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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

IGOR E. KLYUKANOV

When we examine communication and choose a research method for our investigation, we often forget that there is an intimate connection between our object of study and our life, our subjectivity. The way to explaining how and understanding why we communicate the way(s) we do — the method to our sanity and madness — is not simply a stretch lying between the starting point and the goal. As Martin Heidegger reminds us in his Sojourns: The Journey to Greece (2005, p. 60), “The Greek μένος does not refer to the ‘procedure’ [Verfahren] of an inquiry but rather is this inquiry itself as remaining-on-the-way”. Thus, no object can be made to say anything that we want it to say, and neither does it ever lie; it simply reveals itself to those who — ideally — become one with it, not so much being-on-the-way as being-the-way-itself.

And so we plunge (or rather are plunged) into the flux which is our life, longing to become (a part of) the world even as everything melts: communication is a process where/when every one/every thing strives to be-long. But, we tend to forget how everything seemed to be when we first set out on our pathway towards the unity with the Universe. As James Luchte notes in his Pythagoras and the Doctrine of Transmigration (2009, p. 7), “existence and eschatology are separated only by forgetfulness”. The author goes on to remind us of the two types of Pythagorean students — akousmatikoi (‘hearers’) and mathematikoi (‘mathematicians’). For the former the most difficult thing to learn was to be silent, while for the latter number lay at the heart of their doctrine. The former gathered in a community of praxis and were attuned with the Kosmos, while the latter were trained in the general sciences. It is difficult to say whether the opposition between akousmatikoi and mathematikoi led to the Continental-Analytic divide, but more and more often, our ability to hear the voice of Being is disappearing into the fog of oblivion, and the waters of Mnemosyne seem to be drying up. We are fascinated with the magic of machines, and yet, in the words of Jean Greisch, today many palaces of memoria artificiosa are but empty

Igor E. Klyukanov is a professor of communication studies at Eastern Washington University, USA, and is editor of Russian Journal of Communication (iklyukanov@ewu.edu).
fortresses (*Trace and Forgetting: Between the Threat of Erasure and the Persistence of the Unerasable*, 2004, p. 85).

To make those fortresses livable and our theoretical investigations viable, we must fill them with our spirit, breathing life into our every action. As James Luchte remarks, “it takes the work of cultivation to remember one’s own greater soul” (p. 8). Whatever object we decide to look into — be it language, a news story, tobacco, the past — we come closer and closer to understanding them as well as ourselves. For that reason, hermeneutics cannot not be double; and yet, we are often reluctant to go down — or rather become — the path of radical self-reflection. Instead, we rush where we should be treading lightly or — better yet — stop and listen. That is how we forget to remember.

Every article and review in the present issue is an attempt at unforgetting, a step in the cultivation of our common ground. Their authors do their best to shed light on why people crave freedom and curb it; or why they look at the Other with curiosity and suspicion; or why imagination takes them to the depths of detestation and the heights of humanity. Or why Peirce’s second wife, Juliette Froissy, dramatically changed the course of his life as well as his semiotic theory. It seems that the course of communication is always changed by the woman, and so in a way whatever we look for in our studies we look for the woman — that ever-present and ever-elusive *Chora*. For, as Luce Irigaray so beautifully says in *The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger* “what has been forgotten is that ‘perfect roundness’ where to be and to think are the same” (1999, p. 10). And so we continue our search for that “present perfect” where and when silence and science, Self and the Other, *theoria* (thought) and *praxis* (bios) are the same, One.
HERMENEUTICS AND PREJUDICE: HEIDEGGER AND GADAMER IN THEIR HISTORICAL SETTING

Dmitri N. Shalin

This is an inquiry into the paradoxes of ontological and phenomenological hermeneutics whose founders called for radical self-reflection but failed to recognize the intellectual debt their theories owed to the historical tradition within which they were articulated. My thesis is that (a) Heidegger's and Gadamer's early views fed off the affective-political currents of the Weimar and Hitler Germany, that (b) both authors systematically misinterpreted their Nazi era discursive-affective-performative corpus, and that (c) the hermeneutics of prejudice grounded on Heidegger's fundamental ontology lacks the theoretical tools for hermeneutic critique and self-reflection insofar as it privileges language as a medium of interpretation.

Keywords: Heidegger, Gadamer, hermeneutics, pragmatism, biocritique

Even a master of the historical method is not able to keep himself entirely free from the prejudices of his time, his social environment and his national situation. –Hans-Georg Gadamer

[A]uthentic historicality, as the moment of vision of anticipatory repetition, deprives the “today” of its character as present, and weans one from the conventionalities of the “they.” –Martin Heidegger

Dmitri N. Shalin is a professor of sociology, director of the Center for Democratic Culture and coordinator of Justice & Democracy Forum series at the University of Nevada in Las Vegas (shalin@unlv.nevada.edu). Presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, this paper is an early example of the research program of biocritical hermeneutics (See Shalin 1999, 2001, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2010a, 2010b). The 14 theses on biocritical hermeneutics are posted on the website of the International Biography Initiative (http://www.unlv.edu/centers/cdclv/archives/articles/shalin_bh_theses.html).
Radical historicity is the hallmark of ontological hermeneutics. As Martin Heidegger argued in his ground-breaking work *Being and Time* (BT), all understanding is circumscribed by its time, drenched in its distinctive moods that form affective horizons no inquirer can shake by recourse to a scientific method or an empathetic identification with the past. Hans-Georg Gadamer built on this premise a kindred brand of philosophical hermeneutics put forward in his magnum opus *Truth and Method* (TM) which urges scholars engaged in historical research to use their encounters with the past as an opportunity to reflect critically on their historical situation. This radically historical outlook that tethers understanding to age-bound prejudices has engendered a fruitful line of inquiry (Hans, 1997; Jost & Hide, 1997; Michelfelder & Palmer, 1989; Ferry & Renaut, 1988; Shalin, 1986b). It also raised a host of issues that exposed ontological hermeneutics to epistemological and sociological critique (Adorno, 1973; Farias, 1989; Habermas, 1987; 1990; Safranski, 1998; Shalin, 1992b; Wolin, 1991; Wolin, 2000). Particularly intriguing is the charge that Heidegger and Gadamer have failed to come to terms with their own historical situation and give a convincing account of their political engagements during the Nazi era.

This paper is an inquiry into the paradoxes of ontological and phenomenological hermeneutics whose founders called for radical self-reflection but failed to recognize the intellectual debt their theories owed to the historical tradition within which they were articulated. My thesis is that (a) Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s early views fed off the affective-political currents of the Weimar and Hitler Germany, that (b) both authors systematically misinterpreted their Nazi era discursive-affective-performative corpus, and that (c) the hermeneutics of prejudice grounded on Heidegger’s fundamental ontology lacks the theoretical tools for hermeneutic critique and self-reflection insofar as it privileges language as a medium of interpretation. In my critique, I follow the line of inquiry developed in American pragmatism (Joas, 1985, 1996; Rochberg-Halton, 1986; Kilpinen, 2000; Shalin 1986a, 1992a; 2001). The concluding section outlines pragmatist hermeneutics as an alternative to the depth hermeneutics based on the phenomenological tradition.

**Heidegger’s Early Project**

Heidegger starts with an unassailable premise that well before researchers take up their problems and commence a historical inquiry they have been thoroughly steeped in the sentiments, commonplaces, and political currents of their time. The human agent’s historical being — Dasein — is constituted by the pervasive structures of everyday life, which Heidegger identifies by the German expression “das Man,” commonly translated as “they” or the “they-mode,” that refers to the impersonal, taken for granted, unreflexive attitudes informing the agent’s perspective on the world. The most intimate knowledge of the self is
colored by the horizon-forming attitudes that enable the agent to see some things just as they blind it to the things obscured by the regnant prejudices:

But the self of everydayness is the ‘they.’ The ‘they’ is constituted by the way things have been publicly interpreted, which expresses itself in idle talk. ... Proximately and for the most part the Self is lost in the ‘they.’ It understands itself in terms of those possibilities of existence which ‘circulate’ in the ‘average’ public way of interpreting Dasein today (Heidegger, 1927, p. 296, 435).

What makes Heidegger’s early formulations intriguing from the pragmatist standpoint is that he does not privilege reason and logic in the business of understanding, rather, he traces interpretive knowledge to affect and practical activity. This perspective, which will be supplanted in Heidegger’s later work with the increasing emphasis on language, ties understanding to emotionally-charged everyday affairs like minding a business, chatting with a neighbor, answering a threat, or simply feeling bored. The world surrounding us on all fronts is made of “ready-to-hand things” whose being is determined by our mundane purposes, objects like “equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement” (Heidegger, 1927, p. 97). Such ready-to-hand things are tinged with an affective halo disclosing an object’s relevance to our everyday existence. Well before the human agent appropriates conventional beliefs, it finds itself submerged in the dominant mood of the era, in what Heidegger calls “ontic states of mind,” which furrow our understanding and interpretation. The world to which we belong becomes part of ourselves through dominant sentiments imbibed in formative years. Everyday moods tend to be misconstrued as private states, but in reality they belong to and disclose themselves within the historical world we inhabit:

The dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted has already been decisive even for the possibility of having a mood — that is, for the basic way in which Dasein lets the world ‘matter’ to it. The ‘they’ prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and determines what and how one ‘sees’. ... Indeed from the ontological point of view we must as a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to ‘bare moods’ (Heidegger, 1927, p. 213, 177).

Everyday affects are fickle; they change from situation to situation in a seemingly haphazard fashion, yet this very unsteadiness is a sure indicator of what matters to those inhabiting a given social niche. The historical Dasein of group members remains attuned to Being as long as it follows prevailing moods. “It is precisely when we see the ‘world’ unsteady and fitfully in accordance with our moods, that the ready-to-hand shows itself in its specific moodhood, which is never the same from day to day,” points out Heidegger (Heidegger, 1927, p. 177). “By looking at the world theoretically, we have already dimmed
it down to the uniformity of what is purely present-at-hand. ... Yet even the purest *theoria*
[theory] has not left all moods behind it. ..."

Once the historical agent matures enough to adopt a theoretical perspective and
commence a historical investigation, it glosses over its constitutive moods and taken-for-
granted attitudes. Although moods tend to be “tranquilized” at this point, they never
disappear entirely. The most abstract research is rooted in attitudes privileged in a given era,
in prejudices informing the researcher’s judgment about problems “worth investigating,”
“interesting questions,” “problems at issue,” and so on. “Whenever something is interpreted
as something, the interpretation will be founded essentially upon fore-having, fore-sight, and
fore-conception. An interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something
presented to us” (Heidegger, 1927, p. 191-192). For as long as the knowing agent remains
oblivious to its presuppositions and moods, it persist as an “inauthentic, the they-self” whose
“existence is inauthentically historical, it is loaded down with the legacy of the ‘past’ which
has become unrecognizable” (Heidegger, 1927, p. 444).

If we are creatures of prejudices whose understanding feeds off preconceptions and
fore-sentiments, how can we escape the circle inherent in reasoning — the hermeneutical
circle that allows us to see only what accords with the present moods? How can we break
through this circularity that seemingly dooms us to inauthenticity? The answer Heidegger
offers to this predicament is counterintuitive. An authentic outlook on ourselves and history
does not require an emancipation from the present-day conventions as Schleiermacher and
Dilthey believed. Such a feat is neither possible nor desirable. “To deny the circle, to make
a secret of it, or even to want to overcome it, means finally to reinforce this failure. We must
rather endeavor to leap into the ‘circle’, primordially and wholly, so that even at the start of
the analysis of Dasein we make sure that we have a full view of Dasein’s circular Being”
(Heidegger, 1927, p. 363). Our goal, instead, should be habituating the circle, residing in it
in such a fashion that we can glean the innermost prejudices constituting our lifeworld and
stir our Dasein toward freely chosen ends, for “authentic existence is not something which
floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such
everydayness is seized” (Heidegger, 1927, p. 224). The result of this exercise would be an
existential illumination achieved through a phenomenological reduction, the kind that
Husserl counseled and that brings us back to things themselves experienced in their
primordial Being:

What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way. The
circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any random kind of knowledge may
move; it is the expression of the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself. It is not to be
reduced to the level of vicious circle, or even of a circle which is merely tolerated. In the
circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. To be
sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have
understood that our first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, foresight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves (Heidegger, 1927, p. 195).

The political implications of this philosophical stance were not evident at the time when *Being and Time* found its readers. A few hints sprinkled across some 500 pages of this existentialist manifesto called for a robust self-reflection, a willingness to make tough decisions, and a resolution to confront head-on the prevailing conventions. Somehow one had to embrace everydayness in all its unnumbered forms, albeit in a proper attitude of “sober anxiety” (Heidegger, 1927, p. 358) and the awareness of impending death distinguishing the authentic being in the world. An existentially purified Dasein comes to terms with its historical finitude, accepts its fallenness in the world, takes a firm hold of its moods, faces danger unflinchingly when called upon to act, and resolves to endure the world shorn of its smug certainties:

That which anxiety is anxious about is Being-in-the-world itself. In anxiety what is environmentally ready-to-hand sinks away, and so, in general, the entities within-the-world. ... Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the ‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted. ... Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its utmost Being-in-the world (Heidegger, 1927, p. 232).

**GADAMER’S STRUCTURAL HERMENEUTICS**

Hans-Georg Gadamer declined to follow Heidegger’s existential paradigm that seeks to redescribe objective reality in experiential terms and recover the radical singularity of individual existence, but he remained faithful to *Being and Time*’s central premise according to which humans are saturated with history-bound attitudes, stated and unstated, whose temporal imperatives they cannot evade. This is not a limitation, however, a deplorable condition we are doomed to suffer. According to Gadamer, prejudices informing our perspective need not be viewed as blinding and stultifying. Far from that — and this is where Gadamer parts company with his teacher who tended to equate everydayness with inauthenticity — tradition lends historical inquiry proper dignity, allows the researcher to shed new light on the past as well as reflect critically on the present. The hermeneutical task is not to devise an ingenuous strategy for getting around our prejudices as the Enlightenment rationalism would have it. The question is rather how to become conscious of the biases informing our inquiry, appropriate the tradition to which we belong, and apply consciously fore-understandings to the historical realities confronting the interpreter. To elaborate on
Gadamer, we can say that prejudice is an unacknowledged assumption, and assumption is an acknowledged prejudice.

The recognition that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice gives the hermeneutical problem its real thrust. By the light of this insight it appears that historicism, despite its critique of rationalism and of natural law philosophy, is based on the modern enlightenment and unknowingly shares its prejudices. And there is one prejudice of the enlightenment that is essential to it: the fundamental prejudice of the enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudice itself, which deprives tradition of its power (Gadamer, 1982, p. 239-240).

Gadamer positions hermeneutics as a universal discipline that forswears the goal of expunging prejudices from understanding via scientific method, dedicating itself to bridging the gap between traditions, or as he put it, achieving “the fusion of horizons” endemic to different historical epochs. By engaging in interpretive acts from within the tradition, the interpreter participates in its historical being, borrows from its stock of meaning, and perpetuates, as well as updates, its cherished prejudices constituting the historical formation’s lifeworld. While interpreting the past, we participate in the life of the tradition which never ceases to affect our existence even as it receives a continuous feedback from our interpretive efforts. This is what Gadamer calls “effective historical consciousness,” a consciousness that remains within the circle of understanding peculiar to the age yet subtly updates it in light of experience and encounters with alien traditions.

Tradition is not simply a precondition into which we come, but we produce it ourselves, inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition and hence further determine ourselves. Thus the circle of understanding is not a ‘methodological’ circle, but describes an ontological structural element in understanding (Gadamer, 1982, p. 261).

Thus, our prejudices are not sacrosanct, they are open to change. Moreover, they submit to adjudication. Rational investigation lets interpreters sort out what is tenable and what is not in our tradition: “True prejudices must still finally be justified by rational knowledge” (Gadamer, 1982, p. 242). Immersing ourselves in an alien tradition affords us an opportunity to reflect critically on our pre-understandings, with the historical distance itself stimulating self-reflection and self-criticism. “It is only this temporal distance that can solve the really critical question of hermeneutics, namely of distinguishing the true prejudices, by which we understand, from the false ones by which we misunderstand” (Gadamer, 1982, p. 266).

With this move, Gadamer gives hermeneutical inquiry a decidedly phenomenological thrust consistent with Husserl’s program of uncovering objective meanings in stable
linguistic forms inherent in a lifeworld. This agenda also dovetails with the structuralist movement that construes language as a universal medium through which humanity transmits its tradition as it searches for mutual understanding across space and time. Gadamer’s claims that “being that can be understood is language” (Gadamer, 1982, p. xxiii), that “it is literally more correct to say that language speaks us, rather than we speak it” (Gadamer, 1982, p. 421) — the claim taken over and further developed by Paul Ricoeur — should be understood in line with his general philosophical commitments. This view is also consistent with the precept Heidegger articulated in his later writings, according to which “language speaks” and the “being of anything that is resides in the word” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 129, 61-62). Hermeneutical inquiry is thereby redirected away from the authorial intent, biographical circumstances, and unique historical context that occasioned a given expression and towards close textual analysis of the universal meaning preserved in written documents surviving the test of time:

What is fixed in writing has detached itself from the contingency of its origin and its author and made itself free for new relationships. ... Every age has to understand a transmitted text in its own way, for the text is part of the whole of the tradition in which the age takes an objective interest and in which it seeks to understand itself. The real meaning of a text, as it speaks to the interpreter, does not depend on the contingencies of the author and whom he originally wrote for. ... understanding is certainly not concerned with understanding historically, i.e. reconstructing the way in which the text has come into being. Rather one is understanding text itself (Gadamer, 1982, p. 357, 262, 350).

HEIDEGGER’S ENCOUNTER WITH FASCISM

An unexamined life is not worth living, Socrates famously opined. If Plato’s account can be trusted, his life met the standards of bios theoretikos or a life informed by the person’s understanding of its true purpose. Michael Foucault made a similar point in one of his last interviews where he urged that the philosopher’s life “is not to be sought in his ideas, as if it could be deduced from them, but rather in his philosophy-as-life, in his philosophical life, his ethos,” that “at every moment, step by step, one must confront what one is thinking and saying with what one is doing” (Foucault 1984, p.374). How Foucault’s life fits with his theoretical creed is a subject of separate investigation (Shalin, 2001, 2007). What concerns us presently is how the hermeneutical stance outlined above comports with its authors’ personal choices. We should note that this is the line of inquiry Heidegger strenuously resisted when he set out to investigate Nietzsche, as he warned. “What we must do is turn away from Nietzsche the man and Nietzsche the author, inasmuch as these are fields that lie within a context of human dimension” (Heidegger, 2002, p. xvii). Heidegger was even less
inclined to examine his own Dasein in light of his theoretical commitments. We should not shy away from this task, however, and ask how his political engagements during the Nazi were aligned with his discursive commitments.

In years prior to Hitler’s ascent to power, Heidegger assiduously avoided political engagement. In 1921, he wrote to Karl Löwith a letter professing disdain for the present day culture and politics: “I do not embellish my philosophical labors with cultural requirements suitable for a vague historical present. I work for my own ‘I am’ and my particular spiritual origins. From this faculty surges the fury of ‘Existence’” (Löwith, 1994, p.31). There was indeed a fury welling up in Heidegger, a tangle of emotions attuned to the gloomy mood that enveloped Germany after its defeat in World War I. This mood grew increasingly dower and prickly as the Weimar Republic began to unravel. One senses this in the famous Davos debate held in 1929 between Heidegger and Cassirer, each man displaying personal styles that contrasted the new Germany from Germany of the past. “The debate between Heidegger and Cassirer also meant a great deal to us in human terms,” remembers a witness to this exchange:

[T]his short dark-brown man, this fine skier and sportsman, with his energetic unflinching mien, this rough and distant, at times downright rude, person who, in impressive seclusion and with deep moral seriousness, lives for and serves the problems he has posed to himself on the one hand — and on the other hand that man with his white hair, not only outwardly but also inwardly an Olympian with wide spaces of thought and with comprehensive set of problems, with his serene features, his kindly courtesy, his vitality and elasticity and, last but not least, his aristocratic elegance (Safranski, 1998, p. 186).

There were few hints at the time that Heidegger was ready to jump into politics, none as to what kind of politics he might choose to endorse. Given the stultifying effect of the public life on self-understanding described in his writings, one could have expected Heidegger to shun the mass euphoria that swept the country after 1933. The reality proved otherwise. Given a chance to practice his theory, Heidegger leaped into the fascist circle of understanding and eagerly lent his intellectual powers to National Socialism. Many of Heidegger’s cherished principles articulated in the 1920’s surfaced in his Nazi era pronouncements. The buzz words that were making round since 1927 and that would be unmistakable to any reader of Being and Time were now summoned to prop up the repressive regime. This is evident in the publications and addresses Heidegger gave after he assumed rectorship at Freiburg University in 1933. Here is a smattering of Heideggerisms gleaned from his political speeches: “one single resolve,” “the world of innermost and most extreme danger,” “the determined resolve to the essence of Being,” “standing firm in the midst of the uncertainty of the totality of being,” “the forces that are rooted in the soil and
blood of a Volk,” “to be master of the situation into which we are placed,” “the genuine following of those who are of new courage,” “the extreme distress of German fate,” “the honor and the destiny of the nation,” “our will to national self-responsibility,” “the new German reality embodied in the National Socialist State,” “that fundamental mood out of which self-limiting self-assertion will empower resolute self-examination to true self-governance” (Heidegger, 1991, p. 52, 31, 33, 38, 48, 34). The sentiments embedded in these verbal ticks are deafening. If mood offers a privileged insight into the Being of Dasein, as Heidegger taught us, then we must conclude that Heidegger’s existence in those years was suffused with pathos and determination. The philosopher of Dasein whole-heartedly hitched his existentialism to the National socialist cause.

What is striking about Heidegger’s subsequent efforts to situate his contemporaneous thoughts in the “they-spirit” of the Nazi era was his refusal to take responsibility for his words and actions. In the letter to the de-Nazification committee that Heidegger (1991) wrote in 1945, he sought to explain away his Nazi party membership, picturing himself as a reluctant participant with misguided hopes to steer the National Socialist movement away from its vicious agenda. Offering a gloss on his rectorship at the Freiburg University, he cast himself as a last minute consensus candidate who accepted the position in order “to contain the penetration of unsuitable persons and the threatening predominance of the Party apparatus and of Party doctrine” (Safranski, 1998, p. 238). This explanation flies in the face of the lavish praise he gave to Hitler and the Third Reich; the strict discipline he imposed on the faculty whom he ordered to give the Nazi salute during his inaugural speech; his refusal to investigate the anti-Semitic violence perpetuated by the university students; his decision to sever ties with his teacher Edmund Husserl whose funeral he declined to attend; his stated conviction that the “Führer alone is the present and future German reality and its law” (Heidegger, 1991, p. 47); his contempt for the “much-praised academic freedom [which] is being banished from the German university; for this freedom was false, because it was only negative” (Heidegger, 1991, p. 34); and his secret letters to Nazi authorities denouncing his colleagues as unsuitable for the job, one of whom, in Heidegger’s words, had once been associated with “that liberal-democratic circle of intellectuals around Max Weber” and was now “closely tied to the Jew Frankel” (Safranski, 1998, p. 273).

Years after the demise of Hitler and National Socialism Heidegger remained committed to “the inner truth and greatness of this movement” (Safranski, 1998, p. 289). Nor could he ever bring himself to acknowledge the reality of the Holocaust. When Herbert Marcuse (1947, p. 161) wrote to his teacher — from whom “we learned an infinite amount” — that one “cannot make a separation between Heidegger the philosopher and the Heidegger the man, for it contradicts your own philosophy” and urged the famous philosopher to acknowledge the Nazi atrocities, Heidegger (1947, p. 163) replied:
To the charges of dubious validity that you express ‘about a regime that murdered millions of Jews, that made terror into an everyday phenomenon, and that turned everything that pertains to the ideas of spirit, freedom, and truth into its bloody opposite,’ I can merely add that if instead of ‘Jews’ you wrote ‘East Germans’ [i.e., Germans of the eastern territories] then the same holds true for one of the allies, with the difference that everything that has occurred since 1945 has become public knowledge, while the bloody terror of the Nazi in point of fact had been kept a secret from the German People.

GADAMER’S ACCOMMODATION WITH FASCISM

Now we turn to Gadamer, whose life under Nazi regime contrasts, at least outwardly, with Heidegger’s. Gadamer never joined the Nazi Party. He did not shun his Jewish friends. Nor did he inform on the ideologically suspect colleagues. It is true that Gadamer voluntarily enrolled in the rehabilitation camp set up by the Nazi ideologists for the aspiring scholars; eagerly took over an academic post after his Jewish colleague and friend Richard Kroner was purged from his position; and signed in 1933 a public letter addressed to Saxon Nazi teachers by a public rally in Marburg (something he did to avoid making a show of his true beliefs, he explained later) — not an unreasonable concession given what German scholars had to go through to remain in academia. Looking back at those years, Gadamer (1997; 2001) took credit for smartly taking refuge in the ideologically neutral field of classical studies and doing nothing to implicate himself in the Nazi ideology. “My cleverness consisted in taking seriously as colleagues those who were Nazis but who were also at the same time genuine, rational scholars; avoiding, of course, political conversations” (Gadamer, 2001, p. 129). When in 1941 he went to Paris to give a talk on Herder, Gadamer points out, he managed to slip in a jab against the Third Reich, intimating to the imprisoned French officers that “an empire that extends itself beyond measure, beyond moderation, is ‘aupres de sa chute’ — ‘nears its fall’” (Gadamer, 1997, p. 14). He also claimed to have communicated his differences with the Nazis in an epigraph to a paper on Plato he published in 1934 where he quoted Goethe to the effect that philosophy is always in conflict with the present time.

Recent scholarship has shown that Gadamer’s account of his Nazi era publications and his claim of having no affinities with the fascist ideology are misleading (Orozco, 1995; Wolin 2000). As Richard Wolin (2000) demonstrated in his article titled “Nazism and the Complicities of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Untruth and Method,” the Paris talk, which came on the heels of the crushing defeat France suffered in 1940, was sponsored by the German Institute in Paris, a Nazi propaganda organization dedicated to indoctrination of defeated nations. Titled “Volk and History in Herder’s Thought” and replete with Heideggerisms (“cleansing,” “an hours of decision”), this talk scorned the poverty of French rationalism and the Enlightenment and hailed the superiority of German thought as articulated by Herder,
“a visionary of a new basic force in the sphere of the state: the life of the Volk” (Wolin, 2000, p. 43). One can imagine how the imprisoned French officers felt about the German professor lecturing them about his victorious nation’s strength rooted in the “genetic spirit and a character of a Volk” (Wolin, 2000, p. 43).

Gadamer’s take on his 1934 publication “Plato and the Poets” where he discusses the infamous episode of the expulsion of the poets from an exemplary state turns out to be equally disingenuous. Among other things, Gadamer writes in this pamphlet: “Plato’s paideia is thus meant as a counterweight to the centrifugal pull of those forces of sophistic enlightenment exerted upon the state. ... In opposition to this sophistic paideia, Plato advances a willfully and radically purified poetry, which is no longer a reflection of human life but the language of an intentionally beautiful lie. The new poetry is meant to express the ethos which prevails in the purified state in a way that is pedagogically efficacious” (Wolin, 2000, p. 41). This is hardly Nazi propaganda, but the malodorous tenor of these remarks made in Nazi Germany that was bent on crushing dissent is unmistakable.

The quote from Goethe that prefaced the piece on “Plato and the Poets” and that was supposed to establish Gadamer’s anti-Nazi bona fide also amounts to something other than Gadamer would have us believe. Much longer than Gadamer’s extemporaneous summary, the epigraph states in part, “He who philosophizes is not at one with the previous and contemporary world’s ways of thinking of things. Thus, Plato’s discussions are often not only directed to something but also directed against it” (Wolin, 2000, p. 41). That this was probably an allusion to the liberal Weimer Germany rather than to the murderous Third Reich becomes clear from the subsequent discussion where Gadamer defends an educational dictatorship that Plato developed in his Republic — a dialogue that came to be treated as a model of a totalitarian state in the German classical studies of the Hitler era (Orozco, 1995). Gadamer (2001, p. 128, 127) is also hard to take seriously when he claims that “the real Nazi had no interest in us at all,” that “the Nazi didn’t give a damn what we [German classicists] did,” that in his war-time classes he could teach what he wanted, and that he never sullied himself with the Nazi propaganda. The glowing review that Gadamer wrote in 1935 about Hildebrandt’s infamous book, Plato: The Struggle of the Spirit for Power, belies this claim, as does his decision not to include his pamphlet on Herder in the standard edition of his collected works. The book was reprinted in 1967 under a different title, with the offensive passages expunged and no reference given to the original 1942 publication. Asked if he would respond to the questions raised by Teresa Orozco’s book about his Nazi era views, Gadamer replied that he would not “because that would dignify the book with an attention it did not deserve” (Palmer, 2001, p. 20). This self-serving answer should not deter us from exploring interfaces between Gadamer’s life and his hermeneutical teaching.
RECOLLECTING PERSONAL BEING

In a curious ways, the discursive corpus that Heidegger and Gadamer produced during the Nazi years fits well with their general hermeneutical stance, with the premise enunciated in the epigraph to this essay: “Even a master of the historical method is not able to keep himself entirely free from the prejudices of his time, his social environment and his national situation” (Gadam er, 1982, p. 466). Indeed, if all texts are rooted in their time and suffused with prejudices nourishing its historical imagination, it is only natural that these two thinkers would follow the historical currents of Hitler’s Germany, absorb the nation’s mood and its regnant prejudices. The difference is that Heidegger did so openly and proudly, Gadamer half-heartedly and gingerly. Once history rendered obsolete old beliefs and new prejudices invaded the Zeitgeist, the two men changed their tune — Heidegger reluctantly and half-heartedly, Gadamer proudly and defiantly. Their old texts had to be ignored or reinterpreted to highlight the textual fragments consistent with post-World War II sentiments.

With the wheel of history turning, Gadamer professed his contempt for Hitler’s ideology and condemned Nazi atrocities. Yet even though his theory calls for a “rational examination” of prejudices, Gadamer declined to acknowledge the extent to which his earlier engagements dovetailed with the vile intellectual currents of the time or square off with the fact that Nazi propaganda machine harnessed his intellectual powers to its cause. Given his revisionist stance, Gadamer in the post-Nazi era, one has to take a closer look at his injunction that interpretive practice should deal with “text in itself,” with writing insofar as it has “detached itself from the contingency of its origin and its author and made itself free for new relationships” (Gadamer, 1982, p. 357). Gadamer’s post-war statements make one wonder where his heart really is. To the very end he remained convinced that all “cultures have racial foundations,” that classicists Oscar Becker and Erick Rothacker, well-known Nazi sympathizers, were also “great” scholars (Gadamer 2001, p. 120-121). The accent on universal conversation in Gadamer’s post-war writings is welcome, but it begs the question. Gadamer grounds his dialogism on Plato whose totalitarian fantasies he had earlier championed as a blueprint for the Volkish state. Now he recast his earlier statements as a playful ruse: “the Platonic ideal state presents a conscious utopia which has more to do with Jonathan Swift than with ‘political science’” (Gadamer, 1997, p. 13).

Heidegger’s refusal to acknowledge his complicity in the Nazi era ideological violence is more appalling. It is hard to buy his self-exculpatory narrative that pictures himself as a public intellectual trying to stir the movement along a noble path until he realized the futility of his efforts to uplift fascism. His claims (Heidegger 1991, p. 66, 65) that he completely broke with Nazism, stopped “wearing its regalia,” and embarked on the path of “spiritual resistance” are at odds with the contemporary records showing that he proudly wore swastikas on his sleeve as late as 1936 at a conference in Italy where he met Karl Löwith.
that he actively continued to explore career opportunities in the Nazi establishment after he stepped down as rector, that he gave up his rectorship and active role in the National Socialist movement not because he saw through the inhumanity of fascism but because he was considered too rabid even by the hardened Nazi leaders who refused to dismiss the faculty Heidegger renounced to the authorities.

Heidegger failed to honor his own philosophy that demands from the existentialist to stay in tune with one’s moods and stir oneself along the chosen path. Heidegger’s innermost Dasein that projected itself in his Nazi era involvements hints at a man with vivid, if disturbed, affectivity. In June of 1933, Jaspers asked his esteemed colleague from Freiburg how an ignoramus like Hitler could possibly lead the German nation, to which Heidegger replied, “Education is quite irrelevant . . . just look at his wonderful hands” (Safranski, 1998, p. 232). In the last conversation between the two, Heidegger confessed to his friend, ‘with anger and fury in his voice, that it was ‘nonsense that there should be so many professors of philosophy, only two or three need be kept in Germany.’ When Jaspers asked which ones, Heidegger remained meaningfully silent” (Safranski, 1998, p. 231). Nietzsche’s will to power comes to mind as one searches for a driving motive of Heidegger’s complicity with the Nazi era politics.

FROM STRUCTURAL HERMENEUTICS TO PRAGMATIST INTERPRETATION

Now we can address the limitations of phenomenological and ontological hermeneutics. It is not the emphasis on prejudice that raises red flags (although Wolin rightly points out that Gadamer’s opposition to the Enlightenment bespeaks his conservative political leanings), but the emphasis on language and textual analysis as the focal point of hermeneutical inquiry, the emphasis that limits the scope of hermeneutics and dulls its critical thrust (Habermas, 1990).

What is fixed in writing has detached itself from the contingency of its origin and its author and made itself free for new relationship. Normative concepts such as the author’s meaning or the original reader’s understanding represent in fact only an empty space that is filled from time to time in understanding. ... In writing, this meaning of what is spoken exists purely for itself, completely detached from all emotional elements of expression and communication. A text is not to be understood as an expression of life, but in what it says. Writing is an abstract ideality of language. ... In this sense understanding is certainly not concerned with understanding historically, ie reconstructing the way the text has come into being. Rather, one is understanding the text itself (Gadamer, 1982, p. 354, 357, 350).
Such formalism suits well interpreters distancing themselves from their own feelings. The notion that “tradition is linguistic in nature” and that “it is the nature of tradition to exist in the medium of language” (Gadamer, 1982, p. 351) conflates “tradition” with “textual corpus” and robs hermeneutical inquiry of valuable resources. Why shouldn’t the interpreter raise the question about the author’s intent and the audience for which the text was originally written? This is not just a romantic fancy, as Gadamer would have it; it is a sound imperative that goads us not to squint when confronted with the messy socio-historical and affective-somatic realities surrounding the production of a textual product. We gain an insight into what Gadamer and Heidegger meant when we follow their public engagements in post-Weimar Germany and connect their scholarly corpus with their affective life. Learning the frame of mind behind a given discourse may yield surplus meaning.

Language is not the only “being that can be understood,” as Gadamer contends. Sometimes actions, or inaction, speak louder than words. There is a lot more to tradition than its extant texts. From the pragmatist standpoint, things get interesting when we can measure words with deeds and align emotions with symbolic and behavioral performances — when we bring one type signifying media to bear on an alternative signifying practice (Peirce, 1991). This is what Peirce’s maxim — judge the idea by its consequences — amounts to. We should not short-circuit interpretation within the same signifying media but seek to interpret one kind of signs in terms of another sign types — words with deeds, deeds with moods, moods with discursive outputs, and so on. Once we learn how Heidegger signed himself in the flesh, we can compare his discursive tokens with his emotional offerings and bring these two forms of signification in line with the behaviorally-embodied significations, gaining in the process a multi-dimensional view of meaning that incorporates its textual modalities without reducing meaning to symbolic signs.

We should question the structuralist tendency to reduce tradition to the meanings preserved in textual forms, to confine hermeneutical inquiry to the totality of what has been textually fixed, whether we deal with the “Classical Age,” “Medieval Europe,” “Third Reich,” or “Soviet Civilization.” Focusing on the surviving literary forms, we also risk underestimating historical inconsistencies. Important though textually transmitted meanings are, they are bound to mislead if taken outside the far larger universe of what has been secreted, emoted, expressed, embodied, produced, manufactured, and created in any given era. Textualized forms cannot fully capture the vibrancy of lived experience reduced to a thin-gruel abstraction of linguistic lifeworlds. Written traditions tend to distort voices incompatible with dominant discourses, edit out incongruent sentiments from the annals of history, tidy up and prettify the rough edges of affective experience.

“Bringing into language” that Gadamer sees as the hermeneutically constitutive act has a potential for illuminating as well as obscuring human agency whose being is not coextensive with its textual apparitions. Paul Ricoeur, it seems to me, risks falling into the same trap. Building his structural hermeneutics on the principles articulated by Gadamer, he
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urges the interpreter to follow “the ‘arrow’ of meaning” revealed by the text, to elevate “the saying to the said,” to pursue the “distanciation by which a new being-in-the-world, projected by the text, is freed from the false evidence of everyday reality” (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 193, 200, 113). Ricoeur underestimates the loss of meaning in a text-centered interpretation. An everyday event brought into language may seem like an arrow pointing in a right direction, but the meaning it projects all too often glosses over the objective indeterminacy of the situation submerged in the strategically crafted text. “Textual arrows” made out of the “crooked timber of humanity” miss the target as often as they hit it — even when fashioned by skilled-interpreters like Gadamer and sent on their way by such master-archers as Heidegger. This is where pragmatist hermeneutics may offer an alternative to ontological and structural theories of interpretation.

Pragmatist hermeneutics opens up the hermeneutical circle wide enough to include in its sweep emotions, body, action, and words (Shalin, 2001, 2004). Building on Heidegger’s precept that “Understanding always has its mood” (Heidegger, 1927, p. 182), pragmatist interpreters reconnect affect with its corporeal substratum, placing both in the historical context of social action. Pragmatist hermeneutics starts with the premise that embodied human agency signs itself in the verbal-discursive forms, as well as in its somatic-affective markers and behavioral-performative traces. The pragmatist perspective implies that historical temporality is transmitted through the somatic-affective media as readily as in the discursive symbolic forms. Every tradition has its somatic-affective a priori inscribed in its agents’ brain circuitry, hormonal pathways, and emotional structures that come to the fore in practical deeds and wide-ranging behavioral forays — the embodied forms of agency bearing the imprint of an era and passed on from one generation to another through extra-textual channels. It is the task of pragmatist hermeneutics to expand the scope of hermeneutical analysis so that it can accommodate all the semiotic resources of the body.

Informed by the pragmatist ethos, hermeneutics explores the word-body-action nexus and uses triangulation to find meaning on the intersection of these three primary signifying media. The focus is on the misalignments in the signification process, on occasional and systemic breaks in the live semiotic chains produced by agents inhabiting a given socio-historical niche. Symbolic distanciation is measured here by pragmatist engagement, textual fixation is matched with practical indeterminacy. The former focuses on the process that progressively disembodies human agency, reducing it to what Frege called “sense,” Husserl identified as “meaning,” and Ricoeur equated with “what has been said.” By contrast, interpretation in the pragmatist key pursues the reverse distanciation which realigns the linguistic forms with the somatic-affective and behavioral-agentic signs. What phenomenological hermeneutics dismisses as “noise” obscuring “universal meaning,” pragmatists treat as a sign of indeterminacy and a signal of repressed affectivity occluded by the dominant textual practices.
The political agenda germane to pragmatist hermeneutics calls for recovering the voices that have failed to come to language, retrieving the moods that have been suppressed by the powers that be. Pragmatist hermeneutics draws attention to the pragmatic-discursive misalignment manifest in everyday life and endemic to human conditions. It also calls upon the interpreters to come to terms with their own prejudices — affective, somatic, agentic, and discursive — which bind us to privileged perspectives and serve our hidden agendas. Above all, pragmatists need to keep in check the tendency to edit out disagreeable facts from our own past and resist the tendency to bury our all too human agency in textual products.

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Dmitri N. Shalin


FEELING SHY: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CULTURAL STEREOTYPES OF NATIVE PEOPLE FROM THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST AND ALASKA

DINA NEKRASSOVA

The purpose of this study is to investigate the links between cultural stereotypes and feelings of shyness by examining auto- and hetero-stereotypes of the Native people from the Russian Far East and Alaska. Consistent with the previous research, the results indicate that auto-stereotypes are generally more positive than hetero-stereotypes. However, the respondents assigned different character traits to other cultural groups. While in the Russian sample positive hetero-stereotypes were found similar to positive auto-stereotypes, the respondents from Alaska tend to contrast themselves with other cultural groups. The participants also rely on positive auto-stereotypes and negative hetero-stereotypes when assessing cultural shyness. The discriminant analysis revealed the correlation between age and cultural shyness. Based on these findings, implications for intercultural research are presented.

Keywords: intercultural communication, cultural stereotypes, shyness, cultural change, intercultural adaptation

For many decades, Native cultures have been the focus of scholarly investigation both in the United States and Russia (Blu, 1980; Chaussonnet, 1995; Kaplan, Barsness, & Katz, 1986; Kerttula, 2000; R. Scollon & Scollon, 1979; Stefansson, 1922; Wilson, 2008). Researchers not only collected stories (Bogoras, 1902; Burrows, 1926; Cruikshank, 1998; Ruppert & Bernet, 2001), tried to develop an understanding of cultural worldviews (Kawagley, 2006; Philipsen, 1972) and systems of knowledge (Krupnik & Vakhtin, 1997;)

Dina Nekrassova is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Communication at Rutgers University (dinanekrassova@yahoo.com). She acknowledges the helpful comments of Stacey Connaughton and two anonymous reviewers.
Napoleon, 2005; Wilson, 2008), or described customs of Native people (Kenny & Sa-Ets, 2002; Krasilnikov, 2006), but also demonstrated how cultural contexts are maintained through communication (Brant, 1993; Carbaugh & Rudnick, 2006). Specifically, scholars have examined the following aspects of “cultural communication” (Philipsen, 2002): discourse (Basso, 1988; Philipsen, 1972; R. Scollon & Scollon, 1981), gender (Champagne, 1999; Kenny, 2006; Roscoe, 1998), spirituality and belief systems (Garrett, 1996; Kan, 1999), identity construction (Braroe, 2002; Lawrence, 2004; Miheusuh, 1999), and education (Boyer, 2006; Deyhle & Swisher, 1997; Kleinfeld, 1979; Philips, 1972), to name just a few.

In a similar vein, Russian ethnographers recorded folklore (Alekseev & Nikolaeva, 1981; Varlamova, 2002), described material aspects of Native cultures (Bogoraz, 1991; Iohel'son, 1997; Ivanov, 1954; Vasilevich, 1970), conducted comprehensive analyses of social structure (Anisimov, 1936; Dolgh, 1960), and detailed traditional ceremonies (Krasilnikov, 2006; Tugolukov, 1980; Varlamova, 2002). This body of research is particularly invaluable because as it is sadly evidenced in recent studies (Krupnik & Chlenov, 2007; Morgounova, 2007; Ryvkin, Kosals, & Kovalkina, 1992) many unique aspects of traditional cultures are extinct now due to state policies aimed at forceful assimilation of Indigenous peoples into the dominant culture.

Today, Alaska Natives represent approximately 16 percent of Alaska’s residents and are a significant segment of the population in over 200 rural villages and communities. Many Alaska Natives have retained their customs, language, hunting and fishing practices, and ways of living. Alaska’s indigenous people are divided into eleven distinct cultures (Athabascan, Yup’ik & Cup’ik, Inupiaq & St. Lawrence Island Yupik, Aleut & Alutiiq, Eyak, Tlingit, and Haida & Tsimshian), speaking twenty different languages (Berger, 1985). Scattered along the vast territories of the Russian Far East are twenty six Native ethnic groups formally known as “Northern Minorities” (including Evens, Chukchas, Yukagirs, Yakuts, Koryks, etc.) (Stepanov & Tishkov, 2005). Moreover, the contacts between Native people of the Russian Far East and Alaska have increased dramatically in the past two decades and include not only cultural exchanges sponsored by Native Corporations (Alaska) and Native People’s Organization (Magadan, Russia), but families have been reunited, in many cases, re-acquainted, and lost links in traditional rituals have been discovered and re-established.

The present study sets out to investigate the links between cultural stereotypes and feelings of shyness by examining auto- and hetero-stereotypes of the Indigenous people from the Russian Far East and Alaska (USA). These are unique populations to compare. Both regions share similar histories: (1) before contact with Western cultures, Native people of both regions maintained a unique way of life which was reflected in material artifacts, values, attitudes, and spiritual beliefs (Bogoras, 1902; Naske & Slotnick, 1987; Sergeev, 1957); (2) both regions became parts of a bigger, more dominant country, in terms of political, cultural, and economic development (Johansen, 2005; J. P. Nichols, 1963; Pika,
1996); and (3) Native people in both regions experienced specific policies aimed at their acculturation and assimilation with dominant cultures (Berger, 1985; Buchek, 2004; Joe, 1986; Whitbeck, Adams, Hoyt, & Chen, 2004). However, each region was influenced by countries which differed from each other in every aspect of their political, economic, and cultural development (Kerttula, 2000; Nuttall & Callaghan, 2000; Vakhtin, 1992). Therefore, differences (and/or similarities) in auto- and hetero-stereotypes may unveil shifts in cultural core beliefs and advance our understanding of the trends underlying the processes of cultural change.

The paper is organized into the following sections. The first part provides an overview of the research on cultural stereotypes and shyness highlighting the importance of understanding conceptual linkages between these phenomena. The methods section explains the use of the research procedures which were employed to collect and analyze the data. The section that follows presents the results of factor and discriminant analyses and the discussion of the findings. Finally, the paper is concluded by the review of the study’s limitations and the implications for future research.

**Cultural Stereotypes**

Culture is generally viewed as contexts in which people live and work (Condon & Yousef, 1975) and which are shaped, maintained, and transformed in communication (Carbaugh, 1990). Therefore, culture extends beyond individual personality characteristics but is constitutive of communal “expressive practices fraught with feeling, a system of symbols, promises, rules, forms and the domains and dimensions of mutual understanding” (Carbaugh, 1993, p. 182). Through “communal conversations” (Philipsen, 2002), members of cultural groups create shared knowledge systems that are rooted in collective values and beliefs (Bennett deMarrais, Nelson, & Baker, 1992), and represent those enduring meanings that people use as a map to interpret surroundings and interact with other persons. However, values and beliefs are “more than guidelines for goals of behavior: they also provide symbolic means of presenting, evaluating, and defining the self” (Braroe, 1975, p. 9). In this way, values and beliefs serve as a foundation for stereotypical categorization of self and others (Goffman, 1963). Simply knowing the group membership of an individual can influence our assumptions about this person’s behaviors and attitudes (Duran & Duran, 1995; Kirkhoff, 1996). For example, Basso (1970) discovered that Western Apache Indians were stereotyped as “singularly uncommunicative” (Braroe, 1975, p. 92) or “deficient in interpersonal component” (p. 93) because they remained silent when they were expected to talk. Alaskan Athabaskans may be similarly perceived as unwilling to engage in conversations because they do not explicitly show interest in other people’s opinions and views by refusing to ask questions (S. Scollon, 1982). However as Scollon discovered,
Athabaskans considered questions too powerful to use as they require responses, and thus, may restrict other people’s individuality (see also R. Scollon & Scollon, 1979). These examples show that people who identify with Native and Non-Native cultures assign different values to silence and the significance of talk to maintain relationships.

Stereotyping is a communicative process. In the spirit of Philipsen (2002) and Carbaugh (1990), stereotypes are understood as distinctive ways of enacting cultural knowledge and performing “a cultural function of communicative conduct” (Philipsen, 2002, p. 61). Specifically, stereotyping involves the process of perceiving and forming impressions (both positive and negative) about people, objects, and events. These perceptions and impressions are judged against a set of cultural values and often determine which roles individuals will take on and what communicative strategies people will choose while interacting with members of culturally different groups. For instance, if we hold favorable stereotypes about members of a culturally different group — kindness, hospitality, or generosity — we may feel more at ease when conversing with them. On the other hand, negative stereotypes — aggressiveness, toughness, and greediness — may lead to more timid and reserved communicative practices. In a similar fashion, our stereotypes about how we are perceived by members of culturally different groups influence how we interact with them. Expressly, knowing that the members of the culture to which we belong are viewed negatively impacts how we feel about the encounter and the strategic choice we make in conversations. We may experience communication apprehension, tend to be shy and quiet, or are likely to avoid interaction all together.

Therefore, it is useful to distinguish between auto-stereotypes and hetero-stereotypes. Hetero-stereotypes refer to how members of one cultural group view members of culturally different groups (Kashima et al., 2003) and embody those negative characteristics that are not desirable and acceptable in own culture. Auto-stereotypes are usually formed from those characteristics and attributes that are accepted in the culture. Most studies show that auto-stereotypes are more positive (Triandis et al., 1982) and uniform (Marin & Salazar, 1985) than hetero-stereotypes. For example, “non-Athabaskans conclude that Indians are sullen, uncooperative, even stupid” (Tannen, 1984, p. 189). In the similar vein, Athabaskans have negative hetero-stereotypes of non-Athabaskans and regard them as garrulous and hypocritical (Basso, 1979). These misunderstandings occur not only because members of both cultural groups assign different meaning to silence, but also because they engage in different practices to communicate respect and (un)willingness to talk (see also Basso, 1970; Dumont, 1972; Philips, 1982; R. Scollon & Scollon, 1979).

Thus, in light of the above discussion I ask the following research questions: (1): What are Native people’s auto- and hetero-stereotypes from the Russian Far East and Alaska? (2a): How are Native people’s auto- and hetero-stereotypes from the Russian Far East and Alaska similar? (2b): How are Native people’s auto- and hetero-stereotypes from the Russian Far East and Alaska different?
SHYNESS

Shyness is generally viewed as a personality trait (Amico, Bruch, Haase, & Sturmer, 2004; Beer, 2002) and is defined as “an affective-behavioral syndrome characterized by social anxiety and interpersonal inhibition that result from the prospect or presence of interpersonal evaluation” (Leary, 1986). From this perspective, shy individuals are motivated to produce favorable impressions on others but are also uncertain about their ability to do so (Leary & Buckley, 2000). They are prone to chronic negative self-appraisals, intense anxiety, and aversion toward entering into social interaction as well as feelings of embarrassment (Pilkonis, 1977) and communication apprehension (Daly, McCroskey, Ayres, Hopf, & Ayres, 1997; McCroskey & Richmond, 1982).

Research on the behavioral consequences of shyness presents inconsistent findings. On one hand, it is common to associate shyness with multiple types of discomfort and inhibition (Amico et al., 2004) such as negative self-statements, greater subjective anxiety, public self-consciousness (Bruch, Gorsky, Collins, & Berger, 1989), and avoidance of social interaction (Jones & Briggs, 1984). On the other hand, shy people may be neither avoidant of social situations nor are they necessarily social failures (Cheek & Melchior, 1990; Gough & Thorne, 1986). For example, some shy individuals consider themselves shy but are perceived as socially adept by others (Zimbardo, 1977). Moreover, the degree of shyness may change over time (Cheek, Carpentieri, Smith, Rierdan, & Koff, 1986), and shy individuals are found to eagerly participate in social activity when they are certain that their performance will be successful (Arkin, Lake, & Baumgardner, 1986).

Several explanations can be offered to account for the above mentioned inconsistencies in examining the causes and consequences of “being shy.” First, there might be different degrees of shyness depending on the familiarity with a situation. For example, a shy person may not struggle with presenting a talk in front of familiar people as opposed to giving a speech at a conference. In other words, people may feel shy in new encounters and at the same time feel quite comfortable in familiar circumstances. Second, differences in shyness have not sufficiently explained individual differences among shy people’s social motivation and behavior (Beer, 2002). Expressly, people who believe they do not have control over their experiences of shyness may have different goals and responses in social interactions than do individuals who believe their shyness may change over time. Indeed Beer (2002) found that “attitudes toward the malleability of shyness motivate shy individuals to strive for either avoidance or approach in social situations and respond in a style that supports their desire for either avoidance or approach” (p. 1020). Hence, shyness should not be viewed as a constant fixed personality trait, but that its degree differs depending on social circumstances and individual goals.
Feeling shy about social encounters may also stem from formed impressions and assumptions about other people and situations. Indeed, if we believe that we are negatively evaluated by other people, we will feel more timid to start a conversation with them as opposed to the situation when we assume that we project favorable impressions. Because such assumptions constitute the core basis for creating stereotypes, it is logical to suggest that there might be a link between how people perceive the members of their own social group (auto-stereotypes), members of a culturally different group (hetero-stereotypes), and how they feel about their cultural membership. For instance, one of my former professors used to feel shy when she found herself to be the only Native person in a social gathering and perceived other people uncaring and arrogant which often resulted in avoiding informal networking. Hoy (1993) calls such avoidance of social encounters based on intercultural differences “cultural shyness.” Therefore, I also ask: (3): How are cultural auto- and hetero-stereotypes correlated with perceived shyness?

Answering these research questions will address the differences and similarities in the ways Native people from Alaska and the Russian Far East view members of their own cultural group (auto-stereotypes) and the members of other cultural groups (hetero-stereotypes) and will inform us about the statistical relationship between identified stereotypes and self-declared shyness, particularly as it relates to intercultural communication.

**Method**

Katz and Braly’s (1933) original procedures were used to unearth auto-stereotypes and hetero-stereotypes. Because participants generated more than one auto- and hetero-stereotypes, multiple response analysis (Norusis, 2004) was employed to examine the nonmutually exclusive reporting of stereotypes. Factor analysis allowed for determining the similarities and differences in stereotypes. And, discriminant analysis was used to uncover relationships between perceived shyness and identified cultural stereotypes loaded on different factors.

**Participants**

A total of 370 Native people from the Russian Far East (R) (n = 159) and Alaska (A) (n = 211) participated in this study; 47.8% were male (R = 37.7%; A = 55.5%) and 50.5% were female (R = 61%; A = 42.7%). The youngest respondent was 18 years old and the oldest was over 60 years old. Respondents completed a 70-item questionnaire. Originally, the questionnaire was created in Russian and pre-tested in a pilot study. The questionnaire was distributed among native people in two Russian cities (Magadan and Omsukchan) and
three villages (Orotuk, Ola, and North-Evensk) by the author and her associates from the
Association of Native People in the North (Magadan, Russia).

In the United States, the questionnaire was translated into English and then reviewed
for accuracy and appropriateness both by three social researchers and five Native people.
Then, two people who spoke Russian were identified and asked to translate the English
version of the questionnaire back into Russian. Overall, there were no conceptual differences
between original and translated versions of the questionnaire. The questionnaires were
distributed among Native students during the Fall semester of 1999 and Spring semester of
2000. Also, the questionnaires were distributed among Native people who came to
participate in the Native Arts Festival in the spring of 2000.

Instruments

Studies have shown that despite the between- and within-group diversity that exists
among Native American tribes, there is a common core of traditional values that characterize
Native American traditional culture across tribal groups and geographic regions (Garret,
1996). Although Native people from different cultural groups participated in the study, the
character traits may be expected to have a common core. Therefore, auto- and hetero-
stereotypes were measured using scales that consist of several distinct questions which
included Katz and Braly’s (1933) original procedure. First, respondents were instructed to
choose among 15 traits and circle those which they believed were common to Native people.
Second, among the same 15 traits, they circled those which they believed were
characteristics of Russians/other Americans. Then, the respondents rated on a four-point
scale to what extent 15 different character traits were common to the Native people of the
ethnic group and Russians/other Americans. Test of reliability (Chronbach’s alpha = .88)
indicated that the auto- hetero-stereotype scale is internally consistent and reliable. Finally,
the respondents were asked to list positive and negative traits which are common to the
Native people and Russians/other Americans but were missed in the previous questions. To
assess shyness, the respondents were asked to reflect on their prior experience and indicate
whether they had felt shy about belonging to their cultural group. The respondents could
choose one of the three possible choices: “yes,” “no,” and “I do not care.”

RESULTS

Research question one was asked to uncover auto- and hetero-stereotypes. The
multiple response analysis (Noruisis, 2004) revealed that the respondents from both Russian
and Alaskan samples similarly specified “kindness” (Russia – 15.4%; Alaska –
19.1%), “hospitality” (Russia – 15%; Alaska – 17.4%), and “hard-working” (Russia –
13.4%; Alaska – 11.7%) as the most common auto-stereotypes (see Table 1). The second most frequent category also included “tolerance” (Russia – 11.9%; Alaska – 9.1%), “unselfishness” (Russia – 9%; Alaska – 10.7%), and “aggressiveness” (Russia – 7.4%;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stereotypes</th>
<th>Russia Sample</th>
<th>Alaska Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AS %  GS %</td>
<td>AS %  GT %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kindness</td>
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</tr>
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<td>11.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cleanliness</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>10.7</td>
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<td>Hard-working</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
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<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11.3</td>
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<td>Business-like</td>
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<td>6.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unselfishness</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrogance</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1

*Multiple Response Analysis of Stereotypes for Russian and Alaskan Samples*
Alaska – 10%). The rest of the auto-stereotypes, which are mostly negative character traits, had very low percentage of responses: “resilience” (Russia – 6.9%; Alaska – 4.8%), “stubbornness” (Russia – 5.5%; Alaska – 6.4%), “greediness” (Russia – 1.1%; Alaska – 2.3%), “talented” (Russia – 3.7%; Alaska – 2%), “business-like manner” (Russia – 2.4%; Alaska – .5%), and “arrogance” (Russia – 9%; Alaska – 1.3%). These findings suggest that the respondents from both samples tend to attribute positive auto-stereotypes to the cultural groups they belong.

The multiple response analysis also helped determine hetero-stereotypes. Specifically, the participants from the Russian Far East attribute “kindness” (11.3%), “hospitality” (11.1%), “cleanliness” (10.7%), and “talent” (11.3%) to Russians. Native Alaskans view other Americans as “hard working” (12.9%), “greedy” (12.1%), “talented” (12.6%), and “business-like” (10.4%). The second largest category mentioned by the respondents from Russia is comprised of the following characteristics: “hard-working” (9.6%), “greediness” (7.2%), and “arrogance” (8.5%). Alaskans attribute “arrogance” (9.6%), “kindness” (8.1), and “cleanliness” (7.9%) to other Americans. Interestingly “tolerance” has low percentage of responses in both samples (Russia – 4.6%; Alaska – 3.2%). Although there is difference between the participants from the Russian Far East and Alaska in perceived hetero-stereotypes, generally, hetero-stereotypes are similarly more negative than auto-stereotypes in both samples. These findings are consistent with the previous research on auto- and hetero-stereotypes (Beattie, Agahi, & Spencer, 1982; Marin & Salazar, 1985; McAndrew et al., 2000; Petrenko, Kravstova, Mitina, & Osipova, 2002).

To answer both parts of research question two and examine the similarities and differences in auto- and hetero-stereotypes of Native people from the Russian Far East and Alaska, four principle component analyses were conducted. Factor analyses were run separately for the Russian sample and Alaska sample. For both data sets five factors were extracted. Varimax rotation was used to help clarify the interpretation of the factors. Goodness-of-fit indicated significant results in all tests. Extracted factors of auto-stereotypes explain 61% of variance and factors of hetero-stereotypes explain 72% of variance in the Alaska sample. In the Russia sample, factors of auto-stereotypes explain 49% of variance and factors of hetero-stereotypes explain 52% of variance. Goodness-of-fit test also indicated significant results in all tests. As expected, different character traits loaded on each factor (see Tables 2-5).

In the Russian sample, the maximum variance is a combination of “frankness,” “peace loving,” and “willing to take risk.” This suggests that Native people in the Russian sample view themselves as frank and non-confrontational, but at the same time adventurous and willing to try new things. “Aggressiveness” has the negative loading on this factor which suggests that aggressive patterns of behavior are perceived as harmful for social harmony of a cultural group. The first factor in the Russian sample is different from the first factor in the Alaska sample which includes “self-discipline,” “willing to take risk,” “independence,”
Table 2  
*Auto-Stereotypes of the Alaska Sample*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Item</th>
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<th>Factor 3</th>
<th>Factor 4</th>
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<td>Items</td>
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Table 4

_Auto-stereotypes for the Russian Sample_

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<table>
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<th>Items</th>
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“willfulness,” and “being energetic.” These items show that Alaskan respondents view themselves as strong independent individuals. This does not mean, however, that they do not value “being open” or “frank.” On the contrary, these character traits have high loading on the second factor in the Alaska sample. Interestingly, “peace loving,” “frankness” and “open hearted” loaded together with “compliance” which suggests that respondents generally view these character traits as passive as opposed to such active traits as independence and willingness to take risks.

The second factor obtained from the Russian sample on auto-stereotypes includes the following items: “energetic,” “longing for the future,” “independence,” and “team spirit.” The items that loaded on factor 3 are “self discipline,” “obedience,” “willfulness,” and “compliance.” However, “obedience” should not be viewed in a derogative sense. Conversely, “obedience” and “compliance” are highly valued in interpersonal relationships as signs of respect. This is more clearly expressed in the Alaska sample. In particular, “open-hearted,” “frankness,” and “compliance” have high significant correlation with “peace loving.” The fourth and the fifth factors explain the smallest portions of the variance and are not highly correlated with each other. Surprisingly, “team spirit” (.082) has only one positive loading and only on Factor 1 in the Alaska sample. The highest negative loading (-.302) was on Factor 4 which indicates negative association with “shyness” (.654) and “obedience” (.643).

Native people in the Russian Far East and Alaska have experienced aggressive policies enforced by the countries — Russia (former USSR) and USA — characterized by different political, economic and social systems which, however, similarly manipulated almost every aspect of the Native cultures (e.g., values, customs, education, governance, ideologies, etc.) in order to assimilate them into the dominant societies (Brave Heart & DeBruyn, 1998; Forsyth, 1992; Johansen, 2005; Kerttula, 2000; Miller, 2006). Therefore, it was expected that loadings would be different on each of the five factors. Indeed, respondents from the Russian sample viewed Russian people as “peace loving,” “open-hearted,” and “frank” (Factor 1, Russian sample). Respondents from the Alaskan sample generally viewed “other Americans” as “independent,” “willing to take risks,” and “energetic” (Factor 1, Alaska sample). The participants from the Russian sample attributed to Russians almost the same character traits as they attributed to themselves. For instance, Factor 2 includes “self-discipline,” “shyness,” “obedience,” and “compliance,” which is almost identical to Factor 3 of auto-stereotypes. Furthermore, “independence,” “energetic” and “willing to take risks” are loaded on the same factor. Interestingly, combination of these items explains less variance than in the auto-stereotype test.

In the Alaska sample, items loaded differently for auto-and hetero-stereotypes with one exception. The first factors in both tests include almost identical character traits: “willfulness,” “independence,” “willing to take risks,” and “energetic.” However, in Factor 2 they attribute such character traits as “hard-headed,” “aggressiveness,” “laziness,” and
“rivalry” to other Americans as compared to Factor 2 of auto-stereotypes (e.g., “open-hearted,” “frankness,” and “peace loving”). Factor 3 is characterized by “self discipline” and “team spirit.” Interestingly, “soft” qualities (e.g., open-hearted, frankness, “peace loving,” “compliance,” etc.) loaded only on Factor 4 which indicates that the respondents from Alaska view other Americans more pro-active, assertive, and aggressive even in interpersonal communication as compared to interactions among members of Native communities. The participants describe Native people as being rival and aggressive only in the last factor where components explain the smallest portions of variance and are all uncorrelated with each other.

Discriminant analysis was used to answer the third research question and allowed us to examine correlation between self-declared shyness and stereotypes (see Tables 6 and 7). Discriminant analysis generated the weighted, linear combinations of variables that most sensitively distinguished between those participants who felt shy about belonging to a certain cultural group, who did not feel shy, and those who did not care. Two discriminant analyses were run separately, one for the Russian sample and one for the Alaskan sample. “Shyness” was the grouping variable; five factors of auto-stereotypes, five factors of hetero-stereotypes, age, and scores on “how important is it for you to belong to your cultural group?” scale were included in the independent list. Two discrimination functions are significant for the Russian sample. Specifically, Wilks’ Lambda for Function 1 is .632 which accounts for 59.3% of the variance. Function 1 is a combination of moderately high “age” (.516), hetero-stereotypes loaded on Factor 4 (.338), auto-stereotypes loaded on Factor 1 (.312) and low auto-stereotypes loaded on Factor 2 (-.388), hetero-stereotypes loaded on Factor 1 (-.247), auto-stereotypes loaded on Factor 2 (-.138), and hetero-stereotypes loaded on Factor 5 (-.094). As it was discussed earlier, hetero-stereotypes loaded on Factor 4 include “willfulness,” “longing for the past,” and “dissociation.” Auto-stereotypes loaded on Factor 1 have the highest loading of “frankness,” “peace loving,” and “willing to take risks.” These variables contribute to the respondents’ perceptions of their “shyness” only when they are highly correlated with the auto-stereotypes loaded on Factors 2 and 5, and hetero-stereotypes loaded on Factor 1. Thus, Function 1 in the Russian sample indicates that age of the respondents and combination of auto- and hetero-stereotypes play an important role in how the respondents assess their experiences of intercultural “shyness.”

Function 2 was also significant for the Russian sample (Wilks’ Lambda = .829) which accounted for 40.7% of variance. This discriminant function presents an interesting combination of moderately high auto-stereotypes loaded on Factor 4 and hetero-stereotypes loaded on Factors 2 and 3. Expressly, Function 2 is illustrated by aggressive (slightly negative) character traits such as “rivalry” and “being hard headed” assigned to the Native people and hetero-stereotypes that arbitrarily can be called active or initiative traits (e.g., “independence,” “energetic,” “willing to take risks,” and “longing for the future”). Scores on “importance of belonging to a certain cultural group” had the least weight in function 2.
Table 6

*Fisher’s Linear Discriminant Functions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fisher’s linear discrimination functions</th>
<th>Russian Sample</th>
<th>Alaska Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>shy</td>
<td>not shy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto-stereotype 1</td>
<td>.998</td>
<td>.942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto-stereotype 2</td>
<td>.533</td>
<td>.623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto-stereotype 3</td>
<td>-.168</td>
<td>.281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto-stereotype 4</td>
<td>1.116</td>
<td>1.697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto-stereotype 5</td>
<td>.287</td>
<td>.411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hetero-stereotype 1</td>
<td>-1.512</td>
<td>-1.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hetero-stereotype 2</td>
<td>-.550</td>
<td>-1.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hetero-stereotype 3</td>
<td>-.929</td>
<td>-1.359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hetero-stereotype 4</td>
<td>-.753</td>
<td>-.893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hetero-stereotype 5</td>
<td>.967</td>
<td>.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.369</td>
<td>1.905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m proud to belong to my cultural group</td>
<td>2.060</td>
<td>2.269</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Auto-stereotypes (1-5) and hetero-stereotypes (1-5) are the factors extracted in the factor analysis.

for the Russian sample. Furthermore, Function 2 is low on auto-stereotypes loaded on Factor 3 characterized by “obedience” and “compliance.” Indeed, a “compliant” and “obedient” person is hardly expected to be independent in his or her decisions and to take initiative.
Only one discriminant function was significant (Wilk’s Lambda = .493) for the Alaskan sample which accounted for 92.5% of the variance. Specifically, there was only 1 response “I do not care” to the question “Have you ever been shy about belonging to your
cultural group?” This discriminant function was a combination of high auto-stereotypes loaded on Factor 1 (.711), moderately high auto-stereotypes loaded on Factor 5 (.256) and hetero-stereotypes loaded on Factor 5 (.245). As it was discussed earlier, auto-stereotypes loaded on Factor 1 in the Alaskan sample consist of “self-discipline,” “willing to take risks,” “independence,” and being “energetic.” Furthermore, when the respondents perceive themselves as “energetic” and “independent,” they regard other Americans as “shy,” “compliant,” and “longing for the past.” This argument is supported by the presence of low hetero-stereotypes loaded on Factor 1 (-.230) and auto-stereotypes loaded on Factor 4 (-.035) in Function 1. In auto-stereotypes loaded on Factor 4, the respondents view themselves as “shy,” “compliant,” and “longing for the past,” while attributing such character traits as “willing to take risks,” “independence,” and being “energetic” to “other Americans.”

Prior probability was also calculated in order to assess the likelihood that a case belongs to one of the three groups: (1) I have been shy about belonging to my cultural group; (2) I have never been shy about being a member of my cultural group; and (3) I do not care. As it was mentioned earlier, the respondents from Alaska selected primarily between the first and the second choices. That is, 76% of the participants responded that they have never been shy about their ethnicity, and 23% positively answered the question. Similarly, 68% of Native respondents from the Russian Far East have never been shy about their ethnicity, and 21% positively answered the question. However, almost 10% of the participants from Russia “did not care.” These results suggest that respondents from Alaska “cared” and felt responsible to either proudly state that they are proud of being who they are in any situation or recall situations when they did not feel so.

Finally, the test of Fisher’s linear discriminant function unearthed the variables that contributed the most to the assignment of cases to three groups: (1) those who have been shy; (2) those who have not; and (3) those do not care. In both samples, respondents highly valued to “belong to a certain Native group.” Specifically, 40% of the Russian sample and 61% of Alaskan sample assigned the highest possible value when evaluating the perceived importance of belonging to their cultural groups. Furthermore, the combination of respondents’ age, their positive auto-stereotypes and slightly negative hetero-stereotypes are most sensitively distinguished between the participants who are “shy,” “not shy,” or “do not care.”

**DISCUSSION**

These findings provide additional support for the argument that members of any cultural group tend to view in-group members more favorably than members of other cultural groups. First, the respondents from the Russian Far East and Alaska similarly rated character traits common to the cultural groups to which they belonged higher than character traits common to the Russians or other Americans. These findings are consistent with the
previous research on auto- and hetero-stereotypes (Beattie et al., 1982; Marin & Salazar, 1985; McAndrew, 1990; McAndrew et al., 2000; K. R. Nichols & McAndrew, 1984; Petrenko et al., 2002; Triandis et al., 1982). Second, the respondents from both samples have similar auto-stereotypes. Specifically, the participants assigned the following character traits to their cultural groups: “frankness,” “openness,” “peace loving,” “energetic,” self-discipline,” “independence,” etc. The only difference between two samples was that “frankness,” “openness,” and “peace loving” loaded on Factor 1 in the Russian sample but loaded on Factor 2 in the Alaska sample. In the similar vein, “energetic,” “self-discipline,” and “independence” loaded on Factor 1 in the Alaska sample and loaded on Factor 2 in the Russian sample. One explanation is that despite the loss of contact for almost 70 years due to separation along national borders, the core cultural values remain an important aspect of everyday life in Native communities (see also Kerttula, 1997).

Hetero-stereotypes assigned by the participants from the Russian Far East and Alaska differed in two significant ways. First, the respondents assigned different character traits to “Russian people” and “other Americans.” Second, the responses differed in the manner of stereotyping “Russian people” and “other Americans.” These intriguing findings suggest that the respondents from the Russian Far East and Alaska may harbor different attitudes toward the decades of aggressive state practices aimed at forced assimilation of Indigenous peoples into dominant cultures. In both countries, the outcomes of government policies are similarly tragic and range from decline of traditional cultures (Bogoraz, 1991; Joe, 1986), pollution of the environment (Krupnik & Vakhitin, 2002) and alienation from their traditional relationship with the land (Nuttall & Callaghan, 2000) to such social ills as alcohol and drug abuse (Kraus & Buffler, 1979), suicide (Yardley, 2007), and domestic violence and child abuse (Duran & Duran, 1995). Nevertheless, in the Russian sample positive hetero-stereotypes were found similar to positive auto-stereotypes. One possible explanation is that the participants from the Russia sample generally view Russian people in a more positive way and accept Russian values and norms as their own. Another explanation is that they might “negatively judge themselves as having ‘lost’ traditions” (King, 2002, p. 157). In the Alaska sample, the respondents tended to contrast themselves with “other Americans,” and construct a more favorable image of themselves as members of Native communities. Such a rejection may reflect a negative attitude toward the history of government policies (Brave Heart & DeBruyn, 1998; Joe, 1986) and consequent changes in Native cultures (Berger, 1985; Blu, 1980; Champagne, 1999). Also, the contrasting strategy in the Alaska sample may indicate resistance to changes that took place in their lives (Brown, 2003; Deyhle & Swisher, 1997) or efforts to maintain cultural identity through “antitheses” (Cheney, 1983).

The discriminant analysis showed that auto- and hetero-stereotypes can be used to distinguish members of three groups from one another: (1) those who have been shy about belonging to their cultural group; (2) those who have not; and (3) those who do not care. The respondents rely mainly on positive auto-stereotypes and slightly negative hetero-stereotypes
when responding to the question whether they have ever felt shy about belonging to a certain cultural group. The most significant traits that define the participants’ choice are “aggressive” or initiative traits (arbitrary called). This tendency was characteristic to Function 2 in the Russian sample and Function 1 in the Alaska sample. Indeed, “energetic,” “aggressive,” “willing to take risks” respondents are not “shy” about who they are. In addition, high ratings of the importance to belong to their cultural group indicate that respondents value and are proud of their cultural origin. Interestingly, the more recent studies in Russia show that Native people do not assign much significance to being a member of a certain cultural group (Zelischeva, 2007) or the importance of speaking Native languages (Averin, 2005; Bogoyavlenskiy, 2005; Buchek, 2004; Kudashkin, 2006). Moreover, the overwhelming majority — 90% of the participants in Zelischeva’s (2007) research — preferred speaking Russian and using it in schools as a main language. In contrast to such gloomy results of survey research in Russia, Kidwell and Velie (2005) report the growth of books published in Native languages in the Unites States, efforts to assume political dimensions, maintain traditions, and practice arts and aesthetics (see also Kleinfeld, 1979; Lipka & McCarty, 1994).

The discriminant analysis also revealed the correlation between the age of the respondents and the experiences of cultural shyness. This finding provides additional support for the argument that shyness is not a stable personality trait, but its degrees fluctuate over time (Cheek et al., 1986). Also, feelings of shyness may depend on changes in people’s experiences and circumstances of their lives. In particular, a significant proportion of the respondents were students (17.3%). Moving from a village to a big city is always associated with stress which may result in depression, anxiety, and/or avoidance of social encounters. In this case, “shyness” could be attributed to anxiety about unfamiliar situations or “emotional coldness” (Garret, 1996). Furthermore, a number of the participants indicated during informal conversations (especially older respondents) that on several occasions they felt uncomfortable being the only Native person present in a room. They felt “shy” because they perceived the lack of emotional support and understanding from other people (Chen & Rubin, 1992). Several older participants shared their painful experiences what it felt like to be a Native student in 1940s. A vice president of the Native People Association (Magadan, Russia) recalled that her elementary school teachers forbade her to speak Even (her Native language) and if they heard her do so, she was requested to wash her mouth with soap. Regretfully, many educational policies in Russia and Americas were similarly aimed at assimilating indigenous people’s language, spiritual beliefs, and traditions into the mainstream cultural trends through rigid and intolerant educational and social policies (Brave Heart & DeBruyn, 1998; Deyhle & Swisher, 1997; Forsyth, 1992).

What do the findings of this study mean for intercultural research more broadly? The current study contributes to our understanding of the role that auto- and hetero-stereotypes play in intercultural communication by linking stereotypes and cultural shyness. The study
not only focuses on, describes, and compares the trait characteristics which Native people from the Russian Far East and Alaska attribute to their own and other cultural groups, but opens up a new space for developing an understanding whether these perceptions are related to how the respondents feel about commonly shared cultural stereotypes. Doing so is critical. The study provides additional support for the argument that cultural shyness is not necessarily a stable personality trait inhibiting information exchange, but a “cultural convention” (Tannen, 1984) that is enacted in communication practices. For instance, in Western cultures shyness is revealed in the tendency to be timid and reserved. Individuals who feel shy will talk less and refrain from engaging in conversations with people in an unfamiliar environment. The Alaska Native Review Commission (Berger, 1985) reports that Native students are often perceived shy or quiet by their instructors and peers. However, it is important to emphasize that the Native students may not view shy individuals as social inadequacy. On the contrary, shyness is regarded as an endearing quality in many Native cultures (Brant, 1993). And, silence in the presence of elders is a sign of respect and harmony (Carbaugh, 1990). Children demonstrate their willingness to learn by quietly listening to the instructor, observing interactions, and by avoiding open confrontation in the classroom (R. Scollon & Scollon, 1979). Disagreements and open discussions are often associated with disrespect and, therefore, are viewed as a violation of cultural norms and values (Deyhle & Swisher, 1997; Philips, 1972). While in Native cultures silence serves a specific communicative role (Basso, 1970; S. Scollon, 1982), in Western cultures silence indicates absence of communication and is associated with the lack of interest, insufficient knowledge, social inhibition, unassertiveness, discomfort, or low self confidence. A shy individual may be less successful in the mainstream educational and organizational environment because “organizations tend to reward highly verbal individuals and either ignore quiet people or dismiss them” (Richmond, 1997, p. 256). Indeed, in cultures which view effective communication in terms of direct verbal expressiveness and assertiveness, people who tend to speak less, and thus create impressions of timid and reserved people, may be perceived as less knowledgeable and professionally incompetent.

Several limitations must be acknowledged. First, the list of stereotypes was developed in the frames of Western culture. Katz and Braly’s (1933) original procedures might not include some character traits common to the Native people of the Russian Far East and Alaska. However, because the developed survey was reviewed by five individuals from the University of Alaska Fairbanks for accuracy and appropriateness of the terms, it can be assumed that the most common stereotypes were part of the research instrument. Moreover, the statistical test of reliability proved the developed scales to be highly reliable. Second, the scales measured self-reported data from the participants. The results revealed prevalent auto- and hetero-stereotypes common to native cultures and allowed to make assumptions about the role they play in intercultural communication. However, the collected data does not allow us to uncover specific practices through which the stereotypes become evident in
interpersonal communication. Therefore, it was not possible to compare participants’ actual characteristics enacted in communication with the self-reported traits. Third, the assessment of self-declared shyness does not allow us to evaluate the role of personality traits in the development of cultural stereotypes, shyness, and their combined effect on communication strategies during intercultural encounters. These features should continue to be explored. And, although it was beyond the scope of the present study to examine the impact of different social circumstances on cultural stereotypes and shyness, a systematic study of the conditions under which these phenomena are developed would be also valuable to future research. Finally, future research should address additional factors such as self-confidence, interpersonal relationships, and communicative competence that may contribute to the formation of cultural stereotypes and shape intercultural experiences of feeling shy.

This study has examined cultural stereotypes as a new window through which to view cultural changes that took place in the Russian Far East and Alaska. The study provides further support for the hypothesis that shyness is not a fixed personality trait but varies not only through the course of a person’s life and its degree depends upon social environment and the context of interactions. The examination of cultural stereotypes and shyness has the potential to help us understand how these phenomena shape perceptions and cultural expectations and can also generate new insights into existing theories of interpersonal communication focusing on willingness to communicate and communication apprehension during intercultural encounters.

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Why Do Russians Support Censorship of the Media?

Jukka Pietiläinen and Dmitry Strovsky

This article analyses support for censorship in Russia as part of the democratization process. Censorship has been an important part of Russian history and it was strengthened during the Soviet era. After the collapse of the Soviet system formal censorship was banned even though the reality has been different. Therefore it is not strange that many Russians would like to limit the freedom of the media and to censor certain topics. The views of Russians on censorship have been studied on the basis of a survey carried out in 2007. According to the results, three different dimensions of censorship were found. These dimensions include moral censorship, political censorship, and censorship of religious materials. Support for these dimensions varies on the basis of socio-demographic characteristics and media use. The article concludes that many Russians reject new phenomena, while support for the censorship of political criticism is not as high, but political censorship seems to enjoy more support among elites than among the common people.

Keywords: Russia, censorship, public opinion, mentality, social change, media

Public support for democratic values has been seen as an important part of the democratization process. If people tend to see democracy and democratic institutions in a negative light, they may easily support authoritarian movements which may turn back the democratization process. Freedom of speech and the press belong to the most important institutions of a democracy and in order to survive they need popular support. Since an independent media did not exist in the Soviet Union, these freedoms have been weak and their development has been slow. In the 1990s many journalists and media ended up with

Jukka Pietiläinen is a media researcher at the Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki (jukka.pietilainen@helsinki.fi). Dmitry Strovsky is a professor of media history in the Journalism Faculty of the Ural State University, Russia (stroovsky@mail.ru).
paid-articles which destroyed public trust in the media and few protested when the state silenced critical television channels after 2000. If people do not see the value of a pluralist, uncensored media they may easily support or approve of, government policies will limit the freedom of speech.

The concept of an “authoritarian personality” was launched in the 1950s (Adorno, Frenkl-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) and since then both right-wing and left-wing authoritarian individuals have been seen as a threat to democratic regimes and even though criticism has been directed at this concept and the authoritarian personality has been seen to be in decline in post-modern societies, the links between individual beliefs and political outcomes have been widely studied. Former studies in post-Soviet Russia have been found that “authoritarianism strongly predicted support for reactionary leaders and military actions and opposition to democratic and non-Russian leaders and to democratic activities” (McFarland, Agyev, & Abalakina-Paap, 1992, p. 1004).

In this article we pay attention to one aspect of authoritarian political thinking, namely, the support for censorship, and analyze how support for censorship is structured in Russia and what kind of materials post-Soviet Russians would like to censor and why. It is worth noticing that attitudes to censorship have been widely studied in the United States (see Lambe, 2002,), while this kind of research has been very limited in other countries, especially in Western Europe. Therefore, this study about Russia will also offer opportunities for international comparisons.

CENSORSHIP IN CZARIST RUSSIA AND IN THE SOVIET UNION

In the Czarist era, censorship was inseparable from the political background of the society and was actively cultivated by the monarchy. The political will of the tsar was always considered indisputable by most people, and therefore the proclaimed “rules of the game” seem to have been a strong priority for the nation. Censorship was consistently promoted by czars without the agreement of political bodies. The first Russian newspaper, Vedomosti, was founded by Peter the Great in 1702 and was personally edited by him for over two decades. In fact, Vedomosti was not a specific kind of a publication and resembled more a PR instrument than a newspaper as traditionally understood in the West.

Although historical sources indicate great changes were underway with regard to censorship in the early twentieth century compared to previous centuries, this, in fact, concerned mostly political plurality, not the printed word. True, there existed a larger variety of newspapers at that time, but any publication critical of the political system was unwelcome. With some exceptions, the Bolshevik press was undermined until Lenin and his comrades came to power in 1917.
The Soviet period inherited many political traditions from the preceding society. One of these legacies was undoubtedly the existence and enforcement of censorship.

As early as December 1918, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Russian republic enacted the Statute of Military Censorship. In June 1922, a new body inherited all censoring authorities: Glavlit (Glavnoe Upravlenie po Delam Literatury i Izdatelstv — The Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs). Glavlit censored all printed materials, photographic materials, and books. From the very beginning, Glavlit possessed vast powers. It was authorized to conduct a preliminary surveillance of all works destined for publication and distribution, including the press.

Some stages of Soviet history, the so-called “thaws” which only lasted for relatively short periods of time such as New Economic Policy under Lenin or Khrushchev’s denunciation of the Stalin’s legacy, demonstrated a different attitude to censorship. Nonetheless, these “thaws” did little to change the ideological principles underlying the state’s existence. In Soviet society, formal censorship developed alongside political control (party supervision of the media) and pre-censorship by editors (Dzirkals, 1982). Censors were interested not only in repressing heretical opinions, but also in dictating what must be written (Dewhirst & Farrell, 1973, p. 12).

**The Post-Soviet Era: New Trends?**

In the Soviet media law of 1990, formal censorship was banned even though the reality was different. There were many rules that allowed these proclaimed rules to be broken by claiming political necessity. The “inadmissibility of censorship” is also declared in the contemporary Russian media law, which was adopted in 1991 and maintains its initial traits without great changes. Censorship itself is defined as “the demand made by officials, state organs, organizations, institutions or public associations that the editor’s office of a mass medium shall get in advance agreement on a message and materials (...) and also for the suppression of the dissemination of messages and materials” (Russian Mass Media Law, 1991). This definition extends the range of censorship beyond state organs. Even though formal censorship was apparently removed in post-Soviet Russia, editorial freedom was limited, and therefore most Russian journalists continued to engage in self-censorship (Belin, 2001, p. 341). By self-censorship we mean, to a large extent, self-limitation, that is when an author involved in different sorts of creativity has to restrain or even stop himself/herself from developing a certain idea. Self-censorship usually appears as a very specific skill in camouflageing one’s thoughts in response to political, economic, and cultural circumstances. Moreover, new forms of limitations have been developed concerning the ban to spread state, military, or commercial secrets (Zhirkov, 2001, p. 349-350). Under Putin’s presidency, state supervision of the most important media, especially television, has been tightened (Belin,
The state itself and its structures became pivotal censors of the content of the two main Russian TV-channels (First channel and Rossiya) of the state’s interests. Non-criticism of state policy, initiated and developed by Russian Presidents Vladimir Putin at first and then Dmitry Medvedev, was and is strictly favored by these two TV-channels, and all other scenarios are unwelcome.

Aleksei Simonov, the Chief of the Russian Glasnost Defense Foundation, identifies six types of censorship: administrative censorship, economic censorship, censorship resulting from actions by, or threats from, criminals, censorship resulting from editorial policy, censorship resulting from editorial taste, and self-censorship (Dewhirst, 2002, p. 28-30). If tighter criteria are used, only the first of these remarks can be defined as censorship. The challenge for researchers in the Russian case is that the concept ‘censorship’ may be used in a much wider context than is usually the case in the West.

Many opinion polls conducted in Russia over the last few years have demonstrated a high level of support for censorship and media control among the Russian population. The recent polls conducted by ROMIR Monitoring and the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (WCIOM) in the spring of 2004 and 2006 have shown that 62-63% of Russians (WCIOM, 6.7.2004; VCIOM, 04.08.2006) and 40% of Russian journalists (Zhurnalisty o Rossii, obschestve i SMI, 2004, p. 11) support censorship in the mass media. To be sure, the ROMIR survey notes that a third of respondents viewed censorship as necessarily justified (obyazatel’no nuzhna), while 39% were feeling that it is more likely to be justified (skoree nuzhna). Only 9% of respondents considered censorship unjustified (neopravdannaya), while 18% reported that censorship is unjustified only to some extent. According to WCIOM, 35% of those interviewed thought censorship absolutely necessary (bezuslovno nuzhna), while 28% considered censorship justified to some extent (2004; 2006).

In other polls conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation, support for censorship was lower (between 49% and 57%) than that in the polls by ROMIR and WCIOM, but the majority of Russians supported the idea of censorship. The topics that Russians usually consider necessary to be censored include not only politics, but also sex, pornography, violence, crimes, and surprisingly, advertising. Some respondents added to these topics art forms, entertainment, and feature films (Monitoring obschestvennogo mneniya, 2004, p. 93-94).

**Research Material, Methods, and Results**

To determine why and to what extent Russians today are inclined to support censorship, a question on censorship was included in a survey of the Russian population commissioned by a group of Finnish researchers.
Why Do Russians Support Censorship of the Media? Jukka Pietiläinen and Dmitry Strovsky

The Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences carried out the survey in February 2007 in 52 locations in Russia under the supervision of Mikhail Chernysh. The data were collected by geographical cluster sampling. The locations in which the interviews took place ranged from Moscow to small villages in the Far East as well as to non-Russian republics. The total number of respondents was 2,014.

The question on censorship was divided into ten different categories, partly on the basis of earlier research and opinion polls, partly on the basis of researchers’ decision. Even if the list of the topics suggested is far from complete, it nevertheless offers an opportunity to analyze support for censorship in detail. The support for censorship for each content category was measured on a three-point scale. These were: 1) information should be banned; 2) information should be published with limitations, and 3) information should be freely disseminated. Between 3% and 18% of the respondents chose the fourth option, “hard to say.” The lowest figure for those having no opinion occurred with regard to the censorship of violence, and the highest, regarding materials glorifying communism. The last category was included in order to find out if there were people who would like to ban the praising of the former regime, but are liberals concerning other topics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Banned</th>
<th>Released with limitations</th>
<th>Circulated freely</th>
<th>Hard to say</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of the President of Russia</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials against an ethnic group or race</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials glorifying communism</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative information, “the dark side of reality”</td>
<td>66.9%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information on sexual minorities, homosexuals</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials on sects, non-traditional religions</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depiction of violent scenes</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openly erotic materials, naked bodies</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious propaganda</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertisements</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1

Opinion about Banning Various Types of Information
In general, support for censorship was high (Table 1): the average figures for the ten issues were 47% for total censorship, 34% for partial limitation, and only 11% for free dissemination. On the other hand, the topics were selected so that they would have yielded significant support for censorship.

The results indicate that censorship of political topics, represented in this study with the banning of criticism of the Russian President, is rather unpopular in Russia. Only a few people favor a total ban; the rest of the respondents were divided almost equally between those supporting free dissemination and those supporting partial limitations. On the other hand, the majority would like to suppress other topics, including those not occurring in the Soviet media, such as nudity, information on sexual minorities and on new religious movements.

Cluster analysis reveals that Russians could be divided into five different groups according to their support for censorship (Table 2). Initially, a small group of liberally-minded people emerges who almost completely oppose censorship. On the opposite side of the spectrum is a rather large group supporting extensive censorship. Quite close to the liberals is a third group consisting of “middle-way” people who hold neither strictly pro-censorship nor strictly anti-censorship views, but would impose limitations on some specific

### Table 2

Five Groups of Censorship Supporters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberals</th>
<th>Supporters of partial censorship</th>
<th>Supporters of censorship of religious materials</th>
<th>Supporters of political censorship</th>
<th>Supporters of hard-line censorship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in big cities</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 30 years of age</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High education</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
cases. In addition, two groups are usually pro-censorship but along stricter lines, firstly, with regard to religious materials and, secondly, with regard to political materials.

The first, most liberal, group comprises only 6% of Russians. They oppose most forms of censorship and would at most like to censor only explicit scenes of violence, advertisements, and nudity. They are mainly men, often younger than 30 years of age and live mainly in Moscow and some other major cities.

The second group is comprised of people choosing the middle option of selective control. The majority of this group supports only a ban on the portrayal of violence. The third and fourth groups differ from the others with regard to certain materials. The supporters of censorship of religious materials would like to limit religious propaganda and information about new religious movements, but would have allowed criticism of the Russian President and materials glorifying communism. Another group supporting selective censorship comprises supporters of political censorship; they would not seek to limit religious propaganda, but would like to limit criticism of the Russian President and materials glorifying communism. The supporters of censorship of religious materials are also younger than the supporters of political censorship; old women especially prefer political censorship to censorship of religious materials.

The supporters of hard-line censorship would like to ban most topics from being published. Only criticism of the Russian President and advertisements are not unanimously supported. Hard-line censorship is the most common type among women over 30 and men over 60 years old. This finding is well in line with former studies on values in Russia. Ellen Garnaghan, for example, has learned that Russians “who were more willing to give up freedom often thought they had very little freedom to start with” (Garnaghan, 2007, p. 180). Remarkable differences on the basis of age were found by Mishler and Rose (2007), who came to the conclusion that such differences were caused by socialization under different social conditions.

The more liberal groups include those people who are better educated, younger, and who have higher incomes. The liberals and supporters of partial censorship are also the groups with a majority of men. The supporters of hard-line censorship can mostly be found in rural areas and in towns with a population of less than one million inhabitants.

Different categories of censorship correlated positively with each other. The highest correlation (.50) could be found between the censorship of information on sexual minorities and the censorship of materials about non-traditional religions. The weakest correlation (.065) occurred between censorship of advertisements and the censorship of criticism of the Russian president. Also, correlations between the censorship of religious propaganda and of ethnic hatred were low. Support for a censorship of religious propaganda seems to have different roots than do other types of censorship.
The factor analysis suggests three different dimensions of censorship; for further analysis the ten topics of censorship were reduced to three factors, of which the components appear in Table 3.

The first of these factors most clearly includes topics such as information on sexual minorities, explicit scenes of violence, and erotic materials. These clearly reflect the moral nature of censorship. The second factor comprises mainly censorship of criticism of the Russian President, of materials glorifying communism, and of materials against an ethnic group. This factor represents the political nature of censorship.

The third factor is represented most clearly by religious propaganda, followed by the censorship of advertisements. Also, materials on sects and non-traditional religions as well
as materials glorifying communism receive a rather high loading on this factor. Therefore, this element of censorship may not reflect anti-religious and anti-capitalist Soviet thinking, but rather a more modern anti-religious and anti-market thinking.

As studies in the United States have found (Lambe, 2004), censorship of pornography and censorship of hate speech are two different elements of censorship. In Russia, however, this distinction is not as clear as in the United States, since censorship of materials against an ethnic group or race is also partly represented in the moral censorship factor.

The background variables affecting the support for each of these types of censorship, differ somewhat, and in some cases, are even opposite.

As Table 4 shows, the three types of censorship are based partly on different background variables. The three trust variables in the table have been counted with factor analysis on the basis of trust in 15 different institutions. In addition, identity variables have been counted with factor analysis by factoring a group of statements on identity with which the respondents could agree or disagree.

In addition to background variables, media use and media-related attitudes also have an impact on support for censorship. Actually, most of these media-use habits reflect support for censorship mostly on the basis of the different media use habits of different age or other groups. Therefore, reading *Cosmopolitan* or watching *MTV* may have no direct links to decreased support for censorship, but rather such media are targeted at young people, who generally support censorship of moral issues less than older people, who seldom read *Cosmopolitan* or watch *MTV*.

On the other hand, these media-use habits may be connected to censorship attitudes. For example, it seems reasonable that people who read *Cosmopolitan* and watch entertainment TV channels *STS* and *TNT* may oppose moral censorship more than others, even though one must note that such media use habits have less influence than age. The causality may even work in the opposite direction: supporters of moral censorship may be less likely to read *Cosmopolitan* or to watch entertainment TV according to their attitudes to censorship. When correlations are counted separately for each age group, reading *Cosmopolitan* and watching *STS* appear to bear a significant relationship to support for moral censorship only among people aged 40 to 49. The correlations concerning the groups of different ages are positive, but statistically insignificant.

The results suggest that media-use habits are based on age, which also explains both the attitude towards moral censorship and media use. The impact of a particular type of media use on censorship attitudes appears only in some population groups.

**Moral Censorship**

The most important predictor for moral censorship is age. The young support moral censorship less than older people. The clearest difference is in the willingness of the latter
Table 4

Significant Correlations Between Background Variables and Different Types of Censorship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background variable</th>
<th>Moral censorship</th>
<th>Political censorship</th>
<th>Censorship of religious materials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>-.06*</td>
<td>-.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>-.06**</td>
<td>.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of settlement (1 = Moscow, 9 = small village)</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has children</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family size (living together)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent’s family income</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-perceived level of well-being</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>.06*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in well-being since 2000</td>
<td>-.10**</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic optimism</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in spending for medical services</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in spending for food</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>-.06*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in spending for municipal payments</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>-.07*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position in managerial hierarchy</td>
<td></td>
<td>.08*</td>
<td>-.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaks a foreign language</td>
<td>-.13**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.07**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusts state institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusts civil society (including the media)</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusts army and church</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic non-Russian</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity: regional and ethnic</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity: world citizen</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
<td></td>
<td>.07**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity: USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.08**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believes in God</td>
<td>.08**</td>
<td>.08**</td>
<td>-.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox believer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.09**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** = correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; * = correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.

to support censorship of erotic materials: support for censorship decreases almost exactly 10 percentage points per ten years of age (see Table 5). Willingness to support censorship of
### Table 5

**Media Use and Support for Censorship**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background variable</th>
<th>Moral censorship</th>
<th>Political censorship</th>
<th>Censorship of religious materials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Read newspapers</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read magazines</td>
<td>-.07**</td>
<td>.07*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen to the radio</td>
<td>-.08**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watch First channel (state)</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watch Rossiya channel (state)</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watch TNT channel (private)</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
<td></td>
<td>.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watch STS channel (private)</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watch MTV channel (private)</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watch Kultura channel (state)</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watch Sport TV (state)</td>
<td>-.08**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watch Ren-TV (private)</td>
<td>-.07**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen to Radio Rossi</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen to Evropa Plus</td>
<td>-.16**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen to Avisoradio</td>
<td>-.08**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen to Radio Shanshon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen to Radio Dorozhnoe</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.09**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen to Ekho Moskvy</td>
<td>-.05*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read Komsomol’skaya pravda</td>
<td>.06*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read Liza</td>
<td></td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read Cosmopolitan</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read Sem dnei</td>
<td></td>
<td>.08**</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read Zdorov’e</td>
<td>.07*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet connection at home</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of information: newspapers</td>
<td>.05*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.11**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of information: internet</td>
<td>-.09**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of information: radio</td>
<td></td>
<td>.06*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
violence does not decrease with a similar tendency but it nevertheless demonstrates the lowest rate among the youngest. In addition, support for censorship of information on sexual minorities and of negative information is lower in younger age groups. In particular, those under 30 differ from all others.

This finding is well in line with generation differences in Russian society that have been found previously. Younger Russians, whose experience of the USSR is more limited, are better adapted to the new social conditions. Therefore, they tend to accept new phenomena in society and the media better than the older generations who have lived under completely different conditions.

Moreover, gender and income are important predictors of support for moral censorship. Women and those with low incomes are more willing to support moral censorship. The difference between men and women is usually not very great: it is highest for the censorship of erotic material (+19%) and of negative information (+12%). People whose families earn less than 7,500 rubles monthly are more willing to support moral censorship.

Those living in rural areas more often support moral censorship as do those with lower education. In addition, those who feel their well-being has not improved since 1998 are more willing to support moral censorship.

The impact of trust in social institutions is measured according to three dimensions. Levels of trust in 15 institutions were measured on a five point scale and factor analysis served to reveal three dimensions of trust (trust in state institutions; trust in non-state institutions, including the media; and trust in the church and the army).

Trust in traditional institutions of authority (the army and the church) has a positive impact on support for moral censorship, but trust in civil society — including the media — has a negative impact. Various institutions seem to compete for the place of moral guidance: trust in traditional authorities opposes trust in modern institutions. Thus, those who see traditional institutions as more important tend to support censorship. Trust in state institutions has no significant impact on support for moral censorship. In addition, media use has some impact on support for moral censorship. Those who read newspapers less often are less willing to support moral censorship, but those who read journals and listen to the radio more often are more willing to support moral censorship. The differences caused by media use actually result from different media-use habits among people of different ages. When the influence of age is controlled for, these differences disappear or become insignificant. Having an Internet connection at home also decreases one’s willingness to support moral censorship.
Political Censorship

Political censorship combines the censorship of criticism of the Russian President, of praising communism, and of hatred against ethnic groups.

The most important factor behind differences favoring support for political censorship is location. Those living in the countryside are more willing to support political censorship than those living in Moscow and in towns with 100,000 to one million inhabitants. In this respect, the most liberal people can be found in St. Petersburg.

The impacts of age, income, change in well-being since 2000, and change in consumption are opposite to support for moral censorship. Those who are young, have higher incomes, whose well-being has improved, and whose consumption of food and medical services has decreased support political censorship more often than others. The impact of age is mostly due to younger Russians’ greater inclination to ban materials glorifying communism.

Women support political censorship more than men. The gender difference is greatest in support of a ban on materials against an ethnic group or race (+6%), but is almost non-existent in the two other main categories of political censorship.

Income as such does not lead to any differences in support of political censorship, but a person’s self-perception of his/her economic situation has a small impact: those who feel that their economic situation is better more frequently support political censorship. This is due mainly to the fact that those with no economic problems support the censorship of materials glorifying communism more than do others and would like to at least limit, if not ban, criticism of the Russian President. In addition, those at the lower end of the economic scale support political censorship more than do middle-class economic groups.

Position in a managerial hierarchy also has a positive correlation to political censorship. About 25% of top-level managers preferred to ban criticism of the Russian President and as many as 48% of managers supported a ban on materials glorifying communism.

Believers in God are also more prone to support political censorship. People who identify themselves as citizens of the USSR are less willing to support political censorship, mainly because they support censorship of materials glorifying communism less than others. People who identify themselves as citizens of the USSR are usually older, more often live in the rural areas, and have a lower level of education.

The most important difference for moral censorship is its impact on trust in civil society. Trust in almost any institution, including the media, increases support for political censorship. In particular, trust in media and in civil society institutions (trade unions, civic organizations) and in political institutions increases in terms of a certain desire to support political censorship. This can be explained by the fact that trust in both the President and the
media represents support for the status quo and that this trust in state authorities implies trust in granting the right to control media content to someone in a superior position.

Political censorship seems to enjoy more support among elites than among the common people. This element of censorship also includes topics such as the censorship of materials glorifying communism. It seems reasonable that elites in particular support such censorship. The orientation of elites has turned to the opposite but the attitude to alternative views has remained the same: before anticommunist materials were not tolerated, now the same attitude is focused on pro-communist materials.

Censorship of Religious Materials

This dimension of censorship represents a way of thinking which opposes both religious propaganda and, strangely, advertising. Both are topics which did not exist in the Soviet media. In addition, materials on new religious sects and, perhaps surprisingly, those glorifying communism have a certain impact on this element of censorship.

The clearest indicator for censorship of religious materials was naturally represented by religious faith. Of believers, 24% supported censorship of religious propaganda and 22% would like to permit it without limitations, whereas among non-believers, these figures were 29% in favor of complete censorship and only 12% in favor of the free dissemination of religious propaganda. It may seem strange that many believers support the control of religious propaganda, but they may oppose the propaganda of other religions more than that of their own or they may not define religious materials primarily as “propaganda.”

Moreover, a respondent’s position in a managerial hierarchy affects his or her support for religious censorship. Those in higher managerial positions support censorship of religious materials more than do others.

Men support this kind of censorship more than do women and the young support it more than the old. Gender and age had completely opposite effects on the censorship of religious propaganda and advertisements than on the censorship of other kinds of issues.

The banning of religious propaganda enjoys support among the younger population, but banning of advertisements has more support among people over 60. Among others, support for the banning of advertisements is relatively stable. Among people under 30, the attitude towards advertisements is the freest: as many as 41% would allow it without restrictions. On the other hand, only 12% of people under 30 would like to allow religious propaganda without restrictions.

Even though education has practically no impact on religiosity, those with a poor educational level support censorship of religious materials more actively. Those who do not use newspapers as a source of information and do not read newspapers also favor censorship of religious materials.
Quite naturally, those who did not trust the Russian Orthodox Church seek to support censorship of religious materials. On the other hand, there were no major differences between trust in other institutions and censorship of religious materials.

While a ban on religious propaganda is supported more by non-believers than by orthodox believers, support for a ban on information concerning non-traditional religions is bolstered by orthodox believers, even though the difference is small. Also, the censorship of advertisements enjoys support among orthodox believers more often than among members of other religions and non-believers. The finding that a significant number of believers support a ban on religious propaganda can be understood as part of a certain formlessness which according to Jeffrey Alexander (1997, p. 109-110) has emerged in the post-socialist states.

**Discussion**

The high level of support for censorship, which has also been found in earlier studies, lends support to the idea that some elements of a totalitarian or authoritarian mindset still prevail in post-Soviet Russia. As has been found earlier (Mishler & Willerton, 2003, p. 114-115), the Russian public tends to support order and security and expect the state to take responsibility for popular well-being. It may well be that Russians also expect the state to take responsibility for decent media content and therefore tend to support censorship, even if this means state control of the media. Fear and suspicion regarding new things perhaps explain Russian attitudes to censorship even more clearly: things which did not exist in Soviet period continue to generate dissatisfaction, especially among older people who were socialized during the Soviet era.

Moreover, according to research conducted on the basis of data collected for the European Social Survey, the average Russian is characterized by a high level of cautiousness or even fear, and a high need for the protection of a strong government (Magun & Rudnev, 2008, p. 56).

High levels of cautiousness on the one hand and trust in strong government on the other are also related to high levels of support for censorship. Fear of new things contributes to the idea that the emergence of new things should be limited and strong support for social protection from a powerful government paves the way to censorship (by the government) as a means of restriction.

The two main elements of censorship, moral censorship and political censorship, are supported by very different, in many cases even opposing, groups of people. Moral censorship is supported more often by the elderly, women, those with low education, low social status, and people living in rural areas.
On the other hand, political censorship is supported more often by those who have gained in the transition and who are on the upper levels of the managerial hierarchy. This may have something to do with the idea that fear of freedom is part of the totalitarian mentality inherited from the Soviet past (Mikheyev, 1996, p. 34). The new elites have been formed partly on the basis of the old Soviet elite and have retained part of that old elite’s mentality.

The high level of support for censorship, even if censorship itself is based on moral rather than political considerations, indicates that institutional learning did not develop as rapidly as Mishler and Rose (2007) found on the basis of some other variables. Moreover, when comparative data is available it tends to indicate an increase rather than a decrease in support for censorship in general.

The rather strict views on the censorship of most issues are in accordance with the trend previously identified in lesser advanced countries of Eastern Europe (Russia included) that “the population feels a stronger need for stricter laws, for resisting illegal acts and organized crime,” and in this case the professionals “indicate the highest degree of support for respect of the legal and institutional order” (Tilkidjie, 2006, p. 124-125).

Increasing trust in the president and other institutions may even have an impact on support for censorship: an increased trust in institutions may also result in increasing trust in censorship exercised by these institutions.

Political censorship seems to be more related to the Soviet past. Political censorship is supported more actively by the elites. The old thinking remains, but the direction is the opposite: the glorification of communism should be banned, likewise criticism of the Russian President. Political censorship, however, is much less prominent than moral censorship, and attitudes towards it are much more liberal.

The fact that Russian elites support political censorship more than ordinary people confirms that the elite is not ready for freedom and political competition, as Lilia Shevtsova (2007, p. 295) has aptly stated.

Different types of censorship can be seen to have relationships to different types of totalitarian mentality, as Vainshtein (1994, p. 256) has defined them. As some support the former totalitarian regime, some are adherents of authoritarian rule aimed at the creation of a market economy, while the democratic idea is generally compromised.

The generation shift may also reduce the support for censorship, but this will more likely cause a decline in moral rather than political censorship. Attitudes to some new phenomena have become paradoxically both more tolerant and even less tolerant, as is the case with attitudes towards religious sects (Levada, 2004).

On the other hand, it is worth noting that only a minority entirely support free publication of materials against ethnic groups even though Russian political culture has some elements of intolerance. Russians seem to be realizing dangerous opportunities for xenophobia, which may lead to dire consequences, taking into account the historical legacy
of the country. Therefore, the many provocative attempts by nationalistic groups to fan the fire of hatred against national minorities are being regarded as a negative development by most of the population.

**CONCLUSION**

This study examined three different types of censorship found in Russia. These elements of censorship include moral censorship, political censorship, and the censorship of religious materials.

Moral censorship combines the censorship of obscenity (violence, nudity) as well as various new phenomena including non-traditional religions and advertisements. Moral censorship represents fear and rejection of new phenomena and seems to be related to political conservatism, as in the United States (Peek & Brown, 1978). In Russia, however, moral censorship seems to be linked even more to age and may decline in the future.

Censorship of religious materials is a form of censorship that is more frequently found among the young than the old and is more common among men than women. This dimension of censorship seems to be the most non-traditional element of censorship, which is more supported by people who identify themselves as citizens of the world.

An individual support for censorship correlates with his/her experience of the overall political and economic changes in modern Russian society. Many individuals reject new phenomena such as pornography, sexual minorities, and non-traditional religions indiscriminately. In this respect, Russians support censorship when they become older or if they are poorly educated, live in smaller towns or in rural areas, and believe in God. Similar causalities have also been found in American support for censorship (Lambe, 2002).

In fact, Russians support the censorship of many issues mainly for the same reasons as do Americans. On the other hand, censorship of criticism of the Russian President, the glorification of communism, and of religious propaganda are seen as specific phenomena support for which is not directly connected to support for the censorship of other topics.

The prospects of support for censorship seem to be uncertain and ambiguous: the decline of non-conformism can be seen as a positive development, but at the same time there is also a growing willingness to condone violence and ethnic hatred. There is not, as could be expected, a negative correlation between opposition to censorship of information on sexual minorities on the one hand and opposition to hate speech on the other. This sounds alarming, because with opposition to censorship on political issues more acceptable forms of censorship, such as that of violence and of hate speech, lose support.
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CONSTRUCTING THE ENEMY: STALIN’S POLITICAL IMAGINATION AND THE GREAT TERROR

VLADIMIR DOBRENKO

This article analyses Stalin’s political imagination, which is crucial in our understanding of the nature of the Great Terror. Through the minutes of the 1936-1938 show trials this article explores the process of how the enemy was constructed and medialized for the state organs to communicate to a mass audience. Stalin externalized his political fantasies and materialized them through the narratives of the show trials. The Show Trials had their own dynamic, even though Stalin was directly involved in initiating and conducting them. As the producer of the trials, Stalin pushed the idea of politics as conspiracy onto the centre stage. This paper is concerned with how the show trial minutes were used by the state media organs to generate typologies which could be internalized for mass consumption. Not only did the trials define the nature and dimensions of the threat facing the USSR, they also provided a mobilizational narrative that showed citizens on what and on whom to focus their vigilance.

Keywords: Stalinism, the Great Terror, propaganda, medialization, myth

This article deals with the centrepiece of the Great Terror — the Moscow Show Trials. Specifically, it will concern itself with the functions of enemy images and mapping out the process of how they were constructed and medialized through the minutes of the 1936, 1937 and 1938 show trials. At the centre of our interest is the analysis of Stalin’s political imagination, which is crucial for our understanding of the Great Terror. The enemy images

Vladimir Dobrenko is a Ph.D. student at the University of Sheffield, United Kingdom (vladmirdobrenko@googlemail.com).
which materialized during the show trials functioned within a narrative (the written word) which Stalin had formulated in his speeches and articles in the 1920s. Yet the minutes of the show trials were not merely a continuation of the enemy narrative which Stalin had built in the previous decade. Not only did the show trials give flesh to Stalin’s imagined enemies, but they also created a legitimizing political narrative and a political show. Above all, the show trials, with their tortuous plotlines, characters, and drama, medialized the enemy. In other words, the minutes of the show trials, as a piece of text, materialized Stalin’s political imagination and provided a mobilizational narrative for other organs of propaganda to communicate to the masses. After all, Stalin, unlike Hitler’s penchant for oratorical histrionics, was a man of writing and, as this analysis will demonstrate, through the written word he projected his political vision onto the public sphere.

Accordingly, this paper approaches the Moscow Show trials as a communicative process from top to bottom, as conceptualized and directed by Stalin and communicated through media organs for mass consumption. Though the show trials were communicated in innumerable ways, the task of this paper is to analyze one strand of this communication: the show trial minutes. However, it should be noted that this analysis does not correlate with the two most prominent historical approaches to Stalinism: totalitarianism and revisionist social history. Though the former approach emphasises Stalin’s personal role in the Terror it ultimately postulates that he was a product of a system with an all-embracing vision of life which demanded a leader with total power. This analysis does not share this premise. As stated earlier, the starting point of this analysis is that Stalin was the architect of the Terror. The emphasis on mass perception, characteristic of so many social historians (Davies, 1997), is also inessential here since this analysis is not pre-occupied with public opinion of the Terror but what and how state propaganda organs communicated to the public.

Stalin managed to take power in the 1920s in part by creating “plausible” narratives for each of his political opponents and instilling them in the Party. Yet these narratives existed only on paper; they had yet to materialize into a reality. In essence, Kirov’s assassination allowed Stalin to reformulate the enemy narrative which he had been refining in the 1920s into a “script” and a theatrical charade aimed at mass consumption and internalization.

However, what was meant to be internalized as a singular “enemy” was anything but. Instead, the “enemy” was an amalgamation of different characteristics which reflected Stalin’s own position vis-à-vis the Party and the masses. After all, in constructing a serious and credible threat in these three theatrical farces, Stalin was able to “fan and direct society’s fears” by providing them with “a mobilization narrative” (Chase, 2005, p. 230) to expand the scale of the Terror to all corners of the country.

But how was Stalin able to transform his “script” and give the trials “a form in which all details — charges, evidence, testimony, roles and sentences — were creatively harmonized within the framework of a general idea? In which the Oppositionist’s anti-Soviet
substance could be proven to be ‘Oppositionist criminality?’” (Carmichael, 1976, p. 46). The internalization of the Terror was a top down phenomenon. Stalin’s logic was first taken on by the state organs, which themselves would transfer the terror to the people. In his memoirs, Alexander Orlov, a former high-ranking NKVD functionary, described the machinery of transmission of Stalin’s will to the NKVD apparatus and the role of Iagoda and Mironov.

This is how the mechanism of externalization worked through the institutions of the NKVD and Politburo:

One of Mironov’s many abilities was his phenomenal memory. A trait of which Yagoda himself couldn’t boast. For that very reason Yagoda used to take Mironov with him to Stalin even when reporting things that did not concern Mironov directly, in order to lean on Mironov’s prodigious memory and not to miss a single detail of Stalin’s instructions. As a rule, after such reports to Stalin, Mironov would immediately sit down at his desk and transcribe for Yagoda in great detail each of Stalin’s instructions with the exact expressions that Stalin had used. This was especially important for Yagoda in those cases when Stalin instructed him in what pseudo-Marxian phraseology Yagoda must formulate certain propositions to the Politbureau on issues in which Stalin had a hidden interest. Incidents like that occurred mostly when Stalin would begin to “dig under” some member of the Politbureau or the Central Committee with the intent of getting rid of him (Orlov, 1954, p. 123).

This initial phase of institutional internalization was greatly expedited by State Prosecutor Andrei Vyshinsky and the head of the NKVD, Nikolai Ezhov. Vyshinsky’s role in the Shakty Trial, as Procurator-General, was a “test run” for his role in defining the enemy in the 1936-38 Show Trials. After the trial, he had developed a new categorization of the enemy, coming up with such catchphrases as “Moscow wrecking centre,” and “Kharkov anti-Soviet centre.” The model had been invented and tested and would soon be working at full tilt. In Vyshinsky, Stalin found someone who could, “with a taunting logic delivered in a sophisticated and dignified manner” (Carmichael, 1976, p. 44), force many “to build a chain of (delusional) rationalizations in their minds” (Rogovin, 1998, XXIII). Vyshinsky’s version of “revolutionary legality” blurred the line between notion and action. In conjunction with the first show trial, Vyshinsky developed his theory of “evidence” that downgraded the importance of “objective proofs, and emphasised confessions” (Solomon, 1996, 23). Just as Vyshinsky had Stalinised the Justice System, Yezhov was “refining” the investigative techniques of the state security services.

By instilling Stalin’s conception of conspiracy, the state apparatus was given “quasi-theoretical background in processing the population” (Carmichael, 1976, p. 90). This institutionalization of paranoia was self-reinforcing: it created a semblance of an authentic judicial framework because it had “explanatory” power and logic of its own. It causally linked all enemies together in a conspiratorial web and based this on the assumption that
anyone might be guilty despite all appearance since everyone could be wearing a mask (Fitzpatrick, 2005).

Since the Moscow Show Trials represented the theatrical apex of this logic, it is important to understand how this play was scripted. Though Vyshinsky and Ezhov were the two who filled out the details, it was Stalin who played a direct role in ordering investigations, crafting the indictments, packaging, and transmitting the “lessons” of these three trials.

The genesis of criminalizing the Opposition was outlined by Yezhov (and edited by Stalin) in a May 1935 manuscript, “From Fractional Activity to Open Counter-revolution,” in which he claimed that Trotskyites were informed about the terrorist activities of the Zinovievites (Hedeler, 2005). The basic concepts of this turned into directives to the NKVD organs. Just as Yezhov was establishing what the NKVD would “obtain” from its “suspects,” Vyshinsky presented Stalin with the indictment in August of 1935. Throughout the Moscow Show Trials, Stalin would edit Vyshinsky’s closing speeches and indictments before the “investigation” was even over. In the 1936 Show Trial, for instance, it was Stalin’s wish that Zinoviev be considered the instigator of Kirov’s assassination. Stalin also crossed out from the text all the references to the testimonies of the Old Bolsheviks in which they explained what had prompted them to continue their oppositional activity (Rogovin, 1998, p. 12).

Despite this strict methodology of construction, the Moscow Show Trials should not be viewed as one big indistinguishable monolith. Each Show Trial had its own dynamic and emphasised different strands of the “enemy,” which were guided by Stalin’s considerations for his target audience.

As propaganda the Zinoviev/Kamenev show trial of 1936 had exterior and ulterior objectives. On the surface, the main objective was to stamp out any perceived potential that Stalin’s old and defeated enemies — Zinoviev, Kamenev, Smirnov, and other, less prominent oppositionists - might have in posing a challenge to Stalin, real or imagined. However, interpreting the Zinoviev and Kamenev trial as only Stalin’s way of easing his own political paranoia misses an important point. Stalin’s motivations behind the 1936 trial were also based on politically pragmatic calculations: the complete subservience of the Party to the Leader. In actuality, the 1936 trial was the realization of Stalin’s imagined dialogue with the Party and a warning to all of its members about what it means to deviate from Leninism.

Therefore, the linking of “Bloc” and enemy with the “organization of terrorism” was a warning to the Party members that forming a bloc in itself amounted to a terrorist act. Thinking outside of Leninism meant working against the people’s will, since “the people” staunchly supported Stalin. Furthermore, this formula is constantly reiterated with an emphasis on the enemy’s “removal of Stalin by force,” which morally and politically delegitimizes any opposition within the Party. Stalin can only be removed by force because
he had the support from below, which thereby pits Stalin and the “masses” against the Party (Khlevniuk, 1992).

The realization that the 1936 Kamenev-Zinoviev Show Trial was too inward-looking led Stalin to alter the composition of the enemy in the 1937 and 1938 Show Trials. The 1936 trial emphasised the enemy as a threat to Stalin and the Party, both of which did not elicit much sympathy from the people (Carmichael, 1976, p. 58-59). For the Terror to take a life of its own it had to reflect the everyday life of the people. As the main architect of the Terror and the Show Trials, Stalin, as propagandist, had to taken into consideration “factors tending to modify the general reactivity level, such as public anxiety nervousness, irritability, unrest, discontent or strain” (Jackall, 1994, p. 19). Whereas the 1936 trial pitted the enemy against Stalin and the leaders of the Party, the 1937 and 1938 trials pitted the enemy against the people. The Trotskyist Centre of 1937 and the Bukharin-Trotskyist Centre of 1938 had waged terrorism against the workers, through acts of sabotage and wrecking, and against the countryside, through support of the kulaks, the poisoning of animals and crops, and conspiring to split up the land and enslaving the people by reintroducing capitalism. In the 1937 and 1938 trials, it was “revealed” that the enemy had essentially declared a covert war on the Soviet public. This emphasis on “the aggressiveness, immorality and impropriety of the ‘enemy’ made the Terror psychologically acceptable on a nationwide scale because it “loosened the restraining grip of the (public’s) conscience upon destructive impulses” (Manning, 1993, p. 116-141).

The 1936-1938 Show Trials, in the most theatrical fashion, reflected and reinforced the internalization mechanism of the Terror: the defendants admitted their mistakes and disgraced themselves politically. In these tightly-scripted self-condemnations Stalin projected his own political tactics onto the defendants. Berman-Yurin admitted that Trotsky emphasized that the attempt must be prepared very carefully and circumspectly. He insisted: “Trotsky told me that this terroristic act against Stalin must not be committed secretly, on the quiet, but that the assassination must be committed publicly, before an international forum” (The People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, 1936, p. 26). This admission, of course, is priceless, since it sums up the totality of the externalization/internalization mechanism: Stalin solved his own political anxieties by extrapolation of his own tactics on the enemy. In fact, the enemy was produced as the object of this extrapolation (Gudkov, 2004).

If the Show Trials had provided physical “proof” of a nationwide conspiracy and fulfilled part of Stalin’s grand narrative design, the enemy typologizations produced by the Show Trials had yet to be internalized by the masses. Understandably, the task of transforming what to many people might have been an intra-elite humiliation ritual into a public witch-hunt which offered the illusion of empowerment through denunciation was taken up by the press. In essence, the task of the leading state-owned newspapers, in particular Pravda and Izvestia, was to amplify the “crimes” of the enemies against the Party
beyond the courtroom. In the process, the medialization of the Show Trial filtered and contextualized the enemy through the barely concealed rage, anxiety, and desperation of everyday Soviet life brought on by the dire political, economic, and material conditions of Stalin’s Five-Year Plans.

This act of transmission and internalization in constructing the enemy is succinctly summed up by James Aho’s process of reification, in which people come to accept something abstract as concrete or physically real for “which they have no responsibility, over which they have no power, and which they must passively suffer as victims do their fate” through five stages: naming, legitimization, mythmaking, sedimentation and ritual” (Aho, 1995, p. 35). [This would be interesting integrated into the analysis instead of tacked onto the end] This process of reification fittingly illustrates Stalin’s own strategy, as expressed through the medium of show trial minutes examined here, which elevated it from an inner Party struggle to a nation-wide Terror.

Yet, with all this considered, why should the Moscow Show Trials warrant a separate investigation from other show trials throughout history? The answer to this lies in the fact that while the Moscow Show Trials share common links with other political trials, chiefly that of the ruling regime willingness to use their adversaries in a judicial context to legitimise their own rule, they are distinguished in several crucial respects. The Trial of Louis XVI is a case in point. All the leading Bolsheviks were conscious of the historical parallel between their revolution and that of the French Revolution, most notably Trotsky, whose critiques of Stalin in the 1930’s drew historical parallels between Stalin and Robespierre. Yet in retrospect, Trotsky only scratched the surface. True, the Moscow Show Trials, like the trial of Louis of XVI, were less a judicial process rather than foregone political decisions to kill and that the trials resembled ritual murders (Laughland, p. 43). Yet, in the Trial of Louis XVI there was a clear dividing line between the defendant and the prosecutor. In the Moscow Show Trials no such line existed: both defendant and prosecutor shaped each other’s dialogue for the show. In a wider historical context, unlike many other political trials throughout history, the Moscow Show Trials were not based on rational motivations. Unlike the Riom Trial in Vichy France or Louis XVI, the Moscow Show Trials were not necessary for asserting Stalin’s regime. He had already accomplished that nearly a decade earlier through political intrigue.

In looking at the newspapers from the early 1930s, it becomes evident that Stalin intended to present the Show Trials as the culmination of the economic and political development of the country. But even before 1936 Stalin could already clearly define the role the media would play in covering the Show Trials. In the earliest year of the Bolshevik regime, the authorities had already grasped the propaganda value of trials. Nearly 20 years before the Show Trials, Lenin and Trotsky advocated highly publicized trials of Nicholas II for “mass education.” Such a legal spectacle would depend on “locating a defendant sufficiently, one who symbolized and embodied the old order” (Cassiday, 2000, p. 41) and
turning them into “victims of a totalizing script that allowed for no outcome other than guilty as charged” (Cassiday, 2000, p. 5). By the end of the 1920s, political trials had become staged and highly ritualized pokazatel’nye protsessy as “legal proceedings” melodramatic enough to be replicated in film and “mock trials” in theatres across the country. In essence, these “legal proceedings” were ready-made for mass consumption, with defendants performing rituals of samokritika (self-criticism) with carefully assembled spectators ready to show their outrage and collectively condemn them.

Nevertheless, even though the theatrical aspects of the Show Trials were a logical extension of the formula perfected in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the press coverage of the Trials had its own distinct process. The evolution of the image of the enemy in the coverage of the Show Trials went through two phases. Covering the early days of the investigation, the press dehumanized the defendants on the level of official discourse. Yet, in reporting the testimonies and the death sentences, the press employed harsh populist discourse. For example, just as the Zinoviev-Kamenev Trial was beginning to proceed, an editorial on 19 August 1936 promised that the hearings would uncover Trotsky’s and Zinoviev’s “relentless ideological emptiness.” Having been stripped of their ideological status, the defendants were turned into a conglomeration of concealed identities:

When they were free, when they were camouflaged, they appeared as people of different occupations, different levels, different aspirations and even different interests. But they were just different masks of the members of one and the same criminal gang. Now they are sitting side by side, and a thread of equality is stretched between them (Pravda, 1938, p. 6).

By unmasking the defendants, revealing their emptiness, and stripping them of any recognizable human features, the press was free to recreate the enemy. The vagueness bestowed on the enemies meant that their threat extended beyond the Party; the enemy had the potential to be anyone and to be everywhere. The task of literally recreating this vague, but omnipotent enemy was brazenly assumed by Pravda:

What if we remove their respectable Soviet jackets and tunics and mentally dress them … well, say, in stereotypical coats, and pull the bowler-hats over their ears, and put blue shades on them … Of course! No doubt! Here they are, the real-life jailers, the police hides, the ‘peacoats!’ (Pravda, 1938, p. 5).

During the Show Trials the media adopted the voice of the outraged spectator by relentless promoting the calls of the “people” to physically destroy the enemy. The blurring between the press and “the people” in the coverage of these rituals of humiliation and public shaming appeared immediately after Kirov’s assassination. Pravda regularly published letters by “workers” and “peasants” that condemned the accused as “predatory beasts,”
“reptiles,” “scoundrels” and “demand(ing) that the murderers be shot.” *Pravda* would often reinforce this moral outrage. In a December 24, 1934, issue *Pravda* concluded that the “accused lost the appearance of human beings” (Brooks, 2000, p. 141). During the Trial of Kamenev and Zinoviev in 1936, *Pravda* completely replaced the voice of the outraged spectators. The headline read: “YESTERDAY THE TRIAL OF THE TROTSKYITE-ZINOVIEV GANG OF KILLERS BEGAN” and instructed readers to “Squash the vermin! Shoot the members of the Trotskyite-Zinoviev gang!” In addition, the dehumanization of the enemy as “predators,” “snakes,” “wolves,” and “rabid dogs” showed that the press consciously employed Russian folklore to appeal to the peasantry.

Yet, by filtering the Show Trials through Russian superstition and populist terminology, the media would inevitably resort to anti-Semitism. For example, a TASS (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) article covering the Zinoviev-Kamenev Trial revealed the “real” names of the defendants, such as Radomyslsky and Rosenfeld (Rogovin, 1998). Jeffrey Brooks has noted that such a Manichean representation of the enemy was bound to fuse with anti-Semitic religious undertones. During the coverage of the second Show Trial this was made most explicit with Trotsky:

> Judas — this synonym for the blackest treachery was struck as if branded on the forehead of Trotsky by Lenin more than a quarter century ago. The mark of Judas from that time was boldly and clearly stamped on all the deeds of Trotsky and his followers (Brooks, 2000, p. 145).

However, the reporting of the Trials was not merely aimed at whipping up mass resentment and diverting attention from economic problems through scapegoating. A crucial aim of the press during the Show Trials was to present to the reader a solid bond between the people and Stalin in their battle against the enemy. People had to believe that a collective effort in the destruction of the enemy and the protection of Stalin was necessary for the survival and well-being of the future because Stalin represented the heart of the “people.” Throughout the Show Trials, *Pravda* relentlessly promoted a formulaic narrative in which a big meeting took place at a factory or a collective farm where an old worker from a stage would spiritedly denounce “traitors,” call for justice against the would-be assassins of Stalin, and proclaim his devotion to the leader. It was this bond between the people and the leader that made the internalization of Stalin’s political vigilance necessary. As *Pravda* had argued, it was only the “sharp eye of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (who) uncovered the gang of mad criminal just in time” (*Pravda*, 1937, p. 2).

As we can see, the Trials of Kamenev, Zinoviev, Radek, Bukharin and others not only functioned as symbolic showpieces of the Terror, but they also fleshed out and reinforced the “Rightist” and “Leftist” narratives that Stalin had pinned on them 10 years earlier in his power struggles. Through self-condemnation and “testimonies,” the defendants of these
Show Trials were forced to work within Stalin’s logic and present “proof” of their crimes, thus giving these theatrical farces the illusion of real court proceedings. Yet the Show Trials also found Stalin at a strategic crossroads: how to externalize his own political logic so that it could be internalized by the public. The press coverage of the enemy typologies generated from the Show Trials were contextualised and filtered to reflect the economic, social, and political upheavals of the Five-Year Plan. The media campaign portrayed those on trial as only the tip of the iceberg of a vast network of conspiracies conducted by an omnipotent and omnipresent enemy. The proceedings transformed Stalin’s enemies into “enemies of the people.”

**AMALGAMATION OF THE ENEMY**

The Moscow Show Trials of 1936-38 expanded the scope of the Terror. Through tightly scripted dramatization and absurdist “confessions” from the defendants, the enemy had now materialized from Stalin’s writings into a “reality.” Like any theatrical performance, the roles of all involved — from the prosecutor to the defendant — were constructed to collectively represent a complete and monolithic enemy, ready for the audience’s consumption and internalization. Each defendant’s role in the trial was part of an ever-evolving enemy motif dictated by Stalin’s political strategy. In one trial some defendants would represent a key characteristic of the enemy, while other key characteristics would be emphasised in later trials. It is therefore important to look at each trial not as a unique paradigm on to itself, but rather as a link to the next trial. Even though each trial emphasised certain key characteristics while only hinting at others, there was enough reoccurrence and consistency to view these three trials as three acts of one big performance.

The enemy could be perceived in nine different guises (Keen, 1996): 1. Enemy as Stranger; 2. Greedy Enemy; 3. Enemy as Terrorist and Conspirator; 4. Omnypresent and covert enemy; 4. Enemy as Traitor; 6. Enemy as Beast; 7. Enemy as Aggressor. Internal/External enemy; 8. Enemy as Abstraction; 9. Enemy as Unworthy Opponent. Sam Keen’s typologies provided a flexible framework from which to approach my analysis. The purpose was to link my analysis within the enemy narrative which Stalin constructed in the 1920s. These nine typologies were broad enough in scope to cover the multitude of themes generated from the enemy narrative.

Equally important is to emphasize the successive order of these nine typologies: throughout the three show trials, they consistently linked with each other. They represented the stages of degeneration of the enemy. Judging from the level of severity, the characteristics can be grouped into three successive stages of the degeneration of the enemy. The enemy develops a conscience about himself as a deviationist with values differing from those of the rest of the Party. Coupled with this is his self-glorification and lust for power.
In failing to achieve these goals legitimately within the workings of the Party, the enemy is filled with jealousy and hatred of others, which overtake his whole being and compel him to compromise whatever principles he might have had initially and ally with enemies of the Party in the quest for power and glory. In his further degeneration, the enemy resorts to illegal acts, each more serious than the previous, which only reveals his failure to derail the Soviet Union and its people and his increasing desperation. Forced to conduct himself covertly, the enemy forges alliances with “like-minded” individuals, conducts espionage in preparation for the assassination of Party leaders, resorts to deadly acts of sabotage, and finally allies himself with political enemies of the Soviet Union, the fascist-capitalist bloc. Having politically compromised himself, he consequently develops a theory of terrorism, defeatism, and restoration of capitalism — all diametrically opposed to Leninism. In the final stages of his degeneration, he enters into an alliance with the enemies of Soviet Union. Having become a servant for the foreign aggressor, the enemy has ceased to exist as a respectable human being (as defined within the Stalinist paradigm).

The work of René Girard on the construction of myth and scapegoating (Hammerton-Kelly, 1987) offers a provocative interpretation on the nature of this type of narrative. The narrative of enemy degeneration can be viewed as a reaction by Stalin to what Girard calls “the mechanism of mimetic desire”: the lust for power which everyone had internalized in the 1920s had, in Stalin’s eyes, created “monstrous doubles” of himself. The political rivalries and battles which he had endured and won in the 1920s had only confirmed this. However, this wasn’t simply political paranoia, but Stalin’s realization that these “monstrous doubles” were a threat to running the country. The narrative which Stalin had constructed in the 1920s became the “mythic rationalization” which both prosecutor and defendant relied upon during the show trials to turn publicized acts of murder into a ritual of sacrifice. By this logic, the Moscow Show Trials had to take place, because in order to reproduce terror in all strata of Soviet society the narrative had to be communicated in such a way that the “unanimous violence would have to be the violence of all…(where), without exceptions everyone should be involved...” (Hammerton-Kelly, 1987, p. 100). The show trial was the perfect medium for this because, as a cultural institution, it provided a ritual in which the mythic mentality prevailed and “rationalization” could be used by design to conceal the Stalin’s true motivations.

The Enemy as Stranger

In his speeches and articles from the 1920s, Stalin had painted his enemies as deviationists from Leninist principles. In order to “explain” these deviations, a narrative had to be constructed that argued that deviation (eventual ideological degeneration) was inevitable since the opponents had never internalised the values and ideology of the Party. Historical revisionism “revealed” that, prior to joining the Party, the opponents on trial were...
motivated only by self-interest or vacillated between communism and capitalism. This characteristic of the enemy was emphasised in the 1937 and 1938 trials, but was marginalized in the 1936 trial. This was because Stalin had already defeated Zinoviev and Kamenev by 1928 and reduced them to political outcasts. Therefore, their “testimonies” did not need to retell the origin of their deviation, which had already been established in the public’s eyes.

As the conspiracies thickened and became more outrageous (from espionage and attempted assassination to terrorism and alliance with foreign enemy), it was crucial to backtrack and explain, and therefore, justify the outrageous charges. Even the main characters of the second trial, such as Pyatakov and Radek, were forced to go into great detail recounting the “origins” of their deviation. From Pyatokov’s “testimony” it transpired that his Trotskyite activities in 1926-27 and his connection to the Zinovievite centre made him vulnerable to Sedov’s persuasive words, which “only served as a fresh impetus.” Pyatakov had let himself degenerate and “so quickly consent to resume the fight against the Party and the Soviet government” because “the old Trotskyite views still had survived in me and subsequently grew more and more... and by 1931 had grown sufficiently” (People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R, 1937, p. 26).

For Radek, who had split with Trotsky in 1929, his re-alignment with Trotskyism was due to Mrachkovsky and Smirnov, who had sensed “something was brewing” with Radek and that his “depressed frame of mind ... might crystallize into definite actions” (p. 88). More importantly, Trotsky was able to convince Radek to come back into the fold because of the latter’s belief in the inevitability of the defeat of Soviet Union (which itself would become an ideology: defeatism!). As Vyshinsky concluded in the 1936 trial, the reason why the defendants found themselves in such a “sad and shameful end” was because within “our ranks they were never distinguished for either staunchness or loyalty to the cause of socialism” (The People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, 1936, p.162-163).

Greedy Enemy

For the image of the enemy to be effective as propaganda he had to be believable, i.e. he had to be presented to the spectators with convincing motives. Just as the enemy had failed to internalize Soviet values, he was susceptible to the basest of human instincts: greed and jealousy. The indictment in each trial only briefly hints at the motives of the defendants. Yet consistently throughout all three trials, the explanations given for why the defendants undertook crimes against the state and the people all mentioned how they “were guided by their boundless hatred of the leaders of the Party and the country, and by a thirst for power with which were once so closely associated and from which were cast aside by the course of historical development” (p. 65). In essence, the trials expanded on this theme because they confirmed that factionalism was only motivated by unchecked lust for power. Throughout
the Moscow Trials this connection between ethics and legitimacy is constantly projected onto the enemy. It was revealed that the Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre, “seeing no favourable prospect for themselves, resorted to the gun” (p. 12). It transpired that Mrachkovsky, with no political platform, was able to organize a centre with I. N. Smirnov and Ter-Vaganyan by “…selecting people who nursed particularly bitter feelings against the Party leadership…” (p. 16).

The Enemy as Terrorist and Conspirator

According to Vyshinsky, greed and a lack of (Marxist-Leninist) principles had forced the opposition to employ tactics of theft, espionage, murder, sabotage, and terror. In employing these tactics and carrying out these criminal acts, the opposition became politically illegitimate, because, by removing the government by force, they were waging a war against “the people.” They became:

A gang of bandits, robbers, forgers, diversionists, spies and murderers…can only be compared with the medieval camorra which united the Italian nobility, vagabonds and brigands (Moscow: People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R, 1937, p. 482).

By compromising their beliefs with a desire for power, the opposition became the enemy, because, once it had made the decision to work outside of Marxism (read: Stalinism), every method had become permissible. This comes through clearly in the testimonies. Vyshinsky, as the “vox populi,” would often pose to the defendants questions meant to spark moral outrage. For instance, in questioning Pyatakov’s involvement with foreign firms, Vyshinsky asks him outright if he realized that, by paying excessive sums to firms, he was stealing from the Soviet government. Pyatakov answers simply: “unquestionably” (p. 27).

In Stalin’s “script”, the enemy, after realizing that he is unable to gain power legitimately, without second thought resorts to “illegitimate” tactics. Throughout the testimonies of the defendants, their inability and unwillingness to gracefully accept their political defeat are highlighted. When explaining the stages of their degeneration, none of the defendants showed any signs of doubt or morally questioned the horrific actions that they were accused of undertaking. The point here was that the enemy, in pursuing power by whatever means necessary, had no moral objections to employing the crudest tactics (i.e., espionage, sabotage, terrorism).

The criminalization of the defendants delegitimized them in the public’s eyes. In the “script,” the opposition, in employing the criminal tactics of murder (as in the Kirov assassination) forced the “land of Soviets to rise up like an unshakable, iron wall in defense of its leaders, (because) in this boundless love of millions of toilers for our Party, in this infinite love of the people lies the strength of the defense and protection of our leaders” (The
People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, 1936, p. 119). Through the murder of Party members and sabotage, the “defendants” had demonstrated that “the boundless love of millions of toilers” could not be swayed.

One of the main objectives of the trials was to present the defendants as liars and cynics. Having decided to engage in horrific crimes, but lacking in popular support, the enemy was simultaneously forced to conspire in secrecy and deflect attention from themselves by creating an illusion of a loyal, public servant. Therefore, in each trial, it became characteristic for Vyshinsky in his closing statement to “unmask” the defendants and reveal their “true” nature. As the “story” unfolded it became common for characters to meet in secret and re-forge old alliances. In the first trial, Reingold elaborated:

The idea of the Zinovievites uniting with the Trotskyites arose as far back as 1931. Meeting Zinoviev in his apartment and in his villa that year, I heard him say that it was a pity that we had fallen out with Trotsky (p. 55).

Rykov would account how like the other members of the Rights’ centre I was aware of the treasonable negotiations that were being carried on between the representatives of our counter-revolutionary organization and the German fascists, whose assistance we sought (Tucker & Cohen, 1965, p. 14).

Yet what was more treacherous than conspiring or being an accomplice, as was emphasized through all three trials by Vyshinsky, was the insincerity and duplicity of wearing the mask of loyalty.

Omnipresent and Covert Enemy

Vigilance was a sacred oath, a test of loyalty, sincerity, morality and commitment to the socialist cause. This “hermeneutics of the soul” (Halfin, 2007, p. 1-17), would lay bare the true intentions of the individual. In the context of the trial, the Kirov murder was used to demonstrate the enemy’s cynicism in turning vigilance into a mask to cover up his covert intentions. In his closing speech in the first trial, Vyshinsky clarifies this point. Even though he ritually eulogizes Kirov, the emotional impact and the main point was not the actual murder of Kirov, but the fact that Zinoviev had willingly and without any moral reservations faked vigilance to manipulate and deceive the Party and the people. In “unmasking” one of Zinoviev’s “scenes of cunning, perfidious masquerade,” Vyshinsky is playing out the following surreal performance:

Zinoviev carried this perfidy to such lengths that after the murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov he sent an obituary notice to Pravda. The only thing he said here about that was: “That obituary was not published as far as I remember.” And that is all.
Here is the obituary; I have it in my hand. Zinoviev dated it, if I am not mistaken, the 4th or 7th of December, most probably the 4th of December.

You, Zinoviev, gave this obituary notice on Comrade Kirov the title “The Beacon Man.” How did you start the obituary notice which you intended for the press, and which, consequently, was to become public property?

This is what you, the accused Zinoviev, wrote in this terrible and disgraceful article. Why did the Party lose this near and infinitely dear S. M. Kirov, accused Zinoviev? The Party lost this man who was so near and dear to us because you, the accused Zinoviev, killed him, you killed him with your own hands, your hands are stained with Kirov’s blood! . . .

This is what Zinoviev wrote, exceeding all bounds of cynicism!

Such is this man. He loved him, he was proud of him, and he killed him! The miscreant, the murderer, mourns over his victim! Has anything like it ever occurred before?

What can one say, what words can one use fully to describe the utter baseness and loathsomeness of this: Sacrilege! Perfidy! Duplicity! Cunning!

Whom did you kill? You killed a magnificent Bolshevik, a passionate tribune, a man who was dangerous to you, a man who fought devotedly for Lenin’s testament and against you (Moscow: The People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, 1936, p. 136).

The enemy could not be trusted, even on the surface, because, by externalizing Stalin’s vigilance, he only covers his true malevolent intentions. In scenes like this (and there are quite a few of them during the trials), Stalin demonstrates the limits of the externalization/internalization process and its explosive potential by showing its cyclical nature. Any seemingly irreproachable move can be easily turned inside out and reinterpreted as a malicious act. Therefore, everyone can be easily accused of subversive activities. The fear of being accused has a paralyzing effect. It is the terror.

In the three “acts” of this “play,” with its shifting “casts” and “plotlines,” one consistent enemy is reinforced: the omnipresent Trotsky. In all three trials it was Trotsky (from abroad) who was responsible for inventing the conspiracies, persuading old allies to come back, and giving exact instructions. It only highlighted his illegitimacy in the eyes of the public because, having been rejected by “the people,” he could only impose his will through conspiratorial murder and sabotage from abroad. His “omnipresence” presupposed his total isolation with layer upon layers of secrecy. In all three trials, the defendants describe their encounters with Trotsky almost as meetings with a grand wizard. For instance, Holtzman recounted how he had to meet with Smirnov in secrecy to deliver a letter to Trotsky’s son, Sedov, in Germany, who would then deliver it Trotsky. When Holtzman finally managed to meet Trotsky, he discovered a man in a small darkened room “walking up and down in a rather excited state” (p. 100). It was the fact that Trotsky was so prominent in planning these conspiracies and yet was so secretive and elusive that made him morally repugnant: his “omnipresence” was not God-like, but cowardly.
Enemy as Traitor of Leninism

Conspiracy, masking, and diversion were just different strategies for the treacherous behavior of the enemies. The betrayal of Lenin and his legacy was a cardinal sin in the show trials narrative. We have seen how Stalin defied Lenin in his speeches and “reduced” himself as a humble “student” of Lenin, using it as a tool for attacking and demonizing his opponents. Thus, the betrayal of Lenin by the opposition marked its final evolution as an “enemy.” This theme was particularly emphasized in the second and third trials, since the “star” of Vyshinsky’s closing speech in first show trial was Stalin as the possible victim of the trial. However, as the plots thickened and pasts were “exposed,” in the 1937 and 1938 trials it was “revealed” that the defendants had either opposed Lenin or had conspired to assassinate him. What was important in these demonizations was not a façade of consistency, but the emotional impact of such deeds. Thus, witness Vyshinsky as he “traces Pyatakov’s political path” and demonstrates that he was an anti-Leninist as far back as 1915: “He and Bukharin advanced an anti-Leninist platform on the question of the right of nations to self-determination… calling Lenin a ‘Talmudist of self-determination’” and, without any concern for logic Vyshinsky revealed how Pyatakov’s “outwardly ‘ultra-Left’ stance was unmasked by Lenin as anti-Marxian in character” because it “repeats the Trotkyite thesis that it is impossible to build socialism in one country” (The People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, 1937, p. 475-476). These “revelations” of an ideological schism between the defendants and Lenin were mere façades in which Lenin(-ism) was just as much a prop as the defendants. Stalin would interchangeably apply his own ideology to Lenin’s, consequently blurring any difference between himself and Lenin. In scripting these schisms, Stalin was rewriting history by arguing that there was never any difference between himself and Lenin, which meant that the enemy, in betraying Stalin, was betraying Lenin. Thus, in typical Stalinist revisionism, Vyshinsky codified this symbiotic relationship between Lenin and Stalin in Radek’s treachery: “While Lenin was alive he fought Lenin, and after Lenin’s death he fought Stalin” (p. 478). What was important here was that, by blending the two figures together, it became more plausible to see their fates intertwined in relation to the enemy in this ever-evolving narrative. Therefore, by 1938 everything came together when the accused Bukharin admitted that

We had direct contact with the ‘Left’ Socialist-Revolutionaries, whose platform was the forcible overthrow of the Soviet government headed by Lenin, Stalin and Sverdlov, to be followed by the arrest of Lenin, Stalin and Sverdlov and the setting up of a of a new government consisting of ‘left-Communists’ and ‘Left’ Socialist-Revolutionaries (Tucker & Cohen, 1965, p. 33).
It is clear that Stalin’s intention in presenting the enemy as traitors of Lenin was not merely to repeat the 1920s tactics. Whereas in the 1920s Stalin had painted everyone as a deviationist and traitor of Lenin and himself as the mere caretaker of Lenin’s legacy, in the 1936-38 trials Stalin was attempting something more radical. By fusing his own political destiny with that of Lenin (which Stalin himself had created), he presented himself as the rightful heir to Lenin.

The betrayal of Lenin and his legacy, the Party, and the country ultimately led to self-betrayal. Yet Trotsky’s reach was not meant to only highlight the extent of his power and possible threat to the Soviet Union, but also to underscore Stalin’s old criticism that Trotsky was an incompetent and amoral leader no matter whom he led, whether it was the Party or counter-revolutionary forces. As has been demonstrated, Stalin initially demonized Trotsky in the early 1920s as an “adventurer” who put his strategies above the Party organization. Stalin integrated this characteristic into the narrative of the Trotskyist terrorist centre. Trotsky, now leading the fascist centre from abroad, had once again fallen out of touch with his allies and put them in compromising situations. Since the assassination of Stalin and other prominent members had failed, Trotsky had, by 1935, “expanded” his theory from mere terrorism to “defeatism,” in which the Soviet Union would be partitioned by the Germans and the Japanese. What was important here was not “Trotsky’s theory” but the reaction of his allies: as the executioners of his orders, they themselves could not accept such “madness.” Radek would “re-account” that, upon hearing these “directives” from Pyatakov, he could not believe it.

Trotsky would ever admit, under the influence of his arguments, that he did not know the basic elements of the situation; and as to risk one’s neck in order to achieve a five per cent reduction in baseness was not worth while (p. 15). According to Radek, Trotsky’s new line of attack meant the collapse and death of the bloc... for nothing at all, just for the sake of Trotsky’s beautiful eyes — the country was to return to capitalism (p. 122).

Yet Radek was right when he “felt as if it were a madhouse (p. 127) upon reading Trotsky’s initiative. In his final plea, he came to the conclusion that Trotsky had lost faith in the operation, it was all a concealed way of saying: ‘Well, boys, try to overthrow the Soviet power by yourselves without Hitler. What, you cannot try to seize power by yourselves. What, you cannot? (p. 546)

Here, it finally became “obvious” to the defendants that Trotsky was a devil in disguise. They realized that they were merely cogs in his ever-evolving plans and had no human worth for him. In Stalin’s script, Trotsky had not only attacked the Soviet Union through his criminal conspiracy, but once again he had betrayed his own “comrades,” without paying the price. His omnipresence was not because of his “genius” but because of his inherent cowardice in facing the consequences of his actions.
Dehumanization: Enemy as Beast

Throughout the three trials, Vyshinsky dehumanized the defendants. It was argued that, by engaging in terrorism knowing fully that it could lead to the murder of innocent civilians, the defendants had ceased being human. As Vyshinsky would argue:

After this, can we speak with these people in any sort of political language? Have we the right to say that we can speak with these people in one language only, the language of the Criminal Code, and regard them as incorrigible and hardened murders (The People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, 1936, p. 124).

In Vyshinsky’s moralism, the opponents had placed their political gains above the lives of the innocent. Vyshinsky’s language of the Criminal Code, despite all of its legalistic window-dressing, was, in essence, populist rhetoric that pitted a “cowardly” minority waging a covert war against the “innocent and hardworking toilers.” In doing so, the opposition had reduced themselves to a “foul-smelling heap of human garbage” (Tucker & Cohen, 1965, p. 520) and miscreants of the “bestial countenance of the international brigands” (p. 515).

For instance, in the second trial it was revealed that, following the orders of Pyatakov, “the parallel centre” carried out a number of wrecking acts in industrial enterprises and on the railways. In the Kemerovo mines an explosion was organized on the instructions of the accused Drobnis, resulting in the death of ten workers (People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R, 1937, p. 11). Yet the decisions to carry out such despicable acts of murder were made with the greatest ease, as Norkin would illustrate in his testimony. He described meeting Pyatakov, who bluntly told him that “it was no use being squeamish; what are you worrying about! You have nothing to hesitate” (p. 51). They reached the apex of their cruelty and inhumanity at the third trial, with Zelensky’s “admission” of wrecking activities at the cooperative societies in the Kursk Region, during which glass and nails were thrown in butter and “hacked the throats and stomachs of our people” (Tucker & Cohen, 1965, p. 289). Yet what made these characters even more repulsive was their lack of admission of their “obvious” and “proven-beyond-doubt” crimes. These sub-humans could not even face their own disgusting nature, which explained why Bukharin “shrinks from the admission of his guilt as the devil from incense.” For such treachery “the people” were justified in “destroying these traitors, reducing them to ashes and wiping them from the face of the earth” (People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R, 1937, p. 496).

Dehumanization: Enemy as Aggressor, Internal/External Enemy

One of the Show Trials’ main objectives was to demonstrate that no distinction existed between the external and internal enemies. This was a unique element of the Show Trials,
because Stalin had never previously accused his political enemies of being *active agents of foreign intelligence*. In taking up terrorist methods, the defendants eventually turned into mere agents who did the dirty work of hostile foreign countries with no control over their own activities. In addition, the trials revealed the internal enemy's helpless *subservience* to foreign powers. This was a gradual process, which had its seeds in the Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre. In 1934 it could still be argued that the Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre was operating independently from foreign organizations, as Olberg revealed that the connection with the Gestapo in coordinating the assassination of the Party leaders and the Soviet Government “was in line of the Trotskyite in conformity with the instructions of L. Trotsky given through Sedov” (The People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, 1936, p. 25). At that time, the external enemies were at least on an equal footing with the Trotskyite, with the Gestapo “advising (Olberg) to apply for help whenever necessary.” Yet the 1936 Trial had made it “apparent” that the fascists were not merely “offering service for the purpose of terrorism” (p. 103). The indictment revealed that the conspiracy to murder the leaders of the Soviet Union had failed, and that a more active role of the foreign powers was required to topple the Soviet regime. It was at this juncture that the internal enemies had compromised their own goals and became agents of foreign aggression, fascist hirslings. Whereas the initial aim was to take power through a coup d'état, the impossibility of achieving this without external “aid” meant that the Trotskyite now had to achieve the aims of the foreign countries as payback for further assistance. As Radek would divulge in Trotsky's “letter” from December 1935, the payback for foreign assistance read like a shopping list of national treason:

> We shall inevitably have to make territorial concessions. Maritime Province and Amur region to Japan, and the Ukraine to Germany ... Germany needs raw materials, foodstuffs and markets. We shall have to permit her to take part in the exploitation of ore, manganese, gold, oil, apatites, and to undertake to supply her for a definite period with foodstuffs and fats at less than world prices. We shall have to yield the oil of Sakhalin to Japan and to guarantee to supply her with oil in case of war with America. We shall also have to permit her to exploit goldfields. We shall have to agree to Germany's demand not to oppose her seizure of the Danube countries and the Balkans, and not to hinder Japan in her seizure of China (The People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, 1937, p. 9).

To achieve these aims, the internal enemies were forced to undertake a joint operation of economic sabotage and “systematically engage in espionage on behalf of these states, supplying foreign intelligence services with secret information of the utmost of state importance” (p. 18).

How did the internal enemies rationalize such a strategy? In undertaking “this most painful course... a series of most heinous crimes” (p. 155), the Trotskyites had gambled on the possibility of exploiting their “new allies” before they themselves were exploited. Yet,
in becoming “fascist hirelings,” the Trotskyites had betrayed themselves. It was important in the proceedings to point out that working for other external enemies brought no glory. Vyshinsky made this particularly clear by dragging Sokolnikov through the mud in his questioning of the latter about what “rewards” there were to be gained by being subservient to the Japanese and Germans. Did Sokolnikov really expect any other fate “than to be simply an appendage of German fascism, utilized and then thrown away like useless, dirty rag… that you could retain some independence?” By 1938 this question was answered: the Trotskyites were utter nonentities caught in the international fascist web, infiltrated from within and forced to work for the fascists.

Even if the logic of this narrative had been somewhat derailed in the 1938 Show Trial by “the materials in the possession of the investigating authorities,” which “revealed” that Trotsky and the Trotskyites had connections with the German and British Intelligence Services as far back as 1921 and 1926, respectively, the Trotskyite subservience to the foreign governments was still highlighted. This motif had reached its theatrical peak with Chernov’s absurd and elaborate account of how he became an agent for the Germans. After his meeting with the Menshevik leader and émigré Fedor Dan in Koningstein, Chernov was apprehended by the German police, who had incriminating evidence of his visits with Dan. Threatened with exposure, Chernov “consented, and became a German spy.” Vyshinsky, finishing Chernov’s sentence, put two and two together and “realized”: “If you could not have transmitted the conversation, it means that the police learnt about it from Dan. And if Dan informed the police about it, it means that he is an agent of the police” (Tucker & Cohen, 1965, p. 100). It had now become a fully established fact: there was absolutely no difference between the internal Trotskyite enemies and their external conspirators — the two had fused together, with the former dominating the latter. Kamenev had “arrived to the same conclusion” in his final plea:

We are sitting here side by side the agents of foreign secret-police departments because our weapons were the same, because our arms became intertwined before our fate became intertwined here in this dock (The People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, 1936, p. 169-170).

Dehumanization: The Enemy as Abstraction

As has been established throughout this paper, the enemy was an amalgamation of the most detestable and base characteristics. But how did these personality traits affect the enemy’s ideology? In its greed for power, the enemy entangled itself with foreign agents and was forced into sabotage. As was demonstrated with the enemy’s transformation into agents of foreign aggression, the means became the ends. And, since the “means” were ever evolving — from espionage, sabotage, theft, terrorism, murder, etc. — so too was the
ideology. During the court proceedings, both sides used the same set of notions to conceptualize the detective plot. In fact, all possible sentiments, personal feelings, and individual circumstances were replaced by these concepts. It made it no longer necessary for the viewers to respect or sympathize with the defendants. It was much easier to think about the doomed people in terms of some ideological abstractions with no personal dimension.

In his final plea, Zinoviev contemplated his ideological path up to that point:

My defective Bolshevism became transformed into anti-Bolshevism, and through Trotskyism I arrived at fascism. Trotskyism is a variety of fascism, and Zinovievism is a variety of Trotskyism (p. 171).

Already, the fusion of the Trotskyites with the fascist-capitalists was a gradual process, peaking in the second trial. It was, therefore, somewhat of a “privilege” for Zinoviev to categorize his own “ideology” as heir to the traditional internal enemies of Bolshevism:

We took the place of the terrorism of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Not the pre-revolutionary terrorism which was directed against the autocracy, but the Right Socialist Revolutionaries’ terrorism of the period of the Civil war, when the SR’s shot at Lenin (p. 170).

By the second trial the defendants had no such luxury because, as Vyshinsky proclaimed:

Comrade Stalin’s forecast had finally come true: Trotskyism had indeed become the central rallying point of all the forces hostile to socialism…and irrevocably transformed into lackeys of capitalism, into restorers of capitalism in our country (The People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, 1937, p. 469).

As predicted, Pyatakov, Radek and others were discovered to have formed a parallel centre whose “task was the forcible overthrow of the Soviet government with the object of changing the social and state system existing in the USSR” (p. 6). Yet, as with the alliance with the fascist powers, the transition of Trotskyism into capitalism was not smooth or natural. Pyatakov would “recall” in his conversation with Trotsky in Oslo in 1935 how the latter had told him, “This means, it will be necessary to retreat. Retreat to capitalism. How far and to what degree, it is difficult to say now-this can be made concrete only after we come into power.”

In toppling the Soviet government, the Trotskyite centre would allow for “the development of private capital, the dissolution of the collective farms, the liquidation of the state farms, the leasing of a number of Soviet enterprises as concessions to foreign capitalists.” Yet what was emphasized throughout the second trial was that ideology was
useful for the Trotskyites only as long as it provided the surest way to power. The trials had demonstrated that what mattered to the Trotskyites was ideology’s expediency. Otherwise, it was interchangeable.

Yet one of the main objectives of the trials was to demonstrate that beneath this ever-evolving “ideology” one component consistently comprised the core of the enemy’s logic: a loss of faith in the ability of socialism to flourish in the Soviet Union. Stalin had only hinted occasionally in the 1920s that his opponents had lost faith in the values of the Revolution. Yet by the time of the Moscow Show Trials this had evolved into an actual “ideology”: defeatism. Time and time again the defendants would confess how they had banked on the failure of Stalin’s industrialization and collectivization, and that when this prediction had not come true, the next step was to artificially induce this situation through all methods available. Therefore, for the internal enemy defeatism was a natural progression to capitalism.

By the third trial the enemy had made a full transformation into the vanguard of capitalism. Whatever reservations in adopting a capitalist stance the Trotskyites, such as Radek or Sokolnikov, had were gone, as “they reached this shameful end because they had marched along this road for decades (p. 469).” Bukharin perfectly summed up his transition:

> When all the state machines, when all the means, when all the best forces were flung into the industrialization of the country, we found ourselves, literally in twenty-four hours, on the other side …with the capitalist remnants which still existed at the time in the sphere of trade. Here we went through a very interesting process. Our program was — the prosperous peasant farm of the individual, but in fact that kulak became an end in itself (Tucker & Cohen, 1965, p. 338).

Just as Bukharin “now” saw himself in such a light, so too did Vyshinsky. In his closing statement of the 1936 trial he observed:

> We are building a new, socialist society, a new, Soviet state… every step in our progress is accompanied by desperate resistance on the part of our enemies who rouse against us all the forces of the world, all filth, all the scum of the old society (The People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, 1936, p. 118).

Vyshinsky had now finally signaled the ideological degeneration of the internal enemy by equating him with the international bourgeoisie and the “past people.” Without the least bit of irony, as Trotsky had done twenty years earlier, he disposed of them in the dustbin of history.
The Enemy as Unworthy Opponent

In his examination of R. V. Pickel in the 1936 Show Trial, Vyshinsky concluded that the leaders of the Trotskyite-Zinoviev centre were only “masters in the art of playing upon the ambitions, on the particularities of each of their accomplices… to rouse passion, to rouse hatred, to rouse their supporters to the boiling point (p. 63).” By equating Zinoviev and Kamenev with an Iago-type character, Vyshinsky was fulfilling one of the trials’ main objectives: the complete denigration of the enemy’s status as politicians and as human beings. This humiliation ritual was justified because, in its thirst for power, the opposition had transformed into enemies of Stalin, the Party, and the people. Therefore, they should be treated with the respect reserved only for the lowest of the low.

In these tightly scripted “acts,” Vyshinsky and his “defendants” would play out scenes of sadomasochistic degradation. One aspect of this was to emphasize the defendant’s utter untrustworthiness and insincerity before and even as the trials were proceeding. For instance, in questioning Kamenev about his article on Party loyalty, Vyshinsky forces him into an absurd self-incrimination:

Vyshinsky: What appraisal should be given of the articles and statements you wrote in 1933, in which you expressed loyalty the Party? Deception?
Kamenev: No, worse than deception.
Vyshinsky: Perfidy?
Kamenev: Worse.
Vyshinsky: Worse than deception, worse than perfidy — find the word. Treason?
Kamenev: You have found it.
Vyshinsky: Accused Zinoviev, do you confirm this?
Zinoviev: Yes.
Vyshinsky: Treason, perfidy, double-dealing?
Zinoviev: Yes (p. 69-70).

The second show trial also demonstrated that the unworthiness of the enemy lay in their childish naivety (a contradiction, if one considers that in the first trial, Vyshinsky, in his closing statement, had justified the destruction of the enemy precisely because they were clever). As had been demonstrated, in allying with foreign aggressors the internal enemy had been compromised, not just ideologically, but tactically. Vyshinsky elaborated on this in his closing speech of the second trial:

But to anybody who had not utterly lost his head, for anybody who possessed a grain of reason, it should have been clear that the agreement about which Pyatakov, Trotsky and Radek spoke, was not an agreement, but embroidered capitulation, the Trotskyite surrender to the mercy of the conquerors, that this was bondage, that to accept such an
agreement meant crawling into the wolf’s mouth while consoling oneself with the idea that the wolf is not wicked and will not gobble one up (The People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, 1937, p. 483).

Vyshinsky’s questioning of Radek encapsulated this characteristic of the enemy as insincere. In what was obviously a tightly scripted exchange, Radek “compliments” Vyshinsky in a most hollow manner, in what was meant to sound like a last, desperate attempt for redemption. Vyshinsky, in his “display” of “vigilance” for “two-faced” tactics, harshly rebukes Radek:

Radek: You are a profound reader of human hearts, but I must nevertheless comment on my thoughts in my own words.
Vyshinsky: I know that you have a fairly good stock of words behind which to conceal your thoughts, and it is very difficult for a man, even a good reader of human hearts, to understand you and induce you to say what you are really thinking. But I would ask you not to reason here so much as a journalist who has specialized in international affairs, but as a man accused of treason. And it is from this standpoint that I ask you the question: were you in favour of defeat in 1934 (p. 127).

CONCLUSION

This paper has demonstrated how Stalin was able transform the enemy narratives he had constructed in the 1920s into a “script” consisting of enemy typologies for show trials which he could consumed and internalized by the masses. As the producer of the trials, Stalin pushed the idea of politics as conspiracy onto the centre stage. Not only did the trials define the nature and dimensions of the threat facing the USSR, they also provided a mobilizational narrative that showed citizens on what and on whom to focus their vigilance.

The Kirov assassination in 1934 was key to this transformation of an intra-party elite narrative into a conspiratorial script ready for mass consumption. Because the enemy had now supposedly progressed from anti-Leninism to conspiratorial murder Stalin was able to shape the narrative into a dramatic script which would medialize and communicate enemy typologies more effectively than his speeches of the 1920s could have ever done. The press coverage of the enemy typologies generated from the show trials was contextualized and filtered to reflect the economic, social, and political upheavals of the Five-Year Plan. The media campaign portrayed those on trial as only the tip of the iceberg of a vast network of conspiracies conducted by an omnipotent and omnipresent enemy. The proceedings transformed Stalin’s enemies into “enemies of the people.” Because the media had exaggerated the enemies beyond human form and implored the masses to be vigilante people
could be convinced that through denunciations they were empowering themselves and were taking direct political action against those who were bent on destroying them and their country.

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COMMUNICATION WITHOUT ‘THE ENEMY’: TRANSNATIONAL INTELLECTUALS AND NARRATIVES OF RECONCILIATION

SERGEY V. AKOPOV

This article focuses on the discussion of means that can help to replace political narratives of the “enemies” with political narratives of reconciliation. Among the three intellectual obstacles we explore the theoretical grounds of agonism, the abstract ideas of tolerance, democracy and protection of human rights, and the ambiguity of the concept of “national identity.” We conclude that the agonism and consensus pluralism discourses should be synthesized with the concepts of security community, generalized trust, bridging social capital, transnational intellectuals, cultural dialogue, existential communication and cosmopolitan education. For political philosophy it means a return to the legacies of I. Kant, H. Arendt, S. Benhabib, as well as an attempt to incorporate the political theory of S.L. Frank, his ideas of “live knowledge” and “we-feeling.”

Keywords: identity, communication, “enemy” image, narratives, transnational intellectuals.

Although the Berlin Wall fell 20 years ago, many new walls have been constructed since 1989, usually to isolate someone from their perceived “enemies.” These walls may stretch along traditional nation states and newly self-proclaimed entities, along the growing ethnic diasporas and marginalized native communities, along the colonizers and those having been colonized, between the ones raised in the hotbeds of nationalism and the ones stretching out towards cosmopolitan and transnational values, between the rich and the poor, freedom

Sergey V. Akopov is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the The North-Western Academy of Public Administration in St. Petersburg, Russia (sergakopov@gmail.com). He thanks Richard Abraham (London) for corrections and suggestions.
fighters and their oppressors, executors of genocide and their victims, and between those who oppress and the oppressed. Today we not only live in the world of walls but also those ‘walls’ go through us, through our thoughts, our stereotypes, education, learning patterns, preconceived ideas, introspections and perceptions of “the others”: our friends and enemies. These walls often stretch along narratives that contain “enemy” images, which a few transnational intellectuals are taking steps to challenge and dismantle. Their attempts to reach across national boundaries, however, compete with the undiminished “enemy” images on TV, the “far away locals” in newspapers, and in the conditioned minds within East and West, as well as North and South. When the global oriented media produces narratives of people from distant countries and accompanies them with images of murder, epidemics and looting, the only thing left for the viewer is “to thank God for making them what they are — the far away locals, and pray that they stay that way” (Bauman, 1998, p. 76).

Remnants of the Cold War persist in influencing popular belief and political thinking. We continue to discover new enemies in other parts of the world, and the cycle of isolation and demonization among nations continues. Despite the well-recognized and broadly espoused ideals of international peace, tolerance, democracy, and human rights, lists of “enemies” emerge from often mysterious origins to rationalize another small war ostensibly to maintain global peace.

Even if we intended to keep national culture intact, national borders remain porous and diffuse; they are products of our own collective imagination. B. Anderson describes a page in the New York Times:

We might find there stories about Soviet dissidents, famine in Mali, a gruesome murder, a coup in Iraq, the discovery of a rare fossil in Zimbabwe, and a speech by Mitterrand. Why are these events so juxtaposed? What connects them to each other? The arbitrariness of their inclusion and juxtaposition… shows that the linkage between them is imagined (Anderson, 2006, p. 33).

Furthermore, national and cultural purity and installation is not only a practical impossibility but a counterproductive enterprise. The 2008 Exhibition “A Mestizo Planet” in the Quai Branly Museum, Paris recycled Montaigne’s dictum, “An honest man is a man of mixed origins.”

When approaching and crossing cultural borders we carry with us our narratives about our identities, about ourselves, and about “others.” Indeed, these narratives are an important element of every culture and all the human sciences, and they constitute a vital component of effective human communication. The transnational dialogic community necessarily embraces distinct cultural identities and shapes collective memories since storytelling is a universal anthropological phenomenon for conveying meaning. While mankind is a “story telling animal,” however, not all professional storytellers provide “good case narratives”
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 240). For better or for worse, mass media and blogospheres make the narratives of public intellectuals more widespread and influential then ever before — some creating conflicts, others promoting mutual understanding, dialog, and peace. In order to advance the critically important latter goals we need to understand the cultural roots and define the structure of such narratives. To this end, we need to research those intellectuals “on the edges” of multiple national cultures and boundaries, i.e., intellectuals with transnational identities, and to investigate whether their theories and narratives could bridge the political “walls” and “curtains” that divide social entities.

One can easily find transnational narratives analyzing the biographies of prominent Western intellectuals such as B. Anderson and C. Geertz (experiences in Indonesia and Bali), A. Macfarlane (UK-China, Japan), E. Said (Palestine-US), I. Wallerstein (post-colonial Africa), S. Benhabib (Turkey-US) J.-P. Sartre and A. Camus (France-Algeria), C. Lévi-Strauss (France-Brazil), T. Eriksen (Norway-Mauritius, Caribbean), A. Appadurai (India-US) and others. For example, in his book *Europe Old and New*, R. Taras (2009) gave a detailed description of transnational narratives (as well as national phobias) within Eastern Europe. By contrast with the familiar literature of Western authors, however, Russian transnational intellectuals and their narratives are understudied in the West. The comparative and interdisciplinary (political theory, political history, cultural and political anthropology, political communication) case study analyses of narratives of reconciliation by several 20\textsuperscript{th} and 21\textsuperscript{st} century Russian transnational intellectuals (for example, N. Berdiaev, J. Brodsky, I. Bunin, S. Frank, N. Gumiliov, A. Konchalovsky, V. Nabokov, A. Tarkovsky, V. Posner) as well as the present-day transnational networks of such intellectuals have not been fully researched. At the same time we can formulate a research hypothesis that the narratives of reconciliation produced by Russian transnational intellectuals are deeply rooted in/inspired by the narratives of Western transnational intellectuals (and vice versa) and therefore can help to ‘bridge’ cultural and political gaps between Russia and the West. Specifically, we believe that reconciliation narratives of Russian transnational intellectuals can provide alternatives to “enemy” and “otherness” themes that underlie contemporary political mobilization and power legitimization. Identification of transnational values and deconstruction of political phobias should strengthen ties and enhance cooperation among countries (non-proliferation, climate change), and assistance to academic intellectuals can make them active builders of transnational civil society between Russia and the West.

We also see three intellectual obstacles on the way of our ideals of reconciliation. The first obstacle is intellectuals producing negative narratives that justify the existence of “enemies” for human and social interactions as natural. The second obstacle is a misleading belief that real life transnational experiences and communication can be replaced with abstract ideas of tolerance, democracy and human rights protection; that the latter can do away with an “enemy” image based type of political mobilization. Finally the third obstacle is the ambiguity of the concept of identity, particularly “national identity.”
ON THE NARRATIVES OF “THE OTHERS”:
AGONISM OR CONSENSUS THEORIES?

Regarding the first obstacle — the negative narratives that justify the existence of “enemies” — political scientists and specialists in conflict resolution often agree that today in world politics at large we have come back to the neo-Schmittian perception of politics and foreign affairs. Even the popular term “geopolitics” signals a return to the “friend” vs. “enemy” paradigm. Himself a classic of geopolitics, Karl Schmitt (1996) in his work The Concept of the Political defined the content of politics as opposition to the “other,” to an “enemy” or any “stranger,” who represents a serious threat to one’s own interests. Schmitt’s perhaps best-known formulation of the essence of politics is based upon the identity distinction between friend and enemy. Such a distinction is to be determined existentially: when the enemy is “whoever is in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible” (p. 27). Those who agree with K. Schmitt today may say that, after cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia, the dream of taking people to some common ground of international law and solidarity may sound utopian and naïve.

Many today would also probably share the concept of Belgian born British theorist Chantal Mouffe. She believes that the Enlightenment brought into Western culture the end of the holistic model, and the recognition of pluralism — that “people are not one.” This, continues Mouffe, can be interpreted in two ways, as “the people are multiple” or the “people are divided”:

Foucault, Deleuze and from a liberal perspective, Rawls, Habermas, they are of course all pluralists. But for them, pluralism goes without antagonism. I would also put Hannah Arendt into this category. It is the view of plurality that recognizes the different positions on the world, but if you were able to assemble all of them together, then you would be able to reconstitute some form of harmony. … And then there is the other pluralism, which you find in Weber or in Nietzsche seeing pluralism as ‘the people are divided’. There is a division and therefore there is conflict. There is not simply multiplicity. And this is the ontology to which I belong. Pluralism here also means that there is no ultimate reconciliation possible. This view forms the basis from which I understand politics (Carpentier & Cammaerts, 2006, p. 972).

C. Mouffe — a follower of L. Althusser and A. Gramsci — alongside with W. Connolly, E. Laclau, B. Honig and Canadian philosopher J. Tully represent “agonism.” Agonists do not believe in the capacity of politics to eliminate deep divisions within society, no matter whether we talk about cultural, gender or class divisions. Mouffe’s ontological presuppositions are that politics exists in society only because there is conflict, that every
type of social order is the product of a hegemony, that the reality and meaning are not given to us, but are always constructed by *hegemonic articulation*, even if it now seems “common sense.” The role of the totalitarian language and symbols in hegemonic relationships was widely explored later, for example by A. Ventsel (2009) using the example of USSR (pp. 19-20).

For E. Laclau and C. Mouffe “political” is not an area which is located within the state or the parties, but also in culture, in media, in art and all other fields which contribute to maintain “hegemonies.” C. Mouffe defines any narrative as an ideology built on a series of specific articulations of signifiers such as objectivity, ethics and truth: “Ideally, the role of the media should precisely be to contribute to the creation of an agonistic public space in which there is the possibility for dissensus to be expressed or different alternatives to be put forward” (Carpentier & Cammaerts, 2006, p. 971). This post-structuralist discursive construction of reality fits into the framework of Social Darwinism and resembles R. Dawkins’ (2006) “meme theory.”

At the same time, on the other side from agonism today there are those who criticize K. Schmitt and C. Mouffe for being anticosmopolitans and linking concept of national identity to the ideas of sovereignty and separatism. A. Abizadeh (2005), a politics scholar based in Montreal, is also skeptical about Schmitt’s idea that any social objectivity is only constituted through acts of power (p. 54). However strong and popular the neo-Schmittianism may be today, a shared collective identity does not necessarily presuppose “the other.” He argues that a cosmopolitan dream of shared global identity may face many obstacles, but metaphysical impossibility and conceptual confusion are not among them (Abizadeh, 2005, p. 45).

We understand that in order to define who we are we need to make comparisons with someone else. Yet why should a shared collective identity necessarily presuppose “the other” in a negative way? Why should we constitute our identity against, when we can try to define ourselves by comparing with different friends? Does not friendship provide enough foundation for feeling self-unique? Unlike self-definition from the enemy, self-definition from friends has one indubitable advantage — it does not advance the presence of fear of “the other” inside us.

There are different ways of providing social mobilization in society. One of them is mobilizing people to act on the grounds of unifying ideals and dreams for the sake of friendship and cooperation. Another way is to mobilize people against their “enemy,” who seems to threaten them and has to be destroyed. F. Moghaddam (2005) in his book *The Staircase to Terrorism* claims that politicians often deliberately construct “enemy” images to extend internal frustration and aggression upon someone outside their group (p. 167). The presence of external danger may unite fellow citizens so strongly behind the political leader that some say, if there is no war one should invent one. “The construction of an external enemy,” writes anthropologist J. Gledhill (2000), “is integral to attempts to define the unity
of the United States, as witnessed by the ‘invention’ of Saddam Hussein to occupy this structural position after the Soviet Union abandoned it” (p. 170). “Enemy” images become “reservoirs,” inside which one can not only place negative characteristics of an opponent, but also reveal psychological complexes of those who create such images. Moreover often there is even no need for the enemy image to correlate with real facts. According to V. Volkan (1998) enemy images are at any condition “inlaid in national identity,” their presence crystallizes a nation’s self identification, till we get the “symbiosis of enemies” (p. 5).

We think that should the enemy inevitably exist, it could be characterized with the help of H. Arendt’s concept of the “banality of evil.” What kind of a narrative of evil do we find when we open Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil — her work about the trial over the Nazi lieutenant colonel responsible for transporting Jews to concentration camps? Instead of setting an enemy based agonism story, H. Arendt (2006) rather finds Adolf Eichmann a “joiner” and a “conformist,” describing him as “a leaf in the whirlwind of time,” somebody, who was doing his duty, not only obeyed orders, but also obeyed the law (pp. 32 & 135). “Despite all the efforts of the prosecution,” states Arendt (2006), “everybody could see that this man was not a ‘monster,’ but yet ‘terribly and terrifyingly normal’” (p. 154 & 276).

As for the base motives he was perfectly sure that he was not what he called … a dirty bastard in the depth of his hart… alas, nobody believed him. The persecutor did not believe him because that was not his job. Counsel [sic] for the defense paid no attention because he, unlike Eichmann was, to all appearances, not interested in questions of conscience. And the judges did not believe him, because they were too good and, perhaps, also too conscious about the foundations of their profession to admit that an average, ‘normal’ person, neither feeble-minded, nor indoctrinated nor cynical could be perfectly unable of telling right from wrong. … Their case based on the assumption that the defendant, like ‘all normal persons,’ must have been aware of the criminal nature of his acts. And Eichmann was indeed ‘normal insofar as he was “no exception within the Nazi regime.’ However under the conditions of the Third Reich, only ‘exceptions’ could be expected to react ‘normally’ (Arendt, 2006, pp. 26 — 27).

According to H. Arendt, the leaders of the Nazi state managed to create conditions to the point when conscience in Germany as such had apparently got lost. While there were individuals who resisted “their voices were never heard” (Arendt, 2006, p. 103) and could hardly become guidelines for some kind of a moral choice for someone like A. Eichmann. Without any evident attempt to justify A. Eichmann, H. Arendt tries to listen to what the “enemy” has to say. She is not blinkered in her detestation of Eichmann’s crimes, nor was she blinkered when she tried to resume contact with the philosopher M. Heidegger, despite his record of support for the Nazi state (Ludz, 2004). One can easily feel the influences of
close friend and teacher, K. Jaspers (1994), while reading Arendt’s *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, who used to write: “Freedom arises where ‘the other’ is no longer a stranger to me, where, on the contrary, I find myself in another, or where it is apparently necessarily becomes a moment of my existence” (p. 167). Arendt (2006) considers Eichmann’s decisive flaw “an almost total inability ever to look at anything from the other fellow’s point of view” (pp. 47 — 48), something that K. Jaspers would call the inability for *existential communication*. Yet she finds that A. Eichmann’s persecutors are missing that ability too. H. Arendt herself analyses the course of the political trial looking for the “existential situation” of the defendant, his beliefs and dispositions, or his “habitus,” to use P. Bourdieu’s term. Her narratives of reconciliation by compassion are based not on abstract judgment, but on non-empirical, empathic, participatory examination, understanding, and interpretation (what W. Dilthey and M. Weber call *Verstehen*, “empathetic understanding” vs. *Begreifen*). The latter enables her to take the object of her analysis outside of “friend vs. enemy”, or “victim vs. judge” (or using J. Lacan’s analysis “psychiatrist vs. patient”) paradigms. In fact, for H. Arendt, A. Eichmann stops being an object in a positivistic sense at all. H. Arendt’s analysis makes us remember the heroes of F. Dostoevsky and the Christian wisdom: “Judge not, that ye be not judged” (Matthew 7:1). What also comes to mind are again K. Jaspers (1994) words: “either a person as an object of study - or a man of freedom. The transformation of man into an object of analysis ... involves abstracting from his freedom” (p. 15).

Three months after the start of A. Eichmann trial (July 1961), Yale University began Milgram’s experiment on obedience to authority figures. S. Milgram (1974) devised his psychological study to answer the question whether Eichmann and his accomplices in the Holocaust had any mutual intent, in at least with regard to the goals of the Holocaust. His testing finally suggested that it could have been that the millions of accomplices were merely following orders, despite violating their deepest moral beliefs. Since then to a great extent H. Arendt’s and S. Milgram’s conclusions were further proved by “The Third Wave” history class experiment at High School in Palo Alto (1967).

**The Fear of “The Others” and Ideas of Tolerance, Democracy, and Human Rights**

The second obstacle to reconciliation is the misleading belief that real life transnational experiences and communication can be replaced by abstract ideas of tolerance, democracy, and human rights.

The problem with the *tolerance* idea, however good it may sound, is that it immanently contains in itself the “us vs. they” bipolar opposition. Hence the idea of tolerance still predisposes a primordial view of another as naturally different. The limits of such toleration are furthermore hindered by modern political correctness. E. Chudinova (2005) in her recently published novel *The Mosque of Notre Dame de Paris* took the idea of
European tolerance to its extreme. The fictional book describes the imaginary life of Christian resistance in Paris in 2048 after the EU had announced Islam as the official religion. Unsurprisingly the book had been reprinted in Serbia in 2006. It also reminds us of K. Popper’s dilemma. In The Open Society and its Enemies Popper (1992) questioned the limits of tolerance idea by asking: Should a tolerant society tolerate intolerance? Is tolerance only firm and effective when reciprocal (pp. 272-273)? Yet such reciprocity requires initial presence of common values as well as mutual acceptance of the current power distribution and hegemony. Otherwise tolerance would not go beyond its declaration. In fact, if one believes B. Magee (1997) and D. Edmonds (2001), Karl Popper was not always tolerant in his dealings with friends and colleagues (pp. 231-233; p. 132).

Can the democracy concept, in the way it is promoted in the world today, take us beyond the narratives of “the enemies”? The image of G. W. Bush posted on Russian internet sites during the US-Iraq war with words “If you don’t believe in democracy — well, then we fly to you!” raises several questions. Among them: How is it possible to export democracy to those who refuse to accept it (since not everyone would agree to be “promoted” a democrat by force)? Or perhaps they would like to accept democracy volonté générale a la J. J. Rousseau rather than Anglo-Saxon individual liberty democracy from T. Hobbes, J. Locke, or I. Berlin?

How does one export democracy to countries where it does not naturally fit without deviating in a strange way into a double standard camouflage for traditional corruption and paternalism? A. Lieven (2004) writes that many US citizens tend to look at other human beings as potential Americans whose national and cultural realities are unfortunate but can be helped (p. 46). Yet such a universalism contradicts with G. Hofstede’s (2005) research on peoples’ values. Those values tend to be rigid and constitute long-term differences. Culture change is slow for values, because they were learned when we were children, from parents who acquired them when they were children. This makes for considerable stability in the basic values of society in spite of sweeping changes in political practices at the surface (pp. 4-5). We agree with G. Hofstede and suggest that when we talk about culture, things cannot change overnight. The revolutions might considerably change the social structure of the society, the mechanism of redistributing economic wealth, but people will continue to display the same patterns of political behavior just in a “new jacket.”

Within the last 20 years there has been the debate between ideology of human rights, universalism, and cultural relativism. Universalism holds that more “primitive” cultures will eventually evolve to have the same system of laws and rights as Western cultures do. Cultural relativists hold an opposite, but similarly rigid viewpoint, that a traditional culture is unchangeable. Some of them are afraid that the democratization is just a continuation of Western expansion or a new form of 1960’s modernization theory and cultural imperialism. In universalism an individual is a social unit, possessing inalienable rights and driven by the pursuit of self-interest. The cultural relativist discourse on the contrary views communites
as the basic social unit. Concepts such as individualism, freedom of choice, and equality are absent there. It is recognized that the community always comes first (Reichert, 2002, pp. 28 & 31). Some argue that the way “ethnicity” becomes politicized in the contemporary world may simply reflect a subtle universalization of some of the features of the politics of the Northern societies to the South, despite the differences between forms of political organization and political cultures (Gledhill, 2000, p. 14). Those differences are crucial, but often neglected since most transnational media corporations offices have their headquarters in US and Western Europe (Malahov, 2007, p. 209). The latter often explain modern political and social conflicts in terms of an absence of “modernity” the North has attained.

At first glance, the protection of human rights seems to be an idea indubitable for everyone, an achievement of natural law theory developed by H. Grotius and J. Lock, a cornerstone of modern liberal democracy. The UN Human Rights Council directly reports on human rights violations to the General Assembly. The UN Security Council, sometimes together with The International Criminal Court, may take sanctions against human right abuse, up to authorizing the use of force against the aggressor. Yet several problems remain unsolved. Firstly, the rights to self-determination of a group of people stands in opposition to a nation state’s right to its territorial integrity. Secondly, there is a human rights vs. national security dilemma. Anti-terrorism legislation often infringes upon human and citizens rights. Thirdly, there is a question as to what extent do UN bodies remain supreme and legitimate decision makers in world politics? The events in Kosovo have created a lot of doubts. Firstly, they showed that there are other institutions (like NATO and EU bodies) that can challenge UN expertise on human rights abuse. Secondly, the decision on the independence of Kosovo has created an arguable legal precedent for the future cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover the UN has many times been criticized for failing to take action to prevent human rights abuses, specifically during the Darfur crisis in Sudan, the Srebenica massacre in Bosnia, or genocide in Rwanda, etc.

In addition to all this, it seems to us that the genocide concept has recently floated from being a primarily legal term towards becoming a political narrative of mass media. The declarations of genocide that authorize international military intervention are often announced today not as a result of reports of competent bodies (cf. the Institute for the Study of Genocide or Amnesty International), but under the strong pressure of the politicized media groups. Without coming down on one side or another, we should mention that not just media, but also states are using the term “genocide” for political purposes. One can remember ‘The Holodomor’ (literally — ‘murder by hunger’) campaign as a major plank of recent Ukrainian nation building, while South Ossetia used the term “genocide” to characterize the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali in 2008.

Their “stories” constructed in a format suitable for politicians are frequently camouflaged with nationalisms and phobias of all sorts. Back in 1970’s R. Barthes (1977) described the process of projecting a narrator’s voice through the eyes of one of his
characters (so called “paper beings”) as “internal focalization.” A. MacIntyre (1984) wrote: “I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question “of what story or stories do I find myself a part?” (p. 216). In the study of human affairs, there appears to exist only context-dependent knowledge, and every journalist’s case study contains a substantial element of arbitrary subjectivism (Flyvbjerg, 2006, pp. 221 & 237).

In non-Western societies, industrialization, capitalism, and democracy might not have been the eventual outcome of the process of cultural evolution. In those societies many would argue that these ideologies have been shaped and created by Western imperialism. They result from the slave trade and colonialism, modernization, and consumerism help to build it by using A. Gramsci’s terminology, “cultural hegemony.” Keeping all this in mind, we suggest it is not possible to impose a universal system of human rights if the effects of social change stemming from modernization are not understood around the world equally or shared equally. As we showed above, there is a permanent failure of modern institutions to overcome nationalistic particularism of a neo-Schmittian type. This failure, we believe, cannot be fully subdued by ideals of democracy, tolerance or human rights protection alone. After all, these ideas are often based on the narratives of the “enemy” and can be driven by fear of “the others.”

**BEYOND THE CONSTRUCTED “IDENTITY”**

The third obstacle to reconciliation is the construction of identities based on negative political mobilization. As S. Malesewic points out, the plasticity and ambiguity of the identity concept allows for deep misunderstanding as well as political misuses. Moreover its quasi-scientific use through popular appeal has a potential for devastating political outcomes. He expresses the opinion that the main reason for the astonishing popularity of this concept comes primarily from the fact that “identity” has historically and ideologically filled the role that three other major social concepts played. Those concepts previously used to make sense of human difference and similarity are “race,” “national character,” and “social consciousness” (Malesewic, 2006, p. 30). Since identities are products of construction and negotiation, they are not fixed or static but fluid and fragmented (Ozkirimli, 2005, p. 55). The latter makes them mobile and processual, partly self-construction, partly categorization by others, partly a condition, a status, a label, a weapon, and a shield, concludes L. Malkki (1995). Only when there are “others,” points S. Hall (1996), can you know who you are, and there is no identity that is without the dialogic relationship to the “other.” The other is not outside, but also inside the Self, the Identity (p. 345).

J. Gillis (1994) also states that identities are very selective and inscriptive social and political constructs, and for that reason can easily serve particular interests and ideological positions. “Identities and memories are not things we think about, but things we think with.”
As such they have no existence beyond our politics, our social relations, and our histories. We must take responsibility for their uses and abuses” (p. 5). No wonder that the strengthening of national identity is often used as a tool of national defense. In a democracy various appeals to it can be used to provoke violent actions and reinforce missionary zeal (Roshwald, 2006, p. 187). Those who consider themselves the guardians of the memory of the nation compete for the control over the interpretation of national history. An example of this as well as how territorial borders are linked with national identity is the current dispute over the name “Macedonia” between Skopje and Thessaloniki.

Since the works of E. Gellner and B. Anderson, claims for the new identity have often created a lot of suspicion among the scholars. This was especially the case when they were combined with claims for sovereignty or an attempt to pose a primordial view on nations. We argue (cf. Brubaker & Cooper 2000) that the prevailing constructivist stance on identity, the attempt to “soften” the term, to acquit it of the charge of “essentialism” by stipulating that identities are constructed, fluid and multiple, leaves us without a rationale for talking about “identities” at all and ill-equipped to examine the “hard” dynamics and essentialist claims of contemporary identity politics (p. 1). Modern Russian scholars also view the primordial approach as posing grounds for what was called by V. Malahov (2001) a “refined version of new racism” (pp.167-168). Classical racism interpreted differences between humans as biologically natural and then applied the idea of one nation (race) being inferior to the other. The charm of the new — V. Malahov calls it “sublimated” racism — consists in its new logic of differentiation: other nations are not superior or inferior, they are just naturally (primordially) different although their difference might not be “genes,” but “cultures” or “spirits” — a more politically correct and refined way to say — “the others.” New racists might not think of themselves as racists. Meantime, the engine of their racism is the same as an old one: it is a fear of intermixing of any kind. New “refined” racists promote the idea that everyone has a right to have “the others.” Therefore, let everyone live where they are born, no border diffusion, no threats to “our cultural uniqueness” should be allowed (Malahov, 2005, pp. 193-194).

There are other reasons to criticize the primordial approach in nationalism studies. O. Malinova (2005) writes that identity is a very effective political mobilization mechanism; it is often used to shape collective political claims. Yet, once we attribute identity to a group, there is a risk to turn this identity into some innate objective reality, which often becomes cluttered with myths (myth of “national character”, for example). In fact, those myths per se are results of a conflict between different narratives of identity (pp. 11 & 13). An attempt to pose nations as existing naturally and forever often enables elites to capitalize on xenophobic moods, making enemies out of immigrants or ethnic minorities (Tishkov, 2007, p. 491); it gives a premise to what was called by M. Billig (2005) “banal nationalism,” caused by collective amnesia of the past and present (p. 185). The art of constructing a nation is the art of forgetting — forgetting the differences between people that make it. In a modern
globalized world we are all becoming like a solid American citizen, described in a famous R. Linton’s article written in 1936.

When our friend has finished eating, he settles back to smoke, an American Indian habit, consuming a plant domesticated in Brazil in either a pipe, derived from the Indians of Virginia, or a cigarette, derived from Mexico. If he is hardy enough he may even attempt a cigar, transmitted to us from the Antilles by way of Spain. While smoking he reads the news of the day, imprinted in characters invented by the Semites upon a material invented in China by a process invented in Germany. As he absorbs the account of foreign troubles he will, if he is a good conservative citizen, thank a Hebrew deity in an Indo-European language that he is 100 percent American (p. 326).

Reading R. Linton’s self-ironic piece causes one to pose the following questions. With life changing towards being more part of a one multicultural world, why is it that there are still so many Russians, French, British, Americans etc., who watch TV in the evening and thank God they are 100 percent different from “the others?” Why instead of Russo, America or Franco “philias” we often get Russo, America, or Franco phobias? Can it be that peoples’ national identity is partly a fiction, another deliberately “invented tradition” constructed to serve particular ideological ends (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983)?

A. Macfarlane (2000) raises a crucial question. If nationalism and nation-states are very recent inventions, if there has been a movement from tribes to nations, there should be and would be a movement from nations to something beyond nations. For A. Macfarlane, it is quite clear that the world cannot go on the way it is at the moment. He provides two reasons for this conclusion. One of them is ecological, that we have to learn to treat the world as one system. The second argument is global security, which includes nuclear arms and warfare between the nation states. Macfarlane also points out that the process of going beyond the constructed nationalism will be taking place alongside with the transition from a bipolar world towards the emergence of a multi-polar world with “new big players”, including China, Japan, South America, India, Russia, and Western Europe.

We believe that new identities constructed by “political entrepreneurs” cannot help to overcome agonistic approach to the nature of political process or international relations in a globalizing world. Perhaps they will not even try to. We say they should be replaced by real life experiences of communication and dialogue.

**SECURITY COMMUNITIES, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND TRUST**

K. Deutsch and his colleagues coined the term “security community” back in 1957. They called for an extensive research program in order to clarify the conditions of formation of peaceful communities and how these conditions might be extended over larger and larger areas of the globe. The security community was defined as a group of people believing that
they have come to agreement that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change (Deutsch, 1957, p. 4). K. Deutsch advocated crosscutting communication as the main factor of security community construction, alongside mutual sympathy, trust, common interests and high geographical mobility. Since the end of the Cold War, K. Deutsch’s ideas have been developed by E. Adler and M. Barnett. Their book Security Communities argues that community can exist at the international level and that states dwelling within an international community have the capacity to develop a pacific disposition. Adler and Barnett (1998) refer to security communities in terms of shared identities, meanings, interests as well as many-sided direct interactions. They further promote Deutsch’s idea of the development of shared understandings, transnational values and transaction flows (p. 4). At the same time, these two American scholars claim that the nostalgia for Deutsch security community does not drive them towards pure romanticism. They simply reject the view prevailing among modern scholars that the perspectives for war and peace between states should rely on the language of force. Adler and Barnett (1998) suggest that states can become embedded in a set of social relations that are understood as a community and that the fabric of this community can generate stable expectations of peaceful change (p. 6). This peaceful change should be based on high levels of mutual trust. Empirical global research conducted by A. Tusicisny (2007) proves that comprehensive security communities (zones where not only interstate war, but even civil war, has become unthinkable) are characterized by higher interpersonal trust (p. 425).

In his paper on social capital, trust, and corruption, M. Warren (2004), provides evidence to show why by no means every kind of trust can turn our planet into one security community. Social relations, functioning as social capital when individuals capitalize upon them, may turn “bad” if they produce negative social externalities. M. Warren writes in that respect about particularized vs. generalized forms of trust. Particularized trust can generate negative social capital in the forms of racism, ethnocentrism, and religious intolerance (Warren, 2004, p. 17). The political scientist also mentions two types of reciprocity: it can either be “specific” — when obligations are incurred between you and me, or “generalized” — when obligations are incurred between me and everyone else. M. Warren claims that there are two types of social capital. First one he calls bonding social capital. It is exclusive in its nature and develops within inward looking groups of similar people such as might be found in churches, reading groups, or ethnic fraternal organizations. Social relations that function as the second type — bridging social capital — are “outward looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages” (Warren, 2004, p. 18). These two kinds of social capital have differing qualities and benefits. Bridging capital extends networks, and connects groups to resources they might not otherwise be able to access. Bridging capital also enhances information flows, and can generate broader identities and reciprocity. Bonding social capital, implies M. Warren, creates strong in-group loyalty and can provide social and psychological resources for marginalized groups. Bonding social capital may generate more
negative external effects, because strong in-group loyalty often generates strong out-group antagonism. Intolerance and sectarianism, one of the “dark sides” of social capital, are the results of the bonding, not bridging kind (Warren, 2004, p. 18). Using M. Warren’s terminology, we claim that in modern politics, there is a tendency towards “bonding” rather than outward “bridging” network construction. The latter, of course, assists creating strong regional comprehensive security communities such as EU, ASEAN, EurAsEC, NAFTA, NATO etc., but weakens the ones of a global and cosmopolitan type such as UN.

In the late 20th century many authors began to observe a deterioration in the social capital and its networks in general. R. Putnam notes that nearly every form of civic organization has undergone drops in membership. For instance, while more people are bowling now than in the 1950s, there are fewer bowling leagues in the USA today than there used to be 50 years ago. That gave the title to R. Putnam’s well-known book Bowling Alone. In Bowling Alone Putnam (2000) anticipates some of M. Warren’s key ideas, writing that networks and associated norms of reciprocity are generally good for those inside the network, but the external effects of social capital are by no means always positive. Social capital is present in urban gangs or NIMBY (“not in my backyard”) movements. Power elites often exploit social capital to achieve ends that are antisocial from a wider perspective (pp. 21-22.)

**TRANSTATIONAL IDENTITIES: INSTEAD OF STANDING AGAINST “THE OTHERS” PERHAPS MIXING WITH THE OTHERS?**

We now need to develop a conceptual product that could promote people’s solidarity for peace vs. violent nationalism. We think that the security community theory and bridging social capital ideas can become cornerstones of such a concept. We stated earlier that “enemy” images cannot be fully subdued by ideals of democracy, tolerance, or human rights protection alone. What else then can take us beyond constructed nationalism and agonism? We think it should be an increase in amount of people possessing transnational identities. T.H. Eriksen, a Norwegian professor of anthropology provides us with a broad overview of congenial terminology, including the definitions of creolization and transnationalism:

*Transnationalism* directs attention, rather, to a social existence attaching individuals and groups not primarily to one particular place but to several or none.

*Creolization*, finally, directs our attention toward cultural phenomena that result from displacement and the ensuing social encounter and mutual influence between/among two or several groups, creating an ongoing dynamic interchange of symbols and practices, eventually leading to new forms with varying degrees of stability (Eriksen, 2007, pp. 172-173).
Creole cosmopolitanism — notes F. Verges (2002) — is close to P. Gilroy’s analytical description of the translocal identities of the Black Atlantic, an analysis that he has argued in *Between the Camps*. It is a cosmopolitanism grounded in the rejection of ethnic and nationalist absolutism from a post(colonial) position (p.169). Russian scholar I. Ushanova (2005) classifies creolization as a “positive version of acculturation.” She notes that the result of creolization is not a mutual adjustment, like in the case of integration, but a totally new cultural space, filled in with new (creolized) ideas, values, knowledge, and identities (p. 68).

Although we share to a certain degree such optimistic views, we believe that it is still confusing for the scientific society to talk of the creolization in such a wide sense. The major reason is because of colonial allusions. The problem is that there is also a more narrow usage of the term “creolization”, namely as a particular aspect of colonialism, the process of the uprooting and displacement of large numbers of people in colonial plantation economies. Certain groups who contributed to this economy during slavery were described as Creoles. Originally, a *criollo* meant a Spaniard born in the New World. Today, a similar usage is current in La Réunion, where everybody born not in France, but on the island, regardless of skin color, is seen as *créole*. In Trinidad, the term “Creole” is sometimes used to designate all Trinidadians except those of Asian origin. In Suriname, a Creole is a person of African origin, whereas in neighboring French Guyana a Creole is someone who has adopted a European way of life. According to M. Wood (1943) there are even Russian Creoles in Alaska (p. 204). The only thing that all these different Creoles have in common, points out T. Eriksen (2007), is that all Creoles are uprooted, they belong to a New World, and are contrasted with that which is old, deep, and rooted (p. 155).

The second reason for being careful while using the term “creolization” is because the French and Spanish academic traditions use other terminology. For example the French would talk about *l’invention métisse*, *des mondes mêles*, and *le phénomène du métagisage culturel en France*, (Gruzinski, 2004, p. 140) as well as the *mondialisatión* (d’Iribarne, 2002), while Spanish would appeal to *la raza mestiza*. Finally, there is a third reason. Keeping in mind that there are no fixed criteria of Creole membership in academic literature, the use of this term might cause inconveniences similar to the ones with “identity.” As is well shown by Eriksen using Mauritian material, there are basically too many points of entry into Creoledom. Some are born creole, some achieve creoledom and others — such as the children of certain mixed marriages — have creoledom thrust upon them. Consequently, there are Creoles who are against “creolization” but who favor multiculturalism — that is, strong group identities and clear boundaries; just as there are non-Creoles who favor creolization — mutual influence among cultural groups, individualism (Eriksen, 2007, p. 164).

Hence we think that rather than promoting the term “creolization” we should single out principal features of Creoles that could oppose *bonding* nationalism and the fear of “the
others.” Among those features are: fluidity and openness of self-identification, a tolerant attitude to intermarriage, a positive evaluation of cultural mixing, and a respect for individualism. For instance the Creole language utility lies in its ability to unite otherwise very different groups in a shared field of communication. In this respect, it resembles the definition of bridging social capital given by M. Warren above. Thus ‘creolization’ is interpreted as a process whereby new-shared cultural forms and possibilities for communication emerge owing to contact. It highlights the open-ended, flexible, and unbounded nature of cultural processes, as opposed to the notion of cultures as bounded, stable systems of communication. The key terms for the “creolization” process are also dislocation, fuzzy boundaries, and intergroup cross-fertilization (Eriksen, 2007, pp. 161 & 175).

We suggest that the concept of transnationalism might be the right term to explain how the “creolization” idea can override the neo-Schmittian paradigm. R. Taras (2009), provides the following description:

Transnationalism — a condition where national interests are subordinated to wider ones involving promotion of a national common good — is a term that meets with widespread approval in the EU... The assumption on most theories of transnationalism is that citizens have multiple, nested, situational and fluid identities — not a single fixed one. Moreover transformative political processes have challenged traditional, restrictive notions of national citizenship. Economic and cultural globalization has further weakened citizens’ exclusive attachment to the nation-state... The paradigmatic form of transnationalism today is Europeanness (pp. 69 &70).

R. Taras also distinguishes such terms as “postnationality” and “cosmopolitanism”. Postnationality presumes the erosion of nationality-anchored identity. The “European nation,” points out R. Taras, is not what it used to be: with the integration of millions of non-Europeans, host societies have been transformed as well. Yet even the term integration is insufficient. Rather then using terms assimilation or integration, Taras supports the suggestion of European Commission against Racism and Intolerance to use the category “integrated society.” Hence he is referring to successful integration as a two way process, a process of mutual recognition and inclusion of majority and minority groups.

Many people are also increasingly involved in transnational politics through their discourse, networks, commerce and organizations. In the process, they have developed identities of a supranational kind. Some have even become cosmopolitans (Taras, p. 70).

At the same time, we agree with R. Taras that postnational values spread unevenly - more so in the Western part of the EU. And therefore under those conditions transnationalism seems to be a more balanced and appropriate term then supranationalism — the latter completely challenges la raison d’etre of the nation states. Transnationalism could therefore, in our opinion, achieve two goals. First is that it will stand for sensitiveness
to other cultures, including the ones that are extinct. F. Moghaddam (2006) points that of the 15,000 languages on Earth at the time of Columbus, only 6,000 remain. Since every 2-3 months we lose another language on the planet, by 2,200 C.E. there will be only 200 living languages. (p. 424). Transnationalism stands for the ability to listen and expose oneself to opinions of others, find compromises, and take into account the interests, cultures and languages of others.

Another goal that could be achieved by transnationalism is to oppose the averaging-out of cultural life as a result of a globalism and consumerism. Transnationalism is a notion of a positive evaluation of cultural mixing, a way of creating a patriotic personality with a friendly attitude to other cultures and a presence of real cosmopolitan knowledge about them. It would mean the ability and desire to share knowledge and views on things cross culturally. The upbringing of transnational identities includes cultural and educational exchanges, development of common grounds for education and research, erasing language barriers, promoting the Olympic movement, setting joint cultural and scientific events, business connections, promoting principles of hospitality, and network communities etc.

The idea of hospitality exchange has been around for a long time, since after the Second World War when B. Luitweiler founded Servas. In the following decades a lot of special interest groups were developed for bikers, women, hitchhikers and even Esperanto speakers. All Those large networks (AFS, SIGHT etc.) had to battle similar problems: printing host lists, collecting member fees, and promoting their idea. On the web site of one of today’s largest hospitality exchange programs, “Hospitality Club”, one can read:

One day everyone can go to a different country knowing that someone will receive him/her with open arms. People will travel in a different way, meet each other and build intercultural understanding through personal contact. There will be many members in places like Israel and Palestine, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Chechnya and Russia, Ruanda and East Timor who exchange hospitality with each other and in small steps the Hospitality Club will help to make peace a lasting vision for our wonderful planet. Help us reach our dream…

The popularity of such networks testifies that I. Kant’s principle of global hospitality (Kleingeld, 1998) has not been forgotten. We believe that such “peoples’ diplomacy” can set a durable basement for “friend based relations between the states.

“THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE” FOR THE
TRANSNATIONAL INTELLECTUALS AND THE CONCEPTS
OF “LIVE KNOWLEDGE” AND “WE-FEELING” FROM S. FRANK

I. Kant (1993) in The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals notes: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means to an end… Therefore, every
rational being must so act as if he were through his maxim always a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends” (p.36 & 43). This moral notion derives from I. Kant’s metaphysical critique of exaggerated claims of the powers of the rational human mind. As appears from I. Kant’s philosophy our mind carries within itself certain forms and structures which it imposes on any object that appears within its field of experience. As R.P. Wolff puts it: “If the mind imposes its own subjective norms on nature, then the nature it knows cannot be a realm of things as they are in themselves… In the end, the [Kant’s] transcendental philosophy… teaches us that the human mind lacks the power to penetrate the veil of appearance and grasp the inner nature of independent reality” (p. 297). The same is true about difficulties in understanding “as they are in themselves” other social groups and nations. Thus I. Kant implies that the perpetual peace between nations will become a reality only when philosophers are given the right to participate fully in the dialogue over matters of policy as well as in the character development of politicians — for example, through moral and philosophical education. Kant’s plan for perpetual peace between nations envisages a context wherein philosophers are not only allowed but even encouraged to engage in open creative conflict with legal professionals, through peaceful public discussion. Kant believes that such a context already exists — in the form of the university (Palmquist, 2005, pp. 216-222). In Perpetual Peace Kant (1963) indicates that in direct contrast to philosophers, politicians “make a great show of understanding men … without understanding man and what can be made of him, for they lack the higher point of view of anthropological observation which is needed for this” (p. 374). S. Palmquist (2008) concludes:

As philosophers, we must take seriously our potential role as peacemakers by encouraging our governments to adopt policies of engagement that promote balance and mutual respect between different nations and people groups. … If Kant could send us any message from his resting place in the grave, I believe it would be to remind us philosophers that we really can help solve contemporary political problems, and that once we realize this fact, we shall find we are closer than we ever before realized to the day when all the nations on earth, despite their radically conflicting perspectives, may live together in lasting peace (p. 612).

As globalization progresses, borders disappear and miscegenation increases. We are gradually becoming more a planet of new Creoles (even if we think we are 100 percent Russians or Americans from Linton’s article). The number of people that share translocal experiences is constantly growing: Many of them enter political elites or become public intellectuals. Diasporas increasingly influence their governments in relation to their home countries (Clifford, 1994, p. 302). Who do these new Creoles belong to, what values do they stand for, how do others treat them, and what role are they destined to play in the modern world?
E. Said (1998) in an autobiographical memoir *Between Worlds* remembered how he lived in both Cairo and Jerusalem until the age of 12:

With an unexceptionally Arab family name like Said connected to an improbably British first name (my mother much admired the Prince of Wales in 1935, the year of my birth), I was an uncomfortably anomalous student all through my early years: a Palestinian going to school in Egypt, with an English first name, an American passport and no certain identity at all.

Books like *Orientalism* by E. Said and *Dreams from my Father* by B. Obama explain that just as speaking one language does not stop us from learning another, being a patriot does not necessarily mean we cannot expose ourselves to cross cultural experiences and enjoy other countries and cities.

Yet, by the end of the day we have to face a challenging paradox: to get to the point when there is a “communication without an enemy” someone should first start the dialogue with “the particular enemy.” In this connection, B. Flyvbjerg (2006) comments:

I have found the following two strategies to work particularly well in ensuring such openness. First, when writing up a case study, I demur from the role of omniscient narrator and summarizer. Instead, I tell the story in its diversity, allowing the story to unfold from the many-sided, complex, and sometimes conflicting stories that the actors in the case have told me. Second, I avoid linking the case with the theories of any one academic specialization. Instead, I relate the case to broader philosophical positions that cut across specializations. In this way, I try to leave scope for readers of different backgrounds to make different interpretations and draw diverse conclusions…. Readers will have to discover their own path and truth inside the case. Thus, in addition to the interpretations of case actors and case narrators, readers are invited to decide the meaning of the case and to interrogate actors’ and narrators’ interpretations to answer that categorical question of any case study, “What is this case a case of?” (p. 237).

However, not everyone can meet B. Flyvbjerg’s criteria. Mostly likely it will require education, proficiency in languages, and the vocation to do that. These sorts of people can generally be characterized as modern intellectuals. At the same time, let us make an important reservation: it should be not any intellectuals but only the on escapable of *Verstehen* towards the other side of the story, capable of keeping a dialogue with people of different identities. These should be intellectuals with transnational life experiences, whose identities will go beyond “bonding” nationalism and whose trust will be to a large degree “generalized.”

H. Arendt (1958) insists that speech lies at the heart of politics. Paraphrasing Aristotle she notes: “speech is what makes man a political being” (p. 3). H. Arendt’s views are supported by promoters of discursive model of democracy — Seyla Benhabib and Jürgen
Habermas. Habermas (1990) asserted that only public dialogue oriented toward consensus could produce legitimate politics (p. 162). Seyla Benhabib (1992) — a Turkish born Yale philosopher — also believes that political principles can be justified through a process of dialogue that strips those principles of their subjective element and allows them to aspire to the level of universality (p. 132).

Since S. Benhabib does not believe in the purity of cultures, she thinks of them as formed through dialogues with other cultures. Human cultures, according to S. Benhabib, are the constant change of imaginary boundaries. When a person is born, it should not be expected that he or she would automatically be a member of a particular religion or culture. S. Benhabib asserts that the state should not let groups define the lives of individuals. Members of a society have the right to express themselves and it is desirable that adult individuals be asked whether they choose to continue membership in their community.

The discussion around cosmopolitanism curiously takes us back to the dispute between agonism and consensus theories at the beginning of this article. There seem to be two opposite approaches. One was advocated by I. Kant, K. Jaspers, H. Arendt, and later developed by S. Benhabib (2006) particularly in her book Another Cosmopolitanism. Alongside with J. Habermas these authors shape their political theories in categories like accessibility of consensus, freedom, dialogue, communication, etc. They think that dialogical existential communication can help to unveil our political opponents “as they are in themselves” and cooperate for peace.

The other approach talks more about conflicts, exploitation, imperialism and hegemony. For example, such a critique of S. Benhabib’s ideas can be found in G. Calhoun’s (2002) The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers: Toward a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism. In a way G. Calhoun’s critique reminds us of F. Fanon’s (1965), The Wretched of the Earth where a Martinique born French-Algerian thinker promotes the idea of putting peasants at the vanguard of the revolution, because other classes (even the urban proletariat) are insufficient for total revolution since those classes actually benefit from the economic structures of imperialism. As G. Calhoun (2002) puts it cosmopolitans are usually projects of empires and their greenhouses are the imperial and trade capitals, like London, Paris, Moscow, so cosmopolitanism goes hand to hand with neoliberalism. Yet in practice cosmopolitanism reflects the elite perspective on the world, “cosmopolitan thought has a hard time with cultural particularity, local commitments and even emotional attachments” (p. 885). The approaches of F. Fanon and G. Calhoun also both bear the stamp of neo-Marxist thought.

Other critics perceive cosmopolitanism as a hidden agenda of hegemonies — for example globalism and covetousness of transnational corporations. Some, as R. Taras (2009) points out in Europe Old and New, make the provocative claim that in the current EU Eastern Europe region serves as a sweatshop for companies from Western member states (p.72). Futher, N. Klein (2003) claims that Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech
Republic are postmodern serfs, providing low-wage labor for Western Europe. One could object to Klein’s reasons by arguing that the new Eastern EU members get more money from the European funds like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and that countries like Germany and France are playing the role of financial donors towards the countries that aspired to membership in the EU since the fall of the USSR.

Without trying to make any judgments we can find certain elements of agonism in the critics of cosmopolitanism, particularly in the views of N. Klein. At the same time we have to admit that some of the apprehensions of G. Calhoun should be taken into consideration. We particularly think that cosmopolitanism should avoid becoming “uprooted” (using Simone Weil’s expression), indifferent to specific local cultures and detached from national traditions, histories, symbols, and values. The latter can make us all the same — people without any sense of belonging, sacred symbols, personal stories, family trees and coats of arms, without homelands, national traditions in art, cinema, literature, etc.

Is there anything that can reconcile both proponents and agonistic critics of cosmopolitanism? In our view, transnational intellectuals are the people who will promote the anthropological nature of knowledge to go beyond the “invented traditions.” We find that Martha C. Nussbaum (1996) expressed a similar idea in a different way:

As students here grow up, is it sufficient for them to learn that they are above all the citizens of the United States but they ought to respect the basic human rights of citizens of India, Bolivia, Nigeria, and Norway? Or should they — as I think — in addition to giving special attention to the history and current situation of their own nation, learn a good deal more then they frequently do about the rest of the world in which they live, about India and Bolivia and Nigeria and their histories, problems and comparative successes? Should they learn only that citizens of India have equal basic human rights, or should they also learn about the problems of hunger and pollution in India, and the implication of these problems for the larger issues of global hunger and global ecology? Most important, should they be taught that they are, above all, citizens of United States, or should they instead be taught that they are, above all, citizens of the world of human beings, and that, while they happen to be situated in the United States, they have to share this world with citizens from other countries? I suggest four arguments for the second concept of education, which I call cosmopolitan education. (p. 6)

The ideas of M.C. Nussbaum are consonant with ideas of the Russian political thinker S. Frank and his concepts of sobornost, “we-feeling,” and zhivoe znanie. Sobornost in Russian philosophy signifies spiritual community of many jointly living people. The term was coined by the early Slavophiles, Ivan Kireevsky and Aleksey Khomyakov, to underline the need for cooperation between people at the expense of individualism on the basis that the opposing groups focus on what is common between them. Perhaps, sobornost could be considered as a Russian Orthodox equivalent of the Western communitarian idea, though
much less Cartesian than the latter. I. Kireevsky promoted *sobornost* to designate cooperation within the Russian peasants community (*obshina*), united by a set of common Orthodox Christian values, as opposed to the cult of individualism in the West. According to the expression of Russian philosopher K. Aksakov, in *sobornost* “the individual remains naturally free like someone singing in a choir, whose voice adds on to the collective harmony of the chorus, and yet is not lost within it” (Zenkovskii, 1991, p. 18). At the same time, *sobornost* (N. Berdiaev uses the term *communotornost*) should oppose the simply mechanical collectivism which sounds close to French *le solidarisme* of the 1920 Nobel peace prize winner L. Bourgeois (Berdyaev, 1995).

*Sobornost* has been heavily criticized within and outside Russia by many as a merely abstract and naïve category. However, we believe that it deserves to be deployed in a field of political communication, which can be otherwise dominated by a rather arid Western: “society vs. individual” opposition. *Sobornost* should be achieved with the help of the *we-feeling* and *live knowledge* concepts.

According to S. Frank, our Being is an all-pervasive unity (in Russian philosophy - *Vseedinstvo*), to which we belong only as its solitary and particular incarnations. Therefore, the actual possession of the Being by a particular individual can only be conceived as a revelation of Being in *live knowledge* (*zhivoe znanie*). Such knowledge, according to the philosopher, is born in the depths of personal life experience. It is not knowledge-thought, this is - *live knowledge*. In his book *The Spiritual Foundations of Society*, S. Frank (1992) writes: “On the question of critical philosophy, whether there is the ‘Being’ outside us or only within, in our mind, it is necessary to answer that both are simultaneously supported by the fact that *we are inside the Being*” (p. 481).

In his late book *Reality and Mankind*, S. Frank (1949) continues tradition of Plato, Augustine, Pascal and Descartes. Frank calls I. Kant — a genius who went beyond the “dogmatic metaphysics” but was later misinterpreted by many in a positivistic way (p. 223 & 225). Frank acknowledges the accomplishments of Kant, Fichte and Hegel in taking us beyond the “reality of objective facts” and towards “the reality of Spirit”. One thing, notes Frank (1997), “to learn about the social and political life from within, by participating in it, gaining thrilling live experience, and quite another thing to study it as naturalist examines the life of an anthill” (p. 226). The genuine reality, according to Frank, can only be perceived through the in depth self-consciousness, “existence” and even mystic experience. One can remember in this regard the words of Søren Kierkegaard (2000), whom Semen Frank highly admired:

> What I really need is to get clear about *what I am to do*, not what must know, except insofar as knowledge must precede every act. What matters is to find my purpose, to see what it really is that God wills that I shall do; the crucial thing is to find a truth that is
truth for me, to find the idea for which I am willing to live and die… What use would it be to me to be able to develop a theory of the state, getting details from various sources and combining them into a whole, and constructing a world I did not live in but merely held up for others… if it had no deeper meaning for me and my life? (p.8).

In his essay, *Pushkin on Relations Between The West and Europe*, S. Frank (1996) wrote about the brilliant ability of Pushkin for synthetic thinking, reconciling opposing perceptions. In opposition to the extreme Westerners like P. Chaadayev, A. Pushkin defends the value of an authentic Russian historical culture. In opposition to the Slavophiles A. Pushkin claims the superiority of Western culture and its necessity for Russia. According to S. Frank (1996, pp. 287-288), this is not just an eclectic reconciliation of the irreconcilable, not just some kind of “medium line,” but a genuine synthesis based on an entirely unique perspective, which opens up new, broader spiritual, philosophical and historical horizons.

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Forum

IN THE NET OF ABDUCTIONS (ON JULIETTE PEIRCE’S IDENTITY)

VITALY KIRYUSHCHENKO

In spite of all the industrious efforts Peirce scholars have made so far, Peirce’s biography still retains a number of gaps, among which the problem of identity of Peirce’s second wife, Juliette Froissy, stands out most significantly. It is all the more important that, as some scholars suggest, the discovery of any reliable facts about Juliette could provide an explanation to some of the decisions Peirce had made, which irrevocably changed the course of his life, as well as his semiotic theory. By courtesy of Professor Dr. Nathan Houser and the Peirce Edition Project, the writer of the present paper was granted access to the archive materials containing the Max H. Fisch — Maurice Auger correspondence and Victor Lenzen’s notes on Juliette. The paper aims at arranging the dispersed data obtained from these and other sources into a set of several distinct versions, which curiously refer to each other and collectively impose a certain order on some major abductions concerning Juliette’s identity.

Not long before Charles Peirce set off for his fifth trip to Europe in April, 1883, he wrote a letter to Julius Hilgard, the Superintendent of the Coast Survey, which said:

I wish to marry a French lady, Madame Pourtalai, who has been in this country for a good while being detained here by the bad state of her health. Her condition of health has now become almost desperate, her financial affairs are going wrong and demand her

VITALY KIRYUSHCHENKO is an associate professor in the Department of Humanities at State University-Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg, Russia (kiryushchenko@mail.ru). This paper is an English translation of chapter 9 of the first full-length biography of Ch. S. Peirce in Russian, “Charles Sanders Peirce: An Introduction to the Intellectual History of America” (“Charlz Sanders Pirс, ili osa v bytulke: Vvedenie v intellektual’nyu istoriyu Americi”), published in Moscow in 2008 by Territorija buduschego Publishing House.

presence, she will not consent to being married here unless I will go to France to have the ceremony repeated, and for all these imperative reasons she must go and I must go with her (MHFF, 1984).

As the marriage certificate indicates, Peirce’s second wife was Juliette Annette Froissy, 26 years old, born in France, and the daughter of Auguste Froissy and Rose Eyem. The certificate also states that at the moment of entering into marriage, Juliette was a widow, her former husband’s name being de Pourtalai.

The marriage was announced not long before the departure, in New York City, just two days after the formal divorce of Peirce and Harriet Melusina Fay. The haste looks even more suspicious given the fact that it cost Peirce his position at the Johns Hopkins University and thus frustrated his plans to pursue an academic career. Moreover, upon Peirce’s return from Europe, another trouble was awaiting him: his career in the Coast Survey was also coming to an end, as by the early 90s after Peirce’s father’s death and the decline of the Lazzaroni group, the Survey was gradually losing its authority as a purely research enterprise. Five years later, in May 1888, Charles and Juliette bought a house in Milford, Pennsylvania, where Charles spent most of his last 26 years. The Milford mansion became a sort of voluntary exile for both Charles and Juliette; there Peirce wrote most of his currently known works on the history of science, as well as on ethics, pragmatism, semiotics, and cosmology.

When asked about Juliette’s past, in most cases Peirce would either tell stories unsupported by any direct evidence, with his most telling example found in L 482, CSP-Unidentified, 13.11.09, or say something to the effect that he would stoop to anything not to reveal the mystery of his wife’s true identity. True, in a number of his letters he does give scattered details and hints on Juliette’s past, as well as a few more or less full accounts — which sound more like awkward melodramas (Pierce, 1984b) And really, despite all the efforts of archive and field research, the only veritable fact of Juliette’s biography, apart from those directly connected with the life of Charles and those known from the Peirces’ family correspondence or from Milford Dispatch articles, is the date of her death, October 4, 1934. Meanwhile, the seven years between starting his work at the Hopkins and moving to Milford are obviously the peak of Peirce’s biography. Besides, many of the versions curiously overlap. Taking into consideration all these facts, we can assume that it might be more than possible that despite the seeming disappearance of reality behind numerous mystifications around Juliette’s life, the very nature of these mystifications, as well as the geography and the list of names they generate, all that taken together does tell us something about the relationship of Charles and Juliette and does create an imprint (even if a negative one) of her personality.

In any case, it is evident that no fiction can be absolute: it inevitably incorporates some odds of reality. Weaving a thick veil of fictional stories and facts around Juliette and Peirce,
like Don Quixote, could not but realize that fictional stories are good only as far as they resemble the truth, even if remotely. Neither deliberate falsification nor true scholarly contempt towards any pre-experimental distinction between the real and the unreal can allow the subject of speech to remain, in Michel Foucault’s terms, an absolute “hero of the Identical.” The range of similarities is not infinite, alas.

However, an invented world aims for closedness, as otherwise it would be impossible to believe in it. On the other hand, this closedness is not only the means of, but also a necessary prerequisite for creating fiction. This point has been hard to argue with since the time of Aristotle’s *Poetics*. But for the same reasons, any historian or biographer is doomed to repeat the destiny of Borges’ Averroes, who could probably have learnt by heart Aristotle’s *Poetics* and even understood all that it says about theatre, but nevertheless never learnt what “theatre” means. And it is fair, as the reality of any given life presupposes a set of finite facts and experiences, the external semantics of which is not something obvious. In other words, they represent motivational unities, habita, which can be used or interpreted, but in which, as Wittgenstein would have said, there is nothing left to understand. Thus, inevitably leaving a certain part of biography to fiction, all that we gain in exchange, as Gordon Comstock, one of Orwell’s characters, put it, is a number of keyholes through which we see something only because we do not see all the rest.

Meanwhile, the issues of creating, making up, or truthfully describing a certain object, are interwoven in Peirce’s semiotics, too. The latter allows most fantastic transformations of the description-reality, or the “outer-inner” relation:

What distinguishes a man from a word? There is a distinction doubtless. ... It may be said that man is conscious, while a word is not. But consciousness is a very vague term. It may mean that emotion which accompanies the reflection that we have animal life. This is a consciousness which is dimmed when animal life is at its ebb in old age, or sleep, but which is not dimmed when the spiritual life is at its ebb; which is the more lively the better *animal* a man is, but which is not so, the better *man* he is. ... Again, consciousness is sometimes used to signify *I think*, or unity in thought; but this unity is nothing but consistency, or the recognition of it. Consistency belongs to every sign, so far as it is a sign; and therefore every sign, since it signifies primarily that it is a sign, signifies its own consistency. ...there is no element whatever of man’s consciousness which has not something corresponding to it in the word; and the reason is obvious. It is that the word or sign which man uses is the man himself. For, as the fact that every thought is a sign, taken in conjunction with the fact that life is a train of thought, proves that man is a sign; so, that every thought is an external sign, proves that man is an external sign. That is to say, the man and the external sign are identical, in the same sense in which the words *homo* and *man* are identical. Thus my language is the sum total of myself (Peirce Edition Project, 1984).
This truly Augustinian logical chain does not maintain that coherence of a story necessarily implies its truthfulness. On the contrary, without challenging the norms of basic common sense, it objects to the possibility of the purely internal and leaves hope that at least some of the suggested hypotheses, or, in Peirce’s terms, abductions (in our case, those of Juliette’s identity) must have an indication of the events and facts that really took place. In this context, it is also a curious fact that this fragment from “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities”, like many other fragments from Peirce’s early Kant-inspired papers, contains a veiled reference to certain sections of Kant’s 1st Critique. Here, the hint is unmistakably at the Kantian notion of “understanding” and, more specifically, at “The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection” — the section of 1st Critique, which serves as an important transition point from “Analytic of Principles” to “Transcendental Dialectics”. This section is devoted to the ambiguousness of reflective concepts — those of the inner and the outer, of matter and form, of identity and difference, of agreement and opposition.

As regards the facts most hypotheses concerning Juliette are based on, they provide quite a patchy and contradictory picture. Alongside with the record in the marriage certificate, there is other abundant evidence, both direct and indirect, concerning Juliette’s age, name, ancestors, place of birth, as well as possible reasons for concealing this information.

Thus, for example, in 1900, Juliette told a census taker that she was 48 years old. According to various statements made by Peirce, she arrived in the US from Europe between 1876 and 1878, at the age of 19. One of his journal records, dated January 6, 1914, not long before his death, mysteriously says: “Hodie uxor L anos nata est,” or “Today my wife turns 50.” If that be true, Juliette must have been under 12 years old by the moment of their first meeting in, let us say, 1876.

As regards the name, Juliette used both Froissy and de Pourtalai/de Pourkealés in her correspondence at different times. In several letters, Peirce wrote that she arrived in the US “without a name”, which can be interpreted as a hint suggesting that all her names known at the time before their marriage are totally fictional by mutual consent. “I don’t know what her name is or was, and have no suspicion or hint”, wrote Peirce in September 1909, in a drafted letter to William James which he never sent (MHFF, 1909a) Walter Gassman, who was 13 years old in 1898 and whose parents moved to Milford approximately at the same time the Peirces did, remembers that he never heard Charles call his wife by her name, the preferred nickname being “Little Girl”. He also mentions that addressing Peirce she sometimes used the name Bopper (Papa, in Joseph Brent’s interpretation, or Baba in Victor Lenzen’s), which sounds quite odd for the 19th century US. Gassman also remembers that the Little Girl often visited their house and had long conversations with his mother, mostly about her childhood, allegedly spent in Austria with the Habsburgs, mentioning Franz-Joseph and Bismarck, on whose lap she liked to sit (MHFF, 1909b). Meanwhile, whereas the second variant of the name is more or less possible and makes some sense and the first
one is most probably a phonetic combination of the other two, the name “Baba” gives some support to the not too strong theory of Juliette’s Russian ancestry. Baba is a Russian vulgar word for “woman” used as a humiliating term when addressing men.

**BERTS**

Mrs. Philips, who lived for a while in the former Peirce’s house after Juliette died, remembered that when Juliette was angry, she cursed in Russian and that she could also understand the Polish language. Besides, as other interviews with former neighbors show, Juliette claimed to have a sister who married a Russian earl and disappeared in Russia during the revolution of 1917.

“The Russian version” finds some support, even though not too convincing, in the Peirces’ family correspondence. In 1901, James Mills (or Jem) wrote to his younger brother Herbert:

...I have heard from Charlie that “Juliette decided” to accept an offer of $7,000 for the Milford estate, including furniture and belongings, and that she will go abroad to live. I hope that she will not head for St. Petersburg and I don’t think she will. ... After all, it may be that it will not be too high a price to pay for her absence, though I have been made to believe that she has made herself very necessary to Charlie and that he cannot live without her. ... The mystery of his obligation to her is beyond my understanding. But it may be that there is nothing to understand, except that he conceives that he has ruined her life and owes her every reparation (MHFC, 1901).

The letter does not make it clear whether this assumption was based on the knowledge of who Juliette really was or if Jem was merely trying to play up to Herbert who was a secretary at the US Embassy in St-Petersburg at the time; he was not very favorably disposed to Juliette and did not feel like meeting her at all. This attitude in its turn could be explained, unless we consider one of Charles’ letters to Jem, written between 1881 and 1883, to be another fiction. He writes that Juliette’s reputation suffered from some “terrible error” he had made, from “evil machinations of a man who had tried to take advantage of her unprotected state”, and from the “brutal conduct of the Peirce family”, except for the father “who really did know the world, [and therefore] was with her”. The name of the evil man is not revealed, the details of the terrible error are not described either. Further on, Charles writes about his break-up with Juliette and mentions Herbert, who had learnt everything about Juliette not long before and who decided to take advantage of the situation and started courting Juliette. Peirce also claimed that his wife had letters that could unmask his brother and that he was ready to use them at any moment (L, n.d.).
The circumstances of Herbert’s appointment in the St. Petersburg Embassy are not quite clear. On 19 September, 1893, he applied for a consulate position in Frankfurt-on-Main or in Brussels. Shortly after that, Charles wrote to his friend William Everett, a congressmen and son of Edward Everett, a politician known for his opening speech for President Lincoln at the Gettysburg Address:

I want your most serious and most secret counsel. Here is Berts wants me to exhaust all my influence with Congressmen and Senators and others to get him a consulate. Now I think this is pretty hard. I might get a consulate for myself. We cannot both be consuls. … I have in mind to tell him that Juliette’s friends are talking of having me appointed minister, which is true, & that I need a place too badly to spoil my chances and that if I am appointed minister I will try to make him Secretary of Legation. … He doesn’t speak French or German. Hardly reads French with facility (MHFC, 1983).

Indeed, Herbert was not a man of exceptional talents, but he did have the minimum capacity for pursuing a mediocre diplomatic career. Despite the obvious trickster nature of the letter, it remains a fact that in 1894 Herbert was appointed third secretary of the American diplomatic mission in St. Petersburg, where he worked till the year 1901. In 1897, when the mission received the status of Embassy, he was awarded the emperor’s medal by the Russian government for his service during the coronation of Nicolas II; in 1900, as a representative of the United States, he participated in the negotiations on the issue of Russian poachers’ illegal fishing in the territorial waters of the US in the Bering Sea.

Of special interest to Herbert were Russian prisons, which becomes evident from his extensive letter addressed to the editor of New York Tribune, published as an article in the March 14, 1898 issue. In 1899, at the peak of the construction work of the Trans Siberian railway, Jem visited Berts. The purpose of the visit is not clear; there remains only one letter from Jem to Charles that contains nothing but his general impressions of St. Petersburg, a detailed description of the appearance and personality of Nicolas II, words of admiration of fresh caviar taste, Russian theatre talents, and St-Petersburg police:

The go<ro> davoi, or policemen, are the nicest looking fellows I know in that capacity, as far as possible from your big powerful London bobby, and still further from the wild Irishmen of the New York streets. They are rather small, active-looking young fellows, with faces beaming good humor, without any symbols of authority or force, standing all day long in the middle of the streets to regulate traffic and help people find the way, which they do most obligingly and even affectionately, with soft-toned manly voices. But this does not prevent their being ready to obey the orders of their chiefs, were they to massacre all the inhabitants of Petersburg (L, 1899).
In 1905, Herbert represented the USA at the peace conference in Portsmouth, which attempted to settle territorial conflicts between Russia and Japan. That was probably the peak of his diplomatic career. In March 1906, he initiated several diplomatic scandals, exposing various cases of abuse and misconduct in American embassies in the East (drinking, corruption, illegal business, forgery of entry certificates for Chinese workers). He led rigorous investigations in US embassies in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, Port-Said, Singapore, Hong-Kong, and Vladivostok, and in 1907, upon arrival in Boston, he himself was arrested for bad debts.

A month before Herbert’s appointment, in his letter to Jem, Peirce mentions certain “embassies” from New York who attempted to convince Juliette to break up with Peirce and leave for Europe (L, 1994). There are also other letters written by Peirce at different times where he mentions Juliette’s connections in Russia and hints that Herbert’s appointment was due to her influence. Among those letters, there is one addressed to New York on March 14th, 1898, where Peirce refers to Juliette’s powerful friends at the Russian court in St. Petersburg and suggests that she should consider going back to Europe, to her “friends”.

In December 1883, eight months after Peirce’s marriage, Sara Mills, Charles’ mother, writes him a letter about professor Sylvester’s resignation from the Hopkins, where she makes a strange statement (“congratulations on your Siberian exile”), a phrase which sounds absolutely out of context and is never explained. It is quite possible, though, that this remark has nothing to do with Juliette and is just a metaphor referring to Peirce’s problems in the Coast Survey.

Victor Lenzen, investigating possible Russian and Polish traces in Juliette’s past, refers to this letter and several others as evidence for one of the hypotheses, which claims that Juliette’s father could be Adolphe Fourier de Bacourt, born in Nance, who served as French ambassador in Washington and in Sardinia in 1840’s (MHFF, n.d.). Juliette herself confirmed being acquainted with the man. De Bacourt’s niece, la Comtesse de Martel de Janville, was a French writer who published critical articles and sketches under the pen-name Gyp during the 1870’s to the 1890’s, ridiculing the populist democracy of the French republic. In her later book Souvenirs d’une Petite Fille, Lenzen finds a description of her former classmate, dark-haired Juliette. It is also known, that Juliette was familiar with the book and even made notes while reading it, possibly in order to use them in one of her mystifications. In Lenzen’s interpretation, the name of de Bacourt is associated with the names of princes Radziwills and Golitsyns, although the facts he provides cannot be considered sound evidence for any definite conclusions (MHFF, n.d.).

As it is well known, one of the most famous American Golitsyns was prince Dmitry (1770-1840), who moved to the USA in late 18th century and became a catholic priest having been ordained in Baltimore, a city with one of the largest catholic dioceses in the US at that time. After years of traveling around Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania as a missionary, he founded a settlement named Loretto within 150 miles from Philadelphia, between Cresson
and Ebensburg. It is a curious fact that these two towns hosted stations of the Coast Survey which were supervised by Charles Peirce and which he visited on several occasions. Golytsyn spent a lot of money on maintaining his catholic colony, hoping for an inheritance from Russia, which he never received. In the end, he incurred large amount of debt, beyond his ability to pay off. Later, Golytsyn gave up his title and his name and lived in Loretto under the name of Father Smith. In 1840, his relative Elizaveta Golytsyna moved to the USA. Being also a catholic, she took monastic vows in France and before arriving in the US, she lived in various French catholic monasteries, all of which belonged to the congregation of the Sacred Heart. The congregation was founded by Madeleine Sophie Barat in 1800 as an order devoted to bringing up orphan girls. The congregation opened its first orphanage in Amiens, France.

Houlné

Juliette used to tell her friend Maria Schteiner that she was born in a little Alsatian town of Lährimboile. According to another story which she spread a little more rigorously, she, like Adolphe de Bacourt mentioned above, came from Nance, a city in Lorraine, on the border with Alsace. Gifford Pinchot, the Chief of the US Forestry Service (1905-1910) and Governor of Pennsylvania (1923-1927, 1831-1935), a former student of French National Forestry school in Nance and the son of Mary Eno Pinchot, Juliette’s friend, later made an attempt to find families with the name Froissy in local archives. However, his efforts did not bring any tangible results; later research of the marriage records in France was not successful either. William James, who spent most of his childhood and youth in Europe, was convinced that Juliette was born in Alsace, which, he claimed, could be proved by her peculiar local accent, evident when she spoke German or French.

After Juliette’s death in 1934, a mysterious card was found among her papers. The card had the name of Pierre Fourier d’Hincourt on it; the address written on the back side read 99 Governor Street, Providence, Rhode Island. At that time, Hincourt was the name of a small Alsatian village not far from Ancienville, close to the German-Swiss border. The address on the card was that of a Rhode Island orphanage for girls, visited by Juliette in April 1903, while Peirce was reading a course on the logic of science in Harvard, organized for him by William James. Juliette never explained the purpose of her visit. The research made by Max H. Fisch and Maurice Auger proved only that Juliette, instead of accompanying Charles to Harvard, first visited St. Vincent orphanage in Providence as a guest of someone named Mother Maria (MHFF, n.d.). It has been proved that Juliette’s stay at the orphanage was too long to qualify for a curiosity or charity visit. The orphanage was maintained by the order of the Sacred Heart, in whose monasteries Elizaveta Golytsyna used to live.
Mother Maria turned out to be a nun, Maria Houlné, born February 10th, 1870. In the 1980’s, her niece, also Maria, was still alive, staying in St. Anne monastery in Melbourne, Kentucky. They both appeared to have been born in Steige, Lorraine region, not far from both Nance and Lafrimbolle, mentioned by Juliette as her birth places.

Auger made a trip to France where he conducted research in the archives of Alsace and Lorraine, in St. Jean de Bassel, Obersteinbach, and Steige in particular. As a result of the research and correspondence with other sisters of Houlné, among other things, he discovered that Houlné is a French catholic family, one branch of which settled in the USA in the 1900’s. There were five people under the name of Houlné in Steige, and all of them, like Elizaveta Golysyna, were nuns of the order mentioned above.

Among these nuns, there was one named Marie-Louise, born August 1st, 1861. Her widowed mother, also Marie-Louise, left letters from which we learn about her daughter’s death on September 3rd, 1879. Meanwhile, according to one of the stories told by Charles and Juliette, some time after Juliette arrived in the USA in 1877 or 1878, a letter was sent to her family in Europe which said that the ship bound for the New World she had taken, sank (MHFF, 1985). If this be true, this decision, as Auger assumes, could have been caused by the necessity to say goodbye to the old name either due to debts, persecution, or unwanted marriage. In the latter case, if Juliette was really a catholic, it was the only possible solution given the obvious difficulties of a divorce.

The role of Juliette could also suit some other nuns of Houlné, in particular Eugenie Katrine, born December 18th, 1861. In any case, the research in the archives of the order in Kentucky did not yield anything as one of the volumes containing data on marriages of 1863-1873 was unaccountably missing (MHFF, 1985). The situation looks even more suspicious due to the fact that, according to Brent (1993), all information as regards Juliette was also thoroughly deleted and cut out of Mary Eno Pinchot’s correspondence, which is currently stored in the Library of Congress in Washington, DC.

Besides, the Peirces’ neighbors in Milford were intrigued by the fact that the Peirces were frequently visited by a French-speaking girl whom they seriously considered to be the daughter as Juliette treated her very cordially. If that be true, it is possible that it was that girl Juliette went to see at the St. Vincent orphanage in Providence, north of Boston, in April 1903.

POURTALES-1

On his way to Alsatian Obersteinbach, Auger was surprised to learn from the taxi driver about château la Verrerie, a “live” family estate, located in the vicinity. At the moment, someone named count François de Pourtalés was living in the castle. Upon his visit to the count, Auger learnt that before the castle became the property of de Pourtalés, it used
to belong to the family of Bussieres. Mélanie de Bussieres, who married Edmond de Pourtalés, was accepted at the court of Spanish princess Eugénie de Montijo, who later married Napoleon III and became the last Empress of France.

In the de Pourtalés family, there was someone Jeanne-Albertine, married to Bernard-Erasme Kalberwisch, a Prussian cavalry major. The date of her death, April 24th, 1883, is very close to the date of Charles and Juliette’s wedding, April 26th, 1883. This could mean, as in the “Houlné” scenario, that Juliette was trying to conceal her real past by means of fictional death.

Jeanne-Albertine (whose initials J.A. are the same as Juliette Annette’s) could have crossed the ocean in the late 1870’s and settled in the USA. Kalberwisch is known to have remarried in 1886, so if we believe in the fact of Juliette’s death falsification, her true identity had to be kept in absolute secret (MHFF, 1985).

POURTALÉS-2

While proceeding with his archive research, Auger came across the names of Hans Conrad Cramer, a physician who practiced in Milan for some time, and his wife, Elise de Pourtalés, the daughter of count Louis-Francois de Pourtalés from Neuchâtel, Switzerland, not far from the border with Alsace. The latter was one of the favorite students of a zoologist Louis Agassiz, a Lazzaroni and a close friend of Peirce’s father. Louis-Francois arrived in the USA after his teacher, in 1848, and served as an assistant in the Coast Survey till 1873. After Agassiz’ death in 1873, he became custodian of the comparative zoology museum in Harvard.

Taking that into account, we can assume that he must have known Charles closely as well. From 1866 till 1868 he headed several research trips on board the Bibb, equipped by the Coast Survey to investigate the depths between Florida, Cuba, and the Bahamas. Later, on board the Hassler, he traveled from the bay of Massachusetts through the Strait of Magellan as far as California, the exploration of which had just begun, after Russia sold its Californian settlement of Fort Ross in 1841. Besides, Louis-Francois de Pourtalés made several important discoveries in the history of Gulf Stream (Brent, 1985).

LÉVY

Michel Lévy was a French publisher, born in Alsatian Falsburg, not far from Strasbourg and within 30 miles from Lafrimbolle. Being fond of theater, he kept a small drama theatre for his friends and started his career with the publication of plays in a theatre magazine L’Entracte and with several books on the history of theatre. Later, together with his brothers Calman and Nathan, he published large editions of authors popular at that time, including
Chateaubriand, Hugo, Balzac, George Sand, Saint-Beuve, Renan, Stendhal, Baudelaire, de Tocqueville, Merime, as well as translations from Poe, Dickens, and Thackeray. Michel Levy died in 1875. During his second trip to Europe, Peirce stayed for a while in Paris. He lodged at 11 Avenue de Matignon, and the landlady was none other than Mme. Lévy. In 1877, Peirce visited Paris again, on business for the Coast Survey and in order to meet the editor of *Revue Philosophique* which published two of his articles: “Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.” The fifth time Peirce visited Paris was during May to September of 1883. This time, like in 1877, correspondence from the Coast Survey was addressed to 7 Rue Scribe, the house located behind the building of Editions Calman Lévy office (*MHFF*, 1984c).

In winter and spring of 1875, the year Michel Lévy and the Prussian cavalry officer Kalberwisch from “Pourtalés-1” died, Peirce met Henry James in Paris. The letter Henry wrote to his mother in Cambridge in January says that Charles, who had separated with Zina not long before, “is leading here a life of insupportable loneliness” and “sees, literally, not a soul but myself and his secretary.” The “secretary” is also mentioned in Henry’s letter to his father dated November 18th, 1875. This secretary could have been either Kalberwisch’s wife Jeanne Albertine (J.A.), or, according to one of Fisch and Lenzen’s versions, Mme. Lévy, although Lenzen provides no additional information which would prove that the secretary in question was female (*MHFF*, 1984d). However, in this context we cannot ignore the letter Zina Peirce sent to captain Patterson upon her arrival in New York from Europe in December, the same year. This letter, quoted by Joseph Brent (1985) in his biography of Peirce almost without cuts, explicitly refers to a quarrel between Charles and Zina, but gives no hint as to the details of the quarrel, emphasizing Charles’ negligence of his business and family responsibilities. This gives us some grounds to assume that the reason for her departure was probably not Charles’ infidelity.

Many of the books published by Lévy in Paris were reviewed by none other than Henry James. If Juliette was really the wife (or daughter) of Michel Lévy, she must have had dozens of melodramatic novels at hand, which would have further fed her luxurious imagination. Some extracts from books published by Lévy and reviewed by James reveal similarities with Juliette’s autobiographical fantasies, though this fact cannot prove anything yet. One of numerous examples of these coincidences is the seventh letter from Prosper Merime’s “Letters to an Incognita”:

> I talked to you about the beginning of death. Many years ago, I cannot even remember when, I aroused a serious passion in a variety show actress, a passion which lasted at least for two months. She was an extraordinary personality, not a stranger to virtue in her own way, and she left memories in many of those whom she had made happy. As I see, it was not long ago that she drowned in a shipwreck near America. Before leaving, she wrote to me and asked for money, promising that she would never again bother me,
as she was not going to return. This strange death made me sad and awakened all the memories, almost forgotten, of the life I was living when I was twenty years old. Meanwhile, nothing makes me feel more bitter than these recollections. Each time, I take a deep sigh, falling asleep in the English café, and then I see this poor young girl fighting for her life in the waves (MHFF, 1984e).

Juliette, as it is evident from Charles’ aunt Charlotte Elizabeth Peirce’s correspondence, took acting classes in New York. One of Peirce’s letters to Sarah Mills mentions the name of a famous American actor and playwright Steele MacKaye who is known to express a high opinion of Juliette’s artistic talent (L, 1887). There is a letter in the Peirce Edition Project archives from MacKaye to Juliette which contains his flattering remarks on Juliette’s performance as an actress (MHFC, 1888). Besides, from Henry James’s reviews of Merime’s “Letters” Juliette might have learned some historical and biographical details which she could use in creating her own stories. It is known that Merime had been introduced at the court of Napoleon III and, like Mélanie de Bussieres, was closely acquainted with duchess de Montijo, the mother of empress Eugénie, whom he met in 1830.

**ROMANI**

As regards Juliette’s appearance, Lenzen describes it as follows:

Juliette was a slightly built person, of weight less than a hundred pounds, and of height from 5 feet 5 inches to 5 feet 7 inches. She was of dark complexion, with a facial straight profile and high cheek bones. A physical anthropologist stated that her type is not common in N.W. Europe, France and Belgium, but is common in Central and Eastern Europe. A famous scholar on gypsies characterized her type as of Eastern Europe and specifically mentioned Romania. One anthropologist likened her type to one common in Spain, but another thought she might be too tall for a Spanish comparison. Both anthropologists indicated that appearance rendered a gypsy interpretation possible (MHFF, 1861).

Besides, according to Peirce’s neighbors, quoted by Lenzen, Juliette would resort to various magic practices from time to time. Thus, she could send curses upon people by means of hiding pieces of clothes which used to belong to a martyred member of her family at their house or property. She was alleged to possess hypnotic powers and to be able to tell fortune with tarot cards. Philips, the Gassmans, and William Kenworthy mentioned Gypsies passing through Milford and encamping at the Peirces’ land. Allegedly, Juliette shared meals with the Gypsies and talked to them in their language (MHFF, 1861).
Peirce also showed keen interest in the Gypsy language. In a letter to his friend Francis Russell, dated May 14th, 1892, he mentions having written “An Excursion into Thessaly” (later known as “Thessalian Topography”), designed as a popular lecture and presenting a story of the adventures of a young traveler in Thessaly about 1862 when the country was pretty wild. It has rather a poetical atmosphere, and conveys the impression of being true, but the adventures are quite surprising.

Peirce read the story in the Century Club, a place where all New York artistic and business elite gathered. Some of the characters in the story are Gypsies and some of the dialogues are written partly in the Gypsy tongue. The theory claiming Juliette’s Gypsy origin is attractive as it is not part of the Peirces’ “mythological canon” and finds no support in their own stories. According to professor Andre de Tienne (Peirce Edition Project), Peirce’s references to the life of Gypsies might be drawn from a book by Charles Leland called The Gypsies, published in the USA in 1882, with which Peirce was well familiar. In any case, whether we find this hypothesis plausible or not, it is necessary to remember that Peirce was acquainted with Edward Palmer, an orientalist and scholar of the Gypsy language. Edward Palmer (1840-1882) was a British orientalist and polyglot, who specialized in Gypsy dialects. Among other languages, he knew Farsi, Arabic, Hindi, Urdu, as well as their dialects. In 1882, during the Egyptian insurrection against the construction of the Suez canal, he participated in the negotiations between the British government and the Arab sheikhs. Shortly thereafter, while traveling across the desert and carrying a large sum of money for the sheikhs, he was robbed and murdered by Bedouins. He met Palmer during his first trip to Europe in 1870 and besides teaching Pierce several lessons of Arabic, he could have taught him the basics of the Gypsy language, too (L, 1909).

Other Milford dwellers who knew Juliette after Charles’ death testify that

Mrs. Peirce was a fruitcake … every time something disagreeable happened she would not use that room and had another built on somewhere. She delighted in showing people through her house and the final move was always to the mantle over the fireplace where she pointed to a pretty jar about a foot high and said “And now I’d like you to meet my husband” (MHFF, n.d.).

The jar contained Charles’ ashes: Juliette insisted on cremation, which sounds suspicious, considering her own claims of being Catholic.

Among almost obvious mystifications made up by Charles and Juliette at different times are the following stories:

1) Juliette had to flee to the USA because she broke up the engagement of one European prince, having designed an intrigue with his fiancée’s mother. The story resembles what happened
between Napoleon III and princess Vasa in 1852, long before Juliette could participate in the events since she could hardly even have been born in 1852 (MHFC, 1907).

2) Juliette was a princess of the Habsburg family; she spent her childhood in the company of a boy who later became Kaiser Wilhelm II. Through misunderstanding, she became involved in the so-called Meyerling tragedy, connected with the suicide of Mary Vestera and Rudolph of Austria, the only heir of Franz Joseph I. She had to escape to Belgium, and then to the USA, where she was to stay on the condition of receiving regular payments to an account opened for her. She claimed possessing a dress that used to belong to Maria-Antoinette and a necklace, a gift of Franz-Joseph (MHFF, n.d.).

Mrs. Ketchum Depuy, who once stayed with Juliette while the latter was sick with influenza, remembers how, unconscious, she called herself “princess Juliette” and blamed “little Willie” (the Kaiser) for the “dreadful chaos” he unleashed in Europe (MHFF, n.d.).

Another Milford dweller, Edna Green, remembers:

She spoke French, was a very small woman — tiny waist, — always wore a long black dress with a high neck (in center of this high neck she always wore a Pearl Cross — pinned on — it was set in either platinum or yellow gold). … She had a dress which had Lapis lazuli buttons, down the front, she removed these and among others gave, one each to my Grandmother, Mother, two Aunts and myself, she also gave me the earrings to match. There was a long string of graduated beads to match, and either Mrs. Annie Buchanan or Mrs. Alfred Marvin was given these. … She also had a Cloisenne Link Bracelet (different colors — navy, coral, blue, green) which she had made into pins, also giving them as gifts (MHFF, 1979).

3) Juliette’s elder brother, who, according to her, was a diplomatic service officer, was friends with George Bancroft. They met in Berlin, where Bancroft served as an ambassador to Prussia (1867-71) and then to Germany (1871-74). According to Henry James, Bancroft spoke of Juliette’s features resembling those of his friend, a diplomat baron Nothomb (MHFF, n.d.).

It is interesting to notice that while Juliette’s fantasies are abundant in detail, Peirce’s stories about his wife’s past are much more ambiguous. See, as an example, his letter to an unknown recipient, believed to be addressed to French writer André Nepveu (1881-1959), who wrote under pen name Luc Durtain, dated November 13th, 1909:

I have a wonderful wife, and what I tell you about her is a secret never revealed and never to be revealed as long as she lives. Mind that. Nobody but me knows who she is and I have always protected her against questions and have, when pressed, simply refused to give any information. … Her mother and father were each of them robbed of
great fortunes by guardians after they had been left orphans. He then took a bourgeois name, thinking his own too incongruous and hated. Her father was once afterward pressed most earnestly to accept a large fortune but could not bring himself to do so, and several other times acted in a similar way, and so has my wife who, while free all along to be rich and leave me, has always stuck to me and to the most grinding poverty, — all the more felt, because her father who was as good as adopted by one of the greatest of kings, was able to bring her up in the greatest delicacy while appearing to be nobody. But by a curious sort of affinity royalties always sought them out and made intimate friends of them, and although neither she nor I have ever hinted at such a thing, it is curious that friends and acquaintances in this country have always imagined that she belonged to some Royal family and have taken no end of trouble to identify her with some person in the first part of the Almanach de Gotha. And they were so far right that she was always more at home with royalties than with anybody else. Though we in this country are apt not to think much of that class, yet doubtless their traditions and situations have really freed them from the sordid and I quite see how it is that she has never felt at home here (L, 1909).

Despite Peirce’s allegations, all further attempts to find traces of Juliette’s ancestors under all possible names in the Almanach de Gotha proved fruitless. However, one needs to remember the confirmed fact that Juliette did possess some jewelry and, at least for a length of time, an income of several thousand franks of unknown source which supported the Peirces’ living. Judging by correspondence, most jewelry was gradually sold due to endless debts caused by Charles’ specific attitude towards money, continuous renovation of the mansion, and the fact that Charles and Juliette kept renting an expensive apartment in New York for several years after moving to Milford.

An absurd thing is that despite the authenticity of Juliette’s French and German, recognized by several people, nevertheless, according to Gassman senior’s interview, she often made mistakes, like omitting the final — e in women’s names, while Gassman’s wife is reported to have helped her in writing letters in German (MHFF, 1961).

In any way, all that we have is a complex or rather a mixture of names, facts, and dates. However, it is an interesting — and highly important — fact that many of them occur several times or directly refer to each other in different stories, which allows arranging the stories in a certain web-like pattern.

Juliette did have some interest in the Rhode Island orphanage which belonged to the congregation of the Sacred Heart. The monasteries where Elizaveta Goltsyna stayed, father Dmitry’s daughter, belonged to the same congregation. Father Dmitry founded the settlement of Loretto, located in the vicinity of the two Coast Survey stations which were supervised by Charles Peirce. Charles’ brother, Herbert, served as secretary at the American embassy in St. Petersburg and, according to Charles, received the position thanks to Juliette’s connections. The families of Bacourt and Hincourt mentioned above are connected by their
Alsatian origin and by a common ancestor, mathematician Jean Fourier, who participated in Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign and served as a secretary in Cairo University, founded by Napoleon. Adolphe Fourier de Bacourt was acquainted with Grand duchess Stephanie, the aunt of Napoleon III and through her — with Prince Wilhelm, future Wilhelm I, the first German Emperor. Alsace and Lorraine, lost by the French in 1872, turn out to be Houlné’s place of birth and the location of château la Verrerie. Kalberwisch and Lévy died the same year, and the date is very close to the date Juliette and Charles supposedly met. Etc. The list of coincidences and analogies that abound in the brief account above may be substantially extended.

Indeed — and this was one of our starting points — it is hard to disagree with the fictional hero Don Quixote in that any story, real or fictional, is good only as far as it resembles the truth, even if remotely. As well as it is hard to argue with Aristotle, the real human being, in that any universe, real or fictional, longs for closedness. What is it that creates a ground for such closedness, making a story at least resemble the truth? What is it that allows us to make ourselves at home within a given arrangement of facts, be it a story or a theory, to live it through as if it had personal significance for us? Among other things, in a very basic sense, our belief in it is grounded in the fact that certain details appear to repeat themselves throughout the story, thus organizing it as a system of resemblances and forming in us a disposition to interpret certain things in a predictable way.

In hope that some of aforementioned coincidences might provide a ground, however feeble, for a hypotheses of Juliette’s identity, we have tried to arrange the dispersed data obtained by Max H. Fisch, Viktor Lenzen and Maurice Auger into a set of several distinct versions. However, although in our case these coincidences appear to be not of much help, an interesting detail came out. Curiously enough, moving within each story, we can pass, as if through an open door, to another story, where the verisimilitude and the motivation of the previous one stop working. Eventually, it becomes impossible to escape from this Borges-like encyclopedia, this “garden of forking paths” generated by both Juliette’s tales and research abductions. Each assumption we make allows more than one interpretation; witnesses’ stories contradict each other; hypotheses make fancy but indefinite connections with each other; and when several names are mentioned, it remains ambiguous whether the same person is referred to, or different people. Fiction is interwoven with real events in such a manner that none of the hypotheses can claim enough grounds. Thus, we can only say that biographers see only what they want and are prepared to see, or that they are deliberately being led by the nose.

What has been added, then, by the endeavor, if rearrangement of all the abundant facts in a manner that points to a definite conclusion has proven fruitless — as if some supremely powerful and intelligent Cartesian-like “evil spirit” persistently deceived us at every step? To all intents and purposes, apart from the detail mentioned above, one important positive fact did come to light.
From what has been presented above, it is quite evident that whoever Juliette was, she had reasons to be interested in the period of European history between the end of the Second Republic in France, the Crimea campaign, and the French-Prussian war of 1871-1872, provoked by Bismarck, which resulted in the capture of Napoleon III, the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, or Lotharingia, by the French, and the formation of the German Empire. At least that much is certain: this period spans all possible dates and circumstances of her birth as well as stories of her childhood. Certainly — and this is our abduction — it might be the case that she was just personally interested in everything related to the figure of Charles Luis Bonaparte, or Napoleon III, the last French monarch, the son of the king of Holland Ludowik Bonaparte and Hortenzia Bogarne. Charles Luis, with his temper of a Dutch and a Corsican, was seen by most European royal families as a parvenu; and despite his romantic purposefulness, he was a specimen of inconstancy, eclecticism, and illogical behavior both in politics and in private life.

PEIRCES

Having addressed the problem of Juliette’s origins, one would very likely be lead to consider her relations with the Peirce family. Although this may not necessarily help to obtain a clear idea of how different versions of Juliette’s origins connect to later events, it may certainly help to obtain some idea of it. Besides, it might reveal some ground for the aforesaid abduction, and in any case, it is hardly arguable that this would provide a much better picture of Juliette’s personality.

As regards the attitude of the family members towards Juliette, it was always quite complex. Most curious but at the same time hostile and lacking understanding was Charles’ aunt, Charlotte Elizabeth Peirce, in whose house on Kirkland Avenue in Cambridge the Peirce family lived.

In 1883-1884 Charles and Juliette visited Cambridge twice, in November 1883, and April 1884, immediately before and soon after what happened at the Johns Hopkins. They were not quite welcome there, considering the scandalous character of their marriage. On the eve of their arrival, Sara Mills wrote to Helen, Charles’ sister:

I dread the troubles which are sure to be in store for them and thro’ them for me in the family and in society. Poor Charlie is like a child about conventionalities and has no idea that anything stands in the way of her being received everywhere!! (L, 1883).

Even the first visit made somewhat different impressions on Charles’ mother and Elizabeth Peirce:
Her manners are very pleasing and sometimes when she is animated her eyes are beautiful. Her teeth and hair too are very handsome, and she has a pretty figure and hands — but her cheeks are hollow and she is deathly pale.

I will say this of her that she was always lady-like, gentle and thoughtful of others. I could not help being interested in her — yet I was not in the least fascinated. I do wish Charley would come out openly and tell her true story — yet I am afraid if he did I should not like her any better than I do — now — though I do hate mystery. It seems to me that she is a spoilt child — and I should be wretched if I had to pass any length of time with her... (L, 1883).

Well I do pity Charley, still it was his own choice to marry J. contrary to the advice or wishes of all his friends. I never could imagine what he could discover fascinating in or about her. It was not her beauty — since she had none... The fact is she bewitched him, I suppose. If she had lived in Salem during witch time she wd certainly have been tried as a witch and been sentenced accordingly (L, 1884).

In April and May, an agitated correspondence between Elizabeth and Helen Peirce Ellis, Charles’ sister, started, as during the second visit “aunt Lizzie” managed to become better acquainted with Juliette. These letters are of great importance as they provide an elaborately detailed picture:

My dearest Helen,

...Yesterday morning after I had written to you a telegram came from Charles saying he and Juliette would come here (if we had a room for them) to stay till Monday, and arrive here today! ...I felt perfect despair, and evidently your mother was far from pleased and Jem was barely willing, yet did not feel as if he could say “no” — I should at once have said “no” as I did when Charles asked me to lend him $200. That poor sick creature (is she sick?) on her “last legs” — a victim to hysterics — how utterly regardless of what is due to your mother, at her years and state of health and to me at 80 — to bring her here. To say the least it is entirely deficient in delicacy and propriety in every way. I am afraid that Madame’s plan is to fasten herself upon us. I am more disgusted with her that ever if possible. ... Charles ought to consider that this is absolutely my house. He and Juliette assume that I am fond of her just because I pitied her when she was sick here and was simply polite to her and now as I gave them an inch they take an ell. ...when she was here I pitied her when she was sick in bed and looked so pale and frail, but when she came down stairs in the evening she was like a spoiled and forward child and I thought I never could bear to be with her except for a very short time. And then I heard more of her and got disgusted and sort of afraid of her. Even the legacy myth is enough! What is the meaning of it all? I think that she believes herself irresistible and she means to catch me and make the most of me ... Certainly the way she has come round Charley would warrant any conclusion in regard to her.

She looked a great deal better that she did when she was here before, and there is no hurry about getting mourning for her and Charles as he said he meant to lie down
on her grave and die with her, but there is not the least danger of her departing “for one while” and as to Charley I doubt if he even would put on crape for her. Yesterday afternoon I was alone with her in the parlor and she began to tell me what a horrid winter she has had and all owing to Charles’ treatment of her. … it is strange that Zina and now Juliette should have the same sort of experience. She (Juliette) told me that when Charles gets into his passions it is “perfectly awful”. I asked her what he did. She said, “Oh, I cannot tell you; it would pain you too much”. … One of her complaints is that he interfered so with the housekeeping and the girls that she could not get along at all and the servants would not stay. She told me that within a few weeks Charley lent Bradford nearly a hundred dollars, that he had often lent him money but never got it back, and that it was in reality Mrs. Bradford to whom he lent the money and that both Mr. and Mrs. B. dressed a great deal and she wore jewelry &c... I suspect she is obstinate and self-willed and likes to rule, yet when she pleases she can be very winning.

When I came home, Juliette, whom I left sick in bed, was sitting with your mother and apparently quite restored. She told me afterwards, that her sickness was caused by something unkind, that Charlie had said to her. She says that all her sicknesses have been caused by that. In the afternoon I was sitting in the dining room and she came and sat beside me. We talked German and then French together. Her pronunciation of her native language is really beautiful — so clear, easy and distinct — and so fluent and expressive. She tells great stories of her father and her bringing up. She is a real mystery to me. She seems so artless and simple — it is most strange that a woman brought up as she says she was could have gone round with Charles and been so intimate with him as she has been for many years.

Juliette and Charles got their trunks packed — all ready to go. After lunch (or dinner) Juliette sat in the dining room and wanted to help me — but of course I would not let her — and she laid down on the sofa while I washed the things — and then we sat down and we talked together in French and in German. … I asked her — if she had money of her own — independently of Charles. She said she had — but that she did not let him know she had any, because he would get it and spend it right and left — she did not know how — only he was so extravagant. I had heard that she was in Boston at the time of your father’s sickness that long sad summer — you remember Charles came home from Europe — I said to Juliette “Were you in Boston that summer, when my brother was sick?” “I was sick in New York.” She said. But there was a woman Charles had brought with him from Europe and she was in Boston at that time! … She told me also that there was another woman, to whom Charles gave a great deal of money, and whom he sent for to come here — and she came. She was a handsome “Dutch” girl. How strange Juliette could have married if she knew these things to be true! She said, she did not want to marry him... and he came to her with a pistol in hands and said he would shoot her if she did not consent to marry him — and then your mother wrote to her. … [Charles] told your mother, that Juliette kept everything nice and in good order; but that she understood nothing about figures and he was obliged to interfere about housekeeping — if he did not — things wd go all wrong financially. … I cannot help
being under the influence of her winning ways when I am with her — though at the very time I distrust her (L, 1884).

After Charles and Juliette left Cambridge, Elizabeth wrote a letter to Charles asking him to reveal the date and place of his wife’s birth. This was not mere curiosity, it was an attempt to write her into history, to find her place in family hierarchies, and thus find some basis for reconciliation. Of course, there was no reply. Three years later, she wrote to Helen: She is no doubt a born actress of some sort, but whether she will ever make her everlasting fortune by it — is — the question (L, 1887).

Juliette really took acting classes in 1885–1886, and not without success. The classes are mentioned not only by Elizabeth, but by Sara Mills and by Peirce himself. The image of Juliette becomes even more ambiguous if we look at some of the letters related to her that Peirce sent to his family in Cambridge at different times. Thus, he writes in an undated letter to Herbert:

Juliette seems to have a continual large correspondence about my imaginary irregularities. Why cannot someone say plainly to her that she should not keep those letters a mystery but show them, show who they are from and what the charges and evidence are?

Then she asks who spends the money. In the main she spends it, but she does not consider that when she orders me to pay anything, it is she who is spending the money. Juliette is pursuing a wild course; doing all she can to prevent her husband from having his living and hers; and it is surprising how many people she gets to aid her in this.

She has lost me my office at the Johns Hopkins and then my office of Weights and Measures. … In a few days, I shall lose my place on the Survey. Soon after we were married she told me she had married me to ruin me. It will come to that (though the expression was not serious)…

One habit of hers, is to look over my papers without saying anything to me. She totally misunderstands documents, and then thinking herself very discrete, tells the falsest things owing to her mistakes (L, n.d.).

Keeping in mind Peirce’s impracticality and the obviously maniacal nature of the letter (even if we assume that Juliette’s secret correspondence did exist), we can conclude that his blaming Juliette for squandering was merely wishful thinking. However, the destructive nature of their union was obviously absolutely clear to Peirce, even though for some reason it did not prevent them from marrying. Why didn’t it? Straightly speaking, there’s not enough reliable information to answer this question. So we can choose either to continue looking for a black cat in a dark room, or to consider those singular, unique existential
feelings and situations when human beings just do things which no biography or philosophy is able to generalize.

In January 1887, while preparing for his course in logic through correspondence, which failed later, Peirce wrote to Jem:

She seems to have this mysterious correspondence which she hides from me, and all the statements it contains she retails pretty generally as facts within her own knowledge. It was a visit she paid to the Treasury Department, I have always thought, which brought on the trouble in the Coast Survey. She will calmly state that she knows me to be a thief, — state it confidentially as something which “must go no further”. She may intercept letters from pupils and break up correspondence, or write as if I was not to be trusted with the advance money. I cannot have any clerk at the flat, nor any woman to work for me at all.

Then there is the struggle to fill our mouths, for every morsel has to be paid cash for, till the pupils begin to come. … Uncle Sam and Juliette are enough to drive me out of my wits. I have not learned to calculate in any measure what the former will do; but from the latter I can expect with confidence 30 different lines of conduct per month, of which 25 will be in one way or another impedimentary to my success. Burn this letter, which is imprudent, because I love her devotedly. But I am rather exasperated... this morning [she] broke up a business interview with a gentlemen by bursting in about my “bitches” (L, 1887).

As regards Juliette’s skills in money management, there is plentiful evidence of her exceptional frugality and rationality, especially in her correspondence with lawyers on the issues of Milford mortgage and in the reports she sent to a lawyer hired by Jem in 1895 in order to avoid the threat of having to sell the house.

The strange changeability of Juliette’s physical and emotional state puzzled not only Elizabeth Peirce. In 1890, Charles sent Juliette abroad to take rest due to suspected tuberculosis infection. In Cairo and Alexandria, Julia met Jem, who wrote to Charles:

I have seen Juliette several times in the last week or ten days, and you will like to hear my impressions about her state of health. I cannot help thinking that her winter has been of substantial benefit to her. She speaks of the serious attacks which she still has, and seems to regard herself doomed. But whenever I saw her, she looked and appeared strong and vigorous, and has evidently enjoyed much in her Cairene life and is familiar with Cairo through frequent visits to its streets and bazaars. I passed one morning with her in the bazaars, going to see various articles which she was considering buying. It was not a very good day, but she never seemed to grow tired or to lose her clearness of judgment, and she displayed skill of a high order in selecting the best specimens and bargaining for them. I saw her off for Alexandria on Wednesday last. She went to the train perfectly fresh, not in the least disturbed apparently either by the effort of padding

&c or by the confusion at the station. Of course, she looks very fragile and pale, as she always does. Now and then, there seems to be some effort of breathing and of speaking. But this is not generally perceptible, and the belief left in my mind is that there cannot be serious disease of the lungs. In fact, she seemed to me better and stronger that I have generally seen her, and yet I am aware that only a person very familiar with her phases could form a really valuable opinion of her condition.

The opinion I was able to form of her case is certainly not worth much. But it may be worth something. I did not believe she was so ill as she herself thought. She is easily excited and depressed. When she felt well, she felt happy and interested in all about her, and could not resist exerting herself too much. Then would come the reaction and the fatigue, and she would be in bed for several days. I could not help wondering at her energy and self-reliance and capacity, and though she is certainly a most delicate and sometimes suffering woman, I am sure she has a vast fund of strength and life to draw upon (L, 1890).

The list of Juliette’s diseases may seem very serious, indeed: tuberculosis, frequent immobility, problems that required hysterectomy during 1896-1897, etc. However, if we consider these facts with regard to the date of Juliette’s death (1934) and to the descriptions in Jem’s letter, we can assume that Elizabeth Peirce could have been right in her interpretation of Juliette’s behavior, which she found so bizarre: in one of the letters quoted above she refers to Juliette as “a victim to hysterics”. Obviously emphatic emotional reactions, possibly fictional diseases, frequent mood fluctuations, autosuggestibility, inclination to making up stories, imitation of a personality that impressed her imagination, all that can be seen as symptoms of that ailment, quite wide-spread in the Victorian epoch.

Hysteria was discovered by Freud and Breuer approximately at that time, in the 1890’s, not long before the birth of psychoanalysis, that is the publication of “The Interpretation of Dreams” in 1900. A curious fact is that in the USA psychoanalysis received recognition earlier than in Europe, that is immediately after Freud visited the US in 1909, invited by Stanley Hall, the president of the Clark University at the time (Colapietro, 2006). Freud classified hysteria as a conversion neurosis: conversion symptoms stimulate this or that physical problem (e.g., temporary paralysis), and thus, symbolically reflect and externalize the inner spiritual conflict. The unresolved and unrecognized inner trauma is translated into symbolic physiological phenomena, whereas the hysterics, and in many cases even the physician, are absolutely convinced in the reality of the phenomena. The main point of such a conversion is releasing one’s inner trauma through liberation from external obligations and an attempt to draw others people’ attention to oneself.

Hysteria, as described by Freud as a socially conditioned disease, disappeared with the decline of the Victorian epoch, a time of strict social prohibitions and restrictions. In any way, it represented a truly semiotic ailment, translating the displaced internal into external signs. The internal in such a situation (and it became crucial in further psychoanalytic...
practices) does not lose its substantiality, but what becomes important is the narrated story, as the content of the conflict per se is nothing more than a diagnosis, a mere statement of which is totally devoid of meaning.

However, the coherence of a neurotic narrative is questionable, as it always implies gaps which — just like in the versions of Juliette’s origin related above — allow easy passage from one story to another, but do not allow building a single picture of all of them. Consequently, they who want to find out the truth about Juliette build something opposite to it, a biographical thriller, which, on top of all, deceives the reader as it defies the main principle of literature as stated by one of the greatest Victorian authors, Robert Louis Stevenson: the art of writing is the awareness of what one should be silent about, and the art of reading is the ability to skip what the author failed to be silent about. Failure to follow this rule results in the situation when what is left unsaid, instead of becoming a subject of interest, inevitably becomes a subject of neurotic attempts of the researcher to narrate a story, while the story does have an author already, the latter being Juliette Peirce, who did a good job and is not inclined to yield and give up her authorship. The researcher, in his turn, finds himself trapped in the net of abductions which he himself built.

And yet, in any case, if the internal represents a problem, the external narrates a story of a live human, and if a human is a picture, this picture, like Velasquez’ “Les Ménines”, constitutes a space which, as described by Foucault in the first chapter of his Les Mots et les Choses, is delusory, disappearing, and doubled in the mirror reflection, a space which embraces the artist, the spectator, and the depicted object. This semiotic space is devoid of pure reciprocity of classical semantics, for, as in “Les Ménines”, the real object of an eye is the spot which cannot be seen directly, it is the back side of the canvas painted in the picture, which portrays the one who looks.

For those who believe that the discovery of any reliable facts about Juliette’s past could provide an explanation to some of the decisions Peirce had made, there still remain quite a few questions unanswered by the present account. What role did Juliette’s origins play in her marriage to Charles Peirce? Did Juliette’s reasons for coming to the United States have anything to do with this marriage? Why did she stay with him? Etc. In the meantime, we might treat the problem differently: What if who Juliette really was is less important than what she actually told about the matter? And if so, what traits of Juliette’s character, what patterns of her behavior and relations with other people might impress Peirce so deeply that he married her in defiance of common sense and against his family’s wishes? Thus stated, this question may find at least a hypothetical answer in a set of pictures of the above-described semiotic space created by Juliette’s stories.
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**Reviewed by Maria Shteynman**  
Associate Professor, Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow, philology@mail.ru

Avtonomova’s book is so dense with allusions and cross-references that one is tempted to read this as a set of hypertext linkages, moving from Gasparov to Bakhtin, Bakhtin to Gasporov, Bakhtin to Lotman and then Lotman to Bakhtin. In the final analysis, the reader is caught up in a secondary narration that interweaves the voices of several narrators.

The four theoreticians standing as the subject of this book represent themselves as the four pillars of the Russian humanities. Their roots are to be found deep in the Soviet (and anti-soviet) sciences; contemporary post-soviet scholarship has grown from these roots. In a word, to truly understand Russian Semiotics you need to understand the full range of ideas elaborated by all four of these theoreticians. Furthermore, the “semiosphere” bounded by these four critical pillars delineates the much sought after “open structure” that is the subject of Avtonomova’s study.

The focus of the first chapter is the figure of Roman Jakobson, whose famous slogan — “*Linguista sum; linguisticici nihil a me alienum puto*” (“I am a linguist; I consider nothing linguistic foreign to me”) — alluded to the field of linguistics as key to much broader forms of semiotic inquiry. As Avtonomova makes clear, Jakobson as a key figure in the study of language and communication stands at the very beginning of the development of a broad interdisciplinary perspective in the humanities. Jakobson was also a crucial mediator between Soviet Russia and the Russian diaspora, as well as between the philological past and scientific modernity. Among the brightest scholars of the 20th century, Jakobson laid the crucial foundations for the development of many diverse directions of inquiry in the human sciences.

One of the most interesting points in this chapter concerns the connection between Jakobson’s thought and certain pan-Slavonic ideas, for Jakobson considered his country to be the center of gravity for the rest of the Slavonic world. Thus, Jakobson saw structuralism itself as serving the new ideology of the new Russia. Even more interesting was his attitude...
to Slavonic Studies (and especially Rusistica), for Jakobson saw these fields of science as too immature and very much in need of the collaborative engagements of geographers, ethnographers, historians, linguists and literary critics.

It is highly significant that as late as the 1950s Jakobson was still continuing his mission of developing both Structuralism and Slavonic Studies. If in his *The Kernel of Comparative Slavic Literatures* (1953) Jakobson devoted his attention to comparative research in literature and folklore, then in his *Slavism as a Topic of Comparative Literature* (1954) he concentrated on ideological programs and, especially, the *Slavonic Idea*. At the same time, however, Jakobson’s broad scientific interests clearly demonstrated his cosmopolitan identity (consider, for example, his collaboration with the physicist Niels Bohr).

A quite important part of Avtonomova’s book examines the friendship between Jakobson and Claude Levi-Strauss, who applied Jakobson’s structural methods to the field of anthropology. Under the influence of his friend, Levi-Strauss turns very traditional objects of ethnographic research — kinship and marriage — into questions about language structure. Later Levi-Strauss extends this method to analyses of many different aspects of traditional social and cultural life, most notably the study of totems, masks and, especially, myth. Notably, the fundamental unit of myth — *mytheme* — is clearly based on Jakobson’s structural concept of phoneme. In a word, meetings between Jakobson and Levi-Strauss established the very foundation for the subsequent development of French structuralism.

Mikhail Bakhtin’s position among the other Russian philologists is quite marked. It is difficult to summarize Bakhtin’s work because of the burden of interpretations left by generations of critics. As the source of endless quotes, his works are still enigmatic, for they are very difficult to categorize — literary criticism? Moral philosophy? Politics? History? Culturology? Thus, we cannot but agree with Avtonomova when she concludes that each generation of critics interprets Bakhtin according to the needs of their epoch. The 1990s in Russia witnessed a new wave of interest in Bakhtin’s works. In 1995 there was a celebration of the 100th anniversary of his birth. The Bakhtin Congress in Moscow revealed two opposing tendencies: some thinkers considered him a “post-communist postmodernist,” as did V.L. Makhlin, while some were ready to anoint him “the embodiment of Russian spirituality.” From this it has been quite easy to notice that post-communist Russia was beginning to invent another mythical figure in Mikhail Bakhtin. Moreover, the inner meaning of this scientific myth was not scientific at all. Bakhtin’s new role was to demarcate the new era of Russian identity, an identity freed from communist ideology.

Avtonomova marks two main tendencies in the interpretation of Bakhtin’s heritage. The Russian approach implies complete assimilation of this heritage, finding its proper place in the wider historical and philosophical context. The foreign approach implies diverse ways of applying Bakhtin’s concepts to different phenomena as a means of overcoming the contemporary crisis of culture and ideology. Avtonomova’s main goal is to explore the
possibilities for reconstructing perceptions of Bakhtin and his works in Russia and abroad, as well. From this perspective, the author explores quite specific ideas in Bakhtin’s works. These are the concepts (or, as she labels this, “arche-concepts”) of dialogue (polyphony), carnivalesque (risorial culture) and the novel (mennipean satire) as a specific polyphonic genre.

It is quite interesting to note that Avtonomova has a strong belief that the common contemporary meaning of dialogic perception holds nothing in common with the works of either Bakhtin or Dostoevsky. Dostoevsky’s dialogue is said to be a “goal in itself.” The incomplete nature of communication is the main feature of dialogue and, thus, of life itself. Dialogue can be interpreted as a special sphere of communication between Ego and the Other, but also as a humanistic idea of relationship between them. Both of these notions of dialogue can be applied to Dostoevsky and Bakhtin.

Even more interesting is Avtonomova’s interpretation of the concept of carnivalesque. She underscores the opposition between two cultures — popular (the people) and official. However, this appears to be based upon a certain type of extrapolation. In fact, Bakhtin creates another myth that laughter is a liberating act. Thus, it might be more accurate to speak, not of opposition between two cultures, but of opposition between common people and the authorities.

The genre of novel also carries a special meaning. According to Bakhtin, the novel is a genre of “becoming,” a genre in the process of “growing.” Thus, the absence of fixed canonical criteria is the constitutive feature of the novel. (Once M. Gasparov spoke of himself and Bakhtin as two prisoners of language. Avtonomova agrees with C. Emerson who does not see Bakhtin as either philologist or philosopher, but as a combination of both.)

Although many have long been interested in confirming Bakhtin’s authorship for a number of works signed by apparent pseudonyms (especially Voloshinov), Avtonomova provides not a clue. It doesn’t matter to her who actually wrote Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. Much more interesting is the mythologisation itself. Bakhtin, according to Avtonomova, should be understood only through the prism of myth and mythological perception.

Compared to Jakobson and Bakhtin, Yuri Lotman is best known in Russia. Although a Soviet citizen, Lotman’s identity was European. This duality reflects even the name of the scientific school he founded — Moscow-Tartu School of Semiotics. The structural dominant of his research has never been lost; furthermore, it has been applied to increasingly broader spheres of the humanities, from text to culture itself. Although in the beginning, text was interpreted as a manifestation of language, as Lotman’s theory developed text became the source of its own language. Gradually, the scope and functions of culture have become a type of super-individual mind. Thus, the term “semiosphere,” invented by Lotman, refers to a universal level of structure, equating structure with the “noosphere” (anthroposphere) of the Earth, if not the “Heaviside Layer” of meanings.
Among Lotman’s later works, special place belongs to *Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture*. Some consider this work to represent the beginning of a post-structural period in post-soviet Russia. Based upon articles written between 1960 and 1980, the entire work reflects the end of a global epoch (1990). The crisis of political, social and cultural identity in the post-soviet personality is the basis for Lotman’s research in this book. It is a brilliant, but provocative and disputable work.

The connections between Bakhtin and Lotman, as well as between Lotman and Jakobson constitute one of the most interesting parts of this book. Comparing his own concept of “context” with Lotman’s concept of “code,” Bakhtin came to the predictable conclusion that “code” does not have a special creative nature. “Code” is technically an information medium that stands as dead context. According to Bakhtin’s analysis, Lotman’s semiotics is robbed of creativity, as well. In his turn, Lotman names three main impulses of Bakhtin’s work that have had a great influence on modern science — the dynamic approach to the specific character of a language sign; the idea of dialogue and dialogism; and his “genius insight,” embedding artistic communication into the very center of contemporary science. The field shared by Jakobson and Lotman concerns interpretation itself. Jakobson suggests three attitudes to the process of interpretation (intralingual, interlingual and intersemiotic). Lotman develops these ideas further, concentrating his attention on the problem of primary verbalization itself and the no-less-important phenomenon of untranslatability. To Lotman, untranslatability, that which complicates and at the same time stimulates the process of communication, is the very guarantee of creativity and vitality of culture itself.

Mikhail Gasparov provides the most accurate description of post-soviet culture, where “compulsory ideology was replaced with compulsory spirituality.” In this specific field (free of any kind of restraint, but also of any kind of order), Gasparov became the knight of philology, holding to the norm even in his experiments. He studied “meters and meanings,” which was also the title of his most important work, but even more important for the reader is his attitude to philology as a mediator between different cultures. Thus, philology plays a special role in the process of cross-cultural communication, a role that may very well parallel the role of “semiosphere” in Lotman’s work.

Translation for Gasparov is the only condition of dialogue. Thus, the main cultural function of the translator is to mediate between different languages and different cultures. In his aspirations to accuracy, Gasparov even tended to deny the idea of translation (with its possibility of diverse interpretations) in favor of word-for-word translation. To underscore the point, Avtonomova cites the verse written by Mikhail Gasparov and his son Dmitri Gasparov (“Ya podstrochnik, ya prozrachnik”):

I’m a word-for-word translation
I’m a mind-to-mind translation
I’m a mediator between word and act
Between a person and a person.
I’m transparency.

... I’m a mediator —
I’ll help you to understand the other,
I’ll help you to understand yourself...

So Roman Jakobson, Mikhail Bakhtin, Yuri Lotman, Mikhail Gasparov and Natalia Avtonomova, as well as the author of this review and you, the reader of this review — we are all mediators between cultures; we all belong to the open structure of the semiosphere, the dialogue and the translation of meanings.

**Reviewed by Artemi Romanov**

Associate Professor of Russian Studies, University of Colorado at Boulder
artemi.romanov@colorado.edu

The book acquaints readers with the world of homeless people in Russia on an interpersonal level. Tova Höjdestrand begins with a story of a colorful homeless old man at the Eternal Flame on the Field of Mars in St. Petersburg who claimed he was going to sue the Russian government at the International Court of Justice at The Hague for making him *bomzh*, someone who lacks a *propiska*, a compulsory registration at a permanent address. Tova Höjdestrand argues that homeless people in Russia are deprived of the basic preconditions for a sense of human worth and experience social stigmatization and multi-level social exclusion.

The Swedish author plunged into her research in St. Petersburg in 1999, when she spent ten months observing *bomzh* and communicating with homeless people, mostly at the Moscow Railway Station, but also the City Center for the Registration of the Homeless, the NGO Noclezhka, soup kitchens, and other charities. Höjdestrand interviewed about two hundred homeless people, about 40 percent of whom were women, and the majority of whom were between thirty and sixty years of age. Most of her informants were Russian or Russified, with several people of other ethnicities from the Caucasus, Moldova, and Central Asian republics. The homeless informant Vova, a chronic alcoholic in his late forties, became the author’s guide to the Moscow Railway Station, linked her with many other homeless people at the station, rescued her from exceptionally drunk and disturbing people, and assisted Höjdestrand in her fieldwork. Höjdestrand made several follow-up visits to St. Petersburg in the first years of the next decade. The book is complemented with a series of photographs taken by homeless informants at the Moscow Railway Station and at various sleeping places, bunkers, back staircases, and boiler rooms, which helps the reader to see the Russian homeless world from the inside.

Chapter 1 explores the ways people become homeless in Russia, describing the state system of administrative exclusion, different stages of displacement, and the connections between the *propiska*, allocated housing, access to work, and legal sanctions of the movement in the late 1990s, many of which are echoes of the Soviet system. The author argues that in terms of civil rights, the situation of the Russian homeless resembles the position of undocumented international migrants more than it does the status of the homeless in Western Europe or North America.
Chapter 2 deals with how homeless people found ways to work and earn money in St. Petersburg in the transitional economy of the 1990s, which for homeless people took the form of what the author calls “refuse economics”: gathering empty bottles and aluminum cans, cleaning train wagons, unloading trucks, washing cars, prostitution, theft, and in some cases self-invented micro-entrepreneurship (p. 66).

Chapter 3 takes a look at the use and organization of urban space and connects it with the life of homeless people, who “split their time between the two types of space: to survive, they need to occupy themselves in prime space, while they use refuse space to sleep and rest” (p. 78). The author argues that in St. Petersburg, with its rapid commercialization, as in contemporary metropolises all over the world, refuse space (back staircases, unoccupied attics, boiler rooms, decommissioned bomb shelters, outdoor refuse spaces, and so on) is shrinking, which affects the chances of nighttime survival for marginalized people.

Chapter 4 focuses on familial relations of the homeless in St. Petersburg, painting a picture of nonexistent or fractured family ties. The absence of supportive relatives in post-Soviet Russia has been a particularly crucial factor for the homeless, as relatives and friends “constituted the only functioning social safety net for the poor” (p. 113). The author tries to dispel a stereotype in which a bomzh is assumed to have abandoned onerous duties by renouncing family and friends. Many of the informants were former inmates of orphanages, who obviously lacked supportive families in the first place. Domestic conflicts often result in evictions in which relatives swindle their relations out of their propiski and the right to the living space (p. 119). Intergenerational violence has become one of the more common causes of homelessness (p. 121).

Tova Höjdestrand provides convincing examples of how the transition to a market economy has made it difficult to help loved ones and pushed marginalized people to minimize family ties, as they are reluctant to become a burden to their relatives. Most homeless parents claimed in their interview with the author that they had had no choice but to hand over their children to relatives or orphanages as they had been unable to provide food, clothes, and schooling.

In Chapter 5, the focus shifts to social ties, mutual support, and communication within the circle of the homeless. The study sheds light on the communication aspect of the life of homeless people, which should be of particular interest to the readers of this journal. The homeless in St. Petersburg seem to be using communication styles, content, and strategies that are personally meaningful in attempts to reduce uncertainty (about their relationships, their partners, and themselves) in order to be self-efficacious and to maximize (albeit limited) rewards for themselves. Marginalized people find communication opportunities in railway stations, shelters, soup kitchens, and so forth. (p. 136). Maintaining communication with other homeless people is made difficult by various factors such as police checks, ticket controllers, unexpected income, and drinking opportunities; nevertheless, informants in the study persisted in trying to meet up and maintain meaningful communication, which often
involved exchanging items, finding out some sort of information, and exchanging ideas about sleeping places.

Reducing uncertainty and bridging separateness seem to be central motives for communication among Russian homeless people, who, as Höjdestrand demonstrates, make substantial efforts to gain and share information to understand one another as well as themselves. The author emphasizes that marginalized people in St. Petersburg conduct their communication in an informal and unreserved manner, usually addressing each other using the informal “you” (ty) and employing diminutive endearing word forms. The author observes that the slang terms, certain linguistic forms, visible tattoos, verbal comments, and gestures of the homeless often indicate a past behind bars. Out of Höjdestrand’s 200 homeless informants, a significant percentage had served prison terms. Marginalized people who had served longer sentences had more acute communication problems associated with the unfamiliar social environment: “I can’t even have a sensible conversation because I am so lost in time” (p. 138).

Höjdestrand emphasizes that communication among the Russian homeless goes hand in hand with mutual support, which involves sharing food, alcohol, clothes, and other usable items (p.147). The author’s observations on mutual support among the homeless fit well into the social exchange theory, which states that reciprocation of equal or sufficient value is expected. At the same time, the Russian homeless very rarely call each other friends and often complained to the author of not having anyone who would listen to and understand them or talked about friends only in their former life (p. 150). The author explores various communication strategies of the homeless linked to social characteristics such as gender, age, and level of education.

Chapter 6 describes dirt, degradation, and death in the world of the Russian homeless and essentially emphasizes the negative features attributed to the Russian homeless and the manners in which marginalized people try to deal with those characteristics. Here, readers learn about perpetual problems faced by the homeless, such as keeping one’s body clean, finding places to wash clothes, dealing with lice, and so on. In an attempt to draw a broader conclusion, Tova Höjdestrand describes a fundamental difference between the lot of the homeless in St. Petersburg, Russia, and in Western countries: in Russia, she asserts, “homeless people have been excluded from the system, but not from the society,” whereas homeless people in more affluent societies, dependent on state welfare or charity, are “often included in the state system but excluded from society” (p. 196).

In summary, the study is an admirable foray into the complex issue of homelessness in Russia, which has not received sufficient attention before. This study is remarkable for Höjdestrand’s determination to give a voice to the St. Petersburg homeless and to explore the details of their lifestyle, their points of view, and the attitudes of settled society towards homelessness. It is a study that required professionalism, courage, sympathy, and persistence.

**Reviewed by Maria Zalambani**

Associate Professor of Russian Literature, University of Bologna, Alma Mater Studiorum. Forlì Campus

maria.zalambani@unibo.it

The paperback edition of professor Charles A. Ruud’s book *Fighting Words* (first published in 1982) confirms its value up to now as a convincing and authoritative study concerning Russian censorship in the 19th century. All the same, this new edition stresses the issue of the need for new researches in this field.

After the Soviet period, during which even the word “censorship” was prohibited because of fear that it could give rise to associations with the idea of Soviet censorship, when even research about tsarist control of the written word was avoided, the current post-soviet time has inaugurated a period of fervent activity in this field, which is worthwhile in finding correspondence in English studies as well.

In post-Soviet Russia we have seen the opening of many archives, the publication of new research (a bibliography updated to 1995 is in M. Zelenov, M. Dewhirst, *A Selected Bibliography of Recent Works on Russian and Soviet Censorship*, in “Solanus”, New Series, Vol. 11, 1997, pp. 90 — 97; among the most recent works L. Vavulinskaja et al., *Tsenzura v Rossii: istorii i sovremennost’*, SPB, 2001; I. Gorbachev, V. Pechnikov, *Institut tsenzury v Rossiskom zakonodatel’stve XVI-XIX vekov*, Kazan’, 2004; *Tsenzura v tsarskoj Rossii i Sovetskom Soyuze*, Ekaterinburg, 1995) deserves to be mentioned and the appearance of a helpful site, http://www.opentextmn.ru/censorship/, reporting fundamental documents and an updated bibliography about Russian and Soviet censorship have been relevant; all these events stimulate the rise of new studies about the Russian control system of the written word in the West.

*Fighting Words* focuses on the governmental system controlling the written word before and after its publication, in a period lasting from 1804 (when the Chief Administration of Schools in the Ministry of Education was founded) to 1906 (when *censura previa* was abolished).

The author examines the institution of Russian censorship comparing it with the situation of other European countries, where *censura previa* had been abolished a long time before and he shows how it developed following a chronological order. While depicting the way that European patterns influenced the evolution of Russian censorship, the author denies the existence of continuity between tsarist and Soviet systems of the word control. We are convinced, on the contrary, that the Bolshevik government, having inherited the previous system, adapted it to the new conditions and demands of the Soviet state, enriching it with

Along with the history of censorship, the monograph tells the story of the press, describing how after the reform in 1865 that eased the burden of word control, literary journals rapidly flourished. Depicting the history of government-produced and independent periodicals, the author shows how through the 19th century literary journals were the arena for socio-political, philosophical, and literary debates, the place where state and intelligentsia fought their ideological battles, thus continuing the literature-centric tradition of Russian culture inaugurated at the time of Peter the Great. Above all, starting from the time of Nicholas I, despite the rigid governmental control of the written word, journalism developed and then flourished in the second half of the 19th century.

An important turning point came in the fifties, when Alexander opened the discussion of the peasant question on the press, in a way which had no precedents in Russian history. Thus an inadequate censorship system had to face a situation typical only of western countries and the government had to conceive new rules to cope with the situation. Showing not to have learned the lesson of western democracies which had passed from the *ancien régime* to the *nouveau régime*, Russia appealed to archaic measures, transferring in 1863 all the control word authority to the Minister of the Interior, the conservative Valuev. But soon Alexander II gave way to the reform of 1865, which granted, as unprecedented thing, an element of press freedom at the same time confiding on post-publication measures (administrative and judicial penalties). Thus the easing of censorship accompanied by the modernizing of the publishing industry reinforced the institution of literary journals and newspapers which grew up to 1906 when *censura previa* was abolished. The result was an atmosphere of freedom of the press which caused the appearance of new authors (giving rise to a new status for the writer from about 1900 to 1917) and the birth of thick journals. The results of these changes were astonishing. On the eve of the 1917 revolution, the literary field in Russia had finally gained an unprecedented autonomy which could have opened a way to a new kind of cultural policy as well had not the Bolshevik Revolution intervened.

Ruud traces the history of two fundamental social institutions which forged the physiognomy of the Russian cultural field: that of Russian press and censorship; they both had to play a fundamental role throughout Soviet society as well.

Ruud’s study is a work that scholars can still use as a valuable resource and is applicable to students studying 19th century Russian literature. But it is also a stimulating starting point from which new research devoted to tsarist censorship should depart from.

**Reviewed by Richard Abraham**  
Former Education Fellow of Keble College, Oxford; Head of History and Social Sciences at Graveney School, London (1988-2007)  
rich41_abraham@hotmail.com

Serhii Plokhy, Mykhailo Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University has produced a collection of sixteen papers, previously published or about to be published by him between 1994 and 2010, dealing with issues arising from Ukrainian historiography and Russo-Ukrainian relations. He argues that the “national paradigm” pioneered by Hrushevsky had positive consequences for Ukrainian historiography, shifting attention “from dynasties and states to people, from elites to masses” but also negative ones, “marginalizing the history of ethnic minorities, neglecting the history of social classes and groups not central to the nation-building process, and distorting the history of regions and border areas” (p. 299) and draws attention to Drahomanov’s vision, in 1891, of a Ukrainian history that would incorporate “the direct or indirect participation of Ukrainians of all classes and cultures in European history and culture” (p. 285). The success of such a history depends on whether Ukraine is successful in creating a society based on citizenship in an area dominated by ethnically defined states (p. 251).

Plokhy has grouped his papers in four sections entitled “The Roots of Entanglement,” “Between Class and Nation,” “Post Soviet Debates” and “The Search for a New History.” The first section is full of multiple ironies, leading Plokhy to quote Eric Hobsbawm’s warning that “the crops we cultivate in our fields may end up as some version of the opium of the people” (p. 64). Plokhy traces Russian historiography back to the eighteenth century when Germans argued that Russia was a dynastic empire, while Ukrainians argued for a Russia as a nation state (p. 20-21). The multi-ethnicity of the Empire was celebrated under Catherine II, which chimed in well with the multi-ethnic settlement of “New Russia,” hemming in the “Little Russians” who were now geographically, as well as politically, surrounded (pp. 31-33). Catherine’s new, and better educated, Ukrainian subjects flocked to join the imperial service. “Ukrainians emerged as the most active builders of the imperial ideology, institutions and state apparatus, but they were also among the principal victims of the new imperial project” (p. 34). No wonder Ukrainian nationalists found much to ponder in Scottish history. The original impetus for a distinct “Little Russian” history came from the desire of Cossack families for acceptance into all-Russian society on the best possible terms. Ideally, this would allow Cossacks to receive Russian ranks at least equal to their status in the Cossack hierarchy while retaining autonomous local institutions. In the optimistic view of poet Semen Divovych, a clerk in the hetman’s chancellery, “Great Russia” and “Little
Russia” were equal parts of a single state (p. 36). Such hopes were dashed when Catherine, whose Ukrainian advisers shared her devotion to Enlightenment rationalism, suppressed the Zaporizhian Sich in 1775.

In the first decade of the 19th century, an anonymous *History of the Rus* anchored the history of the Rus in medieval Kiev and biblical Palestine. It attacked another unnamed source, which Plokhyy, in an enjoyable piece of detective work, identifies as the *Short History of Russia* by the Kiev schoolmaster Maksym Berlynsky. In contesting Polish assertions relating to Ukraine, the *History of the Rus* provided a text intended to integrate “Little Russia” in “all-Russia,” but Shevchenko adapted it to provide the basis for a distinct history of Ukraine (pp. 56, 64). Plokhyy’s short paper on “The Missing Mazepa” summarises Shevchenko’s search for images of the controversial Hetman, anathematized by the Orthodox Church, which hunted down and destroyed all his portraits, but who romanticised by several generations of European writers and composers. Shevchenko believed he had found Mazepa’s image, grouped with that of Peter the Great, in an icon from Pereiaslav. This missing image was so important to Ukrainian nationalists that Hrushevky’s *Illustrated History* included no fewer than seven portraits of Mazepa (pp. 67-71). Last year’s celebration of the bicentennial of the Battle of Poltava provoked bitter conflict between Ukrainian nationalists (led by President Yushchenko) and the Poltava Russian commune over a plan to erect a statue to Mazepa.

Much of Part Two of the collection consists of an account of the career and intellectual development of Mykhailo Hrushevsky, both before and after the 1917 revolutions. During the first period, Plokhyy argues, “Hrushevsky’s main achievement, the separation of Ukrainian history from Russia as a field of study, turned the Ukrainian historical narrative from a subnational into a national one” (p. 81). The implication for Russian history is indicated by the title of one of Plokhyy’s previous works on Hrushevsky, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*. He acknowledges that Hrushevskyy’s election to a professorship at the University of Lwów was conceived by his historian mentors, Antonovych and Konytsky, as part of their plan for the creation of a Ukrainian Piedmont in Austrian East Galicia (p. 82). One of the touchstones of Ukrainian history is the Pereiaslav Council of 1654, which has been seen by some as a treaty between equals (*umova, uhoda* or agreement) and by others as an unconditional extension of tsarist compassion (and/or an act of ethnic “reunification”). Plokhyy traces the evolution of Hrushevsky’s views of this event as a populist academic defense against Polish nationalists and Russian conservatives, and how his sympathy for Khmelnitsky grew as he himself became the architect of a Ukrainian state. After 1917, Hrushevsky found himself under attack from Russian Marxists, led by M.N. Pokrovsky, who accepted the idea of a distinct Ukrainian identity, but who also sought to impose a Marxist template on its history in which Khmelnitsky represented “mercantile capital.” Fired by ideology, ambition, and eventually existential terror, the next generation of Ukrainian
Marxist scholars attached various unappetising labels to Hrushevsky, culminating in “national fascism” (pp. 45-111). The Soviet regime’s flirtation with Ukrainization was over.

So what did ordinary Ukrainians make of these varied appeals to their loyalty and identity? In his paper, “The People’s History,” Plokhy analyses the 2-volume collection of peasant memoirs and diaries from the early 20th century collected by Prof. Anatoliy Boiko from rural Zaporizhia (published as volume 5 in the series Dzherela z istorii pvidennoi Ukrainy). Much of the material testifies to “the inarticulateness of the national identities of Ukrainians and Russians in their mutual relations,” which did not prevent Petropavlovka from splitting into a Russian Petrovka and a Ukrainian Pavlivka, and from peasants calling one another khokhli and katsapy (pp. 162, 139). [Ukrainians called Great Russians “goaties” after their beards, while Russians called Ukrainians “tufties” after the tuft or braid left by Cossacks behind their clean shaven heads]. By the time of the First World War, rural Ukrainian identities were multi-layered and fluid. Conscripted rural Ukrainians were quite capable of internalizing an “all-Russian” rodi na during the First World War (and in seeing Ukrainian-speaking Galicians as Austrians), and then rallied to military units formed on a guberniia basis by the Rada in 1917 (pp. 142-144). Sometimes the Russian language dominates the sources, sometimes surzhyk [patois], but there was a positive linguistic response to “Ukrainization” in the 1920s when Ukrainian language theatre was used to compensate for the quality and quantity of Russian language literature. In Plokhy’s view the documents show that “the Ukrainian identity, if not the Ukrainian language, managed to overcome its largely peasant character and orientation in the USSR” (p. 155). Given that the documents were written in Soviet times, Plokhy suggests that they show “the illusory nature of the totalitarian control exercised by the communist utopia over the thoughts of Soviet citizens” (p. 134).

The third section of the collection is given over to “Post Soviet Debates,” in which academic historians played a relatively minor role: these include “History & Territory” (the mobilisation of the Cossack past in defence of Ukraine’s eastern borders), “The City of Glory” (the mobilisation of myths of the Crimean War by Russians in Sevastopol), “The Ghosts of Pereiaslav” (changing Ukrainian attitudes to Khmelnytsky), and “Remembering Yalta” (on the reasons why Ukrainians — unlike other East Europeans — would rather forget the Yalta Conference). As Plokhy points out, Ukrainian embarrassment over Yalta reflects the fact that Ukraine was a beneficiary as well as a victim of Yalta. Plokhy comments that “only the Ukrainian elite ended up sitting on the fence, in complete accordance with a popular historiographic paradigm of Ukraine as a country positioned on the civilizational divide between East and West, democracy and authoritarianism” (p. 238) He has earlier noted that “one of the ironies of history was that Galicians, who had no direct links to the Cossack past, were bringing the Cossack myth back to eastern Ukraine, the homeland of the Ukrainian Cossacks” (p. 174-75). The irony was repeated when in 2007 Galicia (which escaped famine in Pilsudski’s Poland) mourned the Holodomor [the arguably
genocidal famine of 1932-33] on a far greater scale than many provinces that had experienced it themselves.

Plokhy calls his final four papers “The Search for a New History.” He examines the challenges facing contemporary historians of Ukraine and the resources available to them. Plokhy denounces Mark von Hagen’s rhetorical “Does Ukraine Have a History?” (1995) as “outrageously ‘orientalist,’” as though Hrushevsky had never existed. In Plokhy’s view, Hrushevsky had “managed to fill the numerous gaps in the Ukrainian past, transforming Ukraine from a young, emerging nation without a history of its own into a historical nation” (p. 243-45). Without this sense of Ukrainian identity, it is difficult to understand the overwhelming vote for independence, particularly in the Southern and Eastern provinces in 1991. Independence has proven a mixed blessing for Ukrainian historiography. Ukrainian historians are seriously divided over how far to embrace the history of the Ukrainian SSR and over the role of Ukrainians in the Second World War. True, it has been taken more seriously by some in the West following the demise of sovietology, helped by the opening of the archives. However, the dire economic straits of historians in Ukraine and a decline in the relative status of history as an occupation in the diaspora have limited progress. Professor Plokhy fears that “it is doubtful that any new chairs of Ukrainian history will be established in the West, except those endowed by Ukrainians” (pp. 246-51). His last three papers are more optimistic. In “Imagining Early Modern Ukraine,” Plokhy praises the work of Nataliia Yakovenko on the Ruthenian nobility and her attempt to penetrate the world of ideas of Polonized princes whom she sees as “early promoters of proto-Ukrainian identity” (pp. 253-259). Her work contests stereotypes such as the demonization of the Poles and challenges assumptions about atrocities committed in the 1640s, showing that some accounts were simply borrowed from existing historical literature, while patterns of destruction of homes and churches did not always correspond to what tradition might lead us to expect (pp. 263-64). In “Crossing National Boundaries,” Plokhy makes a very powerful case for collaboration in the comparative history of Cossackdom. “The task of comparative research on the research on the history of Cossackdom should be formulated as an appeal to cross boundaries of national historiography and go beyond the parameters designated by the national paradigm” (p. 269). He does not mention Russian historians, but such a project would obviously need their support. Such collaboration is complicated by the fact that the “national paradigm” was suppressed in Ukraine before it could accomplish the tasks completed by national history in other major European countries. In his final paper “Beyond Nationality,” Plokhy lists some of those omitted by national history, such as the Russians, Jews, Poles, and Germans, who dominated Ukrainian cities in the early twentieth century and praises Paul Robert Magocsi’s History of Ukraine as “a multiethnic alternative” to Orest Subtelny’s “more traditional narrative” (p. 289). He also cites some promising studies of Ukraine’s regions. Nevertheless, the integration of the Jewish experience into Ukrainian national history is still at an early stage and there is a risk that multi-ethnic history may fall
into its own version of primordialism (pp. 292-93). He would like to see the emergence of a transnational history, in which the full range of Ukrainian experience could be integrated into a broader narrative without specifying which of the possible areas between which Ukrainian history might act as a bridge. This attractive and well-written book deserves to be read attentively by historians, political scientists, and opinion formers in Ukraine, Russia, and the West.

Reviewed by Stephen D. Shenfield
Independent Scholar, Providence, RI

This edited volume of 23 papers, part of a series issued by the Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki, is based on a seminar held in December 2006 at the University of Tampere. Most of the authors are from Finland, Germany, or the US, though several other countries are represented, including Russia and Israel. Almost all the authors are historians or culturologists with just one political scientist and one psychologist, which supports the editors’ claim that the volume is “multi- and interdisciplinary.” Cultural Studies, however, definitely sets the tone.

The papers illuminate memories of World War II from many diverse perspectives. They are divided (a little arbitrarily) into three sections, focusing respectively on “places,” “media,” and “hierarchies” of memory.

Elena Trubina opens the first section with a discussion of the “rhetorical spaces” of wartime Stalingrad (now Volgograd) as presented by tour guides. Katrin Paehler analyzes how German historiography treats the Siege of Leningrad. Yulia Gradskova describes Soviet women’s memories of daily life during the war on the basis of interviews, while Kirsi Kurkijärvi approaches the same theme through the dialogues in Natalya Baranskaya’s novel Remembrance Day (1989). Elisabeth Cheauré examines images of Russians and Jews in unpublished letters and diaries written by a German soldier in Soviet occupied territory and by two German women under Soviet occupation. Withold Bonner considers memories of Soviet captivity and anti-fascist re-education in the works of East German writer Franz Fühmann. Svetlana Roberman and co-authors Liliana Ruth Feierstein and Liliana Furman explain how Soviet Jewish war veterans have “negotiated” the memory of their combat past after emigration to Israel and to Germany respectively.

The section on media of memory starts with Robin Ostow’s account of how World War II is displayed in the German Historical Museum in (West) Berlin. Kobi Kabalek discusses the published diary of Ruth Andreas-Friedrich, a journalist who was active in a Berlin resistance group. Arja Rosenholm considers the long-secret memories of Elena Rzhevskaya, one of the small groups of Soviet intelligence officers who were sworn to silence after finding Hitler’s remains. Christine Engel’s subject is the “estranging” perspective on the war taken in Aleksei German’s film The Last Train (2004). Suzanne Ament analyzes Soviet songs of the war years. Serguei Oushakine’s focus is also on songs, but of a specific kind — songs about combat that fuse the memory of the Great Patriotic War.
with the memory of more recent wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Yet another medium, explored by Helena Goscilo, is that of Soviet World War II posters.

The theme of the third section is “hierarchies of memory” — a term used to refer to structural tensions between divergent modalities of memory (an unfortunate term, inasmuch as modalities of memory are not necessarily organized in hierarchies). Thus, Peter Carrier compares the logics underlying the transmission of war memories through political institutions, schools, and the family. Tobias Privitelli contrasts the official Soviet interpretations of successive periods of World War II: 1939 — 41 as an “imperialist” war and 1941 — 45 as a “patriotic” war. Olga Baranova compares how Soviet, Western, and post-Soviet Russian and Belarusian historiography treats the theme of collaboration with the German occupation authorities. Beate Fieseler describes how war invalids were represented (or ignored) in Soviet films.

The last four papers examine disconnects between official Soviet war histories and the unofficial wartime memories of various “non-standard” categories of combatants: Jewish soldiers (Zvi Gitelman), child soldiers (Olga Kucherenko), and women soldiers (Roger D. Markwick and — with special reference to women taken prisoner during the fall of Sevastopol — Ramona Saavedra Santis).

What of the approaches taken by the editors and authors to the theoretical understanding of this rich source material? The dominant framework, both in the introduction and in most of the papers, is that of the “social construction” of memory, as theorized by Maurice Halbwachs. Over and over again, it is demonstrated to us that the formation and transmission of memory cannot be an unmediated process and that claims to “immediacy” or “inner truth” — of experience recorded in diaries, for instance — cannot be sustained. There is always the mediation of language, if nothing else. However, the intellectually sophisticated readers who read volumes of this sort are hardly likely to defend a position of naïve realism; in this sense, the constructivists are attacking a straw man.

In doing so, moreover, they tend to go to the opposite extreme, leaving little if any room for individual autonomy and creativity within the broader social processes of memory. For even granting that no memory can ever be “the unvarnished truth,” clearly there is a difference of vital importance in terms of “truth value” between “official” narratives crafted to serve the interests of power — to legitimize the war in Chechnya, let us say — and “unofficial” memories that have at least some basis in real experience. Special value is attached here to the testimony of those whose indoctrination is still incomplete — that is, children.

“Whose collective memory can she lean on in order to (re)construct her individual memory?” — Rosenholm asks herself, referring to the silenced Rzhevskaya, but is apparently unable to answer (p. 149). So perhaps the individual can construct or reconstruct a memory without “leaning on” any collective memory? Hip hip hooray! The individual exists, after all (as a social being, of course). That is good news. The concepts of “official” and
“collective” memory, by the way, should not be conflated because there is also such a thing as collective unofficial memory, constructed through informal social interaction that escapes the effective control of power structures.

Another negative consequence of the exclusive focus on the construction of memory as a social process is complete neglect of the many pertinent insights that might have been gleaned from the vast research that has been conducted into the psychophysiology of memory. After all, memory is a physical as well as a cultural and political phenomenon. So much for the “interdisciplinary approach”!

**Reviewed by Ian Appleby**

Russian Studies, University of Manchester
ian.r.appleby@goolemail.com

Muscovy responded to the introduction of tobacco from the New World by banning it for seventy years, significantly longer than any other state. Yet Russians entered the twenty-first century as the heaviest smokers per capita on the planet. As co-editors Matthew P. Romaniello and Tricia Starks observe, this is “a striking evolution” (p. 6). This volume explores in considerable depth the unusual history of tobacco use in Russia, as compared to other countries. In so doing, as might be expected from the quotidian nature of the commodity in question, it also reveals some fascinating insights into wider Russian social and cultural attitudes. Although there are sixteen chapters from fifteen authors, which vary greatly in approach and focus, a thoughtful and active editorial process has moulded each discrete contribution to form a consistent and satisfying whole: the contributors often make reference to other chapters in the book, while later chapters, arranged in broad chronological order, add new and distinctive perspectives to points made earlier. No attempt is made to derive a theoretical framework: the editors are content to let a series of clear themes emerge as the chapters progress.

Romaniello's chapter “Muscovy's Extraordinary Ban on Tobacco” (pp. 9-25) introduces the two main factors that worked in parallel to discourage tobacco use in the seventeenth century: on the one hand economic concerns, initially the state's mercantilist desire to retain specie within its borders; on the other hand, cultural disapproval, which first manifested itself as religious opposition. He describes how Western European countries either had direct access to tobacco plantations in their colonies or could act as middlemen in the tobacco trade, as did the Swedes, who bought English leaf and sold it on in the Baltic region. The English East India Company and Chinese tobacco growers brought tobacco supplies to the south and east of Russia, with the effect that Russians were doomed to be end consumers, having no untapped market available for the onward sale of tobacco that made the Swedish model viable. Additional economic fears centred on the plight of conscripts in Siberia, who were accruing crippling debts from the purchase of tobacco, leaving them unable to equip themselves adequately for military service. As a result, severe penalties, including torture, disfigurement (according to the 1649 Law Code, repeat offenders were to have their nostrils slit or noses removed (p.15)) and even death, were sanctioned for the importation and use of tobacco. The ban remained in place for seventy years, even if, as conviction records throughout the century suggest, it was marked more by its breech than
its observance until Peter the Great began to lift it with the aim of raising revenue for his Grand Embassy.

For Romaniello, it is clear that despite widespread cultural disapproval of tobacco, economic factors were paramount in both Muscovite Tsars' antipathy towards the herb and in Peter's enthusiasm for it. Erika Monahan, however, demonstrates through a comparison of attitudes towards the illicit trade in tobacco and rhubarb in Siberia (pp. 61-82) that cultural attitudes did mediate the prevailing economic concerns. Both plants were lucrative commodities, but rhubarb was prized as a medicinal plant well into the modern era while tobacco was widely condemned as an intoxicant. The level of ire is, perhaps, surprising to the modern reader, but is in part explained by Eve Levin's chapter (pp. 44-60), which examines startling reports of the harsh intoxicating effects of the tobacco smoked in Russia, including fainting, fits, and death. She concludes that the tobacco ban encouraged either misidentification or deliberate substitution with the similar leaves of the deadly nightshade family, while early varieties of tobacco may have contained higher levels of nicotine. Monahan relates how these moral judgements influenced the punishment of smugglers in the two plants: while tobacco transgressors were often publicly beaten, illicit traders in rhubarb were seldom taken into custody despite the fact that in both cases the state was losing excise revenue. Having established this often tense relationship between economic considerations and cultural outlook as the major theme, the remainder of the volume charts the changes that build toward the high levels of smoking in Russia today: WHO figures suggest that, as of 2008, 70.1% of men and 26.2% of women in Russia smoke (p. 267).

Unsurprisingly, cultural disapproval was initially rooted in religious concerns. Nikolaos Chrissidis (pp. 26-43) examines the content of seventeenth century sermons and concludes that the official Church only became consistently opposed to tobacco use towards the turn of the century, just as Peter was considering opening the market. From the 1680s onwards, a clear argument emerges that while smoking may not be sinful per se, it is the handmaiden of lawlessness and leads the user into sin, notably drunkenness and fornication. It was also condemned as a foreign vice. Chrissidis attributes these arguments to, inter alia, renewed Church self-assertion following the schism and the increasing influence of Ruthenian clergy. A wealth of information is secluded in the notes to this chapter, which leads to some scope for confusion: plate 3.2 shows a monk smoking; only a close reading of note 41 reveals this painting was intended as a condemnation. Where the official Church was hesitant in its attitude to tobacco, the Old Believers were adamant in their opposition, developing a myth that tobacco first grew on the unhallowed grave of Jezebel's daughter (p. 2).

Roy R. Robson's chapter (pp. 120-131) elucidates the nature of this opposition, which arose not only from the herb's foreign origins and, in Russia, links to Peter — whom the Old Believers considered to be the Anti-Christ — but also from the ritual actions of tobacco use: smoke, for example, was seen as a blasphemous parody of incense, while the three fingers
commonly used to pinch snuff were the same fingers used to sign the cross following Nikon’s reforms, hence doubly sacrilegious. Old Believers equated addiction to tobacco use with conversion to idolatry, believing that the user sought solace in tobacco rather than God, and Old Believer communities frequently forbade tobacco users to attend church, to marry, or have their children baptised.

Later chapters explore the evolution of social attitudes towards smoking: the individual’s decision to consume or eschew tobacco was a signifier of their attitude towards the Westernising, modernising Russian state (p. 56). Konstantine Klioutchkine (pp. 83-101) develops this theme through an illuminating discussion of nineteenth century literary depictions of tobacco use as signals to social attitudes, whereby snuff marks a character as firmly wedded to the ancient regime, while pipes in the Romantic period signify progressive, self-actuating individuals. As the century progressed, the pipe would come to represent the modest, competent professional, while the cigarette would become the mark of the true progressive. Cigars would always remain somewhat suspect, a little too closely associated with a desire for luxury to be truly democratic.

Sally West (pp. 102-119) explores projections of class and gender in nineteenth century tobacco advertising, while Catriona Kelly (pp. 158-182) draws on oral history to tease out ambivalent attitudes during the Soviet-era: young people would be exhorted officially to abstain from smoking, while adults were frequently willing to connive in the practice, seeing it as a rite of passage into adulthood. Of course, as this chapter makes clear, individual young people responded in a variety of ways to these mixed messages. A gender divide clearly emerges, especially in rural regions, manifesting itself inter alia as women feeling self-conscious about smoking in public. This imbalance persisted through the Soviet Union, such that when markets were opened in the 1990s, trans-national tobacco companies (TTCs) deliberately targeted urban women with aggressive marketing campaigns (p. 253). As chapters dealing with the flagship Russian cigarette factory Iava (Elizaveta Gorchakova, pp. 203-224) and the Bulgarian tobacco industry (Mary Neuberger, pp. 225-243) show, the TTCs had plotted for decades to penetrate the lucrative and growing Soviet markets.

Anna Gilmore (pp. 244-266) reveals a vast catalogue of unethical practices by TTCs as they moved into the post-Soviet space, while she and Judyth L. Twigg (pp. 267-282) are both highly critical of the unhealthily close relationship between tobacco lobbyists and legislators across the region. It is a major theme of the volume that economic considerations have always outweighed health or cultural arguments: Gilmore argues that, in fact, sharp practices by the TTCs knowingly exaggerated the economic benefit to the host country, while the economic costs of an increasingly unhealthy workforce were ignored. In addition, legislative capture and increasing smoking rates give weight to the International Monetary Fund’s support for the privatization of Soviet-era tobacco industries on the basis that state ownership was incompatible with state health campaigns.
Health issues inevitably permeate the book: tobacco is currently responsible for 220,000-300,000 premature deaths in Russia each year (p. 269). This is despite the Old Believers' prescience in being among the first to recognise tobacco's addictive qualities (p. 125). Levin argues that while arguments abounded in Russia just as in the rest of Europe about whether tobacco use had positive or negative effects, the debate was hampered in Russia by the lack of a Galenic tradition. Muscovite religious culture privileged spiritual causes for disease, while physical healing was left to amateur healers rather than university-trained physicians. Starks (pp. 132-147) and Karen F.A. Fox (pp. 183-202) consider anti-tobacco campaigns in the late Imperial period and early Soviet period, neither of which could counter marketing campaigns or the Soviet need for tax revenue: as Iu. P. Bokarev observes, in the early 1930s enormous increases in tobacco taxation enabled the budget to be balanced (p. 154). Starks points out that the Soviet state was uniquely well-placed to restrict smoking, as it controlled not only all media outlets but also the means of cigarette production. In the twenty-first century, little has changed: huge tobacco marketing campaigns almost entirely overshadow chronically under-funded social marketing, while even health-care professionals under-estimated the damage caused by smoking: Twigg talks of high smoking rates and low awareness of tobacco's health-risks among physicians attending seminars at, of all the institutions, the Russian Cancer Research Centre (p. 278).

This volume admirably achieves its stated aim of describing the trajectory of tobacco use in Russia, with a judicious combination of economic commentary, statistical analysis, and social history, creating a cohesive book that will pique the interest of anyone who studies the country, let alone the commodity. It is perhaps naïve to hope for a happy ending where tobacco is concerned, but the factors explaining the increase in Russian tobacco consumption post 1991, in particular the increasing usage among women and young people, create a particularly depressing picture of Russia's future. Whatever else they may have had wrong, it seems the Old Believers had it right when it came to tobacco.