were used to enable farmers to improve production and living conditions through the dissemination and exchange of information among farmers and other rural stakeholders (Bennett, 2003).

Still based on their origins, the second type of participatory media are grassroots experiences (Gumucio Dagron, 2001). These experiences will be considered for the purpose of our investigation of the communicative practices of Russian civic actors. However, a brief semantic remark needs to be made in relation to the term “grassroots.” Grassroots commonly has a geographic connotation. In this sense, grassroots participatory media experiences are mostly local, non-profit attempts promoted by different kinds of political actors as democratic media environments for citizens to speak and be heard. However, with the rise of Internet, similar experiences have reached transnational levels. In this case, the notion of grassroots would designate the individuals who form the basis of these experiences in contrast to institutions that promote the kinds of development projects described above.
Local grassroots experiences of participatory media have been promoted since the late 1940’s (ibid.). They can be motivated by the lack of any accessible media where they are located (Gumucio Dagron, 2007, p. 202) and/or originate in opposition to repressive political regimes or negative ideological line of commercial or state-controlled media institutions (Downing, 2001). Grassroots experiences can be seen as participatory media organized by existing civic actors and organizations that have media as their most important activity.

Another possible approach to participatory media is to look at their socio-political and cultural contexts. Kevin Howley (2010, pp. 2) creates a brief distinction among actions according to the societal settings in which they are inserted. In a liberal environment dominated by commercial media like the United States, they are usually noncommercial alternatives to the media industries. Where there is a greater public broadcasting tradition, these grassroots experiences tend be oriented towards the diversity of ethnic, racial and cultural minorities as well as other social groups struggling to participate in public debates. In post-colonial societies, participatory media commonly aim at social, political and economic change. In societies with hegemonic state-run media they tend to appear as antagonists to regimes. Howley acknowledges that these are not fixed models. After all, the macro-social structure does not determine the exact kinds of civic actions in the public space. In this sense, the description of participatory media shows one of its many convergences with general social movement and collective action theory. The many facets of civic action in Russia serve as illustrations to how different models of action bloom in a single society. Russian civic groups promote welfare, fight the ideology of the state, struggle for environmental protection and gender balance, to name but a few actions. These different organizations certainly have different communicative strategies. But the media experiences within civic actors is not commonly problematized from the perspective of media studies (Downing, 2008). One exception in Russian studies are organizations which engage in Internet activism. But in order to locate different forms of communicative experiences in Russian civic groups, it is necessary to accept that media refers not only to radio, television, newspaper and Internet, but also to any other means available under contextual restrictions, like public speeches, graffiti, popular theaters, performances, posters and so forth (Downing, 2001, pp. 103-104).

There are other points of convergence between the debates about participatory media and general civic actions. One concerns the relations of organizations with the state. Groups that promote participatory media are expected to be self-sufficient and independent from governmental authorities (Gumucio Dagron, 2007). As mentioned earlier, there is a similar expectation from Russian civic actors. For example, organizations that receive foreign support or maintain some kind of relationship with the state are viewed with suspicion and distrust (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). The problem of this moralistic disapproval is that it
hides the importance of governmental support for the survival of many Russian organizations, especially at the regional levels, outside the major urban centers (Henry & Sundstrom, 2006). The impacts of these cooperative ties also deserve scholarly attention. In Asian and African participatory media experiences, for example, civic actors have formed alliances with local authorities, but some still manage to maintain their identity and independence (Gumucio Dagron, 2007, p. 205). Another point of convergence is the expected social and political impact of grassroots experiences, similar to those observed in relation to Russian civic groups. In general, participatory media are considered politically ineffective for mostly acting at the local level and for having a limited lifespan especially due to draining of resources. These assumptions mostly cause the taken-for-grantedness of the constant negotiations and power relations disrupted in the everyday actions of participants (Rodriguez, 2001).

The last feature in this brief definition of the contours of participatory media practices is the conceptual confusion that has emerged from such diverse empirical phenomena. The elusive character of those grassroots experiences worldwide have generated a number of labels representing different theoretical standpoints. “Community media” commonly refers to generally small-scale media systems produced by and for geographical communities or communities of interest (Howley, 2010). “Alternative radical media” refers both to media that express an alternative to hegemonic media environments and/or oppressing political systems (Downing, 2001). “Citizens’ Media” focuses on the efforts and the power relations among individuals to enact citizenship through media practices (Rodriguez, 2001). “Participatory media” focuses on participation, the common constitutive feature among these conceptualizations (Carpentier, 2008). These are just a few of the most recurring concepts. In this work, emphasis will be given to exploring the intersections between participatory media and traditional social movements and collective actions theory (Downing, 2008; 2011). In summary, participatory media can be a suitable tool for approaching the communication experiences and strategies of Russian civic actors. In the following section, examples of its applicability are presented with an illustrative case from the context of Russian civic culture.

**PARTICIPATORY MEDIA AS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

The notion of participatory media can be articulated as an analytical framework for both observers and practitioners of communicative practices in grassroots civic actions. This framework is thought to be a diagnostic tool for theoretical and practical purposes. For researchers, it will be possible to generate more in-depth expertise about the dynamics of citizens’ engagement and communication strategies in civic actions. For practitioners, the results may be applied for the development of strategies that may enhance civic (as in
opposed to ‘uncivic’) participation in their actions. Either way, the awareness generated through this analysis will be fully based on accounts and lived experiences of the participants.

The analytical framework consists of a combination of existing typologies from participatory media theory which aims at defining the types of organization under scrutiny and measuring the levels of participation in different sections of the groups. The applicability of the framework is illustrated with the case of the Ingrian Union, an ethnic organization from St. Petersburg. The group promotes a number of different activities (from gatherings to folk festivals), but this article briefly describes how participation happens in their newspaper Inkeri [1]. First, the organization is described and categorized according to a scheme to identify different models of participatory organizations (Carpentier, 2008). Then, the spaces for participation — management, production and audience — are disarticulated so that participation in each of them can be measured separately (Peruzzo, 1996).

The Ingrian Union and the “Inkeri” Newspaper

As a heritage of the Soviet Union, Russian minority groups are called “nationalities.” Russia has over one hundred “nationalities” which together amount about 27 million people (Codagnone & Filipov, 2000, p. 263). After the collapse of the old regime, ethnic organizations were formed to maintain traditions and resist the consequences of both high waves of migration and a federal project to build a unified Russian culture (Liikanen, 2008; Lallukka, 2001). The Ingrian Union of St. Petersburg is one of these organizations. Founded in 1988, the Inkerin Liitto (in Finnish, their original language) aims at preserving the ethnic heritage of the Ingrian-Finnish community in the region that stretches from St. Petersburg to Estonia, on the margins of the Gulf of Finland. Throughout history, conflicts between Russian and Swedish Empires as well as the war strategies of the Soviet Union forced the Ingrian-Finns to disperse around different regions in Russia, Sweden, Finland, Estonia and other countries (Matley, 1979). This fragmentation can be illustrated by the Union’s organizational structure. The main office in St. Petersburg coordinates other 29 local independent branches in Russia and abroad. The common actions and general features of the Union are centralized in the headquarters. The branches manage their own local affairs and events. Altogether, the organization has approximately 25,000 members who pay membership fees. Once or twice a year, the Union also receives financial support from the government of St. Petersburg for cultural events. The Union promotes courses on Finnish language and culture. They also promote religious studies and leisure events in partnership with the Lutheran Ingrian Church. Moreover, the organization provides shelters for the elderly, job-searching assistance and professional training for those at working age, social
interaction activities for children and also programmes for youth socialization. In addition to their cultural and welfare actions, the Union also uses communication in their repertoire through their publication: the *Inkeri* newspaper.

The decision-making process within the Union is made through voting in yearly assemblies. It was in one of these meetings that, in 1998, the Ingrian Union decided to produce the *Inkeri*. Six times a year, between six hundred and one thousand copies of the newspaper are published. The *Inkeri* is distributed freely at the offices of the organization and it is also sent to Ingrian communities abroad if requested. Sometimes, the newspaper is sold in determined events, but its costs are mostly covered with the membership fees. The editor-in-chief of the *Inkeri* (in the spring of 2009, also the chairman of the Union) is responsible for the administrative issues of the newspaper. Despite the growth and easier accessibility to new media technologies, the choice of the organization to publish a printed newspaper is strategic since it is thought to reach readers from small villages who do not use Internet.

**Categorizing the “Inkeri” as Participatory Media**

Figure 1 summarizes Nico Carpentier’s (2008) participatory media framework to categorize the organizations and the scope of their actions. In the case of the Union, the goal is to determine what kind of participatory media the *Inkeri* is. According to Carpentier, there are four types of participatory media organizations. They are divided according to their membership status and to how they facilitate access to media technologies and interaction among participants. In the participatory models with more complete access both to technology and production processes, [a] formal or informal members are allowed in the process of media production and [b] non-members have access to the media technology to produce media content. In semi-participatory organizations (generally founded on new media platforms), [c] a group of individuals gather and provide access to Internet technologies for the members to interact (e.g. WiFi communities) or [d] non-member individuals can access online platforms (e.g. blogs, social media) to interact with the organizations (pp. 113-115). The distinction between these models encompass the debates about the essence of participation, its different forms and political roles (Pateman 1970). In this sense, what distinguishes models [a] and [b] from [c] and [d] is that [a] and [b] allow for more maximalist forms of participation while [c] and [d] mainly provide access and chances to interact leaving minimal possibilities for participants to make decisions regarding the shape the technological structure and contents of the media (cf. Carpentier, 2008, pp. 106-110). Based on these criteria, the *Inkeri* belongs to the [a] model. That is, the newspaper
is a formal membership participatory media organization because the content of the *Inkeri* is written by non-journalist members of the Union. In the spring of 2009, there were about six volunteer participants who, together with the editor-in-chief, discussed and decided what was to be published in each edition.

In addition to identifying structural profiles of participatory media organizations, Carpentier (2008, pp. 115-119) articulates four different conceptual approaches to participatory media that may be applied to empirical investigations in order to distinguish organizations according to their range of action. There are media-centered and society-centered organizations. The media-centered model includes organizations that [a] serve a community by publishing or broadcasting themes that are relevant for the members of a specific social group; and [b] those which pose an alternative to mainstream media discourses and systems of representation. The society-centered approaches focus on organizations in a political context [c] for their role in civil society and the part they play in public debates, and [d] for their rhizomatic character and their ability to act as gathering points for different organizations and their relations and linkages with market and state.

These theoretical distinctions of participatory media actions (figure 1) are not exclusive and can actually form combinations depending on the empirical case under scrutiny. It is a useful tool because it forms a flexible, but fixable system for the researcher to deal with the elusiveness of organizations. It is especially relevant in the Russian context as it broadens the sense of civic action. The identification of these differences among
participatory media organizations is important to acknowledge the validity and diversity of different forms of collective actors. Since the Inkeri is a community-oriented publication, it would hardly appear in the radar of dominant approaches to civic action in Russia. The content of the newspaper mainly includes information about Ingrian festivals, celebrations and traditions. It also promotes the use of their original language by also publishing content in Finnish. In sum, the Inkeri has been identified as a formal membership, community-oriented participatory media organization. However, that is not enough to determine how participation happens (either in maximalist or minimalist ways) in the making of the publication. For that purpose, it is necessary to identify the spaces in the participatory media experiences of civic actors where participation actually happens and define a method to measure its levels.

**Locating and Measuring Participation in the “Inkeri”**

Each civic group is a micro-social organism where the question “how do you participate?” could trigger a range of different responses. Thus, in order to investigate how participation happens in a civic group it seems crucial to identify the distinct spaces within the participatory media process in which citizens can participate. Based on elements of traditional mass media research, three spaces for participation can be identified: management, production and audience.

Management is the space where the decision-making processes happen within the organization. Production is where the actions, events and the messages are planned, elaborated and executed. The audience is formed by people outside the management and production who have access to what is produced and transmitted. One important distinction between participatory media experiences at the local level and mass media is that in the case of participatory media, management, production and audience are much more closely interrelated. Participants may share the same geographical space (e.g. village, neighborhood, building) and maintain interpersonal relations. This proximity makes it difficult to draw the boundaries between the spaces of participation with precision. What is noticed is that not only the process of participatory media as such, but also the intertwined relationship between participants and non-participants impact on how participation happens. For that reason, the disarticulation of the process enables the researcher to focus at distinct moments and observe their participatory features within one single organization.

After locating the spaces for participation in a civic group, it is necessary to measure the participatory levels in each of them. There are a number of different typologies which attempt to distinguish different forms of participation in distinct political experiences outside the formal sphere of deliberative politics (e.g. Arnstein, 2000 [1969]). From the perspective of participatory communication, Cicilia Peruzzo (1996) describes three kinds
of citizens’ participation: “non-participation”, “controlled participation” and “power participation” (pp. 169-173). These are displayed in Figure 2.

Non-participation is described to happen in two circumstances. When a prevailing power-holder prevents participation from happening or when audience members show little or no interest in engaging actively in the experience. Controlled-participation can be divided into two sub-categories: “limited participation” and “manipulated participation”. In the limited version, participants may have the chance of planning the actions to be performed, but the final decision is made by the leaders of the group. Manipulated participation is an authoritarian exercise of power disguised as democratic practices in which participants are led to believe they are deciding something which is actually decided elsewhere. “Power participation” is the most radical of the models in the sense that decision-making processes are shared. It is also divided into two sub-categories: “co-management” and “self-
management”. In a co-managed situation, participants may have an active role in decision-making, but not in all levels, since not all decisions are shared. Self-management happens when the participant has direct participation in decision-making within the organization.

The identification and analysis of different participatory levels allows researchers to think of participation not as a rigid yes-or-no condition in civic action. Instead, it places civic engagement in a continuum polarized by minimalist and maximalist forms of participation as described by Nico Carpentier in an interview (Custódio 2011). In theory and in practice, the goal is to understand the process of participation and develop manners to move from the limiting minimalist pole towards the ideal, even if unreachable, maximalist horizon (ibid.).

Let us apply the analysis of participatory levels in the spaces for participation in the Inkeri. The main management aspect of the newspaper consists of general and financial administration, which is made by the board of the Union. Every two years, a central body of representatives is voted in their annual assembly. Participants at this meeting choose the president and ten members of the council, who appoint a vice-president and an executive board. The president chairs the meetings and represents the Union in its public affairs. The executive board controls the finances and plans activities and events. After the representatives are elected, the planning and the topics to be discussed in the assemblies are defined in this administrative body. Under these circumstances, the management of the organization in general and the Inkeri in particular could be considered very minimal, between limited (for the voting process) and non-participatory. That is to say, in a hypothetical example, that a reader or a young volunteer of the newspaper would most likely not have a decisive position in the budget planning, for instance.

In the case of the audience, the only channel general readers dispose to have some influence on the publication is by giving feedback through traditional “readers’ letters.” These opinions and suggestions may be published, but before they need to go through the evaluation of the producers of the newspaper. Thus, the participation of the audience in the Inkeri presents even more minimal, non-participatory levels.

The production is the space of participation in the Inkeri that the organization shows more concern in increasing participatory levels. Every second month, the editor-in-chief and the volunteers meet and decide together on what will be published. The Union has demonstrated interest in increasing the number of contributors, especially for the sections of the newspaper in Finnish. In order to increase the amount of writers for the publication, volunteers attend writing trainings and seminars about the history and culture of the Ingrian Finns. These courses are promoted by the Union. In addition, the decisions about what is produced or published remain in the responsibility of a limited number of participants. In comparison to the other spaces of participation within the group, the production presents a more maximalist form of participation. The decisions at the production are co-managed. But
most important are the activities promoted by the Union to increase the levels of participation. This is the main point of this article. If the complex nature of participatory processes is thoroughly scrutinized together by scholars and practitioners, more maximalist experiences will be promoted for citizens’ participation.

**CONCLUSION**

In summary, the analytical framework presented in this article is essentially a theoretical construct. It combines existing typologies of participatory media organizations and levels of participation to diagnose the participatory status and potential of participatory media actions. Therefore, it needs to be tested and verified in more complex empirical cases than the *Inkeri* before its effectiveness is assured. However, the rather simplistic illustration of the participatory media actions promoted by the Ingrian Union of St. Petersburg is enough to demonstrate how the scheme can be applied as an alternative approach to civic actions in Russia.

There are some key distinctions between the participatory media framework and the dominant approaches to Russian civic culture. The most common analyses are based on discourses of civil society meant to measure political and social impacts of civil society organizations vis-à-vis the state. In contrast, participatory media contributes to more constructivist and culturalist analyses of the interventions of civic actors in the Russian media system. The analyses of these communicative practices encompass the complexity of power relations that happen within these experiences. In contrast, the Russian civil society discourse tends to be restricted to evaluating how (in)effective civic actions are as well as to searching for explanations behind people’s (un)willingness to participate. With the participatory media analytical framework, the emphasis can be shifted to the subjective transformations of participants that may happen as they engage in civic practices. In other words, emphasis is put on how participatory media experiences empower individuals as citizens. Another feature of this analytical framework regards its theoretical and practical orientation. It is a tool suitable both for deeper theory development and for practitioners’ strategic planning and execution of actions which may maximize participatory levels in democratic experiences.

In conclusion, participatory media as an analytical framework enters a growing body of literature worldwide in which it is believed that participation in civic actions is too elusive and important to be taken for granted. Civic engagement is not automatic. Neither is lack of interest in civic actions a mere case of general passivity. Citizens’ participation in different aspects of political life needs to be thought and discussed by scholars and practitioners so that more inclusive, maximalist participatory opportunities in civic practices are promoted. Perhaps by doing so we will understand much more of the reasons behind the
massive unwillingness of Russians to participate politically. Most importantly, from the perspective of media and communication, the dialogue between theory and practice will certainly generate new ideas for applying attempts to increase interest and participation in Russian civic actions.

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BOOK REVIEWS


Reviewed by Vyacheslav Konovalov
Tartu University

In the on-going debates about democracy, its types, advantages, shortcomings, legitimacy, and total absence, when we hear about “sovereign democracy” in Russia, “brought in” democracy in Iraq, or “absence of democracy” in Belarus, there appears another vivid description of democracy — “a cat’s lick” democracy — ascribed to that existing in the three Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania.

The metaphor is taken from the title of the book by Timofey Agarin “A Cat’s Lick: Democratisation and Minority Communities in the Post-Soviet Baltic”. The author, who is a Russian with a post-Soviet Latvian background, puts forward a plain thesis that by placing the policy-making mechanisms in the hands of the majority in the Baltic states the idea of state titularisation has become dominant and the failure to take into account the interests of the minority groups impedes the processes of democratization in the three countries.

Timofey Agarin’s approach to the analysis of the current situation with respect to minority rights and democratic values in the Baltic states is a very comprehensive one, as he tackles the issue from every angle: political, social, economic, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and educational. Moreover, the study is presented as a systematic comparison and contrast of the three states, as legislation, policy-making, educational reforms and national language enforcement are evaluated in terms of each state’s political moves against the others. The seemingly ever-lasting clash between titular and national minorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania finds its realization in the mere fact that the non-titular minorities are squeezed into the periphery of the political arena within each country. Deprived of any significant influence on the decision-making process, they appear as nothing more than a marginalized, voiceless minority, notwithstanding the fact that, for instance, in Latvia they make up to 30% of the population.

In Soviet times, the author argues, the Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians, resisted processes of assimilation and “russification”, fearing for the very existence of their cultures.
and languages. Now, however, the authorities seem to have changed their perspective, eagerly giving the predominantly Russian-speaking minorities “the same medicine” and finding no fault with this. While the national authorities regard high proficiency in the knowledge of the local language as the key element of minority political involvement, Mr. Agarin takes proficiency in the state language as an indicator of persisting social inequalities in the region, providing the foundation for intercommunal tension in each of the Baltic societies.

In support of his argument Mr. Agarin presents significant evidence in the form of a scrupulous study of the legislative acts, minority integration programs and other relevant documents in each of the three states. At the same time he offers support for the opposing viewpoint by providing a broad overview of both electronic and printed media by the national minorities, as well as literature in the field and personal interviews with key-figures in the region. Mr. Agarin’s account would have been strengthened by analyzing specific cases when insufficient language skills or non-titular minority background were used as reasons for refusals to hire non-titular minorities. This would have also helped to soften the very dry narrative descriptive style the author has employed. Yet, that may have been exactly what the author intended, as the text is a very solid example of academic prose.

Although the analysis of the external conditions that have limited engagement of non-titulars in social and political processes in the Baltic states has been carried out rather fully, the author fails to consider in-depth political processes within the minority communities that prevented their voices from being heard (e.g. political ineptness and inability to formulate attractive goals among the Russian politicians in Estonia, lack of leadership skills and leaders themselves, as well as party conflicts over who can/should represent the interests of minorities in the Estonian Parliament best, etc.)

Overall, “A Cat’s Lick” by Mr. Agarin is a highly recommended read for a broad audience from teachers in political science to historians, from descendants of “forest brothers” to former supporters of “interfronts”. Written by a minority representative, which could be considered one of the work’s greatest strengths and the greatest source of controversy at the same time, the book provides solid arguments, logical conclusions and some personal insights. “A Cat’s Lick” helps us understand where the roots of the minority problems in the post-Soviet Baltic states lie, why the assimilation/integration programs designed by the majorities have been largely unsuccessful, how the attempts of the national minorities to voice their opinion have failed, and what approaches for consolidating societies in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are still available.

Reviewed by Anna Kushkova,
European University at St. Petersburg
kushka@eu.spb.ru

*Recipes For Russia: Food And Nationhood Under The Tsars* addresses a very significant period of Russian history, when the issue of nationhood, one of the “cursed” Russian questions, becomes particularly acute: it starts right after the war with Napoleon that conditioned Russia’s international and internal quest for self-understanding, and ends around the time of Emancipation, which facilitated Russian modernization along European lines.

This historical quest boiled down to the following set of questions: should Russia position itself as a progressive state engaged in a modernization project, or should its image be based on the idea of the “Holy Rus’” with its unique “own way,” or should there be some combination of both? And what would this involve for the largely agricultural country where the peasant majority were still serfs, and whose lives were based on the unquestionable authority of “tradition”?

Smith discusses these questions through the prism of the production and consumption of food, showing how issues of authority, identity, authenticity, as well as social status, gender, and ethnicity were expressed through the then current debates on the development of Russian agriculture, on the one hand, and Russian cuisine, on the other.

The touchstone of these debates, or, rather, the mirror that reflected motifs, aspirations, and final goals of their participants, is the overarching image of the “West.” By and large, it is the balance between acceptance of the “foreign” and preservation of “one’s own” that is at stake both for the new “agricultural” and “culinary image” of the country.

Thus, the “agricultural turn” of the state in the middle of the 19th century, when farming for the first time became an immediate concern of the State, on the one hand, was prompted by the desire to provide for peasants’ sustenance, especially after a series of “hunger years” in 1830s. Yet on the other hand, the new “government recipes,” whereby the State sought to strengthen its function as the people’s “feeder” (“kormlencheskaya” function, see: Kondratjeva 2006: 36), revealed a deep anxiety about “catching up with the West” (P. 47), since backward agriculture suggested the general backwardness of the culture. This anxiety may be seen as one of the perpetual mythologems of Russian national identity.

An ideological dimension was also characteristic of the culinary debate: with opinions ranging from what may be called “culinary Russophilia” (e.g. belief in the uniqueness of the “Russian national stomach” and a turn to provincial and/or peasant food, as well as food “in
the olden times” in search of “culinary authenticity”) to partial or complete departure from the dietary rules set by the Orthodox Church and readiness to embrace foreign cuisine among the Russian elite. All these various and often conflicting opinions boiled down to the question of whether food/food practices bear any relationship to patriotism or serve as a sign of national superiority (e.g. whether eating raw onions is a sign of true “Russianness,” or, translated into modern realities, whether one shows more political loyalty by eating “anti-sushi” rather than just “sushi”? ) It may be added that the inclination to link everyday practices (whether related to food one eats or to clothes one wears, or to books one reads, etc.) to one’s political allegiances may also be seen as a constant feature of the Russian national mentality.

One may compare Smith’s book with a sumptuous feast to which a motley crowd of guests are invited: Russian officials and policy-makers, including the tsars themselves, Orthodox priests, foreign travelers and Russian ethnographers, Russian and foreign doctors, housewives and farmers, cookbook authors/compilers and their publishers, French gastronomes and Russian middle-class housewives, Slavophiles and Westernizers, village and urban dwellers, the rich and the poor, landlords and peasants — all those who brought their mite into the discussion of the country’s “agricultural” and “culinary” destiny. The author skillfully orchestrates the polyphony of these multiple voices, providing each with a historical background to explain their respective stances.

The book is divided into two parts, “Authority and Material Concerns” and “Production and Consumption from Theory to Practice,” each of which is further subdivided into 3 chapters. The author leads the reader down two closely related lines of discussion about food production and consumption, which approach creates a very dense and informative text that exposes the audience to a wide range of related topics.

Among the most important of those are: changes in the Russian political structure on the eve of Emancipation and the expansion of state authority over the peasantry (Part I, Ch.1, “Ensuring Sustenance — The State and the Starving Peasant”); State preoccupation with public health and the spread of medical and dietary knowledge (Part I, Ch. 2, “Making Cabbage Healthy — Dietics and Public Health as a National Concern”); details of everyday and festive lives of the Russian peasants (Part I, Ch. 3, “Describing the Russian Diet — Ethnography, History, and Cultural Definition”); a comprehensive history of translation of foreign works on agriculture and culinary art, as well as the history of the publication of foreign and Russian works on the subjects, including domestic periodicals (Part II, Ch.1, “Searching for an Authority — Encyclopedists and the Art of Translation”; Part II, Ch. 5, “Who is Responsible? — Master Chefs, Gentlemen Farmers, and Progressive Patriotism”); gender specificities as related to authorship/audience of culinary books (Part II, Ch. 6, “Audiences and Authorities — Russian Housewives and European Gastronomes”), and so on.
Although, as the author concludes, “Over the course of the century before Emancipation, authority over Russia’s system of food production and consumption shifted dramatically” (P. 177), one should not, in our view, underestimate the “power of tradition,” which continued to play the key role, particularly for the Russian peasants for a long period after 1861. In this respect it is also significant that the “culinary project” seems to have been much more successful than the “agricultural” one. Perhaps there were too many competing authorities over Russian agriculture (in which case it may be compared to that soup that was spoiled by too many cooks); or, perhaps Russia’s size and the variability of climatic conditions made it impossible for the country to “digest” foreign and implement domestic agricultural “recipes.” Or, perhaps this may be explained by the belief that the printed word alone could “transform Russia’s agricultural sector” (P. 145).

Alison Smith’s Recipes for Russia: Food and Nationhood under the Tsars is a thorough and multi-faceted study based on an impressive number of sources, including a large number of archival materials, and supplemented by a detailed glossary of Russian culinary and social terms. This book is a valuable source for students of Russian history, including economic history, as well as all those interested in the development of a discourse of nationhood in 19th-century Russia.


Reviewed by Olga Gurova
European University at St. Petersburg
Gurova@eu.spb.ru

This compelling book by Professor Christine Ruane, based on rich archival materials and containing a large number of fine illustrations, is an analysis of a subject whose existence has always been under question, namely, the fashion industry in Russia. As a historian, Ruane is not interested in giving a definition, or in developing a concept, of the fashion industry. Instead, she masterfully embraces historical data with her own research scheme and considers the fashion industry as being constituted from the textile industry, the needle trade and clothing production, the fashion press and advertising, and forms of retailing and shopping. She then puts the fashion industry into the political, social, and cultural context of two centuries of Russian history, from 1700 to 1917.

The fashion industry started to grow in Russia in the beginning of the XIXth century due to a huge impulse, given earlier by the sartorial reforms of Peter the Great. Seeking independence from foreign manufacturers and with the purpose of developing domestic textile production, Peter the Great set the tone by wearing garments made exclusively from Russian textiles. He then provided manufacturers and entrepreneurs with government orders for uniforms for state servitors and introduced financial and other instruments, such as cash advances, fixed prices, protectionist taxes for textiles, and, later, for imported clothing, all of which helped the nascent industry not only to survive but to develop successfully. He also began a campaign to lure European tailors to Russia, most of whom were from France, Germany, and Great Britain. All of this resulted in the European modernization of Russia, and, at the same time, further enhanced the great dilemma of fashion that still exists — the dilemma of Western vs Russian, according to which Western fashions, tailoring, clothing were considered by Russian consumers to be superior to Russian clothing fashion.

The superior status of Western clothes was maintained by a fashion press that became widespread and popular among all social classes by the beginning of the XXth century. According to Ruane, there were two periods in the history of fashion press in Russia. In the first period (1830-1870), the fashion press mostly appealed to the upper classes. In the second period (1870-1917), fashion magazines became available for the middle class and even for the lower strata of Russian society. This second period witnessed the arrival of modern fashion magazines. In the first period magazines reported fashions in both Paris and St. Petersburg, whereas in the second period they only covered Paris fashion and omitted...
fashion in Russia. This made female consumers feel as if they were on an equal footing with 
women in Western Europe (p. 88).

The fashion retail trade was also an important part of the fashion industry. In general, 
Russian retail development followed the European pattern. After Peter the Great’s sartorial 
revolution, European tailors and dressmakers created shopping districts in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, and later in Russia’s other big cities. Ruane provides a classification of the 
forms of the fashion retail trade that existed in Russia. She also describes two forms of 
shopping - ‘Russian’ and ‘Western’ - which were attached to particular forms of the fashion 
retail trade. If Western shopping was cold and formal, Russian shopping was informal, with 
frequent heated exchanges between customers and clerks arguing over prices (p. 126). The 
Russian shopping style was inherent to open-air markets, trading rows, and fairs, whereas 
Western style was intrinsic to fashion specialty stores, boutiques, and department stores, the 
latter being introduced in 1860. What was considered Russian was not obviously inherent 
exclusively to the Russian retail trade; these names came from a cultural debate on the 
meaning of westernization in Russia (p. 126). According to this debate, Western style was 
considered modern and fashionable, which is why Russians entrepreneurs used to mimic this 
style through various strategies, for instance, by giving their shops foreign names.

The Empire’s New Clothes does not just cover the history of the fashion industry and 
retail trade. It embraces the field of fashion in a broader sociological way by exploring its 
connections to issues of identity: gender, class, ethnicity, locality, and citizenship. For 
instance, in her thoughtful analysis Ruane explains how needlework changed its gender 
associations and became the quintessential work of women. In the XVIII-XIXth centuries 
tailoring and dressmaking skills were taught through a system of apprenticeship. During this 
period both sexes were involved in this job, although, by the end of the XIX century sewing 
had come to signify women’s work. The number of women involved in this trade grew due 
to the fact that sewing had become a fundamental part of women’s education for both noble 
and commoner girls. The system of skill acquisition that had been formed in the master — 
apprentice relationship, was broken. As Ruane points out, what used to be ‘skilled’ work 
became ‘unskilled’ (p. 65). As a result, with the growth in the number of women involved, 
this work lost its former status.

On the one hand, sewing lost its former respect. On the other hand, paradoxically, it 
acquired another social meaning and became an emancipatory practice for educated women 
in Russia. The domestic ideology of the XIXth century prescribed two major roles for a 
woman — to be a wife and a mother. Activists for emancipation, the first Russian female 
economist Maria Nikolaevna Vernadskaia among them, suggested broadening this set of 
roles through sewing, which could help educated women enter the paid labor force. 
Vernadskaia encouraged upper-class women to seek employment as artisans, that is, work 
traditionally performed by commoner women. According to Vernadskaia, the more upper-
class women became involved in sewing, the higher the status of this work would be. Ruane then emphasizes the flaws and difficulties in Vernadskai’a’s scheme. This scheme legitimized sewing as women’s work rather than questioning the gender hierarchy of various types of work. However, these ideas did not become part of real life, at least, not until the Revolution of 1917 with its championing of emancipation.

Thus, *The Empire’s New Clothes* is a book that explores what is regarded as a phantom, namely, the fashion industry in Russia and demonstrates decisively that in fact it was not a phantom after all. Looking at the history of the fashion industry in Russia, Ruane’s book provides the reader with lots of thought-provoking arguments on various issues related to fashion in Imperial Russia, from the story of Singer’s sewing machine to dress as a form of social protest and to Lev Bakst’s design. The fashion industry is considered to be a set of cultural, economic, and social institutions that create a certain type of fashion, which, in turn, reflects and forms particular identities. It also creates a national identity and a sense of Russianness. According to Ruane’s book, it is clear that foreigners helped to create Russia’s domestic fashion industry (p. 223). At the same time, a French corset still stifled a Russian heart (p. 152). This book, which is well worth reading, illustrates these intricate relationships of the fashion industry and its symbolic meanings in a clear, thoughtful, and sophisticated way.

Reviewed by Raymond Miller
Bowdoin College, Brunswick, ME USA
rmiller@bowdoin.edu

This fascinating book is many things: social criticism, post-Soviet cultural history, philosophical treatise, and often brilliant literary analysis. While it focuses primarily on Russian issues, it also offers trenchant observations on contemporary Western pop culture and various Western authors. At its core are the dual contentions that nightmare is at the heart of a “Gothic aesthetic” that permeates modern culture; and that the center of the Gothic aesthetic par excellence is contemporary Russian, where “the hidden work of deformed memory … results in transformations of values, customs and social relations …”.

Dina Khapaeva is a fellow at the Helsinki Collegeum for Advanced Studies at the University of Helsinki. She has been developing her theory of the Gothic aesthetic for several years now, most notably in the book “Àê ñèæåìè â íàé áòî äîéí â èí ò ñèæåìè íà áòàáí” [Gothic society: the morphology of nightmare] (2007), and the article “History without memory. Gothic morality in post-Soviet society” (Eurozine, 2009-02-02; see http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2009-02-02-khapaeva-en.html; all the quotes above and below are from this article, unless otherwise noted). At the root of her analysis are disturbing data from sociological surveys that show that a majority of Russians still admire Stalin and believe that the Russian people bear no responsibility for the crimes committed under the Soviets. She states her main thesis explicitly at the very beginning of “History without memory”:

Post-Soviet society is seriously ill with a partial amnesia that makes its historical memory strangely selective … There is no intellectual or political force that would make post-Soviet society face the issue of historical responsibility. The Soviet past is a history without a memory.

From here, Khapaeva elaborates her theory that Russia is a “Gothic society”, in which “personal loyalty to superiors and respect for hierarchy constitute [the] most important and only uncontested law.” Then she takes the bold, provocative step of connecting all this with contemporary popular culture, arguing that “the witches and werewolves of post-Soviet fantasy fiction embody the morality of a society in denial about its criminal past.” It is this that Khapaeva calls the “Gothic aesthetic”, and she ties these Russian phenomena to a broader crisis she sees in contemporary Western culture as a whole.
“Êîø ô ì àð” can be seen as a book-length expansion of a brief section in the middle of her 2007 book. In this new volume, Khapaeva patiently develops her conception of nightmare as the main component of the Gothic aesthetic, as she treats the theme in the work of five very different writers from the 19th and 20th centuries. (See below.) These analyses comprise Part I, “Êîø ô ì àð êëøðàðàòóðû”, which, in turn, forms the 240-page heart of the book; Part II (“Êîø ô ì àð ëóëüòóðû”) runs only 37 pages and thus strikes the reader as an extended coda. Similarly, the space allotted to the different writers varies widely: over 100 pages are devoted to Dostoevsky (primarily to three of his early, shorter works: “Áâî éé êê”, “Áê ìï ì ëí ë ñàðëèí”, and “Óê çîëèé”), while Gogol (the Petersburg tales of 1835-36) is given 58; the rest (Viktor Pelevin, H. P. Lovecraft, and Thomas Mann) each get less than 30.

At first glance, this selection of writers might strike the reader as curious, as will the order in which Khapaeva treats them — Gogol, Pelevin, Lovecraft, Dostoevsky, Mann. However, as she makes quite clear, she has a specific definition of “nightmare”, and each author embodies a particular aspect of it. Thus, she is striving, as it were, to provide the reader with a holistic picture of what she means by the term. In brief, this is what each writer brings to her analysis: Gogol, for her, is “the source” of literary nightmare; he performs experiments on his readers’ consciousness in order to test the borders between “literary reality” and the reality of life, and between both of these and nightmare. Pelevin is Gogol’s modern successor, playing with his readers’ minds, but taking away their chance to contrast nightmare with reality. Lovecraft deals with our “enjoyment of nightmare” and its combination of the horrible and the sublime: Khapaeva sees this “passive, hedonistic craving for nightmare” as an important element in the contemporary Gothic aesthetic. Dostoevsky, meanwhile, explores the inexpressibility of nightmare in words, and from here its connection with madness. Finally, Mann interrogates the timelessness of nightmare and thus the connection between dreams and prophecy. (Of course, each writer treats more than one of these factors to some extent, and it is best to see each section of the book as part of a descriptive whole.) What interests Khapaeva in particular in all of this is the boundary between nightmare and reality, which each of these writers plays with in his own way: e.g., “… when, under the pressure of a nightmare’s emotions, which reason cannot express in words, the contrast between word and feeling becomes insolubly acute … and nightmare materializes in reality” (“Êîø ô ì àð”, 234). This permeable border is what allows for the Gothic aesthetic in modern pop culture — and what connects it with the historical amnesia Khapaeva sees in contemporary Russian society.

It is no exaggeration to call these frequently superb chapters an intellectual feast. Khapaeva has a vigorous, readable style that invites the reader in to wrestle with the profound issues she discusses. (Indeed, she often presents her views in the form of rhetorical questions, rather than declarations.) Meanwhile, she ranges widely over the intellectual
landscape of the 19th and 20th centuries. Among the important thinkers she engages are Albert Einstein, Michel Foucault, and Immanuel Kant; among the other writers who make cameo appearances are Leo Tolstoy, J. R. R. Tolkien, and Charles Maturin. (Both of these lists just scratch the surface.) Particularly fascinating to this scientifically challenged reader was Khapaeva’s argument that modern cultural treatments of nightmare (and thus her Gothic aesthetic) are directly connected with developments in modern physics and theories of time.

However, all this gives one a sense of how idiosyncratic Khapaeva’s definition of nightmare is. In her view, nightmares are always timeless and can never be expressed in words; in them, we lose a sense of what is real and what is not, but we often enjoy the scary thrills they give us. Other elements that she sees as sine qua non for nightmare include feelings of being pursued, vertigo, and (self-) hypnosis. She never cites any hard psychological research on dreams, however, and one cannot shake the feeling that there might be more to bad dreams than this. (Offhand, I could mention frustration dreams, which fall in the nightmare range and can boast of a superb literary advocate in Franz Kafka; neither is mentioned in “Êîøì à òëî”, however.)

Readers might also take issue with Khapaeva’s all-but-directly-stated assumption that nightmare — as defined by her — is virtually the only thing going on in these writings. I, for one, have a hard time believing that in his Petersburg tales Gogol was knowingly conducting a “psychological experiment on the reader’s consciousness which pursued very definite extra-literary ends” (“Êîøì ø î àð”, 20), or that these works are to be defined primarily as an “investigation of nightmare … conducted in order to find out how ‘terrible reality’ can break through from literature into life, from life into literature, from reality [ýàëû] into nightmare, and from nightmare into reality” (ibid., 47). If Gogol were here, such declarations would surely surprise (and shock, and appall) him! It is one thing to compare “Í î íî” to postmodernist literature (see ibid., 81); it is something else to assume that Gogol actually thought like a postmodernist himself. And such single-mindedness, of course, ignores decades of analysis in which nightmare is treated as but one element in Gogol’s art.

A different kind of problem is that the reader who is not familiar with Khapaeva’s critique of Putin’s Russia will have a hard time connecting this challenging literary/intellectual analysis with her concepts of “Gothic society” and “history without memory” in the post-Soviet context. From time to time she refers to them in this book, but does not develop them anywhere near as thoroughly as she does in the earlier works that bear these phrases in their titles. I would suggest reading “Êîøì ø î àð” in conjunction with these other writings in order to get the full effect of her views.

These shortcomings aside, Dina Khapaeva has contributed much to our understanding of these writers, especially Gogol (making allowance for the problems discussed above), and Dostoevsky. The long section on the latter can be seen as the centerpiece of the book: her treatment of “The Double”, in particular, should inform Dostoevskian scholarship from now
on; her scathing critique of Bakhtin, too, is bracing, and will invite debate. And her
discussion of Ivan Karamazov’s devil makes me hope she will tackle the vivid nightmares
in Dostoevsky’s great novels in the future.

Reviewed by Ellen Knutson
Northwestern University
e-knutson@northwestern.edu

The essays included in this volume originated at two events at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign -- a seminar entitled “Prostranstvo knigi: The Space of the Book in the Imperial Russian Social Imagination” and the 2006 Ralph and Ruth Fisher Forum entitled “Book Arts, Culture and Media in Russia, East Europe and Eurasia: From Print to Digital.” The volume shows the variety of recent scholarship on Russian print culture in Imperial Russia, Soviet Russia and post-Soviet Russia. The essays utilize a variety of methodologies and are organized around the following broad themes: commercialization and social engagement, plurality of reading communities and their social status, community intersections and appropriations, reader response, and censorship and communication strategies.

According to the editor, Miranda Remnek, the book has two goals 1) to highlight current research in Russian book studies and 2) to attract younger scholars to the field. Remnek’s tactic for achieving the second goal, attracting younger scholars to the field, is to preface each chapter with an editor’s note. Within each note she discusses ways the research could be expanded or enhanced through tools available to digital humanities scholars such as TEI and GIS. Presumably she is making the assumption that using digital technology to explore print culture is a way to attract younger scholars. We will have to wait to see how well the volume achieves that goal. However, I can report that the first goal was achieved. Taken as a whole the volume gives a broad overview of the current scholarly landscape of Russian print culture. Additionally, each chapter stands well on its own for readers who are interested in a particular time period or methodology.

The first two chapters concentrate on the first theme: commercialization and social engagement. Lina Bernstein examines the literature that was aimed at merchants in the eighteenth century. It is a straight ahead historical treatment about the books that were published for the merchant class and the topics they covered. Bernstein focuses on “the rapid growth in the second half of the eighteenth century ... of specialized literature on trade ethics and practices” (30). She posits that the books not only offer practical advice to merchants but also give a portrait of the social role that merchants should play in Russia. George Gutsche writes the other chapter in the first theme, but takes a social historian perspective and outlines the work of a single bookseller, Aleksandr Smirdin. Gutsche
describes one dinner party that Smirdin hosted while he was at the height of his career, using it as a snapshot of the players and relationships that made up Russian print culture in the early 1830s.

Joseph Peschio and Igor’ Pil’shchikov addresses the book’s second theme: the plurality of reading communities and their social status in their study of Pushkin and Baratynskii’s use of quotes and allusions to other authors as a way to divide their audiences. Peschio and Pil’shchikov’s best guess as to why Pushkin and Baratynskii chose to fragment their readership may have been a reaction to the growth in readership and a desire to keep an in-group of elite readers in their circle. Ben Eklov uses social and quantitative history, rather than literary criticism, to flesh out the question of the plurality of reading communities in his study of the rural libraries in late Imperial Russia. Contrary to claims at the eve of World War I that libraries did not exist in the countryside, Eklov documents that libraries did exist but that their collections may not have been appropriate for remodeling the peasant child as a new Soviet citizen. This section is rounded out by Leonid Borodkin and Evgeny Chugunov’s study of workers’ reading habits, which also relies on quantitative data from zemstvo publications, library catalogs and archival materials. They detail the rise of reading culture among Russian workers at the end of nineteenth century.

The third theme in this volume, community intersections and appropriation, contains two chapters that both work with visual and textual analysis. Kevin M. Kain examines the way that Old Believers responded to increase and diversification of Russian reading culture in the second half of the nineteenth century. He accomplishes this through an analysis of the writing and accompanying images of Istoriia o patriarkhe Nikone. He shows that rather than the Old Believer text being a closed system, it did respond and react to the “movement of ideas that flowed across confessional lines” (188). Similarly, Jeffrey Brooks utilizes visual and literary analysis to illuminate the moral imperatives and ethical dilemmas in late Imperial and early Soviet Russia. He discusses the popular engravings, lubki, that dealt with both religious and secular themes, as well as popular magazines and fiction, and posits that the questions of how to lead a moral and ethical life ran deep throughout these publications and prints.

Stephen Lovell addresses the fourth theme in the book, reader response, in his treatment of the types of books Russians were reading during the Soviet period and on into the post-Soviet era. He argues that even during the time books were highly politicized the social historian can still glean a lot of information about the desires of the reading public. The next chapter takes a much narrower perspective from Lovell’s broad picture of reading culture. Anne Fisher, instead, focuses on two authors (who wrote as a team), Il’ia Il’f and Evgenii Petrov. Furthermore, rather than focusing on the text itself, Fisher examines the peretexts, in this case primarily the forwards of various editions of Il’f and Petrov’s Ostap Bender novels.
The final chapter of the volume, was originally the keynote address to the 2006 Ralph and Ruth Fisher Forum. Therefore, Marianna Tax Choldin’s review of censorship in the media in the post-Soviet era has a slightly different feel and format than the other papers collected in this book. Tax Choldin examines entries from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s *Media Matters* to document the openings and closings of the Russian media during the first half of the 2000’s. Remnek treats it as a kind of epilogue to the volume.

*The Space of the Book* demonstrates the breadth of topics and methodologies that are currently employed in the scholarship around print culture in Russia. It comes as little surprise that the studies of Imperial Russia figure prominently in the book, as one of the two events that the papers were drawn from also focused on reading culture in Imperial Russia. However, scholars of the Soviet period and to a lesser extent the post-Soviet era will find something of note in this volume. Equally as important as the topics covered, are the range of methodologies employed in the scholarship, from cultural history to literary criticism to the cultural history images. Most notably missing was a study by a digital humanist. As mentioned before, Remnek tried to make up for this lack by discussing in her editor’s notes before each chapter ways that digital tools could be used to further scholarship in this field.

Reviewed by Katerina Tsetsura,
Gaylord College of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Oklahoma
tsetsura@ou.edu

*Mezhpokolencheskaya kommunikatsiya* (translated as *Intergenerational Communication*), published in Russian (with a summary in English) in 2008 by the publishing house Librokom, is a timely volume that presents a series of research studies conducted in Russia and in the Russian context on intergenerational communication. The book can serve as a textbook, but it might be best described as a monograph that accumulates years of research that has been conducted by the author, Yuriy Romanov, an associate professor of Russian at the University of Colorado-Boulder. Romanov approaches the investigation of this topic from two perspectives: communication and sociolinguistics. I appreciate this dual approach because of the increasingly large number of research studies about intergenerational communication (and Romanov cited many of these communication studies extensively). At the same time, a sociolinguistic perspective brings an additional dimension and adds flavor to what otherwise could have been just another research project on the differences in communication patterns between and among generations.

The book presents a solid overview of many previous studies of intergenerational communication that were conducted and published in Russian (on pages 48-50, for instance). This makes the book a useful resource, and it would be safe to say that this book is the first comprehensive attempt to address the issue of intergenerational communication in the Russian context. The book aggregates much of the previous research, Russian and Western, on the subject as it relates to the Russian environment. And, to my knowledge, this is the first scholarly volume about the topic published in the Russian language.

The book demands readers’ attention and involvement as it is a true idea generator, and the attentive reader will find many ideas worth pursuing in future intergenerational communication research in the Russian and other cultural contexts. The author introduces many interesting, sometimes provocative, ideas and invites readers to continue thinking and exploring intergenerational communication beyond our traditional view on the subject. For example, Romanov defines intergenerational communication beyond age, which expands a traditional understanding of intergenerational communication and offers readers a way to look at the problems in communication between generations. I only wish the author would have provided more evidence to show how intergenerational communication is defined and manifested beyond age, generation, and cohort because many studies presented in the book
still deal with describing and analyzing differences only in communication between the elderly and the young.

The volume is structured as a series of research studies that the author has conducted in different Russian cities throughout the years. Some of the book’s six chapters can be characterized as previous literature review and critique (Chapters 1 and 2), and others present original research by the author (Chapters 3 and 4). Chapter 5 offers an extensive analysis of intergenerational communication in the familial setting and presents a fascinating sociolinguistic analysis of famous Russian literary texts of the 19th Century to illustrate the particularities of Russian familial communication. Romanov skillfully intertwines examples from Russian literature and previous scholarly investigations with examples from his own research to exhibit how communication between parents and children in Russia has changed (or not changed) over the years.

Empirical studies were performed in a variety of settings and among not only different age groups, but also among various Russian professional groups. Populations included students of various universities in Russia (I appreciate that the author made an effort to collect data from outside Moscow), different-age groups of ordinary Russian families, faculty, and researchers of different disciplinary backgrounds, including those from the natural sciences.

Many of these studies, however, are descriptive and investigative in nature. Some readers might find the methodologies of these studies problematic; particularly, they lack clear descriptions of sampling procedures and data analyses (see, for instance, pages 79 and 108). I wish the author had provided detailed explanations of sampling procedures for some studies, particularly those in which results are intended to provide analysis beyond description (such as a study of the self-evaluation of communicative behaviors among different age groups of Russians in Chapter 3 and the study of uses and understanding of the ecclesiastical lexicon in Chapter 4).

Nevertheless, many of these studies, although exploratory in nature, offer a revealing account of communicative norms among Russians of different generations as well as from cohorts in a variety of settings. One such study, described in Chapter 6, investigates the communication deficit that elderly Russians experience in everyday contexts, and it outlines possibilities for reducing this deficit. In fact, Romanov discusses in detail how the communicative problems of the elderly are addressed in different parts of the world, concentrating on the experiences in Russia and in the USA. The author also offers a comprehensive analysis of educational experiences of the elderly who had participated in the intergenerational communication programs he himself had set up as part of the study abroad experience for his students.

The author often draws on examples from his family and his own personal experiences to describe concepts and illustrate points. On pages 38-39, for instance, Romanov provides
a thorough account of his father’s research and discusses how his father views the importance of being an unselfish scientist to explain how thinking about work and scientific endeavors has changed among Russians throughout the years and how this thinking might influence communication between older and younger Russians. On page 62, Romanov shares the family story about his great-grandparents’ first casino experience (his great-grandmother bet on black in the roulette, and his great-grandfather immediately bet on red so the family’s budget would remain unchanged). He also provides a detailed explanation of his family members’ painful self-disclosures and the narratives of elders to illustrate how members of Russian families engage in intergenerational communication to achieve a balance in their relations, maintaining comfortable closeness while preserving some distance (see pages 192-197).

Such detailed descriptions make this otherwise scholarly volume come alive. They connect the author with his readers and make this book an interesting and enjoyable read. What is more important, Romanov’s personal accounts provide insight into the importance of studying intergenerational communication and offer a good example of how academic research connects with ordinary people and informs our lives. These personal accounts also allow us to reflect on our own families and to make us realize that the problems of intergenerational communication, so deftly described by the author, are very similar to the ones of other families in different cultural contexts.

In sum, despite some deficiencies, this book is an important read for anyone who is interested in researching intergenerational communication in the Russian context as well as in the broader post-Soviet environment.

Reviewed by Anthony Flinn
Eastern Washington University
aflinn@ewu.edu

Irkingly, *Exotic Moscow Under Western Eyes* describes neither an exotic Moscow nor a Western gaze upon it. Moreover, however modest its production resources, the Academic Studies Press did not exhaust them in cover design, page design, or any other production elements for this book. Judging this book by its garish, misleading cover and other surface qualities would surely mean returning it to the box it came in.

But fortunately, just as the book’s title bears no substantial relation to its core subject matter, so the book’s production values are no indication of its scholarly value. *Exotic Moscow* is in fact a wonderful book: a collection of essays that are uniformly erudite and lucidly written, precisely and closely argued, wide-ranging yet (nearly) coherent as a collection. Though the book’s essays were written over a period of many years, most are pulled together by two threads of a dynamic struggle based in the social, cultural, and economic disparities in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Russia. Religious figures, aesthetes, peasant warriors, social and political revolutionaries, the bourgeois, and the wealthy, all struggle for the soul of Russia — and thus their own souls — typically imaged as a beautiful young woman treated as quarry, prize, or victim to be rescued. Masing-Delic steers us through the works of writers from Pushkin to Gorky, with side visits to Austen and Conrad for comparative emphases.

Masing-Delic calls the warring elements of this struggle Civilization, Culture, and Barbarism. Briefly, “Culture” is a national condition dreamed of and aestheticized by Russian literati and other intellectuals to regenerate the energy, purpose, and fundamental morality of the Russian character. In lieu of a vital Culture to nourish the spirit, there lay only, on the one hand the dissipations of a westernized “Civilization,” and on the other, the thuggish illiterate anger of the peasantry and the urban poor, “Barbarism.” Civilization is sickly, dissipated, decadent, individualistic, devoid of all but Frenchified passions, sexually and politically corrupt. Barbarism is snarling, undisciplined, dangerous, animalistic, damaged by poverty and brutality, and frequently fanatical. “Culture” is a reconciling presence, a morally invested aesthetic, that organically engages both the elemental, often religious power of the narod and the idealism of the hyper-literate artist.

The book’s first essays focus on the struggle between Culture and Civilization. These essays, studies in comparative literature, construct parallel examinations of Western
European, mainly British works — *Emma* and *Under Western Eyes* — with *Oblomov* and *Crime and Punishment* respectively. The *Emma* — *Oblomov* essay is especially notable, examining the Pygmalion motif common to both books. In Emma Woodhouse’s case, it’s a shedding of the narcissistic veneer of personal consequence in “Civilization” to disclose a more generative presence that can accept the greater good of a morally and emotionally reciprocating “Culture.” Oblomov’s situation is more complicated; Olga attempts to inhabit Pygmalion to make Oblomov her Galatea, but she in turn is Galateaed by Shtolts. In essence, Masing-Delic describes “Culture” in terms of productive integration of the individual into both community and personal intimacy, and Civilization in terms of narcissism, isolation, and emotional sterility. She does not choose to evoke Huckleberry Finn, perhaps the greatest arbiter of the Civilization — Culture dispute, but her conclusions are clearly in keeping with his.

This first section of the book, while engaging, was to me less interesting than the second, Russian-focused section, perhaps because the former’s subject matter seemed but partially treated. That is, in Masing-Delic’s efforts to have the European and Russian novels “enter into dialogue with” each other (38), the points of intersection rise in consequence above the distinctness of the texts themselves, leaving a felt absence of references to other works on similar topics. For instance, Masing-Delic’s excellent opening essay on the role of Nietzsche’s Apollo and Dionysus and Turgenev’s “Song of Triumphant Love” left Lawrence’s treatment of the same tale, “The Ladybird,” not only unexamined but unreferred to. Her account of the Turgenev tale’s use of Nietzsche’s trope, though astute, principally re-cements the long-established links between Turgenev’s work and western European traditions. A more interesting use of her erudition would have been to explore the comparative use of the Apollo/Dionysus vision in a range of Russian and European works. That, of course, would have been another book, but it would have been worth it.

The Russian section — the core, the large beating heart of the book — pounds through the 19th and 20th centuries from Pushkin and Dostoevsky to Pasternak and Nabokov. In these chapters, two intertwined concerns drive each. In the ultimately and invariably destructive collision of Barbarism, Culture, and Civilization, the soul of Russia, and thus the promise of “Culture,” is figured by a beautiful, vulnerable, often difficult woman — Masha Mironova, Nastasya Filipovna, and Lara, for example. The woman is pursued by an artist-idealist (Petrusha Grinyov, Prince Myshkin, Yuri Zhivago), representing Civilization in pursuit of redemption. The third, brutish element, also in pursuit or control of the “Russian Beauty,” is either a Barbaric member of the narod (Pugachev, Rogozhin), or a corrupt manipulator of the narod, like the “civilized” Komarovsky. This dynamic, tragic triangle is simultaneously a working of a religio-utopian vision, a projection of Russia’s history and destiny, and a Hegelian gift to the world of itself in which all is reconciled with all (113). But always hovering wolf-like in the background is corruption, from both internal and
external sources, persistently threatening efforts at generative synthesis. Internal corruption of the Russian soul emerges from a weakness of will in either the “Russian Beauty” or the artist-idealist, or in external corruption from either Western Europe or, for Alexander Blok, the East, in his notion of the “Asiatic.”

The troubling issue that Masing-Delic’s work discloses but does not discuss, though, is that for many of these writers, the idea of a generative unity of Civilization, Barbarism, and Culture requires exclusion, or purging, of socio-ethnic elements deemed insufficiently pure, insufficiently Russian in the cultural sense. That this integration requires exclusion, while not necessarily a deconstruction, is at least ironic. The irony is redoubled in the fact that this purging of the impure or corrupt, while an elemental vitality is drawn into a renewed Culture, was an ongoing part of the Modernist project in both Western Europe and the United States. Hieratic contemporaries of Blok, for instance, like T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, W.B. Yeats, and D.H. Lawrence, all sought ahistorical sources of cultural strength while trying to purge vestiges of ethnic or religious mixing. In a sense, to inhabit Russianness, or Northern European Christianity, or any other “pure” cultural identity, is to be like the very Other being expelled.

Masing-Delic’s final essay, which gives the book its title, is a study of Valery Briusov’s “early urban poetry.” Her justification for including this “exotic Moscow” essay is that Briusov helps resolve the problem of civilization’s vitality by pressing the aesthete’s perspective. However, this is not a convincing rationale. Masing-Delic herself is modest in her claims for its linkage to the larger themes of the book: “[h]opefully, the articles form a thematically unified collection interacting with and complementing each other” (xviii). A greater candor about her premises would have been preferable. That is, implicit in the final essay, and beneath the dynamic struggle of Barbarism-Civilization-Culture, is the claim that, no matter what, the writer/aesthete is ultimately the one with the moral and spiritual authority. It’s a fixed game: whatever vitality her subjects try to draw from the barbaric and the civilized, writers and artists win simply by the nature of their projects. Everyone else is corrupt, weak, or brutish.

All these quibbles aside, including Masing-Delic’s disinclination to revise the Russian section to include comparative studies of such modernist Europeans as Lawrence and Yeats — admittedly, it would have taken more than a few Sunday afternoons to do so — Exotic Moscow verges on brilliant, probably the best version of the book she intended to assemble.